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CHRIST AND THE CHURCH

TWELVE THESES FOR AN ECUMENICAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN THEOLOGIANS OF THE PROTESTANT AND THE ROMAN CHURCHES[1]

by Professor Dr EDMUND SCHLINK

In his inquiries into the New Testament conception of the Church, Karl Ludwig Schmidt propounded the thesis: Ecclesiology is Christology—a thesis which is certainly not new, but which is by no means self-evident in the context of Protestant theology. At the outset I should like to say that I do not want my thesis to be understood in the sense of this equation, for the following reasons:

1. The terms in which the New Testament speaks of the Church are very manifold, and they are by no means merely Christological. Beside Christological designations of the Church —such as *σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, *νύμφη*, *γυνή*—there are also pneumatological designations such as 'temple of the Holy Ghost', and theological such as *ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ*, *λαὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*. Thus ecclesiology taken as a whole must be expounded and developed in a trinitarian way; and in this we should not forget that in the primitive Confessions the articles concerning the Church are directly connected with the articles on the Holy Ghost. This suggests that, within a trinitarian context, one should expound the doctrine of the Church as the *opus proprium* of the Holy Ghost.

2. Corresponding to this variety in ecclesiological conceptions is the variety of the answers which have customarily been given to the question concerning the origin of the Church. Is it founded by the outpouring of the Holy Ghost at the event of Pentecost? Is it founded by the death and resurrection of Christ, and by the sending out of the apostles as the appointed

[1] These theses were propounded and discussed at a joint conference of Protestant and Roman Catholic ecumenical study groups on the 25th March 1953 at the Evangelical Academy, Tutzing. The translation is made by Miss Mary Lusk, B.D., Edinburgh, from the German version, appearing in *Kerygma und Dogma* vol. 1, issue 3, 1955 (Verlag Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen) and still available from booksellers and from the publishers.

eye-witnesses of His resurrection? Is it founded in the election of the Covenant people of the Old Testament? Or in the creation of the first men, or in the eternal decree of creation even before the act of creation (the truth in the sub-apostolic affirmations of the pre-existence of the Church)? We cannot discuss these questions further here, but each one of them is in a real sense to be answered in the affirmative. The question of the origin of the Church demands a trinitarian answer too. In celebrating Pentecost especially as her birthday, the Church considers herself to be the *opus proprium* of the Holy Ghost.

3. But even with reference to the specifically Christological designations of the Church, the equation Ecclesiology = Christology is not a useful one, because it expresses only one of the very manifold connexions between Christ and the Church, and this one it isolates dangerously. The equating of ecclesiology and Christology is suggested by the New Testament statements of the Church as σῶμα Χριστοῦ, in which one should certainly not overlook the irreversible relation between the Head and the body: only Christ is both the Head and the Body, while the Church is only His body. Besides, there are the descriptions of the Church as the Bride of Christ, which in themselves, though pointing towards unity, express rather a distinction between Christ and the Church. Then one has to take into consideration all the places where Christ confronts the Church as Lord, and even as Judge. Ecclesiology has also to consider such warnings of the exalted Christ as that to the Church at Sardis: 'Repent! If therefore thou shalt not watch, I will come on thee as a thief. . . .' (Rev. 3.3). These expressions exclude a thoroughgoing equating of ecclesiology and Christology, in just the same way as it is impossible to equate the doctrine of the creature with the doctrine of God the Creator.

So under the heading of 'Christ and the Church' we shall deal here not with ecclesiology as a whole—not with ecclesiology in the whole of its trinitarian context, but simply with the special aspect of its Christological reference. In what follows the development of this subject is outlined in twelve theses, of which the first ten begin with the words: 'The Church is . . .'. Most of these theses will be only briefly expounded. But the statements concerning the attributes and the marks of the Church must be developed at greater length, since these are of

special significance for our theological conversation. Then in conclusion we must ask the question: What is meant here by '*is*'? and what is meant by saying the Church '*has*' attributes?

I. *The Church is the People of God called by Christ out of the world*

Jesus Christ died on the Cross for the whole world, and in His resurrection is exalted as Lord over the world. The self-assertion and self-will of the world are placed under His judgment. In Him also there is opened up a possibility of deliverance from this judgment for everyone who believes in Him. We are called out from the world by the Gospel of the death and resurrection of Jesus. This call is not merely news about Jesus, and not merely the announcement of the deliverance of those who believe in Him; but the Gospel is also the Word by which the risen Christ is Himself present and acts. It is by the Gospel that Jesus Christ accomplishes the deliverance of believers; and by the Gospel He reveals Himself in power as the exalted Lord. In baptism we have not merely received the mark of Jesus' death and resurrection: but we have become the property of Christ, we have been delivered up to His death, crucified, dead and buried with Him, so that we live with Him (Rom. 6.3ff).

So we are gathered out of the world by Christ and united in Christ. We are added to the New Testament people of God—both Jews and Gentiles—in which the worldly distinctions between races, classes and sexes are eschatologically annulled. In the people of God all those who are differentiated in the world are 'one in Christ Jesus' (Gal. 3.28).

As members of the New Testament people of God we are subject to the Kingship of Christ. We belong no longer to ourselves, but to Christ our Lord. Day by day we receive from Him anew forgiveness, life and fellowship. And we are subject to His command.

II. *The Church is the prophetic-priestly-kingly people sent out into the world by Christ*

Christ has called us out of the world, so that He may send us as His messengers into the world. He has given us a new point of origin outside the world, so that we may go forward into the world from this point of origin. Since we have been

liberated by Christ we must proclaim to the world its end, and to the captives freedom in Christ. Both movements—out of the world and into the world—belong essentially together in the conception of the Church.

The Church is sent into the world by the Lord who, as the Crucified and Risen One, rules the world and intercedes for it in His threefold office of Prophet, Priest and King. By virtue of His commission the Church receives a share in this office corresponding to His. The Church is the prophetic people by whom the mighty acts of God are shown forth before the whole world (Acts 2); she is 'the royal priesthood' (1 Peter 2.9ff). Under the Old Covenant *individual* men were called to be prophets or priests or kings, and these individuals stood over against one another and the people as a whole; but now the Church *as a whole* is called to be a people of prophets, priests and kings. All that we may say concerning the different gifts of the Spirit in the New Testament (and even the peculiar nature of a gift of prophecy) and concerning offices in the Church—all this is within the context of the reality of the prophetic, priestly and kingly office of Christ, which embraces the whole Church and gives her her commission, and which makes every member a prophetic witness and a royal priest. Jesus' threefold office is represented before the world in the ministry of the Church as she is sent out into the world.

Sent into the world, the Church is the proclamation and the instrument of the Lordship of Christ breaking-in into the world. It is only when we include in our conception of the Church this sending out of the Church into the world that we really grasp the relation between the Church and the Kingdom of Christ. The Church is the Kingdom of Christ, because her members are subject to Christ as Lord of the world, and because she calls the world to recognise this Lord. She is the effect and the instrument of the Lordship of the Kyrios.

III. *The Church is the worshipping assembly, in which Christ is present and active*

This twofold movement—out of the world and into the world—has its centre in the worshipping assembly in which the saving acts of God are proclaimed and glorified, and the Lord's Supper celebrated. Christ has called us into this assembly by

His Gospel; He has joined us to it in baptism; and from it He sends us out to our ministry in the world. The worshipping assembly is so very much the centre of the life of the Church that it has become the central designation of the Church in the concept ἐκκλησία. The designation of the Church as the Body of Christ, which is connected with the Lord's Supper, as well as the designations 'Temple' and 'House of God', all point to this centre. And the worshipping assembly is at the centre of the Reformation conception of the Church (*Confessio Augustana* VII).

The life of the Church is concentrated with peculiar intensity in the worshipping assembly. In the event of worship we have to distinguish several dimensions, of which we shall call attention to the first three now and to two others in the two following theses: (1) the active presence of the crucified and risen Lord in the Word and Sacrament; (2) our becoming the Lord's property, in hearing His Word, in receiving His body and blood, in confession, in petition, acclamation and doxology; (3) our mutual service of one another—of believers and non-believers—in witness and intercession.

It is through the presence of Christ that, in New Testament language, every local worshipping congregation is in the full sense ἐκκλησία, σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ναὸς τοῦ θεοῦ. This is so, not with regard to the total number of believers, for these are scattered throughout the world and belong to geographically separated congregations, but with regard to Christ, who is wholly present in every local congregation of believers. So the Church comprising all the believers in the world should not be conceived as the sum of local churches; rather she is a κοινωνία in the sense of a common participation in the one Christ, who is present whole and undivided in every local congregation.

IV. *The Church is the Bride waiting for Christ, and already in the worshipping assembly she participates in the coming Marriage Supper*

We are going towards the coming Lord, whose appearing in glory we await. So the Church is like the Bride who awaits the coming of her Bridegroom to the marriage.

In the worshipping assembly it is not just that we *pray* 'Maran atha'; but the Lord whom we invoke actually *comes* into our midst. In the Lord's Supper it is not only the crucified and

risen Christ who makes Himself present to us, but the Christ who is to come again. In Him we already partake now of the great Supper in the Kingdom of God—the eternal Marriage Supper of the Lamb. The Church is not only the Bride, but the Wife of Christ. It is true that in this life we are still moving towards the goal: yet it is also true that we have already reached the goal. Although we do not yet see the promised glory, we have a share in it already by faith in the Lord, who gives Himself to us in the Lord's Supper.

So the worshipping assembly is also the present fellowship of believers on earth with the perfected believers of all ages, whom Christ will one day gather in glory. The invisible unity of the Church militant with the Church triumphant is realised in the presence of the Christ who is to come.

This is the fourth dimension of the event of worship.

V. *The Church is the Body of Christ, which in the worshipping assembly will be built up into the new universe*

As we receive the body of Christ in the Lord's Supper, we who are baptised and believe in Christ are built up as the body of Christ. Christ is the Head of His Body. As Head He rules the Church, His Body; He confronts her as Lord. But it is also true to say that Christ is not just the Head, but the Head and the Body. The Church does not just live under Him as her Lord; she lives in Christ, she is a part of Christ, she is the Body of Him who is Himself both the Head and the Body. The unity of the Church and Christ is not the unity of identity; for it is Christ only, and never the Church, who is the Head of the Body. But it is the unity of the Body of Christ.

The Body of Christ is growing—growing up '*into him* in all things, which is the head, even Christ' (Eph. 4.15); and growing *from the Head*, 'from which all the body by joints and bands having nourishment ministered, and knit together, increaseth with the increase of God' (Col. 2.19). This growth takes place in knowledge of faith, in the fruits of good works, as well as in the sufferings of the martyrs, who 'fill up that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ . . . for his body's sake, which is the church' (Col. 1.24). But the increase of the body consists above all in the adding to it of more members as the fruit of the Gospel preached in the world. The Body of Christ

grows in the increase of the faithful and in the size of their company, inwardly and outwardly, upwards and in the dimensions of space and time, in her struggle with the trials of the world. So Christ who is the 'firstborn from the dead' is 'the head of the body', 'the beginning' (Col. 1.18) and the goal of the growth. But Christ Himself is also the 'perfect man' (Eph. 4.13), in whom the Body and all the members are fitted together under the Head.

As the Body of Christ, the Church has an even greater significance: she reaches forth beyond mankind—and, in fact, pervades the whole universe. She is 'the fulness of Him that filleth all in all' (Eph. 1.23). The power of Christ which fills the universe is present in the Church; the Church is the fulness of Christ, which is extended by Him into the universe; the Church is, indeed, 'the universe in its eschatological form' (E. Käsemann). It is in the Church that the creation reaches its goal—not as the world, but as the Kingdom of Christ. So in the Church there is brought about the harmony of voices of all creatures who praise God as their Lord. In the worship of the congregation we join in the praise of the angels who offer the *Sanctus* to God. No doubt the praise of the Church in this world will not be without entreaties and supplications and sighings; and yet the new creation is already realised in Christ and in the people who praise Him.

This is the fifth dimension of the event of worship.

VI. *The Church is the fellowship of the gifts of grace, in the diversity of which the one grace of Christ makes itself effectively present*

All the Scriptures of the New Testament bear witness to the fact that the Holy Ghost is given to every member of the new people of God. Paul in particular bears witness to the fact that the outpouring of the Spirit works a diversity of spiritual gifts (but cf. also e.g. 1 Peter 4.10f). To each believer a particular *charisma* is imparted: 'one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will' (1 Cor. 12.11). Paul taught the diversity of spiritual gifts as so fundamental a doctrine, that his statements should not by any means be considered to be limited to the churches in Corinth (1 Cor. 12-14) and Rome (Rom. 12.6ff), nor even to the Pauline churches or to the early Church. Rather, the diversity of spiritual gifts is essential to

the Church in all times and places. As the Body of Christ the Church is an organism of manifold gifts, in which particular spiritual gifts are divided to each believer by the Spirit as He will.

Every spiritual gift is a διακονία, given for the edifying of the Church. No one receives spiritual gifts for himself alone; and so among all *charismata* love is the 'more excellent way' (1 Cor. 12.31), the transcendent, the 'more costly way' (Luther).

In the diversity of the divine gifts the fulness of the one Christ is made present in the Church, and, through the Church, in the world. The diversity of *charismata* may appear in different forms in different churches (cf. 1 Cor. 12 and Rom. 12) and at different times. But it is always the manifestation of the one χάρις of Jesus Christ. As the Head of the body He is the bearer and the originator of all *charismata*, and all are related to Him in the ministry. So the community of spiritual gifts consists in their common participation in the one χάρις of Jesus Christ.

VII. *The Church is the congregation led by Christ Himself through the office of pastor*

From the calling of everyone to membership in the prophetic-priestly people of God and so to ministry, we have to distinguish the calling which commissions and authorises individual members to a particular ministry. From the diversity of the spontaneous *charismata* and ministries of all the faithful we have to distinguish the ministry which is exercised by virtue of a definite commission and authorisation in the Church (as was the original basic ministry of the apostles). It is true that everyone who exercises a charismatic ministry is to an extent related to such a definite 'Word' of the Church, since he is subjected to the testing and judgment of the congregation. This is the significance, for example, of the Amen by which the Pauline congregation recognised free testimony among them as a testimony of the Spirit. This is also, in a different way, the significance of the Pauline admonition that they should submit themselves unto the ministry of Stephanas, for the sake of the work which he was actually doing for the congregation (1 Cor. 16.15). But the 'Words' on which the charismatics and their ministries are *subsequently* dependent are different from the

calling which *precedes* a ministry, which sends out particular men to a particular ministry and authorises them for it in prayer.

In this case we speak of ecclesiastical office: this means that charismatic ministry which among all the diversities of the charismatic ministries of the Church rests on a special calling, commissioning and sending. Nevertheless all offices in the Church are distinguished from the historic apostolate, because it alone possesses the unique and incomparable authority of those who were directly called by the Lord to be eye-witnesses of His resurrection. This authority is the basic norm for the Church of all ages. All other offices in the Church have authority only in obedient submission to the apostolic authority. Those ecclesiastical ministries which are based on a special precedent calling are in particular the functions of founding and leading the Church. They are embraced in the concept of the pastoral office; and in addition to the different forms of the pastorate there are further offices of the diaconate in the narrower sense.

If the apostolic message is proclaimed by the pastor, the same promise which Jesus once made to His apostles holds good for the pastor too: 'He that heareth you, heareth me' (Luke 10.16). When the pastor cries: 'Be ye reconciled to God', he like the apostle is an 'ambassador for Christ', an instrument by which God Himself intreats the Church and the world (2 Cor. 5.20). The consoling, admonishing and judging voice of the pastor is not merely a human voice, but the voice of Christ using human words as its organ of speech. The same commission and the same promise which were given to the apostles are given to pastors of all ages: 'Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained' (John 20.22f; cf. Matt. 16.19 and 18.18). In everything that the pastor does in obedience to his commission, he confronts the congregation as the representative of Christ, the one Good Shepherd. As the pastor leads the congregation in worship, Christ Himself through this ministry leads the Church; thus He consoles, admonishes, strengthens and directs her.

Because Christ is actively present in the gifts and ministries of the whole membership, the leadership of the congregation

cannot in any way be a lordship of the pastor over the congregation. Not only the office of pastor but also the free charismatic testimony stands over against the congregation. For in that, too, Christ encounters the congregation. Christ acts upon the congregation through the office of pastor; and He acts upon both the congregation and the pastor through the diverse charismatic ministries. Thus the pastoral office stands in the midst of the reciprocal ministries which all members exercise toward one another. The pastor stands in the midst of the diverse operations of the one grace of Christ through diverse ministries one to another. So it is not only that the charismatic testimonies of the congregation are to be proved by the pastorate; but the opposite is also true—the congregation has the duty and the authority to prove, to criticise and to judge the ministry of the pastor, as it does every free ministry.

VIII. *The Church is 'one, holy, catholic and apostolic' (Nicaea)*

These four attributes of the Church are in a peculiar way interwoven. The first three are of the same Christological structure, while the fourth occupies a special position.

1. The *unity* of the Church. We see not only a number of spatially separated assemblies, but already in the New Testament epistles we read of various tensions, oppositions and groupings within the local congregations—for example, differences of opinion at Corinth which extended even to the celebration of the Lord's Supper; and also of tensions and differences between the apostles (Gal. 2.11ff). These tensions and even the forming of cliques did not hinder Paul from testifying to the unity of these very churches and their members, nor from speaking to those who were disunited among themselves about their unity, nor from exhorting them to unity by appeal to that unity.

The unity of the Church is not primarily the unity of her members, but the unity of Christ who acts upon them all, in all places and at all times. It is one and the same Christ who by Word and Sacrament has called them all and incorporated them into Himself; one and the same Christ who is actively present in the diversity of spiritual gifts. All members of the Church have been chosen by the one God, called by the one Christ and renewed and endowed by the one Holy Ghost.

Hence, the unity of those who believe in Christ, are baptised into Christ and receive the body of Christ in the Lord's Supper is an object of faith, transcending all their visible tensions, oppositions, cliques and local differences. Faith regards it as the reality created by God in Christ through the Holy Ghost.

Because those who believe in Christ, who are baptised into Him and who receive His body are one, they should strive for oneness; because they are one, they ought to be one. On the ground of the unity given in Christ, the apostle exhorts them to give expression to this unity in an ordered, common celebration of the Lord's Supper and in a mutual ordering of the *charismata* in love; and, beyond the local congregation, in a mutual recognition of ministries and in mutual intercession and assistance. So the exhortations of the apostle to the church at Corinth which refer to this subject are of the structure common to New Testament *paraklesis*. The imperative is given on the ground of the indicative of the saving act which has taken place and which is recognised by faith. The unity of the Church is not the task and achievement of men; rather, it is on the ground of the unity which Christ has achieved that the faithful ought to be one.

2. The *holiness* of the Church. This holiness is not to be seen by looking at all those who belong to the Church. Nor is it to be seen by looking at the picture which the New Testament epistles give us of the early churches. There we read of many and various sins; and even when the incestuous and some of the grossest sinners were excluded from the Church, there was still enough to be admonished—presumptuousness, covetousness, legalism, lack of faith, licentiousness and uncharitableness of every sort. Added to that were the hidden sins, then just as now. In fact, the Church was from the beginning a 'bed and sick-room of those who are ill and in need of healing' (Luther, *Römerbriefvorlesung*, Fi. II, 111).

The holiness of the Church is not primarily the holiness of her members, but the holiness of Christ, which is imputed to this gathering, and the holiness of the Spirit, who sanctifies these men in Christ and dwells in them. Only in this way can we understand the indifference with which the writers of the New Testament epistles address as saints those same members of the Church whose sins they so clearly expose. The holiness

of the Church is not the sum of the holiness of her members, but the holiness of Christ, who gives Himself to the Church and dwells in her midst—in the power of the Holy Ghost, who makes sinners holy. If we look at the members of the Church, they are all sinners, and the Church is a fellowship of sinners and not of saints. But if we believe in the Christ who is present and active in her through the Spirit, we know that by the gospel and by the sacraments this multitude of sinners is justified and will be daily justified anew. In this sense the Church is both a sick-house and a palace for the cured—to the natural eye a sick-house, and to the eye of faith a palace for the cured.

Because the Church is holy through God's sanctifying work, her members ought to put away sin and strive after holiness. The exhortation to holiness presupposes the saving action of sanctification. Because the members are sanctified, they ought to lay hold on holiness. Because they are holy, they ought to live as holy. Yet we should notice that this New Testament imperative is directed not only to individual members of the Church, but also to whole Churches. So we can say even of the Church as a whole: Because she is sanctified, she ought to be holy.

3. The *catholicity* of the Church. If by catholicity we understand that the Church encompasses the world geographically, we see very little of that in the New Testament writings. For what significance has even the road from Jerusalem to Rome in comparison with the whole world? Nevertheless, according to the Nicene Creed, the Church was already the catholic Church at Pentecost.

The Church is catholic because Christ, who is exalted as Lord, the Pantokrator, acts in her—He to whom is given all power in heaven and on earth. The word 'catholic' is not to be found in the New Testament writings; it is found first in Ignatius, and there in a Christological context: 'where Christ is, there is also the catholic Church' (Smyrn. 8.2). As the concept is further developed, the geographical extension of the Church on the earth becomes more prominent, and later a distinction is made between actual and virtual geographical extension. The Reformers, on the other hand, in accordance with the original line, liked to translate 'catholic' by 'Christian'.

We may connect with this an understanding of catholicity, which one comes across repeatedly in the ecclesiology of the Eastern Church, according to which the catholicity of the Church consists in the comprehensive diversity of charismatic gifts, of theologies and of believers. The catholicity of the Church is the catholicity of Jesus Christ, Lord of lords, Lord of the universe. As this Lord, He is present and active in the Church; He incorporates believers into His Body, which is the πλήρωμα of Him who fills the universe; He gives them, in the diversity of spiritual gifts, a share in the all-embracing riches of His grace; and He sends them into the world to proclaim to it the end of its self-will and to proclaim Him as Lord of the world. It is because Christ the *Pantokrator* is in her midst, because He empowers and sends her, that the Church is catholic. She is catholic on the strength of the catholicity of her Lord, which is imputed to her.

Because in Christ the Church is catholic, she ought to be catholic. She does not have to achieve her catholicity primarily through her own extension, but she has to believe in her Lord who encompasses the universe and to be obedient to Him. Because in faith she is catholic, she should give scope to the abundance of His gifts of grace in the manifoldness of the knowledge of faith, of witness, of ministries in the widest sense, through which the Lord in His riches is present in her midst. Because she is catholic, she ought to advance into all regions of the world, to proclaim to all men Him who is already their Lord, whether they know it or not, whether they confess or deny Him. Since we do not have by our own effort to make Christ the *Pantokrator*, nor even to make the Church catholic, our ministry, in spite of all troubles and trials, is in the end an easy and joyful one.

4. *Apostolicity* occupies a special position among the four attributes of the Church. Certainly it is true of each one of these attributes that it is only realised in conjunction with the other three. They are inseparably interwoven in like manner as are the attributes of God: and their enumeration is incomplete, as is that of the attributes in the doctrine of God. Yet, within this belonging to one another and this unity of the four attributes, apostolicity has a special place in so far as the Christ —one, holy and exalted over the universe—really encounters

the Church only in the apostolic witness. Without the apostolic witness He would simply be hidden, and only on the basis of this witness is He really known. So the significance of apostolicity is that it is the attribute on which the other attributes of the Church rest in a special way; because Christ neither rules the Church, nor is He present in her, without the ministry of the apostles.

If by the apostles we understand the called and enlightened eye-witnesses of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, they are the foundation of the Church, and that not only in the historical sense that once the Church was founded through their ministry and so on them. As the chosen eye-witnesses of the victory of Christ, they have beyond that a lasting, an incomparable, an unrepeatable, a normative position as authorities *vis-à-vis* the Church of all subsequent ages. One cannot approach Christ if one by-passes the apostolic witness to Christ. Consequently it is only in faith in the apostolic Gospel that the Church is one, holy and catholic in Christ. If she is the apostolic Church obedient to the apostolic message, then she is also the one holy catholic Church.

Because this is so, the Church of all ages must heed the exhortation to abide by the apostolic Gospel, and, where she has departed from it or gone beyond it, to return to the apostolic message. This is the meaning of the challenge: *ecclesia semper reformanda est.*

IX. *The Church is indestructible*

The structure of the attributes of the Church becomes even plainer here. For of the relevant New Testament passages none speaks, strictly, of any attribute of the Church, of any capacity of *her own* to abide on earth, or of her incapacity to be destroyed; they speak, rather, of *the promise of God in Christ.*

The world resists the message of the Church. The message of the end of the world and the summons to submission to Christ the Lord cause disturbance in the world. The world wants its own kind of eternity; it wants to continue to be the world. So it struggles against the Church on a double front: in open attack, oppression and persecution on one side, and, on the other, in adapting itself to the Church, in bringing the Church into subservience and in secularising her—of which

the second is the more dangerous. In one way or another this struggle takes place under ever new camouflage and on continually changing historical fronts.

The promise is given to the Church that she will abide, in the midst of all trials and struggles. 'The gates of hell shall not prevail against it' (Matt. 16.18). The woman (the Church) remains on the earth, even when her seed (the individual members) are killed (Rev. 12.6, 13ff). Even though she is almost choked by the tares that the enemy has sowed secretly, yet she will remain until the time of harvest (Matt. 13.24ff).

This promise does not mean that the Church will always remain in the same place, with the same increase in her membership, with the same order, in the same clarity of knowledge and of love, with the same diversity of spiritual gifts. But never will the earth be without those to whom is given the promise that they will 'inherit the earth' (Matt. 5.5). Never will the earth be without her for whose sake and for the completion of whose number God preserves the world in spite of sin and death. The one holy catholic apostolic Church will always remain.

Because the Church is given this promise, she is subject to the imperative to combat the powers of the world. Christ does not only promise, 'neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand' (John 10.28); He also commands, 'abide in me'. The combat in which the Church is ordered to engage is an extremely strange one, and it is waged on both sides with quite different weapons. The Church fights as she is gathered for the Word and Sacrament, as she thanks God even for her trials and intercedes for her enemies, as she confesses Christ before the world and takes upon herself suffering for the sake of her confession. She fights as she continues in her λειτουργεῖν in the widest sense, and as she continues to be that which she originally is—as she abides in Christ. She fights for the victor's crown by abiding in Him who is already Victor over the world.

In order to abide in Christ, the Church has in the course of her history fixed the canon of the New Testament and defined dogmas and orders. These decisions all have their common origin in the service of the worshipping assembly, and they have, historically, been pronounced as the Church combated threats to this assembly.

In the canon, the Church has gathered the documents of the apostolic message. It is the norm of the Church's speaking and acting—and that not because the Church made it, but because the apostolic message is the normative foundation of the Church for all time. The Church has recognised in the canon the norm of the apostolic witness to Christ.

In dogma, the Church has acknowledged Christ. Dogma is authoritative for the Church's speaking and acting, not because it was formulated by the Church, but because in it confession is made of the Christ to whom the apostles bore witness—the Christ who is the same yesterday, today and for ever, and who has ever to be confessed anew by the Church on her historically changing fronts.

In her order, the Church has appointed the manner in which the ministry of preaching and of the administration of the sacraments is to be exercised. Even order has its binding validity not because it was instituted by the Church but because of the commission of the Lord to preach the Gospel and because of His institution of the sacraments. In her particular historical situation the Church has to acknowledge by her orders the ordinance of Christ.

Notice the increasing width of the field of possibilities within which the Church has come to these three decisions. In the fixation of the canon, she was bound (notwithstanding the whole problematic of the antilegomena) to the historical documents which had been handed down, and to their text. In dogma, the Church has ever to use her own words to bear her witness, making her choice between various ideas and in controversy with continually changing heresies and *Weltanschauungen*. Ecclesiastical order in its details is to an even greater extent conditioned by the external presuppositions of the contemporary situation in which the Church is obedient to the commission of her Lord. From this result the problem of the historical variability of these ecclesiastical decisions and the differing manner of their authority and validity for the Church.

X. *The Church is visible in this world*

The Church is hidden from the eyes of the world, like the earthly Christ and the operation of the Holy Ghost. Admittedly everyone can see the worshipping congregations and hear their

witness, and discern the temporal duration and the spatial extension of Christendom. But without faith the Church cannot be discerned as the people of God. In the eyes of the world she is concealed in the abundance of religious-historical and religious-sociological analogies. She appears as only one religion among many. Neither her unity nor her holiness nor her catholicity may be discerned without faith in her Lord.

But the Church is also hidden from the eyes of believers. Certainly it is clear that those who have separated themselves from the worshipping fellowship do not belong to the people of God. But the company of the children of God is further hidden among the many who may take part in worship but who nevertheless do not lead a new life—whether it be that they deny Christ before the world, or that they persist in adultery, covetousness, ambition, etc., or self-righteously boast before God and men of their irreproachable conduct and of their confession. Often enough the number of hypocrites seems greater than that of true believers. One must not, however, stop at such judgment of others; and on no account may one anticipate the separation between the living and the dead in the Church, which is reserved to Christ as the Judge who is to come. Rather, it is precisely the believer who discerns again and again in himself the sinner, the hypocrite, the denier! Who could boast of his obedience before God? Who must not cry daily, 'Forgive me my debts'? The one holy Church is concealed not only beneath the disunity and the unholiness of others, but also beneath my own sins.

In the midst of the assemblies of this world one may only discern the Church in the same way as the sinner discerns in himself one who is justified and holy—namely, by faith in the Gospel. The Church is not the Gospel, but the congregation of sinners in which the Gospel is preached. But the Gospel is God's Word, powerful and active, by which He produces faith and justifies and sanctifies believing sinners. In spite of every contradiction brought against it by men, the Gospel will never fail to produce its effect, namely to awaken faith and to save. Where it is preached, one may reckon with certainty that God is gathering His people, however questionable may appear the gathering in which this takes place. Where baptism is administered there is an incorporation into the Body of Christ, and

where the Lord's Supper is received the Body of Christ is built up, even when unbelief is judged in this event and believers are concealed among hypocrites. So the preaching of the Gospel and the administration of baptism and the Lord's Supper are the marks by which the Church can be discerned with complete certainty in this world.

Certainly, where the Gospel is preached, there arise, as a result of faith, new obedience, prayer and witness, as well as trials and suffering. Gifts of the Spirit break forth, by which men minister to one another and in which the love of Christ is manifested in the midst of the world. In a wider sense all these effects may be designated as marks of the Church. But they remain in the twilight of all human action. Often prayer is concealed under groanings which cannot be uttered; and often beneath a witness to the world is concealed the boasting of the confessor. The Church is also made visible in a wider sense by her order, her liturgy and her diaconate. But in the midst of all such visible signs the Gospel and the sacraments remain the *notae ecclesiae par excellence*. They are related to all these others as the message of Jesus is related to His signs. Without faith in the message Jesus' miracles were not discerned as signs of the kingdom of God. Other miracle-workers also worked miracles. Only on the basis of the *notae ecclesiae* do all the rest become marks of the Church, and only thus is the Church discernible in the religious-historical and religious-sociological structure of Christendom. The Gospel, baptism and the Lord's Supper are the only marks by which the reality of the Church in the world can be *infallibly* discerned. The question concerning the one holy catholic Church is decided according to the apostolicity of her message.

Now the Gospel is an 'outward' word, which everyone can hear; and baptism and the Lord's Supper are as water, bread and wine 'outward' signs, which everyone can see and consider. The world knows them only as human words and earthly occurrences. But faith discerns in them God's Word and Action. God's own Word encounters men as an outward, audible human word; and Christ, the Crucified and Risen One Himself, is imparted to the believer in an outward, visible, earthly occurrence. So the Church is *visible* in this world to faith. Although hidden beneath the sins of her members, she is revealed in the Gospel which justifies believing sinners. If,

with Augustine, Luther and Calvin, one distinguishes between the visible and the invisible Church, that is, between the company of all who are baptised and that of the real believers, one must add this: that in the visible Church of sinners, in which the gospel is preached, the invisible Church is *visible*. In conformity with the usage of the New Testament epistles, we may now even in this Church, by the judgment of faith, love and hope, regard and address *all* those gathered as the saints of God, because the Gospel is at work here as God's active, justifying, sanctifying word. So the Church is *visible to faith*, although she is hidden precisely in her worldly visibility; and she is invisible to unbelief, even although it sees her—as Jesus was visible to faith as the Christ, although in His self-humiliation He pointed away from Himself to the coming Son of Man; and as the Christ remained invisible to unbelief, even although it saw and heard Jesus.

So the Church has her place in the creed: 'I believe in the Holy Ghost, one holy catholic and apostolic Church.' It has often been remarked that there is a difference made here: 'I believe *in* the Holy Ghost', but 'I believe *the* Church'. The Holy Ghost is the Lord, but the Church is His creation. The Church does not have her place in the creed in the same way as God, the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost. I believe in God as my 'Thou', who has created and redeemed and sanctified me, and who daily acts upon me and all men anew as Creator, Redeemer and Re-Creator. But the article on the Church is an article on men upon whom God is acting. I cannot believe in the Church, any more than I can believe in myself as a Christian. But I believe in God—Father, Son and Holy Ghost—who in His faithfulness has created and preserves the Church. Inasmuch as I believe in the triune God, I also believe the Church. God's re-creating work through the Gospel creates the Church and makes her discernible.

So the attributes of the Church and the *notae ecclesiae* are not identical. The attributes are the effects of the *notae*. For the marks of the Church—Word and Sacrament—are the means by which Christ acts upon the Church and gives Himself to her. By Word and Sacrament He gives the Church her unity, holiness, catholicity and apostolicity as well as her indestructible duration.

XI. *The threat of judgment applies to the Church*

Christ will come in glory. He will overthrow all opposition. He will redeem the poor, those who hunger after righteousness, those who are waiting for Him. Yet He comes not only as Judge of the world, but also as Judge of the Church. It was in this sense that the early Church understood the parables of the wheat and the tares and of the net with the good and the bad fish (Matt. 13.37ff and 47ff). In this sense, time and again in the New Testament, we find the call to repentance addressed to the churches—not merely to individual members, but to whole churches (cf. especially the letters to the churches in the Apocalypse). Yes, the call to repentance is addressed to the whole of Christendom.

This call to repentance extends not only to false doctrine and vice, to unbelief and disobedience of every kind. Beyond that it applies also to the special dangers which only emerge through the kind of decisions by which the Church in her conflict with the world seeks to abide in her Lord. It is not the Church that preserves the Word of God, but God through His Word preserves the Church. The Church does not preserve herself against all assaults; but God preserves her, and therefore she abides. If she has in this faith fixed the canon and determined dogma and order, that does not exclude the possibility that her preservation by Christ may be perverted into a self-preservation of the Church, and that the Church may misuse the canon, dogma and order as a means of self-preservation. Consequently, we know even in the Church the danger of the scribes, who in their appeal to Scripture miss the call of the living Christ. We know the danger of that kind of orthodoxy which by its sticking to dogma overlooks the riches of the Scriptures and misses the witness which the Church has to bear in new historical situations and in face of quite different menaces and heresies. We also know the danger of an ecclesiastical legalism which obstructs the abundance of the gifts of the Spirit and the historical leading of the Church by her living Lord. There is a self-confidence in the Church which makes her deaf to the call of the living Christ and to the brethren scattered throughout the world, and which makes her blind to the constantly changing camouflages under cover of

which the world seeks to devour the Church. The canon, dogma and ecclesiastical order have to *serve* her abiding in Christ. But Christ remains the living *Lord* of the canon, of dogma and of Church law.

XII. *The promise of glorification by Christ at His coming applies to the Church*

Out of the Judgment Christ will save, perfect and glorify the Church. His Parousia will be the end of the believing, waiting, hastening, struggling and suffering Church; of the Church which is also sinful which allies herself with the world, and seeks her own security. It will be the end of the Church as *corpus mixtum*, in which the true believers are concealed among the hypocrites. At His coming Christ will show forth the Church in her purity. Though the Church militant and the Church triumphant are now divided, then there will be an end of this distinction. There will be an end of the veiling of Christ in the human word of the message and under the water, bread and wine of the sacraments. Then we shall see Him, and there will be revealed the reality of the dying and rising again with Christ and the communion of the Body of Christ. At His coming Christ will encounter the Church not only as her Perfecter but also as her Judge. But He encounters her above all as her Perfecter—as the Bridegroom who goes to meet His bride so that He may celebrate with her the eternal Marriage Supper.

The first theses began with the words, 'The Church is. . . .' Now, in conclusion, we ask the meaning of this word 'is'.

The Church is, because Jesus Christ, the Crucified and Risen One, acts upon her ever anew. Looking back over the theses we may now say: The Church is, because Christ calls His people out from the world (I), Christ sends them into the world (II), Christ makes Himself present in the worshipping assembly (III), Christ prepares the Marriage Supper (IV), Christ builds up His body (V), Christ unfolds His grace in the abundance of the gifts of the Spirit (VI), Christ leads the Church through the office of pastor (VII). The expositions of the other theses too were determined by the work of Christ. But Christ does not merely work here and there, much less in

a spasmodic, arbitrary fashion; He works continually, in the faithfulness of God. That which He has begun He will also complete. The Church is, because Christ constantly is acting upon her. She was not before this action; and she is not for an instant without this action. Christ's action upon the Church is also the life of Christ within the Church. For in baptism He takes the sinner into His death and resurrection, and in the Lord's Supper He gives Himself bodily as food to sinners. He is present in His Church as the Living One. It is in Christ's living presence that the Church has her being.

Christ acts upon the Church through the Gospel (through preaching as *sacramentum audibile* and through the sacraments as *verbum visibile*). The Word of the Gospel encounters the Church as a double form of address: as a consolation and a claim, as a gift and a demand, as Christ's act of grace upon the Church and as Christ's command to the Church to live in accordance with the grace received.

In the consolation of the Gospel Christ gives to believers His righteousness, His holiness, His life. In the Gospel He shows Himself as the Lord who gives to believers all that is His. In faith in the Gospel the Church is one, holy, catholic, indestructible.

In the claim of the Gospel exhortation Christ commands us to live by His power. Because we have been justified, we ought to strive after righteousness. Because we have been sanctified, we ought to pursue holiness. Because we have been transplanted into His life, we ought to live. Because Christ lives in the Church we are thus exhorted: Be ye one, be ye holy, be ye catholic, abide in Him—be that which in Christ ye are.

From this follows the answer to the further question: In what sense does the Church 'have' the attributes of unity, holiness, etc.? These attributes come to the Church in Christ's operative consolation and claim; or, more precisely, in an ever new consolation and an ever new claim—in His giving and in His commanding, which are new every day. The Church 'has' these attributes in a daily new acceptance and a daily new striving. In other words: She has her attributes only in the double movement—that of being called by Christ out of the world and that of being sent by Christ into the world.

The Church is one in being gathered by the one Christ, and

in striving for unity on the strength of being united with Him. The Church is holy in the acceptance of the holiness of Christ, and in sanctifying herself on the strength of having been sanctified. The Church is catholic as the possession of Christ, the *Pantokrator*, and as His instrument for proclaiming His lordship to the world. The Church is one, as she repents of disunity and believes in the one Christ. She is holy, as she repents of her sins and believes in the holy Christ. As the Church discerns her errors by submitting herself to the judgment of the apostolic message, she is apostolic. As she surrenders herself to die with Christ, she lives and abides. But should a Church desire to hold fast as her own possession both her being and her attributes, cut loose from Christ's daily renewed consolation and claim, then such an understanding of unity would lead to schism, such an understanding of holiness would lead to a denial of repentance, such an understanding of catholicity would lead to a claim to world domination, and such an understanding of apostolicity would lead to a breaking away from the historic apostolate and so to self-assertion over against Jesus Christ. The attributes of the Church should be acknowledged with fear and trembling as the ever new gracious acts of God's faithfulness in Christ. In this faithfulness the Church has her being.

Statements concerning the being and the attributes of the Church, therefore, share the same form as statements concerning the being of the believer in Christ and concerning the attributes of the believer: his righteousness, his holiness, etc. Certainly this analogy is limited in an important respect: my being in Christ, my being as justified and sanctified stands or falls with my ever new acceptance in faith of the righteousness and holiness of Christ, which He bestows on us in Word and Sacrament. But the Church does not stand or fall with my faith. She was, before the individual came to believe; and she will remain, even when the individual ceases to believe. So statements concerning the Church can never be resolved into existential statements. But on the other hand, it should never be forgotten that the Church is the fellowship of believers, and that only in faith can we make true statements about the Church. To that extent, statements about the Church can never be severed from the existence of believers; and we should beware of hypostatising the Church.

TRADITION AND EXPECTATION IN ANCIENT ISRAEL[1]

by Rev. Professor JAMES BARR

Perhaps the most important advance in Old Testament studies in recent years has been the rediscovery of and the new emphasis on tradition. Older studies commonly implied that the biblical material, the sources, were essentially to be seen as literary products, that is as books or documents written at a certain date and edited and annotated through subsequent written additions. This did not explicitly deny that before they were written down the stories or laws had existed in a pre-literary form; but such was the emphasis on study of the *written* material and the discernment of *written* sources that the pre-literary stage was considerably neglected. Biblical criticism was predominantly *literary* criticism. More modern studies have not for the most part abandoned such literary criticism, nor is it ever likely to be fully abandoned; but more and more emphasis has been laid, in Old Testament and in New Testament work alike, on the living tradition which preceded or accompanied the literary transmission.

The present discussion in some of its aspects concerns itself in affirming or denying the use of writing as a means of transmission except in the last stages. Into this question we need not here enter, and may content ourselves rather with a refusal to be dogmatic; in all probability the place which writing has occupied in the transmission of the material has to be determined for each case on its own merits. The important point is that the traditions, in the circles in which they were cherished and preserved, were alive and active; on the one hand they influenced and directed the thought and life of these circles, and on the other hand the thought and life of these circles influenced and moulded the traditions as circumstances and insights changed. Such a living tradition seems to be characteristic of the biblical faith; for we can discern something of the same kind in the transmission of the story of Jesus as it is

[1] Inaugural lecture in the University of Edinburgh, Oct. 1955.

moulded in the different groups and interests which lie behind the various sources of the Gospels.

As well as thinking therefore of the written sources of the Old Testament, and of the literary editors who stitched them together, we have to think of different spheres or circles in which traditions were preserved and developed. We find for example strong complexes of sanctuary traditions, attached to places—holy places like Bethel, Gilgal, Hebron or, above all, Jerusalem—describing special moments of divine revelation at these places and the founding of worship there. Another type, not always clearly distinct from the former, is prophetic tradition, commemorating the deeds and words of the prophets, and preserved in the prophetic schools. We have legal tradition, attached to the sacred covenant of the tribes with their God, and gradually developing to include under the sovereignty of Israel's God elements which were specifically Israelite and others which in form if not in precise content had much in common with the law of the civilised Near East. Another complex of thought was the wisdom tradition, international in its scope and interested in ethics, manners, and the mystery of the world of nature; a tradition which lived and worked in the two related spheres of education and the civil service, and which, because the civil service began really with Solomon, drew the name of the great despot into its literature. These, and many other circles of tradition, are not to be isolated or held distinct, for they interpenetrate and influence each other at many levels. The most important and fruitful of all, perhaps, are firstly the passover tradition, which gathered into itself eventually the whole event of the Exodus, the fundamental deliverance of Israel, and secondly the royal tradition of Jerusalem, enshrined on the one hand in noble historical records, and interpreted on the other in the Psalter of the royal sanctuary at Jerusalem; for it was from this royal tradition that there appeared Israel's greatest gift and insight, the expectation of a Christ.

All this makes a difference also to the dating and the historical evaluation of the material as we now have it. It means that a story appearing in a late written source is not necessarily itself of late origin in substance. Something of this kind has always been discerned, but must now be emphasised more strongly. The fact, if it be a fact, that the Priestly source of the

Pentateuch was not written until the return of the exiles from Babylon does not mean that the ritual or the significance of the Day of Atonement was a total invention of that comparatively late period. So far the approach through tradition may help us to take more seriously certain parts of the Old Testament which have been rather discredited. But it would be wrong to imagine that this will invariably, or even usually, work in a conservative direction, that is to say towards a higher valuation of the historicity of every narrative. The story of the Exodus is a case in point. Though the Exodus came to dominate the whole memory of the time before Israel's possession of its land, memories of the event itself with convincing circumstantial detail are slight. Yet Israel as a people, as an amphictyony of tribes, seems from the beginning to have defined itself as the people whose God was Yahweh and who had been delivered from Egypt by this God. The factual historical scope of this deliverance is now very largely beyond our reach; and yet there is absolutely no improbability in some such event having taken place for at least some part of the tribal group which later formed Israel. Thus we have a national consciousness expressing itself as a memory of a historical event, while historical perception of the event, apart from the Israelite tradition of it, remains exceedingly uncertain; a situation, we may be reminded, not unlike that at one or two key points of the Gospel story such as the birth of Jesus or the forty days after the Resurrection.

The Israelite consciousness, indeed, requires deeper thought and investigation when we discern the place of tradition in moulding the biblical materials. The personality of the great leaders, the men like Amos or Isaiah or Ezra, is not in itself enough to explain the peculiar direction in which Israelite religious history moved; and still less can we be satisfied with the analysis of persons hypothetically postulated, like J or E, the Yahwistic or Elohistic writers, or their shadowy editors. Behind these men, and, if you wish to say it, at a lower level, lies the consciousness of generations, the generations of people who repeated and reinterpreted the sagas of Abraham or Jacob, the anonymous thousands who were bound by the covenant, acknowledged Yahweh as their God, and submitted to his sacral law. When Israel's life was corrupted and its thinking

degenerated, it was to the remnants of this basic consciousness that the prophets appealed, and from it, at least in part, that they drew their inspiration. They renewed the tradition, making it alive once more in their own time, and drawing forth the consequences of its own logic more inexorably than had been observed before. Into the fulness of this consciousness Jesus of Nazareth entered; Israel's mind and Israel's history were his cradle.

The question might indeed be asked: was it Israel's history that shaped its consciousness, or was it the peculiarly moulded mind of Israel that caused the history to be remembered, or constructed, or embellished, in this particular way? Our answer will have to be that both are true. The historical movement of Israel's entry into Canaan, the rise of the kingdom, its division and decline, its growing contact with the great imperialisms of Assyria and Babylon, and the final destruction of Jerusalem and its temple—all these powerfully shaped the theological thought of the people, its understanding of itself and its God; and on the other side Israel's mind, its basic perceptions concerning God and man, was ever active in selecting, arranging, interpreting and revivifying the historical memories, so that they took the form in which we now have them. For tradition, when it is living tradition at any rate and not pure antiquarianism, is always selective and interpretative. There are many things, St. John tells us, which Jesus said or did and which have not been written—the tradition then, also, was selective, and what was remembered was remembered because it was used and kept alive. If we can say that divine providence guided the history and destinies of Israel, we must also say that the thought-forms and categories of Israel were shaped by the same hand. This is why the Bible, as the written crystallisation of tradition, of historical memory and existence seen through the prism of a living and committed consciousness, may be spoken of as the Word of God, while a modern scientific history of Israel, though considerably more accurate and doubtless more fair, is not, and would not claim to be, the Word of God.

It has become a commonplace in modern theology to dwell on the difference between the Hebrew and the Greek ways of thinking, a difference especially important for us today, whose education and inner mental life is built, in part at least, upon

a Greek rather than a Hebrew foundation, so that we might easily incline to a misunderstanding of the biblical message in terms of our own thought. None the less we should notice that the mental, cultural and religious struggle of Israel was not against Greece, except in the latest part of the Old Testament period, but against neighbours who shared with Israel a Semitic form of language and thought. The contrast between Israel and Greece, at least between Israel and the developed classical and philosophical period of Greece, is relatively obvious and evident; that between Israel's thought and thought-forms that are common Semitic property is more subtle and elusive. None the less it existed, and the fiery insistence of Israel upon one God and no images, as against the common acceptance of many gods and many images, was only the central point of impact behind which lay a heavy weight of less dramatic divergences. The religious texts of Ugarit in northern Syria reveal to us a world of thought about God, man and nature widely different from the thought of Israel, the thought at any rate of those circles in Israel which have moulded for us the traditions of its historic faith. For the peculiarity of Israel in this respect certain reasons in political history and sociology might be adduced.

But such reasons alone would not explain Israel's peculiarity in thought. It is necessary to say something at this point about the phenomenology of religion, about our approach to the task of classifying and describing the manifestations which we study. A thorough literary criticism can never work with purely mechanical literary criteria, but must carry with it some kind of provisional judgment of the nature of the religious content. The best example of this is in the study of the prophets, where the quest for the original and 'genuine' words of the prophets themselves was followed not by literary methods alone but with the help of a concept of the kind of religious thought attributable to them, as distinct from the kind of thought which would belong naturally to secondary accretions. It was both the strength and the weakness of Julius Wellhausen's fundamental work that it rested on the double basis of literary analysis and appraisal of religious development—its strength because of the thoroughness of the investigation on these lines, and its weakness because unfortunate judgments in the religious assessment could distort the literary picture also. The Uppsala

scholar Engnell in his *Gamla Testamentet* shows an awareness of this point by including a discussion of religious structures as part of his introduction to the Old Testament, following canon, text and literary forms, but preceding Pentateuchal analysis.

In brief, the older study of religion worked with three categories. The first was that of *origin*. Robertson Smith, for example, dealt with Israelite sacrificial worship by tracing it back to its origins, which would lie a long time before the entry to Canaan. The second was *influence*. 'Influence' from Persia has been called upon to explain the rise in later Jewish times of apocalyptic and angelology. The third was *evolution*. Many books depicted Israel's religious history as an evolution through certain stages of animism, polydaemonism, and henotheism to monotheism, with the climax in the 'ethical monotheism' of Deutro-Isaiah.

All this is important and its value in some aspects will remain. Nonetheless it has obscured another insight which is perhaps even more important, namely that a religion has to be seen as a whole, as what it was. Origins in themselves, for example, explain little. A religion is never a sum of its origins plus the influences which have worked upon it. It has an entirety of its own at any given time, and this entirety has its centre and its periphery. What has come from origins and external influences has its relevance not from its relation to the past and the outside but from the place which it now takes in the present entirety, from the use which is made of it by the controlling centre of the religious complex. To quote the Danish anthropologist Grönbech, 'One has to come to know every culture and religion as an entirety which has absolute value in itself. It carries the people who live in it as an entirety, and it must be taken as an entirety in order to be understood and interpreted. The details receive their content from the centre round which they rotate.'

There is of course a development in this entirety. For Israel the entirety in Ezra's time is not identical with that in David's time, and this is seen by evolutionistic theories. But though the entirety is slowly yet continuously changing, at any given point it has its own completeness, its own power to assimilate, reinterpret or reject what is old or foreign, and its own coincidence with the popular consciousness which is moulding the tradition. What is old or foreign is no longer what it was

before, but is what it is now, in its living relation to the centre. The centre itself in Israel, throughout the history accessible to us, is clearly Yahweh, the God of Israel, who delivered them from the land of Egypt and made them a people by covenant.

All these remarks, arising from the importance of tradition, place us in a position to approach a particular element in the Israelite consciousness, the element of expectation. Jesus understood Himself to be the fulfilment of Israelite expectation, and the Church from the earliest days saw the Old Testament as a prophetic and expectant work speaking of a time yet to come. Not only in Christian circles but in Judaism generally in the first century men were looking for 'him who should come'. Yet modern study has indicated that the spirit of much in the Old Testament was inclined not to visionary solutions in the distant future but rather to the practical here and now with its consequences in the nearer future. It has even been said that prediction of the future was not a part of the prophetic office; the prophet was, therefore, not a foreteller but a forth-teller. This is certainly going too far, for the prophet certainly had a function of prediction. Nonetheless most predictions of which we read do have reference to a future recognisably close. We may accept the assertion of the First Letter of Peter that the prophetic ministry is 'unto us' of the Christian aeon; but may feel it exaggerates when it says it was not 'unto themselves'. In any case the actual space in the Old Testament devoted to literal predictions must on any showing remain very limited; and to understand the Israelite expectation we must widen the field of our discussion from the actual predictive texts to the whole sweep of the tradition and its roots in the Israelite mind. Although the New Testament writers use particular proof texts and can make much of a verbal similarity, we should not rashly conclude that their interest was in mere literal and verbal fulfilments of prophecy and that the wider context escaped them. Several cases point to their perception of this wider context. For example, Matthew relates the story of the flight of the child Jesus into Egypt and quotes Hosea's word: 'Out of Egypt I called my son.' Hosea's reference was of course to the Exodus, where God lovingly delivered His child Israel. It is hardly credible that this escaped Matthew and that the literal correspondence alone interested him; his point is the identification

of Jesus with Israel itself in its hour of crisis. It may indeed be asked whether the story of the flight into Egypt received attention and development in the tradition because of this identification, or whether the latter followed as interpretation of an existing memory; or whether indeed something of both may be true. It is not the prophet Hosea who is predicting the future; rather it is the shape of the Exodus tradition which is being reproduced by Matthew; but through Hosea's mention of 'my son' this reference, rather than any of the other innumerable mentions of the Exodus, is specially adapted for use at this point.

The focal point of the Israelite expectation in its developed form is the expectation of a Christ, a Messiah or anointed one. Now the basis for this, among all the various circles of tradition, is in the royal tradition of Jerusalem. From the beginning the King was the Christ, the anointed. His office is a sacral one as well as a political one. David is represented on several occasions as insisting on the Messiahship of his pursuer Saul. There was a present Messiah before there was an expected one. The sacral attributes of the existing kingship are as a matter of fact a widespread religious phenomenon not only in the Semitic peoples but in others. But we must beware of concluding that Israelite sacral kingship was therefore identical with that of other nations. This is the error we fall into when we select elements from the different religions to compare with one another, rather than seeing each religion as an entirety with its own centre. In fact it has been abundantly proved by Frankfort and others that kingship in Egypt differed widely from kingship in Mesopotamia; and sacral kingship in Israel has to be seen for what it is within its own religious complex. Only the influence of the entire Israelite religious complex can explain why the kingship in Israel developed, as in other lands it did not, so strong a messianic *expectation*, so emphatic a *future* eschatology. It may be said, as Mowinckel for example has argued, that it was the decline of the monarchy and its discrediting in Israelite eyes that projected into the future the sacral representation it had formerly afforded in the present. A case might be made that a certain future expectation attached to the Israelite monarchy from the beginning; but whether this be so or not, we still have to explain why distress,

decline and failure brought about in Israel a future expectation, while in Mesopotamia or Egypt periods of failure or distress produced no such change in the meaning of the kingship. The explanation for this must lie in certain basic positions of the Israelite religious tradition as a whole.

The first of these will undoubtedly be the concentration of the Israelite genius upon history. We have already seen that the traditions of the Exodus may not be *precise* history. What is important for us, however, is that the central expression of the religious mind took place not in some other form, such as a celestial mythology, but in what was understood to be history. This carries with it implications for the understanding of time, for it was in past time that the deliverance had been accomplished, it was in present time that it had to be re-presented, and—the next step is a short one—in future time (not out of time, or above time) some new deliverance may occur. It is important that the Exodus memory is not dominated by the seasonal cycle. The seasonal cycle, so important for the agricultural life, was dominant in many non-Israelite religious forms; the primeval event of many mythologies is not really an event in the past but a recurrent event. In Israel too the seasonal cycle had its place; but its association with and at some points subordination to the Exodus memory subordinates the recurrent to the once-for-all. The royal liturgy of the Temple, as we see from the Psalter, had a strong interest in the fertility and blessing of the land; but its God was Yahweh the God of the Exodus; and so instead of becoming a fertility cult like the worship of the Baals it extended itself into the expectation of a coming deliverer.

Secondly we have to appreciate the profound meditation of the traditions upon the divine *promise*. The entry of the Israelites into Palestine was an event which made a deep impression upon them; it is also the first point at which (in contrast with the Exodus) we are able to test and control the tradition positively. From the first the conquest of the land left the strong consciousness that it had not always been theirs and that its possession was the gracious fulfilment of a promise. Round the conception of the promise were gathered the sagas of the patriarchs, those who were in the land but did not yet possess it. The seriousness which had been attached to time

and history by the shadowy yet all-important Exodus event was now reinforced by a new event on the stage of known political history and by the interpretation of it all by the national consciousness in traditions of promise and fulfilment.

Ultimately this all stands for the freedom of Israel's God and His ability infinitely to transcend the achievements or the status of His own people. Neither bound to natural cycles nor dependent on the prestige of the nation, He was free from the clutches and vicissitudes of time and history, yet active in time and history, the free and living God. The Elohistic interpretation of the divine name, 'I am that I am', expresses well the tradition's understanding of itself. It was this radical freedom of God which opened the way for a real eschatology. Prophets like Amos and Jeremiah, reviving and deepening this insight, made it plain that God could indeed dispense with His people and His holy city, that He could judge them and bring the end upon Israel. Such threats of doom see from the reverse side that divine freedom which fostered the messianic hope.

The concept of promise was extended, however, not only backwards into the patriarchal age but forwards also. The dynasty founded by David was a political fact, but carried with it also a divine promise of continuance. The survival of the Davidic line on the Judaean throne right down to the end of the kingdom is a sufficiently remarkable fact, in view of the impermanence of dynasties in the northern kingdom; and as expectation becomes more concentrated on a future figure, it is as the Son of David that he is known. It is from the stock of Jesse that the messianic branch will spring forth.

During the later kingdom the Israelite sense of promise or expectation suffers a degree of disintegration and transformation, partly because of a thinning out of the sacral understanding of the present kingship which had been so powerful a unitive factor in expectation, and still more because of criticism from the prophets. Elements of judgment and atonement become separated out and are more deeply emphasised, political disasters adding force to them. The prophetic tradition as it took its final shape, embodying the memory of sayings as they were studied, transmitted and complemented by disciples, forms new patterns of these elements. In the deutero-Isaianic work atonement and suffering are interpreted anew; the

thought of future restoration is deepened by the experience of exile.

The story of Jesus may be understood as a reintegration, in one person and one complex of events, of Israel's expectations and their basic presuppositions. The tradition depicts Him as son of David, the basic Messianic and kingly figure. He is Son of Man, an enigmatic designation drawn mainly from that extension of expectation which we call apocalyptic. Atonement by suffering is his destiny. His life and death represent a new Exodus, and He chooses twelve men as a restoration of Israel in a new form and on a new level. The great feast which came to be called the feast of tabernacles has its place in the Transfiguration story and in the Fourth Gospel. The passover tradition, the most ancient and powerful of them all, is associated in different ways both with His death and with the Eucharistic Supper. All these elements in ancient Israel, although not in any direct sense predictive, had or came to have a relevance in Israel's expectations. Jesus, whether through the inner logic of His position, or by deliberate reactualisation, reintegrated them in His own life and work. Historically this is true because the roots of His life were in the history and traditions of His people; theologically we may add, because of the eternal purpose of God 'to sum up all things in the Christ'.

THE CHURCH AND SCIENCE

by The Rev. J. S. MACARTHUR

The Church and science have often enough been or at least appeared to be in conflict with each other, though it might be truer to say that it is Churchmen and scientists who have found themselves in opposition. Who has been to blame? In such strife it is rare that the fault can be attributed to only one side, and it may be that a more accurate delineation of the nature and purpose of the Church on the one hand and of the scope and function of science on the other might resolve the causes of the conflict.

Here is how a Roman Catholic scientist, Louis de Launay, in the introduction to his *L'église et la science*, delimits the two spheres:

> The Church has been given the mission of teaching and commenting on eternal truths acquired by a divine revelation. Science observes, groups, and tries to interpret material appearances localised in one point of space and in one moment of time. Science thus proceeds by the analysis of facts in order to draw hypothetical deductions from them. Religion begins by a synthesis, the consequences of which will be drawn by theology. Science necessarily takes as points of departure the reality of sensory appearances and the veracity of our senses, with the reservation that the evidence of one sense should be checked by that of another. Religion looks beyond these appearances or these illusions and deliberately embarks on mystery, the absolute, the eternal essence of beings. Science seeks, in whatever field, by means of a theory made as simple as possible, practical application and experimental verification. Under penalty of remaining impotent it assumes permanent enchainments of cause and effect which alone allow it to reach provisional conclusions and to set its machinery in motion. Religion subordinates this determinism to the omnipotence of a God acting outside of time and space. The one appeals exclusively to reason, the other to feeling.

Launay goes on to point out that the distinction in subject-matter and difference in methods of approach should have kept science and religion from clashing. But hazardous affirmations and assumptions of authority on the part of one or other have led to conflict.

Science proceeds by experiment and observation to deduce

laws which are general statements of the way in which the natural order operates. It is concerned with the measurable. Of the immeasurable and the unique it has nothing to say. Nor can it form judgments of value. A scientist examining a picture could tell us many interesting things about it, the composition of its pigments, the manner in which the laws of light operate in it, and he might even be able to make useful suggestions regarding its commercial value by determining its age, but he would not, as a scientist, be able to pronounce on its artistic merit.

Dr Oppenheimer pointed this out in the first of his Reith lectures. Science, he said, is non-metaphysical. It can tell us the how of things, not their why. At the same time, by a kind of analogy, it may suggest judgments of value which it is not itself competent to make. Thus, though science cannot tell us what is of ultimate importance for human well-being, the astonishing results achieved during the last couple of centuries by scientific methods have led to the attribution of a sort of moral and spiritual value to this kind of knowledge. There is also the fact that scientists, absorbed in their scientific pursuits and experimenting with those parts of reality that are measurable, will ignore other aspects of reality or at least depreciate their importance.

Dr John Oman[1] notes that there is a kind of rationalism which assumes that the world with which religion deals needs to have its existence proved by evidence not depending on itself, and that those who oppose religion from the point of view of science are often inclined to make use of this type of argument, without realising how far-reaching it is, and how it may be used against their own position. Indian thought, for example, has questioned the reality of the natural world with which science is concerned. It is reckoned to be *maya* or illusion. We may wonder how the Indian thinker can find the visible world more unreal than the invisible. What convinces us of the reality of the visible world? We might find it hard to demonstrate the grounds of our belief, but we move about in this visible world, carrying on our business in it, and the reality that we postulate appears to support our belief in it, so that we are left in no doubt of the world's reality. Why, then, is the

[1] Joseph Needham (ed.), *Science, Religion and Reality*, pp. 28off.

Indian thinker not equally convinced? We might say, with Dr Oman, that it is because, having withdrawn from the world, he has deprived the world of its power to witness to itself by its uses. That is to say, we take the reality of the visible world along with the employment of its natural values and do not go on to ask for some reason outside of what it means for us whereby to establish its reality. The preoccupation with science, though by no means necessarily the study of it, may induce a similar withdrawal from the spiritual world and a consequent questioning of its reality. We have Darwin's own wistfully regretful acknowledgment of the atrophy of his faculty of musical appreciation owing to his preoccupation with scientific studies. Unfortunately this withdrawal from religious reality on the part of some scientists can only too easily be interpreted as a fundamental incompatibility between science and religion.

Louis de Launay[1] speaks of the two great uncertainties of science. First, there is that concerned with the direct interpretation of phenomena, with the existence and formulation of the laws supposed to govern them. And secondly, there is that concerned with first causes and wholly metaphysical principles, questions which had been written off, or of which the solution had been left to the more enlightened understanding of future generations.

Consider the first of these uncertainties, that which is concerned with scientific laws. These are theoretical probabilities rather than absolute truths. They have had to be modified and are still in course of modification. Thus it has been pointed out that modern theories of matter approximate more closely to scholastic teaching than did the theory of the chemical elements which held the field before the discovery of radioactivity. To admit this uncertainty is not to diminish the greatness of scientific achievement, but to set it in its true perspective. The greatness of science is a greatness of effort, always stimulating our curiosity while appearing to satisfy it.

Turn now to the second or metaphysical uncertainty. Science may be compared to a lever with which the world is to be moved. But scientists do not often consider how fragile is its fulcrum and how similar to that of all religions, namely, a system of dogmas and postulates imposed by authority, a com-

[1] *L'église et la science*, p. 158.

plex of mysteries in which reason loses itself if it tries to fathom them.[1] There is, for example, the very difficult metaphysical concept of causality. Again, there is the dogma of simplicity. But simplicity for whom? Is there not presumption in assuming that the best proof of scientific truth is to be found in its adaptation to our mediocre faculties? And then there is the question of the reliability of the senses and all the difficulties attendant on the formulation of a theory of knowledge. Science cannot, it would appear, any more than religion, dispense with faith.

But the scientist may point out that his initial act of faith is amply justified in practice. His faith is manifest in his works. Predictions are verified by the event, inventions work, natural forces are brought under control. Yet in another order of reality religion may point to practical results as a justification of its faith. Morality, which is one of the necessary foundations of human society, has no secure basis other than religion.

Let us pass now to the consideration of a few of the points of conflict between Churchmen and scientists. The biblical account of cosmic and human origins is said to be at variance with the findings of science. That may well be so if we insist on regarding the Genesis story as a scientific account of the origin of the world and of human life on the world. But such an account would not have been intelligible to the readers for whom it was intended, and in any case scientists are not yet agreed on the precise way in which the world began, still less on the origin of life. Geologists and biologists are at variance, biologists in the interest of evolutionary theories demanding a much older world than geologists. Scientific critics of the creation story in Genesis would do well to read along with it the concluding chapters of the book of Job where the poet indicates that if man could have been present at the creation he would have found it exceedingly difficult to understand, a suggestion that has been amply justified by scientific research into cosmic origins. The purpose of Genesis is a theological one, namely, to show that the God of nature and the God of the moral law are one, that man can act like God on a smaller scale—this is the meaning of being made in the image of God —and that a life not lived in conscious dependence on God is ill-lived.

[1] Cf. *L'église et la science*, p. 190.

Yet although the Genesis creation story is non-scientific, or, rather, pre-scientific, it is of the highest scientific importance, an importance not to be gauged by comparison with modern scientific speculation, but by comparison with other ancient cosmogonies more or less contemporary with it. These cosmogonies usually begin with a theogony; the gods themselves have first to be brought into being, and then the creation of the world is depicted as the work of a pantheon of gods, often at variance among themselves. The direction of the universe was regarded as being still in the hands of this pantheon, and the operations of nature were thought of as the expression of their conflicting wills. Such a theology could not be taken seriously by science. The Genesis account, on the other hand, which ascribes the creation and direction of the universe to one almighty power, points to the uniformity of nature, which is a pre-condition of scientific progress. In other words, the Genesis story, without being scientific in character or purpose, points to the only kind of cosmogony that can be taken seriously by science.

One of the most noted and best-remembered conflicts between Churchmen and scientists arose in the case of Galileo. To see this in its right perspective we must remember that at that time scientists were Churchmen, and so we can think of the conflict as having taken place within the Church. Or, to look at it from a different angle, innovators might have found their theories under suspicion and even condemned by any other official and authoritative group.

Pre-Christian thinkers, such as Aristarchus of Samos (third-second century B.C.), had surmised that the earth revolved round the sun, but the theory could not make headway against the authority of Aristotle who took the other view. The theory was revived by Copernicus early in the sixteenth century. He himself does not appear to have got into trouble, but in 1596 the theological faculty of the Protestant university of Tübingen censured Kepler for writing a book supporting Copernican views, that is, for taking up the same position as Galileo did later on, the position which he was required to abjure in the following terms:

> That the earth is not the centre of the universe . . . is a proposition absurd in philosophy and one which, theologically considered, is at least erroneous in faith.

Roman Catholic theologians point out that Galileo had been both provocative and discourteous, poking fun at the defenders of the established Ptolemaic theory, of whom the Pope was one, and that had he put forth his theory more modestly as a working hypothesis there would have been no trouble. All the same they are a little uneasy about the affair, admitting the Church's mistake, and going to some pains to point out that her infallibility was not involved, as the Pope was not speaking *ex cathedra* to the whole Church on a question of faith or morals but was taking disciplinary action rather than making a doctrinal pronouncement. It is easy enough to see now that Galileo's theory did not menace faith or morals, but is that how it appeared at the time when Galileo was required to abjure 'a proposition erroneous in faith'? The distinguished Roman Catholic theologian Vacandard in an essay on Galileo's condemnation, which betrays considerable uneasiness, takes the line that the decision of the Church on this occasion was not infallible but was capable of being reconsidered.[1]

Another Roman Catholic theologian, Fr Hull, in a pamphlet on Galileo gives an interesting note on what he considers to be justifiable coercion by the Church. He thinks that a new scientific doctrine may bring about a crisis in which the Church has to take emergency action by condemning the doctrine—not precisely because it has been ascertained to be false or contrary to divine truth, but because its psychological effects on the minds of the faithful are practically destructive of their faith. Because of this psychological danger the doctrine would have to be discountenanced for the time being, not as false, but as rash or unsafe, and its propagation as premature. That kind of action is just what most Christians outside the Roman Catholic communion would question, and question very strongly.

But may not the Church be justified in banning certain methods of scientific research as inhumane or immoral? For instance, the revolting practice of vivisecting criminals is said to have obtained at one time. If its abandonment was due to the action of the Church there are few who would condemn such action.

This recalls the frequently made accusation that the Church

[1] *Études de critique et d'histoire religieuses*, 1-ère série, pp. 295ff.

hindered the progress of anatomical science by forbidding the dissection of human bodies. This has been denied by Roman Catholics, and the names and reputations of Roman Catholic anatomists appear to support the denial. Sir Bertram Windle, himself a Roman Catholic anatomist, in his book *The Church and Science*, examined the matter and discovered what he believed to be the basis of the charge. It is a curious story that he has to tell. In the days of the Crusades many Crusaders gave directions that if they lost their lives on campaign their bodies were to be brought home to Europe for burial. This commission was not always easy to execute, and the returning Crusaders, in order to carry out the wishes of their dead comrades, resorted to the expedient of dismembering their dead bodies, boiling off the flesh, and carrying back the bones. This was the kind of dissection that the Pope forbade. We may think him squeamish, but it would hardly be fair to call him obscurantist.

The theory of organic evolution furnished another famous battle ground. There are those who say that this is one of the many conflicts in which the Church has been forced to give ground, and in which she has lost face as well. What are the facts? The theory of evolution at any rate is not one of them. It is only a theory. Organic evolution is often thought of as though it were a proved fact, whereas it is only a hypothesis. The late Dr Joad, quoting Professor D. M. S. Watson,[1] says that evolution has been accepted by scientists, not because it has been observed to occur or proved by logical evidence to be true, but because the only alternative, special creation, is clearly unacceptable. In the conflict each side has claimed ground to which it was not entitled, but there is at least the possibility that some Churchmen have been too ready to give ground to which they are entitled, and have accommodated Christian teaching, not to a biological theory, but to a philosophy derived from such a theory, not by logical deduction, but by false analogy.

What is not always realised is that evolutionary theories, known as transformism, were spasmodically discussed for some 1500 years before the time of Darwin. Transformism means that all forms of life began from a simple undifferentiated form, or perhaps from a few such forms. Darwin made it a live ques-

[1] *The Recovery of Belief*, p. 21.

tion, even a battle-cry, between materialists and non-materialists, and constructed out of it a curious religion or at least a rule of life,[1] though it might be truer to say that that has been the work of his camp-followers.

Comparatively few theologians are competent to deal with the critical assessment of the evidence for organic evolution, but a fair number of them ought to be able to see through the false analogies and illegitimate deductions by which a pseudo-religion has been erected on it. In particular they should be on their guard against the sort of substitute religion built on a combination of the philosophical idea of immanent progress with notions derived from theories of organic evolution. According to this way of thinking, man is part of the evolutionary process, evolved from something lower and evolving to something higher. But you cannot derive a philosophy of cosmic progress from a doctrine of organic evolution. Let us provisionally admit that natural selection and the survival of the fittest have been proved, as in fact they have not yet been proved, to be the methods by which the changes of species known as evolution take place. What conclusions can we draw? Is there any discernible progress to an end or a goal? Is the world becoming better or more desirable? If so, for whom?

Then again, and this is a fact of the very highest importance that the camp-followers of evolution ignore, during the whole of recorded human history and even human pre-history, as far as palaeontology has been able to discover, there have been no evolutionary changes in man's physical structure to account for what is commonly regarded as his progress during that period. Failure to recognise this fact is what makes nonsense of so much evolutionary philosophy. And it has this almost equally important corollary, namely, that just as evolutionary change has not wrought man's spiritual heritage for him, so no structural modifications of his body secure it for him.

The Christian accepts the theomorphic anthropology of the Old Testament, according to which man differs from the lower animals by being made in the image of God. That cannot be proved or disproved by science, but science can see the difference from another angle. Most evolutionists would deny that acquired characteristics can be transmitted by the evolutionary

[1] B. C. A. Windle, *The Church and Science*, p. 350.

process, but they have to admit that man can transmit his acquired characteristics, his spiritual heritage, to his descendants, not by the evolutionary process, but by his memory, his power of conceptual thinking, and his ability to transmit ideas.

The ignoring of this obvious distinction between man and the lower animals leads to endless misunderstanding and confusion. Thus Gerald Heard writes[1]:

> Still biologists as a whole seemed to be agreeing that acquired characteristics were not the cause of evolution. They did not seem to fear that such an opinion would meet with any severe social opposition. The genetic theory, however, not only enthroned chance as the cause of all evolution and so made moral striving a vain illusion as far as human progress was concerned. It showed, as Professor William Bateson (one of the Founding Fathers of Genetics) said to the present writer, that in the twenty minutes or so that the chromosomes are in conjunction the cards of the resulting creature are dealt. Thenceforward its destiny is sealed. At that pre-embryonic level and there only freedom exists and it is the freedom of pure chance—a monster or a master may result. Thereafter strict heredity rules.

There is one reason why such teaching does not in fact arouse severe social opposition, and there is another reason why it ought not to do so. The first reason is that the man in the street has not grasped the fact that the evolutionists have decided that acquired characteristics are not transmitted. As far as he thinks about evolution at all he believes that it teaches that they are transmitted. Otherwise he might not accept the doctrine of organic evolution so readily. But the reason why this theory that acquired characteristics are not transmitted need arouse no social opposition is the one that has been outlined above, namely, that if acquired characteristics do not make evolution, neither does evolution make progress. Evolution, if it can be proved, proceeds by adaptation to environment. Progress is achieved by adaptation of environment. It is by adapting his environment, by marking it in a manner intelligible to his descendants and by modifying it in a way in which it will profit them that man transmits his acquired characteristics as the lower animals cannot transmit theirs.

But it is not strictly true that the orthodox evolutionist opinion has not aroused severe social opposition. It has roused severe opposition, and it is significant that the country where it has done so is Soviet Russia. Here is a state where the

[1] *Morals since 1900*, p. 166.

Church has been disestablished and discredited as far as it lay in the power of the state to discredit it, a state where science is to be the basis of behaviour and morals. Just as Czarist Russia attempted to make the Church subservient to the aims and policy of the state so does Soviet Russia practise a new Erastianism with its new religion. The socialist scientific state cannot tolerate a theory according to which evolution and progress proceed in such a haphazard way, a way that seems to leave so much room for personal privilege. The acquired characteristics that the omnicompetent state ordains must be transmissible, and therefore a form of Lamarckianism, sponsored by the Soviet scientist Lysenko, has been enthroned as biological orthodoxy. The writer is not competent to judge the validity of Lysenko's theories, but it is a fair guess that they are not being formulated in an atmosphere of scientific detachment.

Evolutionist ideas linked with the concept of immanent progress were not easily reconcilable with Christian orthodoxy. How could such a catastrophic and epoch-making event as the Incarnation be fitted into the evolutionary scheme? How could man, a being whose progress was conditioned and guaranteed by biological evolution, stand in need of redemption? What meaning could be attached to the idea of a final judgment? These were indeed hard questions.

But man, by his conceptual faculties, by the use of speech and writing can and indeed must look before and after, so that his heritage is infinitely more than what can be transmitted by heredity. Even in the natural order a single historical event, a single discovery or invention, a single person can be epoch-making. To the uncompromising evolutionist who sees in organic evolution the sole method and guarantee of human progress the Incarnation will be touched by the scandal of particularity, but to those who can see that man's moral and spiritual heritage is vastly more than what he inherits by physical generation from his forefathers the congruity of God's act, God's plan for man's salvation with man's nature as revealed by human history, will be evident.

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THE PROSELYTE IN BIBLICAL AND EARLY POST-BIBLICAL TIMES

by The Rev. NAHUM LEVISON

The term may have and convey a clear Greek concept from its derivation *pros-elthein* to come near. The Hebrew is not quite so simple, for though the term *Gēr* is generally used, when it came to legislation it was found that there were different categories to be taken into consideration. There were the *Ezraḥim*, the natives, or free tribesmen, there were the *Toshabhim*, temporary residents, and there were the slaves, and all these were the concern of the community. The common word *Gēr*, it should be noted, had a connotation for the Hebrew that meant very much more than a proselyte. It came very near the word *'ibhri*, Hebrew, one from the other side, a foreigner. The Hebrew never forgot that he was himself a *Gēr*, in Egypt, and afterwards in the various countries of his exile. Another Greek word, *Diaspora*, came to be used in this connexion, but in reality *Gēr* was still the most suitable term.

We cannot go into the earliest ethnic history of the Hebrews. There is yet much to be done in that field of ethnology, but of this we may be sure, that when this tribe became conscious of its distinctiveness it had formed certain simple principles by which it distinguished itself from other tribes. According to our record one of its distinguishing marks was *circumcision*, Gen. 17.9ff. It is not claimed nor need it be assumed that circumcision originated with the Hebrews, but the Hebrews made it the seal of ratification of their covenant with their Deity. It is very important to note that this Covenant was concerned with possession of a home for the tribe, and as St. Paul rightly argues in the Epistle to the Galatians it came prior to the *Torah*, and was based on faith. The promise was not to be realised at once for Abraham's offspring had yet to be *Gērīm* in Egypt for four hundred years, Gen. 15.13, so that it was essentially a matter of faith that this promise would be realised.

The period between the promise and the settlement after the

Exodus is only covered in part with domestic incidents in the lives of three generations. About the story after the descent to Egypt we know nothing till the time of Moses (say about 1280-1220 B.C.). It is quite obvious from the record that it concerns itself with the Isaac-Jacob septs of the tribe. About the rest of the tribe it makes passing remarks, as in Gen. 24-25, and these chapters deal with the part of the tribe that remained in Amurru, and those who though in Canaan did not belong to the covenantal section. We know that the Kenites with whom Moses came into close contact when he first left Egypt, also belong to that confederation (which some scholars identify with the Habiri). The first instance in which the term *Gēr* assumes a special significance is in connexion with the Passover, Exod. 12. It is not easy in that chapter to isolate the primitive from the fully developed legislation concerning the Passover. The Scandinavian 'Historico-Traditional' School has warned us against the dating of passages or books where legislation is concerned. A law or custom may have existed for a long time before it was set down in writing, for oral tradition had a long history in Semitic thinking, and while it is quite obvious that in Exod. 12 we have the most complete summary of the Passover observance, it is impossible to say at what age and stage each of its different parts became a fixed law.

While we cannot say at what stage the problem of the *Gērīm* presented itself, we may yet assume that circumcision continued to be practised by the Hebrews, and that after the Exodus and during the settlement period the problem would arise. We have the case of the Gibeonites in Josh. 9.3ff. These people, seeing how things were going, felt that their best chance of survival was to enter into a peace covenant with the conquerors. Their deception did not last long, but the Hebrews having made the covenant kept to it, and made them servants, but do not seem to have taken them into the family or tribe as brothers.

The legislation laid down in Exod. 12.43-49, is explicit enough, and must be quoted in full, for it forms the heart of our quest.

> And Yahweh said to Moses and Aaron, This is the statue of the *Pesach*: no son of a stranger will partake of it, and every slave whom you bought for silver, when you have circumcised him, may partake of it; the temporary resident, and hired servant shall not partake of it. . . . And if there should

reside with you a *Gēr*, let him observe the *Pesach* to Yahweh, circumcise every male [of his family], then may he draw near to observe it, let him be like the native of the land, but no uncircumcised person may eat thereof, one law shall govern the native and the *Gēr* that dwells among you.

The Passover was a family meal; the *Pascha* was not a 'sacrifice'; it was a family offering of a very intimate nature, and was slaughtered by the senior member, and not by the priest. One of its main features was the sprinkling of the blood. How that was done during the time of our Lord, when there must have been at least one hundred thousand victims, is difficult to envisage, as the slaughtering could not start until after the Mincha. The proselyte after his circumcision became subject in all things to the Torah like any Israelite. In the ethical code (Holiness Code) Lev. 19, it is laid down:

And if there be a *Gēr* dwelling in your land you shall not annoy him, like a native from among yourselves let the *Gēr* be to you, *and you shall love him as you love yourselves. For you were Gērīm in Egypt; I am Yahweh your God.* (vv. 33-35)

In the law of the *Ashes of the Red Cow*, Num. 19, the *Gēr* is included in the law of unsinning. The late Prof. G. B. Gray pointed out in more than one place (*Sacrifice in the Old Testament*) and on more than one occasion that the derivatives of the verb *ḥata'* are often mistranslated, i.e. the English translation of 'cleanse' is not strong enough, that in many cases 'expiate' would be nearer the Hebrew concept, and 'unsin' would in many passages be a much better translation. At any rate the *Gēr* is to share in the benefits of the sprinkling of the ashes of the Red Cow. In the great penitential Ps. 51.9, the author prays:

You will unsin me with hyssop, and I shall be clean, Wash me and I shall be whiter than snow.

In Deut. 23.2-4, it is laid down that certain persons could not become members of the commonwealth of Israel.

The eunuch and sexually mutilated shall not enter into the community of Yahweh; no illegitimate may come into the community of Yahweh, not even in the tenth generation. Ammonites and Moabites shall not come into the community of Yahweh, not even in the tenth generation, but never.

The exilic prophet whose prophecies are included in the book of Isaiah of Jerusalem, however, has a different message.

Let not the son of the stranger who has joined himself to Yahweh, have

occasion to say, Yahweh has utterly separated me from his people, and let not the eunuch say, I am a dry tree. For thus said Yahweh, The eunuchs who will keep my Sabbaths, and choose that which I desire, and hold fast to my covenant I will give them in my house and buildings a hand, and a name better than sons and daughters, an agelong name will I give him, which will not be cut off. (Isa. 56.3-5)

'The Lion Proselytes', of 2 Kings 17.26, as they were unkindly called later, and who are known to history as 'The Samaritans', deserve a special study into which we cannot enter here. Their relation to the Jewish people remained very strained till after the destruction of the second Temple, though our Lord Himself and the Apostolic Church considered them as part of Israel, and tried to break down the barriers that existed between them. These Proselytes did not accept the prophets' teaching as Torah, but only the first five books with modifications regarding the Central Sanctuary. They were messianists, as John 4 indicates. It is quite probable that their accession to Judaism was based on the belief that the God of the land must be accepted as the supreme Deity, yet in fact they became very proper and good Jews, and built up a religious life for themselves based on the first five books.

The Persian and Greek Periods

The dualism of Zoroastrianism came very near to Jewish ethical monotheism, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Judaism adopted a number of Zoroastrian concepts. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body, punishment by fire after death, demonology, and some other concepts which we meet with in the inter-testamental literature, may have been directly taken over from the Zoroastrians, or they may have developed along lines of their own because of the exile. That we do not come across proselytes in the prophetic literature is not at all to be wondered at. The prophets were too deeply involved in trying to halt the opposite trend, and to keep Israel true to its covenant. The exile of the southern kingdom brought the problem of the national Covenant to the fore. In the articles of the Covenant it was laid down that the breach of the articles would be visited upon the third and fourth generations. There was an outcry against this, Ezek. 18, but Jeremiah also faced up to this collective principle, and promised that under

the New Covenant 'it will no longer be said, the fathers had eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge, but each shall die for his own iniquity' (Jer. 31.29-30). Moreover the New Covenant will be written upon the tablets of their hearts.

The Persian period brought recognition of the Gentiles as part of the universal family of God's creation. Jewry had still a part to play, but it had to play it with greater humility, and deeper regard for others. Just how matters developed in the dispersion is not very clear. The conquests of Alexander brought a profound change in the thinking of the period. Alexander meant to bring all his conquered countries into a political and religious unity. For the first time Judaism came up against a culture that could teach it something. The intertestamental literature shows that men like Ben Sirach, the author of 'The Wisdom of Solomon', and Philo of Alexandra were not slow in benefiting from that culture. The important continuation of the Hebrew tradition was taken in hand by a small band known as the 'Sopherim'. They started to build up a corpus of traditional interpretation of the Torah which is designated 'Mishnah' which was to become the authority for faith and life. It was a long period in formation, *circa* 200 B.C.–A.D. 200, but we can take it that its teaching is authoritative for the time of the rise of Christianity.

We need not go here into the sad period of Hellenisation by some of the Ptolemies, and Seleucids, which came near to wiping out Judaism in Palestine, and the glorious struggle of the Maccabees which saved Palestinian Judaism. There is a very important question to which, alas, we have no clear answer. Both Judas Maccabaeus and Aristobulus (104 B.C.) forced many of the Gentiles, the former in the south, the latter in Lower Galilee and Ituraea, into Judaism. On what terms and with what ceremonial did these converts become Jews? In Lower Galilee almost the whole population must have been forced into Judaism, for in the time of our Lord the country was mostly inhabited by Jews, though they seem at least some of them to have looked back to their Gentile ancestry. Thus we find Simon Peter's brother named 'Andrew', which is certainly not of Hebrew origin.

To gain a view of the requirements of the proselyte of the

first century A.D. we have to go to the Mishnah. Our most specific passage in the Mishnah comes from the tractate *Pesachim*. VIII, 8. 'A mourner may immerse and eat the *Pascha* in the evening, but may not partake of other sacred foods (such as the Heave Offering, etc.). If one hears of the death of a near relative, or has been gathering the bones of dead, he may eat of sacred things after immersion. A man who became a proselyte on the eve of the eating of the *Pascha* may immerse and eat, so the School of Shammai. The School of Hillel say, "He who is circumcised is as though he separated himself from the grave".' These Schools flourished between 30 B.C.–A.D.10. Just what is the point in dispute? We have to go back to Num. 19 where in v. 19 it is laid down that one who comes in contact with the dead, or touches a grave must be sprinkled on the third and seventh days. In v. 10, the proselyte is specifically mentioned as subject to this law. Thus the School of Hillel argue that there ought to be the interval of seven days before the proselyte could partake of the *Pascha*. The important thing that we learn from this passage is that circumcision and sprinkling or immersion were required by a male proselyte before he could be counted into the family of Israel. As to the question of children, were the males circumcised and sprinkled? There can be no doubt whatever about circumcision, that was laid down in the passage Exod. 12.48, and the sprinkling would be a corollary of this. It should be remembered that it was the father who was called upon to circumcise the child, but because the operation was a delicate one, the father could ask one who was an expert to perform the operation, and this person, we are told in *Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer* XXX, was designated 'God-father'; but the father had to stand alongside the person performing the operation, and it was then considered that the father had discharged his duty.

It seems that when we come to New Testament times baptism had taken on a new significance. In the case of the proselyte it meant his cleansing from his Gentile relationships, but the baptism of John was for the Jews only and was in preparation for the coming of the Day of Yahweh, and the Messiah. It was the turning point in prophetism, for its message was not to the sinful nation, but to those in the nation who considered themselves righteous and assured of a right relationship to God.

When our Lord's authority was questioned He made their answer to the question of the meaning of John's baptism a test of the sincerity of their intentions: Mark 11.27ff.

Jesus was determined to rescue the fundamental teaching of the Old Testament from the literal interpretations of the Pharisees and Scribes, the Sadducees, and the other parties, and to give it its spiritual content. The crux of the difference between Jesus and the teachers in Jewry of His time, was the Covenants. He could foresee the fall of Jerusalem, and the dissolution of the state. If Israel was to maintain its relationship with God, it had to be on a new basis. When He was asked how eternal life could be obtained, He answered: by true observance of the Commandments; but there was one thing to be joined to them and it was the *Cross*. As the Cross was yet to come the Torah was supreme and binding, though He pointed to its inner meaning, and to its time-purpose. Moses gave you leave to divorce from your partners, but that was because of the hardness of your hearts; in their spiritual essence the marriage vows are irrefragable.

But what has all this to do with the Proselyte? Very much indeed, if we are to grasp, as fully as possible on our extant information, the situation that was to face Christianity in the New Covenant. If the Old Covenants remain in force the proselytes had but to accept them as formulated in the Torah and teaching of the Rabbis. But the New Covenant changed the relationship between God and Man. In the earliest days after the crucifixion and resurrection, the Apostles looked upon themselves as having entered a *New Way*, they wanted to travel it by the old methods, circumcision and the observances of the Commandments by whose merits they would gain rightness with God. This obtained till the Galatian controversy faced them, and St. Paul insisted that the Gentiles were not subject to the Old Covenants. They were not allies bound by treaties which were not observed on man's side, but they were children whose relationship rested on faith in the love of God as manifested in the grace of Christ Who made, sealed and ratified the New Covenant with His blood. St. Paul argues that if the old Covenants are still binding, then Christ has effected nothing. He argues that in fact the whole structure from the very beginning rested on faith, and on being declared justified by faith

not by works of the Torah, for the Torah had not been brought into the relationship till many years after.

The Hebrew Christians did not look upon themselves as proselytes, and a call to a baptism of repentance as Peter prescribed in his speech, Acts 2.38, would have some meaning for his Jewish hearers, but for the Gentiles it had no meaning. St. Paul may seem somewhat involved in his covenantal argument in Galatians because he argues on rabbinical lines, but he nevertheless gets to the very core of the matter when he insists that the New Covenant is made by God Himself in Christ. Herein lies his strongest argument for the deity of Christ. The New Covenant is mediated by God Himself in Christ. It was when the Hebrew Christian came to look upon himself as a proselyte too that Christianity was fully born. There was left a considerable body of Jewish Christians; Jews who accepted Jesus as Messiah, but remained faithful to the Old Covenants, the Ebionites continued for a long time in that state, but Christianity had been well started on its way.

The Gentile Church has handed on some information about the proselytes from their side, the Hebrew Christian part has not. In the Didache and the Church Fathers we have the Gentile polity and Christology. In the New Testament we can only be sure about the Pauline Epistles even when confined to 'the Tübingen four', the way which leads to full fellowship with God.

Circumcision having been adjudged outwith the New Covenant, what was to be the outward and visible sign of the new faith? That St. Paul viewed it as incorporation into Christ there is but little doubt. Professor Adolf Deissmann, with whom I profoundly disagree when he writes of the student of Gamaliel as being 'a Septuagint Jew', has given us a very fine insight into this problem in his *The Religion of Jesus and the Faith of St. Paul* (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1923-6), especially in the part beginning on p. 162.

In the one passage in Galatians in which he touches on their incorporation into Christ, he says, 'You are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus; for all of you who have been baptised into Christ have put on Christ.'

It was by baptism into Christ, incorporation into Christ, that we put on Christ, that we become Christians. At this dis-

tance of time it is possible for some to argue that baptism is not necessary to becoming a Christian. That may all be very well for the good people of the Society of Friends, and others not as good, but for the Hebrew Christian it is a very important matter, for he is cast out from his own people when he confesses his faith in Christ, and thus he needs to have assurance that he is incorporated into the New Israel, for that is in part what Christianity means to him. His reception by baptism into the Church, the Body of Christ, gives him a sense of continuity with the past, and the new relationship to God through the New Covenant realised and ratified in the New Covenant made in His broken body and shed blood. To me as a Jewish proselyte, baptism and the Lord's Supper are the two outward signs of my incorporation into Christ, and my partaking of the grace of Christ when He offers the elements to me which I receive by faith and that His Covenant assures me that I am atoned with God.

While this is not the place to deal with infant baptism, yet I cannot help feeling that any Jewish proselyte would have been horrified at the thought that any members of his family who accepted Christ as Messiah and Lord, whether they were infants or children, were not incorporated with him into Christ. The questions of sprinkling and immersion which have been a matter of controversy among Christians would not have the same import for the Hebrew Christian. As pointed out in the deepest outcry of the soul in Ps. 51, the cleansing with hyssop, which means sprinkling, comes first.

> You will unsin me with hyssop, and I shall be clean, You will wash me and I shall be whiter than snow (v. 9).

On my last visit to Jerusalem a nephew of mine invited one of Professor Martin Buber's assistants to discuss Christianity with me. I was surprised at his knowledge of Christology, and Christian polity. He of course argued for Judaism, and asked me point blank in what way I felt Christianity was superior to Judaism. My answer was, its universalism. In Christ there is neither Jew nor Gentile, male nor female. In the second place in Judaism I see myself only as an ally of God. I am bound to Him by covenants which I cannot carry out, which my fathers did not carry out, not that they did not try, but that they found

it too much for flesh and blood to do. In Christianity I am spiritually incorporated into Christ by baptism and confession, so that I no longer live, but Christ lives in me and I in Him, not in laws and commandments, but in His grace. I find I can believe in God as a loving, just, and holy Being. I understand the meaning of freedom which I could not do as a Jew. In the Cross of Christ I receive power to live a true life of freedom, not burdened every moment with the feeling that I am breaking one of the six hundred and thirteen commandments. In myself, that is in my life without Christ or as St. Paul puts it 'in the flesh', I would break every one of them not because of the holy law that makes me aware of them, but because I am a son of Adam, as well as of Abraham; but in baptism I have been incorporated into Christ, and now I live freely in Him, and so at peace with my conscience and with God, because He is God.

I think it is the Hebrew Christians that St. Paul has in mind when he writes in his Corinthian epistle about vicarious baptism. Many of them had to part with parents, wives, husbands, children dearly loved, and they sought through vicarious baptism resurrection into Christ for their loved ones. The first generation or two there would be the natural feeling that their loved ones rejected Christ in ignorance, because it was only after the crucifixion and resurrection that He was proved to be the Messiah the Son of the living God. The practice seems to have disappeared quickly after the Apostolic times. In Jewish law vicarious baptism for the dead is approved, when the body of the dead person cannot be found for burial. I know of one such case in which the Dayyan Zilberman of Safad, Palestine, ordained that the son of the dead person who was devoured by wild beasts should be baptised for the father.

The relation between the Torah and the New Covenant is too large a question to enter into here, but this much has to be said: Christianity has not changed the ethical monotheism of the Old Testament. The teaching of Jesus has emphasised and deepened the ethical teaching of the prophets and Moses, but it is brought under grace and not works. When St. Paul puts 'The Grace of the Lord Jesus Christ' before 'The Love of God', in his benediction in the last chapter of 2 Cor., he is not blaspheming; he only tells us that grace has accomplished what love could not, though if he had been challenged he most likely

would have said that it was love that brought forth grace.

A word must be said about the biblical writers' conception of time, because it impinges on the position of the proselyte to Judaism. The conception of time was related to events, the events of the past, and the events of the future, this *aeon* and the *aeon* to come. There was always what is known as 'The Prophetic Perfect', that is to say the prophet saw events to come and spoke of them as though they were already here. A good example of this is seen in the chapter describing the Call of Isaiah, Isa. 6. There were three events in the past that dominated Hebrew thought: (1) the Call of Abraham, (2) the Exodus, (3) the Covenant at Sinai. The proselyte was called upon to share with the nation in all these events. He was to become a member of the spiritual and physical family of Abraham by circumcision. He had to share with all Israel the experience of the Exodus of which the Passover was part. He was called upon to consider himself as crossing the Jordan for the settlement in Canaan, for that was part of the realisation of the Covenant with Abraham. He was called upon to take the yoke of the Torah like every other Israelite. Thus the integration of the proselyte into the nation was complete in every sense. The Talmuds go into detail of the various benefits to which the proselyte becomes heir on his passing from the Gentile to the Jewish community. The proselyte's share in the world to come (the future life) was regarded as more blessed even than that of the Israelite himself. Some proselytes like Rabbi Akiba attained to great learning and position, but all were received with honour and kindness. Rabbi Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides), of whom it is said, 'From Moses to Moses none rose like Moses', has commented extensively on the law of the proselyte, but his comments are late, and contain the added requirements by the proselyte, of which the Mishnah has nothing to say.

Our supreme authority on the problem is St. Paul. He had to face the Jewish Christian demands that the proselyte is bound by the old Covenants and this he resisted with all his learning and genius. The Gentiles were to be incorporated into the spiritual Israel through the finished work of Christ. Faith as in the case of Abraham was to be the atoning bond, for Abraham had not works to show before the covenant, 'He

had faith in Yahveh and he accounted it to him as righteousness' (Gen. 15.6).

St. Paul has been called an 'Antinomian', in that respect he shares with Christ the charge of the Jews. It was Christ who said, 'The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath. It has been said to you of old, but I say unto you.'

The disciples who seldom dared to question the teaching of their Master accepted many of the sayings of Christ without questioning their relation to the teaching of the Rabbis. St. Paul who I believe was the strongest antagonist of our Lord during His ministry weighed His teaching more carefully, and when it pleased God to call him into the service of the Gospel he was in a much more favourable position to know the mind of Christ. The fifteenth chapter of the Acts shows that Peter too realised that it was by grace of Christ that faith and salvation come. In the Torah and Mishnah the proselyte becomes partaker with the Hebrew of all the benefits of the Covenants. In Christ in whom there is neither Jew or Greek, all came by way of the New Covenant mediated by Himself to all who accept

THE GRACE OF THE LORD JESUS CHRIST, THE LOVE OF GOD, AND THE ILLUMINATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

EPHESIANS AND THE CHURCH OF SOUTH INDIA[1]

by The Rev. J. R. MACPHAIL

I

Armitage Robinson said about Ephesians, 'The truth of the corporate life which was revealed to [Paul] was never more needed than it is today. Our failure to understand his life and message has been largely due to our acquiescence in disunion.' The Church ought to show people how to live together: it often teaches them how to quarrel.

Robinson wrote in 1903, and since then we have seen divisions among mankind more monstrous and more mischievous than any hitherto achieved. And yet it may be doubted whether twentieth-century men, for all their efforts, have been able to produce anything so deep as the division between Jew and Gentile in the first century A.D. Round the inner part of the Temple in Jerusalem there was a five-foot wall with inscriptions on it in Latin and Greek, threatening death to any Gentile who crossed it. And there was a barrier like it in the mind of every Jew. The nations were in the melting-pot, and an empire that seemed to be universal was taking shape; but the world-sea broke in vain against the rock that was Jerusalem, and the People of God clung more fiercely than ever to their Law and their Promise.

Paul believed the Old Testament and loved his race. On his First Journey, in Galatia, in every city he went first to the synagogue. But the Jews as a rule would not listen to him, and he turned to those who would. When a great crisis falls on men, famine and pestilence or plague, those who can help cannot confine themselves to victims of their own class or race or religion: in the face of real need, man is man. The coming of Jesus, as Paul understood it, was a crisis of still greater magnitude. In Paul's experience, all men need Christ equally,

[1] Three addresses given at the Synod of the Church of South India, Tiruchirapalli, January 1956.

and he saves all 'with undistinguishing regard'. Paul found himself behaving as if there were no difference between Jew and Gentile.

But he soon had to defend his doctrine and practice single-handed. After he and Barnabas had returned to Antioch, a party of preachers came down from Jerusalem, proclaiming, in the name of the original Apostles there, that Gentile converts must be circumcised as a token of obedience to the Law of Moses. They had great success. Peter was visiting Antioch at the time, and he stopped eating with Gentiles; even Barnabas wobbled, though he was fresh from the wonderful work in Galatia. Paul seemed to himself to stand alone, like Elijah. To him, baptism was the appointed way to incorporate a man into Christ; to add another rite, as equally important, was to deny that Jesus is Lord and Saviour; it was to teach that righteousness depends on what man does. The future of Christianity was threatened. And he heard that his new churches in Galatia were going over to the new doctrine. He longed to speak to them again, face to face; but the question must be thrashed out at once in Jerusalem. In haste and in anguish, he wrote to Galatia, and meanwhile went up to Jerusalem for an Ecumenical Council.

The proceedings of the Council are duly recorded in Acts 15; and they are not very impressive. We cannot even be sure what the compromise-resolution said. Today also the findings of Church Councils are apt to impress those who were not there less than those who were. But the decision satisfied Paul at the time, though he says little about it afterwards. He was still to be the Apostle to the Gentiles. Salvation comes by Jesus alone, and there is to be but one Church.

The Council of Jerusalem has faded, but Paul's first letter is as fresh as ever. He begins:

> I am astonished that you should so quickly desert the man who called you and go over to another gospel. There is no other gospel! . . . If I myself, or even an angel from heaven, should preach to you any other gospel than the gospel I preached to you, may God's curse be on him!

He recalls his credentials.

> God set me apart even before I was born, and called me by his grace, to reveal his Son in me, so that I might preach him among the Gentiles.

He tells how he has withstood Peter in public, now in Antioch:

they are both Jews, but they have been set free from the Law: indeed, he goes on, almost forgetting what started him off:

> I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me; and the life that I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me.

And he rushes on, mixing rabbinic arguments with appeals, now to their experience of the Holy Spirit giving them joy and saying in their hearts 'Abba, Father', now to their love for himself:

> You know that it was because of illness that I preached the gospel to you at first. You were tempted, when you looked at me, to laugh. But you welcomed me as if I had been an angel of God, or Jesus Christ himself. How happy you were then! Where is that happiness now? I can testify that if it had been possible you would have torn out your eyes, to give them to me! . . . Oh, my children, my children! I am enduring birthpangs all over again, till Christ be formed within you! And I long to be with you again, to try new ways of speech: for I am at my wits' end about you!

And he pleads with them:

> For freedom Christ has set us free; stand fast therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery. . . . Only, do not use your freedom as an excuse for selfishness, but through love be servants of one another. . . . Walk by the Spirit.

The Second Journey began soon after the Council in Jerusalem: Galatia, Troas, over to Philippi, Thessalonica, and Beroea, down to Athens and Corinth, and after eighteen months there back by sea to Antioch. From Corinth Paul writes two letters to Thessalonica, encouraging them under persecution, warning them against fornication, and bidding them remember however excited they may be over the Second Coming of Christ, that they can serve him now.

In the third journey, after revisiting Galatia, Paul spends the best part of three years in Ephesus, then goes up into Macedonia and down into Achaia, and returns through Macedonia and by the coast of Western Asia to Jerusalem.

From Ephesus he writes several letters to Corinth. In one, he answers questions they have sent him and deals with news brought to him by Corinthians visiting Ephesus. In another he asks why they have turned against him during a visit he has paid them from Ephesus (a visit not recorded in Acts). In the next, written from Macedonia, he expresses his joy when he hears they have turned to him again.

And towards the end of the third journey he writes to the Church in Rome. The journeys seem to go back and forward and to and fro, but he now explains his strategy. He has got as far as Illyria on the Adriatic, preaching only where no one has preached before. Now as he says there is no room left for him in Roman Asia or in Greece, and he means to come on to Rome; not to preach there, since there is a church already, but to make it a base from which he can go into Spain. And he wishes to share his Gospel with them, so that when he arrives they may have fellowship together. So he speaks of the world's need of God; Jew and Gentile need God equally—for now Paul returns to the thoughts of his first letter; and then of salvation, as it is found in Christ. In ch. 9 he turns aside to face the question why his own people, as a people, have rejected their own Christ: he says he would be willing to be cut off from Christ if only his own brethren in the flesh could be saved. And he cannot hide from himself that by opening the door to the Gentiles he has in effect shut it to the Jews. He wrestles with this for three chapters. Then comes the invariable 'therefore', as he applies the great truths he has been considering to the business of daily life:

> I appeal to you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship.

In Jerusalem, at the end of the Third Journey, he is arrested, and so at last reaches Rome, in chains! The rest of his life is surprisingly obscure; he may have been released after two years, and made a further journey (probably not to Spain), then been re-arrested. The tradition that he was executed in Rome, with Peter, is strong. We cannot be sure when the later letters were written. But in four of them, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon, and Ephesians, he speaks of himself as a prisoner; and perhaps they were written in Rome.

The Philippians, hearing of his imprisonment, have sent him some gifts. Their messenger, on reaching Rome, has fallen dangerously ill. When he recovers, Paul sends him back, fearing lest they should be anxious about him, with a short letter expressing his thanks and love, gently rebuking them for some quarrels he hears of, and bursting out briefly but vigorously against some Circumcisers who are still at work. The

letter is personal and unpremeditated, but it includes some of his greatest teaching: he commends humility by recalling the humility of Christ's 'emptying of Himself in the incarnation', and speaks movingly of the supremacy of the Cross in his own life.

Then he hears from Colossae, a hundred odd miles up the river Meander from Ephesus, that false teachers are busy in the church there. He has never been in Colossae, but he writes with urgent concern; and again, dealing with practical issues, he lifts them up to the heights. They are to remember that they are Christ's, and that Christ

> has delivered us from the dominion of darkness and transferred us to the kingdom of his beloved Son, in whom we have redemption, the forgiveness of sins. He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or authorities—all things were created through him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things hold together. He is the head of the body, the Church. . . . For I want you to know how greatly I strive for you . . . and for all who have not seen my face, that their hearts may be encouraged as they are knit together in love, to have all the riches of assured understanding and the knowledge of God's mystery, of Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. . . . And you, who were dead in trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh, God made alive together with him, having forgiven us all our trespasses. . . . If then you have been raised with Christ, seek the things that are above, where Christ is, seated at the right hand of God. Set your minds on things that are above, not on things that are on earth. For you have died, and your life is hid with Christ in God.

At the same time, Paul sends a personal note to Philemon with Onesimus, who is Philemon's slave, and has run away to Rome, and has become known, with all his story, to Paul. Paul has persuaded him to return to his legal master, confident that they will be no more master and slave, but brothers in Christ.

And then, probably, he writes Ephesians. I have spent most of one section on the introduction. I do not apologise for that. Paul's work is of a piece, every part of it is personal, and Ephesians is the crown. His work may be ended, his dream of a journey to Spain may remain a dream. He is content to leave the choice to God. As he told his friends at Philippi, 'For me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. . . . Which to choose I cannot tell.' But the care of all the churches is still his

daily burden, for he can see people and write letters. Writing to the Philippians and Colossians, he has thought over again, as if for the first time, some thoughts that have been in his mind since his conversion, twenty-six years ago: the grace of God, the unity of Jew and Gentile in Christ, the praise of God's glory. These letters gone, Paul has no controversy on his hands. In thankfulness and awe, he dictates one more letter, covering the same ground as in Colossians, but this time addressing all his churches. It is an old man's farewell to his children. Tychicus is to take it round, adding the name of the church he has come to; and in the copy that is made and treasured in Ephesus the name is proudly written down.

It is his last general letter. Where is he to begin? With the praise of God's glory. The first sentence in the Greek has over two hundred words without a full stop. Armitage Robinson says it is 'like the preliminary flight of an eagle, rising and wheeling round, as though for a while uncertain which direction in his boundless freedom he shall take. So the Apostle's thought lifts itself beyond the limits of time, and above the material conceptions that confine ordinary men, and ranges this way and that in a region of spirit, a heavenly sphere, with no course as yet marked out, merely exulting in the attributes and purposes of God.'

Here is the sentence, a little broken up:

Blessed be God, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. He has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in Christ, in whom the heavens as well as the earth are ours. For this he chose us in him before the earth was founded, so that we should be saints, and blameless in his presence. In love he destined us to be his sons through Jesus Christ, such was his will and pleasure, so that his glorious grace which he graciously bestowed on us in the Beloved should be praised. In the Beloved we have redemption through his death, the forgiveness of trespasses: such is the wealth of his grace, which he poured out on us so wisely, with such discernment, making known to us the mystery of his will which he has set forth in Christ as a plan to fill all time, which is, to sum up everything in Christ, everything in the heavens and everything on earth.

In Christ, according to the purpose of him who makes all things work according to his will and pleasure, we who have been the first to hope in Christ have been chosen as God's portion, to live so that his glory should be praised. In him you also, hearing the true message, the good news of your salvation, and believing him, were sealed with the promised Holy Spirit, who is the token payment of all we are heirs to, and the guarantee that we shall possess it in due course, so that his glory may be praised.

II

So Paul begins: 'Blessed be God, who . . ., by whom . . ., in whom. . . .' Climax is piled upon climax, one image poured out after another, to cast new light on the grace of God. He has made known to those that were near and to those that were far off the mystery of His will. The word mystery, as Paul uses it, has nothing to do with our common use of the word today for something puzzling and baffling, so that you cannot help thinking about it, and yet your thinking gets you nowhere. Paul is following Jesus, and the apocalyptic books of the time, and the Old Testament. A psalm says, 'The secret of the Lord is with them that fear him.' When one of Job's comforters rebukes him for not being content with a conventional second-hand knowledge of God, he asks sarcastically, 'Hast thou heard the secret counsel of God?' The prophet Amos says, 'Surely the Lord will do nothing, but he revealeth his secret unto his servants the prophets'; and Jeremiah describes the prophet as one who 'stands in the council of God'. It is the same word in all these passages. Daniel uses a corresponding word often, and so do Enoch and other apocalyptic writers. And Jesus said to the Twelve, 'To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God, but for those outside everything is in parables.'

Many psalms, and the famous twenty-eighth chapter of Job, dwell on the 'secret work of God', the real driving-force at work throughout creation, like the dynamos in a power-house. The careless and the rebellious do not see it, but it is there, and those who ask God's help can see. As Isaiah cries, 'Verily thou art a God that hidest thyself, O God of Israel, the Saviour.'

We may think of a kingdom in which everything seems to be going on as usual, but the king has a plan in his mind that will turn upside-down the whole life of every citizen; and he keeps it in his mind till the time comes for action, but meanwhile shares some parts of the secret with the few servants whom he has picked to carry it out. This secret is not a secret that men are trying to penetrate; most of them know and think nothing about it; it is the king's secret, and he makes it known as and when he chooses. The mystery of God's will is a theological mystery.

From the foundation of the world God has had it in mind

to gather up all that exists in heaven and on earth, to bring it under one coherent order with Christ in charge. All that has happened to us (says Paul)—election, adoption, redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, all spiritual blessings—all these are the means by which God brings us within His purpose, as servants, agents, messengers, witnesses, so that His purpose may be fulfilled and his glory known and praised. Gentiles as well as Jews are drawn in, and they have the Holy Spirit as the seal of their inheritance, a promise, a first payment made on account, guaranteeing full possession when the time comes.

The first three chapters of Ephesians centre on two simple sentences: (1) God has made known His plan for creation in Christ; and (2) I pray that you may know it fully. But the wonder of God's grace so fills Paul's mind that he cannot easily pass from the first sentence to the second; he breaks off again, and again, to repeat or to amplify, and his sentence goes to pieces. Three times he says 'For this cause, I—', and only at the third attempt is the prayer uttered.

The first time, at 1.15, after thanking God for what he has heard of their faith and love, he prays that 'the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory,' may give them 'the spirit of wisdom and of revelation', so that 'the eyes of their hearts' may see

> the riches of his glorious inheritance in the saints, the immeasurable greatness of his power in us who believe, as it is shown in the energy of the might of his strength which he energised in Christ, raising him up from among the dead people and setting him at his right hand in the heavenlies, above every rule and authority and power and lordship, and every name that is known, not only in this age but in the age to come; and he put all things under his feet, and made him head over all things for the Church, which is his body, the fulness of him who fills all things completely.

You see how soon and how completely the readers are forgotten!

The words 'in the heavenlies' are usually translated 'in the heavenly places' or 'in the heavenly sphere'. They came at the beginning of the first sentence: 'God has blessed us in Christ with all spiritual blessings in the heavenlies.' I think they are best taken with the words 'rules and authorities' and so on, and with the word 'fulness'. In the difficult verse at the end of

ch. 1, fulness seems to go with body, but it is probably Christ who is 'the fulness of God who is always filling himself'.

There are many easy ways of thinking about God, that we all fall into more or less from time to time. God is in heaven, and not on earth. The earth, with the human life that so largely belongs to it, is unimportant, if not bad, and we should aspire to loosen ourselves from it, so that we can rise on to a higher level of existence. Or, God shows Himself only in miracles that happen but once; things that happen regularly go on by a momentum of their own. Or, God is in the future; the present is only to be endured, with the least possible concession on our part, till the stream of time shall bring us to where God waits for us. Instead of present and future we may talk more grandly of time and eternity, but the effect is the same. Or, God is in the spiritual things, and what cuts us off from Him meanwhile is that we are in the flesh, mortal, sensual, material; we have to try to purify ourselves, mind triumphing over matter, our higher selves subduing our lower selves. Or, God is in the Church—or perhaps in our own denomination—but not outside it. And so on. In one way or another we tend to confine God to one sphere within what we know as a whole.

But for Paul there is no fixed line separating the natural from the miraculous, or the religious from the secular. There are two orders, but they interpenetrate in every sort of way. God's power extends everywhere, low and high, gross and fine. So do the powers of evil. The 'prince of the power of the air, the rulers of the earth and of darkness, the principalities and dominions, the elemental spirits,' are at work in the heavenlies as well as on the earth, in the Church as well as outside it; they attack our reason and soul and spirit as well as our fleshly nature. When Paul speaks of the sins of the flesh, he is thinking not only of sexual and other sensual sins, but also of sins of the spirit like pride and love of slander. And yet God reigns over all, His fulness fills all things completely, and Christ is His Viceroy. Every part of man at every moment is subject to these natural-supernatural powers, except in so far as he is subject to Christ. As John Mackay puts it, there is a Great Rift which runs from top to bottom, through the heavenlies as well as through the earth; but God has a plan, and He has power to carry it out. The power is now partly

revealed in the power he has conferred on Christ, crucified and buried and raised and exalted. These historical events do not come by chance, they are not God's afterthought; as Paul has already said in Colossians, 'all things were created through Christ and for him, . . . and in him all things hold together'. God's fulness fills time and eternity as well as space and creation. The whole history of the universe, when the end comes, will demonstrate his supremacy. Such is the hope to which we are called.

So much for 'mystery' and 'fulness'. Another important word comes in ch. 1, 'the Church, which is his body', but we shall consider that later.

After this digression, or amplification, on the hope to which we are called, Paul does not yet return to his prayer. God's power is shown in what He has done and does in Christ. It is shown equally in what He does in men. Paul has already said in Galatians, 'There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus'; and in Colossians, 'Here there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, but Christ is all, and in all.' Now, at 2.1-10, he concentrates on the unity of Jew and Gentile, remembering and then forgetting that he has just stood up to Peter in Antioch and told him he was wrong. You, he says to his Gentile readers, were under 'the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that is now at work in people given up to disobedience'. But you are now alive. And we also, the Jews, were by nature children of wrath, 'with God's displeasure for our birthright' (Knox), living a life from which the power of God was as it were shut out. But God, who raised Christ from death, has raised us up from subjection to the Law. You and we are new-created by God so as to do good works.

That is what you are, says Paul. And at 2.11 he says: From here, look back to there, to what you were when you didn't know what the world is for, before the Spirit of wisdom and revelation was given to you. 'But now in Christ Jesus you who were far off have been brought near in the blood of Christ', that is, by his death. 'For he is our peace, who has made both one, and has broken down the middle wall of hostility' (Paul has in mind the barrier which divided the Court of the Gentiles

from the rest of the Temple in Jerusalem). The Jews were under the Law. The Gentiles lived in the flesh, or under the power of the prince of the air. Now Christ has taken on Himself the burden and curse of the Law, destroying its power for ever; and he has brought life both to the Jews, who were dead under the Law, and to the Gentiles, dead in sin. And His purpose was to

> create in himself one new man in place of two, so making peace, . . . for through him we both have access in one Spirit to the Father. . . . You are fellow-citizens with the saints, members of the household of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the chief corner-stone [of the foundation]; in him all building grows into a holy temple in the Lord; and in him you with us are built into it, a dwelling-place for God in the Spirit.

With this new cause for thanksgiving Paul again, at the beginning of ch. 3, begins his prayer: 'For this cause, I, Paul, a prisoner for Christ Jesus on behalf of you Gentiles'—and again he breaks off, this time to express a purely personal thanksgiving. Paul makes no claim for himself, except that he is 'the least of all the saints'; but he can never for long hold in his wonder that he, the former persecutor of the Church, should have been chosen to preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ. So he bursts out once more in 'the praise of his glory': he more than any other disciple was given

> insight into the mystery of Christ, which was not made known to the sons of men in other generations as it has now been revealed to his holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit; that is, how the Gentiles are fellow heirs, members of the same body, and partakers of the promise in Christ Jesus through the gospel.

Co-heirs, co-members, co-sharers—he has to invent new compounds to express his meaning. (So at 2.16 he coined new verbs: 'God has co-raised us and co-exalted us with Christ.') It took all the power of God, working to its full capacity, to raise Jesus from among the dead people, to create one new man out of Jews and Gentiles, and to turn Paul into an apostle. But so it is: Paul is chosen, now in prison as formerly at liberty, 'to make all men see what is the plan of the mystery hidden for ages in God who created all things'.

And now, at v. 10, his thought takes on a new range. The

wisdom of God is 'manifold', he says, using a word that usually describes many-coloured embroidery, like a Persian carpet which seems to show new colours and new shapes every time one looks at it. It reminds us of Francis Thompson's word 'many-splendoured'. The many-splendoured wisdom of God appears in new ways in the Church, so that even the principalities and powers in the heavenlies may take note and learn something. The Church, as Mackay puts it, has become a graduate school for angels. Sterling Hooper,[1] at the Inauguration of the Church of South India, said that this was an event not only of universal significance, but even of cosmic significance. He was putting into modern language just what Paul says here.

Paul goes on:

> This was according to the eternal purpose which he has realised in Jesus Christ our Lord, in whom we have boldness and confidence of access through our faith in him. So I ask you not to lose heart over what I am suffering for you, which is your glory.

So at last, at 3.14, Paul has made it clear who is praying, and to whom; and the prayer pours out unhindered:

'For this cause I bow my knees.' The usual attitude for prayer in the New Testament is standing: kneeling, which probably means prostration, is mentioned only when the prayer is especially earnest.

> I pray with all my might to the Father—the Father of all fathers in the heavenlies and on the earth—that he may grant it to you, according to the wealth of his glory, to be strengthened mightily through his Spirit to your inmost depths, so that Christ may dwell through faith in your hearts, so that your roots may grow in love, and your foundations may be laid on love: for then you, with all the saints, will have power to understand what breadth and length and height and depth can be, so that you may be filled with all the fulness of God.

That is certainly praying with 'boldness and confidence': we couldn't very well ask for more than that. But even now Paul hasn't finished, for he adds a brief doxology:

> But God can do more, far, far more, than all that we can ask or think, according to the power working in us. To him be glory in the Church and in Christ Jesus, one generation after another, for ever and ever. Amen.

[1] Rev. J. S. M. Hooper, a Methodist missionary, the last Secretary of the Joint Committee on Union and the first Treasurer of the Church of South India.

III

In Ephesians, as usual, Paul begins with doctrine (ch. 1 to 3) and ends with ethics (ch. 4 to 6). He brings his readers face to face with the great timeless truths, and then with the little choices and worries of every day. The teaching about conduct in Ephesians ranges wide, and yet all that Paul says is but so many variations on one theme: you are one Body, the Body of Christ, be the Body of Christ. We must have a little preliminary discussion of that.

There are two uses of the word body that we must put out of mind, if we are to begin to understand Paul's use of it. One is derived from Paul. We now speak without thinking of being members of a society, and of the members making up a body. Such membership is a loose association of people who choose to act together now and then for a particular purpose. In that sense we may speak of the Church as the body of Christian people. To Paul, the Church is not a body of people, it is the Body of Christ; and our membership in that Body is no mere metaphor. We are Christians only in so far as we are limbs or organs of a single living organism. A piece of wood is joined to others so as to become the leg of a table; the table is broken up; the piece of wood is practically what it was before. But if a limb of a body or a tree is cut off, it dies.

The other misleading use of the word body is to speak of body as opposed to spirit. In Church matters for example people sometimes say that spiritual unity is all that matters; we need only cultivate nice friendly feelings, and it is vulgar or pedantic to worry about doctrine and organisation. To Paul, such talk would be meaningless. Here he says that we must be 'eager to maintain the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace', but at once he adds, 'There is one body and one Spirit.' And in this he agrees with all Bible writers. To the Hebrews, in the well-known phrase of Wheeler Robinson, man is 'an animated body, not an incarnate soul'; a man does not have a body; he is a body. Just as love is not love till it takes shape in a loving action, so spirit becomes spirit only when it finds itself a body. I remember a friend saying frankly that when she called a man 'spiritual-minded', she meant that she thought him unpractical. That is not Paul's way of thinking.

J. A. T. Robinson argues that Paul's teaching about the Body of Christ has many sources, Old Testament, rabbinic, Greek; but it comes mainly from Jesus' words at the Last Supper, 'This bread is my body' (the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is 'the communion of the body of Christ', 'and we, though many, become one bread, one body, by partaking of the one bread'); and from those other words of Jesus, heard on the Damascus road: 'Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?' By persecuting Christians Paul, in a sense far closer than metaphor, is persecuting Jesus himself; Jesus is embodied in His disciples.

There is nothing about the Body of Christ in Galatians or Thessalonians. But in 1 Cor. 6.13-17, dealing with the argument that since Jesus has abolished the Law we may do what we like (especially fornication), Paul says:

> The body is not meant for immorality, but for the Lord, and the Lord for the body. And God raised the Lord, and will also raise us up by his power. Do you not know that your bodies are limbs of Christ? Shall I therefore take the limbs of Christ and make them the limbs of a harlot? Never! Do you not know that if you join yourself to a harlot, you become one body with her? As Scripture says, 'The two shall become one'! But if you are united to the Lord, you become one Spirit with him.

We are what we love; we become organically one with it. Every action, every impulse or thought, is a kind of marriage, in which two become one, and we are changed.

The full doctrine begins to appear in Philippians:

> Our commonwealth is in heaven, and from it we await a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who will change our lowly body [the body of Christians] to be like his glorious body, by the power which enables him to subject all things to himself.

But in Colossians, and still more in Ephesians, the tense has changed from the future to the present. Now the Church *is* the Body, created by God at the resurrection: God has raised Christ from among the dead people, and has put all things under His feet, and has made Him Head over all things for the Church, which is His Body. In Christ Jesus God has made Jews and Gentiles one, so as to create one new man in place of the two, so making peace, and so as to reconcile both to God in one Body through the cross. He has made the Gentiles co-members of the same Body.

Paul uses the word broadly and freely, and we must not try

to pin him down too much. He sometimes says that the Church is the Body of Christ, sometimes that Christ is the Head of the Body; he can even speak of the Body growing up to the stature of the Head, and it isn't easy to picture that. He mixes up his new image of the Body with his old image of the building, so that we have a Body being edified or built up, and also a building that grows. What we have to hold on to, I think, is this. First, that as Christians we are members or organs or limbs of one living Body, and our very life depends on our playing our part in the life of the Body as a whole; if we do not, we become an autonomous growth, a cancer. Second, that it is the Body of Christ, raised and exalted with Him. And third, that it is a new creation, displaying to the universe the power and wisdom of God that first came to light in the resurrection and exaltation of Christ, planned from the beginning with the end in view. But perhaps we can best see what Paul means by paying attention to the practical teaching he bases on it.

Chapter 4.1-16. Be worthy of your calling, he says, by being patient, humble, forbearing: that is the only foundation of unity. You mustn't be self-satisfied or self-assertive, for there is one Body and one Spirit and one hope: there is nothing worth hoping for except what we can hope for as one Body. There is one Lord, one faith, and one baptism, just as there is only one God, the Father of all, who is over all and through all and in all.

Yet, he says (v. 7), this unity is not a machine-made uniformity, there is a living variety. Grace or power is given to each member in a form determined for him alone by Christ; and we know that He can give every kind of grace, because He came down and went up again, like a king going a progress to show himself to all his subjects. Some are apostles, others prophets or evangelists or pastors or teachers. Paul speaks here of the universal and occasional kinds of ministry, not of the permanent local ministries of bishop, presbyter, and deacon; we can't simply copy his words so as to make a constitution for the Church today. But the purpose of all these ministries is to perfect or equip the saints: and 'saints', in Paul's language, means all the members of the Church, not the good people only. It is to equip all the saints to be ministers and to help to

build up the Body of Christ, till all attain to the fulness of Christ. The English versions, and even the Revised Standard Version, are misleading here (4.12) by putting a comma after 'saints', as if the equipping of the saints and the work of the ministry were the same thing, both to be left to people like apostles. We should certainly read: 'He gave the apostles and others so that they might equip the saints for the work of ministry.' The work of ministry belongs to the whole Body of the Church; some members are given grace and authority of special kinds, but the purpose of the special ministries is that all should be ministers in general. So only will the Church grow up into full manhood instead of being so many children, fickle and gullible.

> Rather, speaking the truth in love, we are to grow up in every way into him who is the head, into Christ, from whom the whole body, joined and knit together by every joint with which it is supplied, when each part is working properly makes bodily growth and upbuilds itself in love.

That is Paul's first application of his doctrine of the Church as the Body of Christ. You are one body, raised and exalted above all the powers in heaven and on earth, with different members but with one ministry and one goal, the fulness of God which is in Christ.

At v. 17 Paul reminds them again, as in the second chapter, what they were: without God, and therefore without understanding, and therefore without self-control. You didn't learn Christ, he says ('learn Christ' is a phrase worth thinking about), so as to go on living that kind of life. Strip off the old nature, be renewed, put on the new nature.

At v. 25, we may think, he becomes elementary. Don't tell lies, for we are members of one Body. If you are angry, don't work it up, seek reconciliation as soon as you can, don't give the Devil room for play. Don't steal: let your life be in giving, not in taking. No evil talk: share with others the grace that comes to you from God. Do not grieve the Holy Spirit, in whom you are sealed for the day of redemption. You have the Spirit, and therefore Christ will recognise you as His own when He comes again in judgment: live accordingly. No clamour or slander: forgive one another as God forgave you.

The same teaching continues into ch. 5 with another phrase worth remembering, 'Be imitators of God.' Walk in love.

Once you were in darkness, but now you are light in the Lord; therefore walk in light. And he quotes what sounds like an early Christian hymn:

> Awake, O sleeper, and arise from the dead,
> And Christ shall give you light.

Be wise, redeem the time, buy back your days from foulness and futility, so that you can sing together, 'singing and making melody to the Lord with all your heart'. That sums up all the teaching from 4.17 to 5.20. You are one Body, created and redeemed by God, and therefore your faith must work itself out in the kind of life that can only express itself in song. Mackay says that Ephesians gives us 'truth that sings, doctrine set to music'; and he calls the Epistle 'the first liturgy of the Christian Church'. It is full of music, as all the Bible is: angels sing at the creation and at the incarnation, and the end will be with a trumpet.

Next (5.21 or 22) he deals, as in Colossians but more fully, with what Mackay calls the Christian Frontiers, Home and Business. Your life and worship in the Church, this singing faith of yours, must reach out so that as wives or husbands, as children or parents, as slaves or masters (employees or employers)—so that there also you show that you are members of the body of Christ. Your faith must be a working faith. Our ideas about the relation of men to women may have changed since Paul's day, and the whole economic order has changed too. But Home and Business are Christian Frontiers still, and we have still something to learn from Paul.

That takes us down to 6.9. And now Paul tells us lastly that our faith must be a fighting faith. Within the Church, so far as it is the Church, there is unity and peace. But in God's providence there are still spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenlies as well as on earth. We are not to contend against flesh and blood: we are not to regard any individuals as implacable enemies of Christ and the Church (whatever they may seem to think themselves). Our enemy is the Devil, and he is a wily one; he has bridgeheads and fifth columns within the Church and within the heart of each one of us. And it is not enough that we should try to keep out of his way: we are to seek him out and to engage his forces everywhere. Therefore we need the armour of God: truth, righteousness, peace, faith,

salvation, 'the sword of the spirit, which is the word of God'—weapons for attack as well as for defence—and above all prayer. Pray, at all times, in the Spirit. Paul's last word to his people is, 'Be strong in the Lord and in the strength of his might'—that is, to pray.

To recapitulate. Paul begins by praising God for His mystery, a purpose now made plain to all who will look in the work of Christ, a purpose filling the universe from height to depth and filling time from beginning to end, a purpose to unite all things, heavenly and earthly, under the lordship of Christ. At 1.15 he prays that they may have grace to understand what is happening before their eyes and in their hearts, but breaks off to praise God's power as it is shown in the raising and exalting of Christ; and at 2.1 he adds the raising and exalting of those to whom he writes, their new creation in one man in Christ. At 3.1 he again begins to pray, and again breaks off to exult in the special grace given to him, the least of all the saints, to preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ. At last (3.14), the prayer gets out, a prayer that they may fully know Christ and his work.

Then in the second part of the letter, at 4.1, he bids them be one in Christ, since already they are one. At v. 17, they are to live together honestly and considerately, so that all together may sing with all their heart. At 5.21 or 22, they are to be one, not only in the church at worship, but also at home and in business. And at 6.10, 'finally', they are to be ready to fight in God's strength against all powers and movements that are not under the Lordship of Christ.

Three words sum up Ephesians, I think. First, the mystery: God's many-splendoured wisdom, filling time and space, and made known by the Spirit to faith; a purpose so great that there is a place within it, a different, special place, for each one of us. Second, unity: typified by the bringing together of the old irreconcilables, Jew and Gentile, but reaching beyond to every frontier of creation. And third, the word praise: we have so many ends in life, big and small, good and not so good, and they are so apt to get jumbled together. Let us remember the end of all ends, that the glory of God should be praised.

It is clear that Ephesians is the Epistle for the Church of South India. God has marvellously brought into one fellowship

those who now meet here, and those whom we represent. It would be presumptuous to claim that up to 1947 our denominations were divided in the same way as Jews and Gentiles in the first century. And I certainly won't ask who before union were near and who were far off. But in our measure, as Paul would say (for he loves to compare great things with small), we have tested and proved God's power to make two into one man, a new creation in Christ Jesus; and in our measure we know how our common worship has been enriched, and our witness strengthened. Therefore let us be strong in our prayer that all may be one. We cannot sit down now. We came to birth, after a long painful labour, because we believed there were too many sects. Yet it would be easy for us to become just one more sect. Let us be strong in prayer, not because unity is attractive or effective, but because it is the will of God to make all one in Christ, 'for in him all things hold together'. Let us constantly remember what thirty-three men said at Tranquebar,[1] thirty-seven years ago: 'We aim not at compromise for the sake of peace, but at comprehension for the sake of truth'.

[1] In 1919, thirty-one Indian ministers of the Church of India (Anglican) and the South India United Church (Presbyterian and Congregationalist) with Dr Sherwood Eddy and Mr. H. A. Papley, meeting at Tranquebar for a retreat during an evangelistic campaign, drew up a Manifesto which was the beginning of the movement towards the inauguration of the Church of South India in 1947.

THE DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION: A SURVEY OF BARTH'S *KIRCHLICHE DOGMATIK* IV/2

by The Rev. Dr G. W. BROMILEY

In the latest part-volume of the *Church Dogmatics* published in the autumn of 1955, Karl Barth has given us his second comprehensive survey of the doctrine of reconciliation. For the setting of this treatment within the whole, readers are referred to the synopsis of the first part-volume in a previous issue (Volume 8, Number 2, June 1955), or better still, to the English translation which is now available (cf. especially § 58, 4). Within this whole, the present part-volume deals with the common material under the general title of 'Jesus Christ, the Servant as Lord', and therefore from the standpoint of the kingly work of Christ. The volume consists of one long chapter (953 pages) within the *Dogmatics*, and is divided into five main sections. It is to be noted, incidentally, that in the rendering of *Versöhnung* in the main title of Volume IV the word 'reconciliation' has now been preferred to 'atonement', although the latter is often used where it agrees with the context.

Before we proceed to an analysis of the material, the following general points may be made. There is again a massive biblical reference, the index of citations from Scripture being perhaps larger than in any previous part-volume. Valuable dogmatico-historical and exegetical *excursus* are to be found in this as in earlier portions, including a very well-balanced assessment of Christian monasticism. There is also the point that in this case Barth has no particular axe to grind, as in his indirect rebuttal of Bultmann in the previous part-volume. The second part is indeed distinctively and almost consciously irenical, finding a place for the legitimate interests of Pietism and Liberalism as well as holding out an olive-branch to conservative Reformed schools. Finally, it may be mentioned that tremendous care is taken with the Christological basis, which occupies not far short of half of the whole book. This is in a sense disproportionate, but we may be grateful for it since it gives us a most detailed and illuminating discussion of the relationship between the deity and humanity of Christ.

It is with this Christological foundation that the chapter (15) opens in the first section (64), which bears the title 'The Exaltation

of the Son of Man'. An introductory sub-section states the second problem of the doctrine of reconciliation, mentioning some of the dangers involved but showing that the problem is necessarily posed by the Bible and that there are elements of truth even in distorted movements (e.g. Monasticism). The all-important need is to begin at the right point, i.e. the identity of the Son of God with the man Jesus of Nazareth.

The second sub-section takes up this central theme under the title 'The Homecoming of the Son of Man'. It is pointed out that as God went into the far country, so man comes home—hints of a Christological exegesis along these lines being found in the Parable of the Prodigal Son. Corresponding to the downward movement of God, there is an upward movement of man in the person of the One who is wholly like us but also wholly unlike us. Three aspects of this movement are then considered. The first is the basis in the election; the second its historical fulfilment in the incarnation; and the third the basis of its revelation in the resurrection and ascension. The first of these is a short summary of the doctrine of election in II/2 and need not detain us. But the second and third are given detailed consideration, especially the second; and the main points made by Barth must be stated briefly.

The main question asked in the second is what is meant by the new event which is the *ratio essendi* and the *ratio cognoscendi* of the existence of Jesus. Barth's answer is that it is an assumption, i.e. a taking up or elevating of man into deity in the whole movement of God's own condescension. This means (1) that God becomes and is also man—representative man; (2) that the existence of the Son of God becomes and is also that of a man—a human Thou—in a union which is not co-essential, social, chemical, organic, intellectual, personal or sacramental, but hypostatic; (3) that divine and human essences, incompatible in themselves, are united in Him by participation (*communio naturarum*); and (4) that He elevated human nature into Himself by mutual participation. In this participation Barth distinguishes (*a*) the impartation (*communicatio idiomatum*); (*b*) what is imparted, i.e. especially the determination of human essence by divine, not in deification but in an exaltation of electing grace to the graces of (i) divine origin, (ii) sinlessness, (iii) the presence and action of the Holy Spirit and (iv) qualification as the organ of the work of the Son of God as the Mediator (*communicatio gratiarum*); and (*c*) its actualisation, not in a prior *unitio* leading to a state, but in an *operatio*, an event, an act of unification; the existence of Jesus in the one movement of *exinanitio* and *exaltatio* (*communicatio operationum*). In this part there are, of course, detailed discussions of the Lutheran and Reformed doctrines of *communicatio*,

and care is taken to state the matter in line with Chalcedonian teaching. Attention is also drawn to the consequent impossibility of giving a biographical or artistic portrayal of Jesus.

Under the third head Barth asks how all this is known. It is known by an act of God which has the character of revelation attested by the biblical witness. But the apostles, like ourselves, give their witness in accordance with the basic text which is Jesus Christ Himself in His self-revelation—something to which we are bound and which we cannot control. But Jesus Christ in His self-revelation is the Holy Spirit in His *testimonium externum* and *internum*. This witness is the self-witness of the risen and ascended Christ. The resurrection and ascension do not add to the incarnation and crucifixion. They are of a piece with them, but their aim is revelation or declaration with a view to the recognition and gratitude of man; the initiative resting always with the risen and self-revealing Christ, and the main point being the identity of the Resurrected with the Crucified. In this two-fold event of the resurrection and ascension (with the appearances between), the former is the *terminus a quo* and the latter the *terminus ad quem*. Jesus Christ comes as no other man from the world, from death, from His awakening; and He goes as no other man to the other world, to God. The distinctiveness of the knowledge is determined by its theme, and it comes down historically through the texts of the New Testament.

The next sub-section is devoted to a presentation of the One of whom all this is true—the royal man Jesus as He is portrayed in the Gospels in the light of His resurrection. Again the material has to be divided and four great aspects are considered. The first is the general fact that Jesus is present among men in a way that is unmistakable, decisive, unforgettable and irrevocable, so that He is thought of always as He who is what He was, and no full portrayal or even characterisation is possible. The second is that His existence is analogous to the mode of God's existence and work for man: majestic in humility; expressed in terms of service; genuinely free in relation to the orders of life (e.g. temple, family, synagogue, political and economic structure); and active on behalf of men. (In this connexion Barth considers Jesus's relationship to the 'people', and also the *makarisms* or beatitudes.) The third is His coming before us in the completed act of His words and works. Not a great deal is said about the words, probably because these will demand fuller treatment in IV/3. But after a useful discussion of the three great terms εὐαγγελίζεσθαι, διδάσκειν, and κηρύσσειν Barth moves on to a fuller treatment of the works of Jesus which are extraordinary not merely as healings etc. (for which there are parallels elsewhere), but as manifestations of the kingdom of God.

Indications of this are found in (i) the fact that the initiative is with Jesus; (ii) the complete lack of self-seeking; (iii) the absence of any programme; (iv) the relationship to the *kerygma*; and (v) their transparent or symbolic quality. With them there comes a new light, five points especially calling for notice: (1) those who experience them realise their need; (2) their need is met; (3) God is seen to be interested in man; (4) He sides with man against evils (the significance of Sabbath healing, of Jesus's severity in the face of death and of the exorcisms being particularly noted); and (5) a particular grace of liberation is displayed either in response to faith or in the creation of it. The fourth aspect is that although the royal activity of Jesus is set in the light of the resurrection it is dominated by the Cross. In appearance the Cross seems to be in contrast to the early ministry. In fact, however, it is the coronation of the royal man (hence the incongruence of so much passion-music). This emerges even in the Synoptists, but more particularly in John and Paul. Four points are made in this connexion: (1) that the death of Jesus is the fulfilment of His willing obedience; (2) that it is according to the divine ordination and therefore necessary; (3) that those around have their own place and function as agents of His death; and (4) that there is a disparate but unmistakable counterpart to the Cross in the existence of the disciples too.

The final sub-section ('The Direction of the Son') forms a transitional discussion corresponding to 'The Verdict of the Father' in IV/1. It answers a two-fold question: How can we say that we are exalted as and because He is? and how can we see the royal man in His concealment? The second question arises out of the first, for it is obvious that if we are to accept the truth that we are in Him in an ontological relationship, we must not look at ourselves in our weakness but at Him as the One whose exaltation naturally and necessarily includes our own. Yet when we look at Him we see humiliation rather than exaltation. The reality of His exaltation is, of course, complete in itself, but how can we know it, and therefore our own? The answer lies in the self-disclosure of the One who is concealed. And this self-disclosure (in His resurrection) has the power not only to show us who He is, but also, and in so doing, to overcome the distance between Him and us, and between our old life and our new. The New Testament counts on it that our decision is taken in consequence of His; that the witness about Him to us has the power (as His living self-disclosure) to set us in the freedom of conversion, i.e. of movement with Him and to Him. This power is miraculous but not mechanical. It is the power of light and therefore of liberation, perception, peace, humility and much else. But there is more to it than that, for exaltation in the

power of His resurrection is the proceeding, presence and action of the Holy Spirit whom we can only confess, since even the institutions by which we may try to guarantee or control Him are His gift. The Spirit is the Holy Spirit, distinctive and differentiating, as the Spirit of Jesus Christ (active in His incarnation, life, death, resurrection, attestation and followers). Hence we too are holy in His presence and action. But the Spirit is also the Spirit of God or the Father, and this points us to the fact that the history of communication in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit has a background in God Himself. If we can find an analogy to the Trinity in (i) the origin of God's saving work in the existence of the man Jesus, (ii) its consequence in the existence of the community and (iii) the transition between the two in the divine disclosure, the equation between the third term and the third person of the Trinity is not just indirect but direct. The miracle and mystery and sovereignty and liberating power of Pentecost is that it repeats and represents something in God Himself—the fellowship of the Father and the Son. Against this background the Holy Spirit unites the man Jesus and His people. Hence the first problem is solved. But He also solves the second problem at the same time, for He who unites Jesus and us is He who unites Father and Son, and who thus shows us that what takes place at the Cross is truth and *doxa* (not paradox) because it corresponds to what takes place in God. It is the humiliation of the Exalted, reflecting the mercy of the Father; and the exaltation of the Humble, manifesting the majesty of the Son. The Holy Spirit in His witness and action effects the transition by placing us under the three-fold wisdom (*Weisheit*) or direction (*Weisung*) of the Son. This direction is indication—we are pointed to a place which is ours and at which we are free. It is correction—the new life has to be sharply severed from the old. And it is instruction—we are given precise directions for the exercise of the freedom that is given.

Having completed this transitional discussion, Barth examines in section 65 the life from which we are exalted by the royal man Jesus as it appears in the light of His lordship. He explains again in a first sub-section that sin and the man of sin can be truly known only in this light. But what the elevating of Jesus discloses is the lowliness and inertia of man which shames us and should make us ashamed. The living Jesus shows us that we belong to that very ordinary and average crowd that does Him to death. As sinners we are disqualified because He has taken our place, our ingratitude only increasing our shame. We cannot separate between our sin and ourselves because we have now no neutral place at which to judge—only the place where Jesus Himself is the new man. Nor can we integrate sin or sinners into a metaphysical schema, for God's genuine over-

ruling took the form of a substitutionary death and therefore involves the death of the old man and the resurrection of the new. The nature of sloth calls for separate treatment in a second sub-section. It is of course laziness—the unbelieving, ungrateful disobedient refusal to live in the freedom given. It takes four different forms in four great relationships: each of these forms being futile but actual; each having dangerous consequences; each practising concealment; and each necessarily entailing all the others. First, in relation to God it is stupidity (as illustrated by the fool of Proverbs and especially Nabal). Second, in relation to man it is inhumanity (as illustrated by the social evils denounced by Amos). Third, in relation to self it is dissipation (as illustrated by the sin of David). And finally, in relation to human temporality it is care (as illustrated by the cowardice of the spies and Israel when they refused to enter the promised land). The sloth of man involves his misery, and in a third sub-section Barth portrays the miserable state of bondage, exile, corruption and death to which man is reduced and which is so severe just because he is still in the sphere of grace. In this state man is totally good, for his functions are good, but totally corrupt because they are exercised for evil. He has freedom of choice, but no genuine freedom (and therefore no power to co-operate) because he does not have the freedom *non posse peccare*. Because he is given up to death, does evil works and is not free, liberation is possible only with the man Jesus who died, who does new works and who bestows the royal freedom of His obedience.

The next section (66) takes up the question of man's sanctification in six short sub-sections which may be briefly analysed. The first considers the relationship of sanctification to justification. The two are not successive stages but two 'moments' in the one action. They present aspects which are genuinely different but they are also inseparable, so that there can be no cheap grace or quietism. The one can claim to be first in order as origin or presupposition. But so too can the other as end or consequence. Next, Barth points out that in the strict sense there is only the one Holy One. The term 'holy people' is infrequent in the Bible and the New Testament speaks often of saints but never of a single saint. Jesus Himself, as the Holy One, is our sanctification, which rests on the presupposition (as against Calvin) that He is this for all men, the saints being those who attest the fact. Saints are men in whom the living Jesus is at work by His Spirit; who are under His direction; who, while still below, are disturbed as sinners and begin to rise up in the freedom for a new life in place of the old. Third, this disturbance is effected by the call to discipleship. This is (1) a sovereign claiming of man which it is terrible to resist; (2) a call which binds, not to an idea

or system, but to the One who calls; (3) a call to take a definite step in faith—a first step, but a real one, and more than the mere readiness to take it; and (4) a call to break with given attachments such as possessions, fame or even family or religion, which are all relativised as in the case of Jesus Himself. Fourth, the summons to discipleship means an awakening to conversion. As an awakening, it is one event –the work of God through Scripture. And it is an awakening to conversion, to a turning on the axis that God is for us and that we are His. This conversion, which affects the whole man, is not an individual matter, or sectional, or private, or once-for-all, but is in company with others and means a whole life of conversion. It entails a basic conflict, a falling-out or falling-apart, as we come under a two-fold determination—that of the new man who is summoned to advance and that of the old who refuses to do so. The acuteness of the struggle derives from the fact that man is *simul* (*totus*) *iustus*, *simul* (*totus*) *peccator*; the old having to perish and the new to come. (Barth warns at this point against the danger of overstressing *mortificatio* at the expense of *vivificatio*.) It is further pointed out that the turning is not mechanical, but under the impulsion of the Holy Spirit; that the dynamic principle in this movement is the truth; and that its actualisation is wholly in Jesus Christ. Fifth, there is a sub-section on the praise of works, i.e. that they are to the praise of God and are praised by Him, and are therefore good. Good works do not justify, and are good only in relationship to the good work of God. They are done in the service of God and His good work, being performed in accordance with the divine command. Their goodness is from God, since it is the gift of grace that there are good works as well as bad. Finally there is a sub-section on the dignity of the Cross, which indicates the limit of sanctification and shows it to be the movement to a final goal. This particular Cross is ours, not Christ's. There is no equation of Christ and Christians, but sanctification is a movement which is crossed through or stamped by the Cross. This does not mean ordinary human suffering for its own sake, which we may rightly try to avoid. It is the cross given in fellowship with Christ and similar to His Cross for all its dissimilarity. Its function is to humble, to punish and to discipline, and it consists primarily in various forms of persecution. But it is not to be sought for its own sake, since it does not constitute an end in itself.

In section 67 Barth turns to the work of the Holy Spirit in the upbuilding of the Christian community. The first sub-section is on the true Church and its edification by the Holy Spirit; the history in which the true Church is, and is visible. The goal of this history is the necessary one of manifesting the world's sanctification in

Christ in a provisional representation—a task for which the Church is empowered by the Holy Spirit. It takes the form of an upbuilding; not private edification, but the construction of a building which teaches us the true nature of building. God Himself is the ultimate builder, and the work is that of integrating the 'materials' (not a good word, as Barth observes, since the reference is to men). The work takes place supremely in divine service. In the next sub-section Barth discusses the parallel concept of organic growth, i.e. the increase of the *communio sanctorum* by participation in the *sancta*. This growth is both external (in numerical expansion) and internal (in spiritual force), but it is not systematic or unlimited. The power behind it is that of the Holy Spirit, and therefore of Jesus Christ Himself both by remote operation and by His indwelling as the Head of the community. This leads Barth to two (irreversible) affirmations: that Jesus Christ is the community; and that the kingdom of God is His community. These affirmations are discussed in relation to Eph. 4.11-16. The third sub-section treats of the upholding of the community in face of the two external dangers threatening its outward growth and the two internal threatening its inward. These are persecution and toleration on the one side, secularisation and sacralisation on the other. Although the Church is destructible *in se*, it is not in fact destroyed, being kept by Holy Scripture and supremely by Jesus Christ. The order of the community occupies Barth in the last sub-section. The form of the community involves order, i.e. what is lawful and right. At this point Barth criticises the idea of a formless Church advocated by Sohm and Brunner. The basis of order is Christological, the Church being a brotherly Christocracy as a provisional representation of Jesus Christ. Its law is distinctively 'spiritual' in the sense of being found in the fellowship of the Spirit, which means, in hearing the voice of Jesus Christ attested in Scripture. It has also a constitutional law in virtue of its relationship with the state, but in accordance with its basis its own law is (1) a law of service—this law being unequivocal, total and universal; (2) a liturgical law, ordered by its special history in divine service, i.e. the Word of God, Baptism, the Lord's Supper and prayer, and always to be found at divine service and concerned to order it; (3) a living law, always ready for new answers, for movement from the good to the better, and therefore not a fixed and binding law for every age or place; and (4) an exemplary law which shows all other human law what true law ought to be—a witness as law which basically proclaims the Gospel.

The final section (68) brings us to the outworking in the life of the individual Christian under the title 'The Holy Spirit and Christian Love'. Again there are four sub-sections. The first of

these on the problem of Christian love begins with an assertion that the individual is inevitably included as a microcosmic form of the community. In the case of the individual, edification is fulfilled as love, which is defined as self-giving (a turning from self to another for the sake of the other). This leads Barth to a discussion of the relationship between *agape* and *eros* and their differentiation. The main point is that although both are historical determinations of human nature, the former corresponds to it, whereas the latter contradicts it. We must not be too severe or self-righteous in relation to *eros*, for we all love erotically as well. But Christian love alone can free us from the vicious circle of wanting and grasping which is the mark of *eros* as opposed to the self-giving of *agape*. In a second sub-section Barth deals with the basis, or origin, of Christian love. It is a free action following the love of God. Love comes from God, who is, and who loves, and who is therefore eternally love. The love of God is exercised in the history of the covenant as portrayed especially by Hosea, Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah in the Old Testament and the Epistles in the New. The love of God is an electing love (the divine *diligere* being a free *eligere*); a purifying love, demanding a break from sin; and a creative love, which brings about (although it is not just for the sake of) a response. (In this connexion Barth points out that the Bible uses the same word for the human response as for the divine love.) The response is, however, a liberation and not a constraint; the 'thou shalt' of the commandment being a future rather than an imperative. The theme of the third sub-section is the act of love. Formally, it is something new and free, totally affecting the being of man. Its character is that of impartation, of giving; and it naturally produces elevation and joy. Materially, it is (1) a love for God (a simple thing if incomprehensible *in se*). This love, which means having an interest in God, includes love for Jesus, and at this point Barth retracts his own earlier exclusion of emotional warmth through exaggerated fear of religious eroticism. Obviously, of course, love entails obedience, but it is the obedience of a free and dynamic act. But love is also (2) love for the neighbour. This does not mean love for humanity and all men generally, but love for our fellows in the specific relationship of salvation-history (Israel in the Old Testament and the community in the New, but also the enemies of God's people). It is, of course, only practically and provisionally that we can say who are our brothers, since many may be so, or become so, apart from our present knowledge. Thus there is no exclusion. This brotherly love consists essentially in the mutual attestation and pledging of the love of God, of which it is a representation in the world. Basically, the mystery of brotherly love is that of Jesus

Christ who is the only true Israelite and the only true Christian. But His love finds in ours a true if imperfect reflection. The section, and indeed the whole chapter, is fitly concluded by an analysis of the manner or nature of love. This takes the form of an exposition of 1 Cor. 13, under three main heads. First, it is love alone that counts (as compared with an ascending series of genuine spiritual endowments). Second, it is love alone that conquers (in face of enemies both within and without). And finally, it is love alone that endures (even through the relativisation of knowledge and the transformation of faith and hope into sight and fulfilment). For love is present now as it will persist through eternity, and therefore beyond all other legitimate and effective gifts and graces 'love is *the* way' (1 Cor. 12.31).

BOOK REVIEWS

Theologische Erkenntnislehre. By HENDRIK VAN OYEN. Zwingli-Verlag, Zürich, 1955. Pp. 244. 25s. 6d.

THE author of this work is Ordinarius Professor of Systematic Theology at Basel. From his name one may presume that the Dutch theologians he so frequently quotes are fellow-nationals. This book, then, should be enough to confound any Nathanaels who, on the basis of certain remarks in recent prefaces to the *Kirchliche Dogmatik* of another Basel theologian, had concluded that no good thing could come out of this northern Nazareth! The modern theological debate receives here a contribution of quite first-class power and relevance.

'An essay in dogmatic prolegomena': the sub-title itself is a theological decision—'dogmatic prolegomena' not 'prolegomena to dogmatics'. As in Barth the 'pro' in 'prolegomena' is temporal and not logical; these are the 'things said first' in dogmatics, not prefixed to dogmatics by some other authority. The epistemology promised by the title is not philosophy of religion, not a collection of rational *a priori*'s laying down in advance of faith the limits within which faith may be permitted to enlighten us (if it can) on the nature of reality. 'The scandalon of Christian faith is accepted, and the essay aims at being the account which biblical thinking must give of itself, taking itself seriously and simply. It is the *recognitio* of grateful faith taking stock of the change of mind (*metanoia*) brought about when a man is led to encounter with Jesus Christ.' Van Oyen seeks to set forth his special contribution over against the positions of two other contemporary theologians of the first importance in the present scene, Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann. On the whole he seems to stand closer to his Basel colleague than to the Marburg theologian. Briefly, while he appreciates the help thrown by the existentialist theology on 'the participatory reception of the message' of the Gospel, he conceives that the theology of Bultmann reduces this in effect to a word about man rather than a Word of God, and also that biblical revelation, properly conceived, stands in no need of demythologisation. Against Barth he wishes to speak of an *analogia communicationis* instead of *fidei*, which, while not establishing the *analogia entis*, does offer ontological possibilities to theology, and provides for a more positive affiliation of the Christian message with the universal phenomenon of religion.

The first part of the book indicates the author's 'orientation' on such general matters as the task of theology, theology and the religions, theology and science, dogma and dogmatics, the place of apologetics. He is as Barthian as can be in his view of theology as standing in the service of the Church: dogmatics is the Church's articulation of its own constitutive faith. But he holds that on the human side the Christian faith presents itself as 'religion', and the other religions must not be dismissed as 'unfaith'. There is no 'primitive revelation' and the specific Christian revelation is no continuation in a straight line of 'natural religion'. But the declaration of God in nature, as in the Psalms; the knowledge of the law of God in conscience, as in Paul's view of the pagan world in Romans; these biblical features must not be depreciated because they cannot be fitted into the Wrath-Grace schema. The usefulness of calling theology a science is doubtful; perhaps it is closer to artistic activity; or if we agree to call it science this should remind us that as such it is a fallible human undertaking yielding relative results which stand in need of constant revision (shades of Huxley & Co.!). As for apologetics, this cannot be Brunner's eristic 'other task of theology' but only the negative or polemical aspect of dogmatic work all along the line; there is no question of justifying faith before some external court of higher instance.

In this first part also there appears the theology of the Word which underlies the special positions of van Oyen in the rest of the book, and which dictates the division of the subsequent matter under three heads: A. The revelation in Christ; B. Man as mandatory (sc. of God); C. The Holy Spirit as Advocate (*Anwaltschaft des Geistes*). Creation the Bible represents as by the Word of God: this is the first 'caesura' of the Divine Speech, of which the second is the Incarnation of the Word in Jesus Christ and the third the continuing Speech in the Holy Spirit up to the perfecting of all things. The creative Speech establishes God as Lord of and over being, and it gives the first principle of an ontology: being as such is therefore 'effable', susceptible of meaning, and the meaning is what the Divine Speech spoke into it in making it. The biblical *imago dei* in the creation of man means that man has a delegated power of speech (*Ermächtigung des Wortes*) which gives the power to penetrate to the meaning of being as spoken by the Divine Speech. It also means the power of standing 'at a distance' from being, including his own being; he is not subsumed in Nature, but is free. Here then we have in human nature an *analogia verbi*. This freedom and knowledge are overlaid in actual man by the misuse of freedom in sin. But the *analogia verbi* remains in fallen man along with the *analogia ordinis* and the *analogia integritatis*, which together form a three-fold

analogia communicationis. This last expression points to the fact that all man's knowledge of God is within the communion and community with God which the Word of God set him in when the Word made him. 'It is the secret of man that he has to do with God. The creature is not without the Creator, the Creator not without the creature.' This last position means that having created the creature, man, who is thereby bound to God, God in creating community binds Himself to man: 'He is no child, who first makes and then breaks, but He stands to what He has brought into life.' This means that the creative Speech will speak again in the redemptive and perfecting Speech of the later caesuras of the Incarnation and the Spirit's work. Meantime we note that the original creative Word which brought man into being told him to increase and multiply and replenish the earth: man is not only constituted by God's creative communion but thereby set in community with his fellow-creatures. In the 'Orders' of society he is aware of an essential being into which he should grow, an awareness which expresses itself in the 'Thou shalt's' of law and propriety. In the deliverances of conscience (*index*, *judex*, *vindex*) he knows the state of integrity from which he has departed beyond his own power to remedy. These analogies of order and integrity 'reflect in their indirect, analogous ways certain aspects of the form which man as creature received from the hand of his creator in order that he might inhabit the earth. They all centre upon the freedom which man has lost for the decision which is expressly implied in his power of speech over being. This high origin serves only to set in higher relief the threats, the poverty of life, of the man without relation to the living God. Here indeed the whole realm of civilisation spreads itself out before us, in whose dialectic of preserving and destroying forces man is not left altogether without protection or guidance, whose thickets are not so dense but that ever and again the preaching of the Word can make room for itself in this world, and thus it is granted to culture here and there to become attentive to the call of Christ. In this way it can happen that this world of analogies can be brought into relation as signs (*zeichenhaft*) of the Kingdom of God in Christ.'

The similarities and dissimilarities of this doctrine to the Barthian *analogia fidei* will be obvious. If we take the essence of the Barthian doctrine as explained by von Balthasar to be that '*analogia fidei* as contrasted with *analogia entis* means therefore . . . similarity from God's side towards the creature, in an irreversible direction, something brought about from above, the creature's being grasped through and by the Word', then we must say that van Oyen's *analogia communicationis* is brought about from God's side, is not the creature's

'possession' in its own right, is illuminated in its true meaning by the second caesura of the Divine Speech in Christ, *but* there is a certain reversibility in the direction. The communion brought about from God's side, in which both in Creation and Redemption knowledge of Him is conveyed, is real personal communion; God Himself is there; so that there may even be talk of an *analogia participationis*—only 'not as the equivalent of the Platonic *methexis* . . . an incomparable-comparable insertion into being . . . but . . . taking part in an intercourse as a gifted relationship, as *koinonia*, whereby it would be possible to speak of an *analogia entis communicantis*'. There is therefore an *Anknüpfungspunkt* in ordinary human nature for the Gospel; the Fall has not obliterated or defaced totally the *imago dei*. 'The structures of human nature possess an analogical character because they express a relatedness both comparable and incomparable with that which God has revealed in Christ as the genuine Word, the true Order, and true Integrity.' 'In and with the Gospel the *Anknüpfungspunkt* is laid down anew (*neu gesetzt wird*).'

The reckoning with the existentialist reading of the Gospel and the demythologising controversy takes place partly in the preliminary first chapter, where the relations of Faith and Understanding are discussed with reference to the views of Bultmann in *Glauben und Verstehen*, and again in van Oyen's later treatment of the biblical conception of Revelation in chapter two. Bultmann is orthodox in Christocentricity: 'Revelation is revelation of new life in Jesus Christ, which as Word addresses itself to me and is heard by me as setting me in a new situation in life. It is the "eschatological activity of God", which ever and anew makes appeal to my present situation and would lead me from death unto life.' Theology is 'the science of existential understanding'. The understanding in place here is the completion of an understanding of himself, which man has or can come to by himself, as limited in his essential being. Death in particular reveals man's radical limitation. Revelation shows to man God as his limit, and redresses the misunderstanding by which man puts himself in God's place, forgetting whence he came. The Gospel meets man's situation as fallen: it enlightens him by showing him himself as he was meant to be, and calls on him to return to his authentic being, and provides a motive power thereto in the revelation of resurrection to new life in Jesus Christ. Van Oyen complains that this conception of revelation in Bultmann is a word about man rather than the Word of God. It is the completion of a primitive revelation (*Ur-Offenbarung*) which man has in the consciousness of himself as radically limited; and the God who is revealed as his limit is only revealed as that which limits man, i.e. God and man are correlatives limiting each other. The Gospel runs out into the

call to man to complete himself with his fulfilment in God—and thereby God too finds His fulfilment! One wonders if this conclusion is what Bultmann himself would be at. Our author finds his thought still shackled by the presuppositions of German Idealism; although he agrees with Jaspers in finding that Bultmann 'does not succeed in carrying through the existentialist interpretation (sc. of Christianity) without an "objective" (*gegenständliches*) element, namely an activity of God making itself effective in history'. We may agree, at any rate, that such a reading of Christian *Existenz* 'remains fettered to intellectual understanding of meaning'—*der Sinn von Sein.*

Van Oyen finds the characteristic note of the biblical conception of the knowledge it has of God in its being knowledge within communion. God is known directly in a real presence under signs (*Zeichen*) in a communion which He initiates and continues with a community of His choosing and constituting. Biblical thinking is not man's creative conceptual construction of his own world, but the receptive perception of God's communication in and towards community. The Word in the Bible means the intercourse which God has with His people, in Christ and in the Church. Hence all the Hebrew vocabulary relating to *truth* is connected with the language of personal intercourse, not with that of the impersonal generalising intellect. The God who is revealed is revealed as *there*, really and actively present under the sign of some outward event, although not objectively (*dinghaft*) qualified by such thing or event. (*Er ist da, in seiner Anwesenheit, Er als Gott*) He reveals Himself as Himself—I am what I am. And He will be what He will be: Truth is faithfulness to His revealed grace and mercy—*Wahrheit* is *Treue*. *Dabar* is not *Logos*, it is the continued Speech of the same God in the succeeding caesuras of Creation, Incarnation, Perfecting by the Spirit. This presence refuses concretion in a material image: idolatry is the cardinal apostacy of the Old Testament. Neither is the Sign a mythological symbol in terms of sense of that which transcends space and time. 'Neither immanence nor transcendence is properly in view here, because these conceptualities do not suffice adequately to express the peculiar secret of God in His opening up of Himself to men.' Consequently the message of the Bible, whether in Old Testament or in New, does not stand in need of demythologising, for it is not myth in the first instance, although the form of the record may be affected by the ancient Hebrew world-picture. Let us not be in too big a hurry to rewrite the record in terms of any current *Weltbild*, which may be out-of-date before long in its turn! The Word of revelation is Speech through a Sign, even as the Incarnation is the Word made flesh. Van Oyen does not him-

self institute any comparison of his own doctrine of the Signs of God's Speech with Barth's conception of the capacity of creaturely reality to act as *sign* in conveying the knowledge of God, where the overtones of the term are those of Lutheran sacramental doctrine. But it might perhaps be a rewarding enterprise to make a comparative study of Barth and van Oyen here, for the relations of Sign to Analogy appear to the reviewer to stand in need of clarification throughout the Barthian theology.

The same insistence on a doctrine of Real Presence runs through the treatment of the *Anwaltschaft des Geistes* in the concluding part of this book. Van Oyen opts for 'Advocate' rather than the Lutheran 'Comforter' as the designation of the role of the Holy Spirit which best fits the full New Testament doctrine. 'The Advocacy of the Spirit betokens a continuing work of God's concern for the being of this world, reaching to its very utmost ends, and for the life of man therein.' Since 'the Incarnation is the great sign of the love of God for the concrete reality of this world' there follows the consequence that 'the love of God has taken this earthly reality up into itself, and where God loves there is also His divine fulfilment bringing itself to pass in things and in men: it is God, the Creator, who loves towards the New Creation'. Our author therefore demurs to Oscar Cullman's statement that if there is no separation as to content between the Kingdom of Christ and the Kingdom of God there must yet of necessity be a separation in time. God the Spirit as Lord is here and now, striving towards the Perfecting of all things. We must not, in view of our understanding of the Holy Spirit as the principle of the existential appropriation of the work of Christ by the believer, limit His presence and power to the 'now' of each individual believer's decision. The Church is an objective magnitude in history. We must not make either of the opposing mistakes of conceiving the work of the Spirit in the believer as the elimination of his own subjectivity, the supersession of the human subject by the Divine Subject; nor yet may we suppose that all that the individual believer feels impelled to is automatically the leading of the Holy Spirit. Van Oyen believes that the fear of 'enthusiasm' (*Schwärmerei*), of the excesses of the sectary, is the chief root of the reluctance to give due place to a true doctrine of the Spirit's real presence, and so limits the full hope and fullest activity of the Christian Church. The fact that our author is also the author of an *Evangelische Ethik* underlines his earnestness here. *Die Kirche ist indem sie geschieht:* that is his 'activism'. But men must not limit the power and reality of the Spirit. The New Creation has begun in the power of Him who is with us always, the Lord who 'is that Spirit'. This is the Truth, the *Treue*, the continuing faithfulness of

the God whose Speech, now in its third caesura as the Spirit's *Fürsprecherheit*, speech for our defence before the world, speaks in communion to the community of His choosing, and towards the communion and community (*koinonia*) of all things in the Consummation.

The outline given above of the main line of argument of this notable book, so far as the reviewer has been able to understand it, can convey little idea of its incidental riches. To mention two matters only: there is a rewarding comparison of the apologetic approach of Pascal and Brunner respectively; and there is a summary of an *Interpretation of the Personality of Jesus* contributed to a recent *Festschrift* by Karl Jaspers, which our author is surely right in saluting as a masterpiece of reverent understanding, short of the insights of believing faith—an astonishing effort of objective observation!

JAMES BROWN

The Faith of Israel. By H. H. ROWLEY. S.C.M. Press, 1956. 18s.

THE volume consists of the James Sprunt Lectures, delivered in 1955 at the Union College Seminary, Richmond, Virginia. The sub-title is truly descriptive: 'Aspects of Old Testament Thought'. Indeed the author ranges over almost the whole of Old Testament thought, so that the book is much more comprehensive than the actual titles of the seven lectures suggest. The volume is an excellent example of the marked tendency in modern Old Testament Study. Critical and analytical study must always have its place, but the days when such studies occupied a foremost place are now past. There is a definite movement to build up positively on the foundations laid by the careful analytical studies of the last sixty or so years.

Professor Rowley first discusses Revelation and its Media. God has not left man to stumble along in the darkness. His revelation is not forced upon man, but is given of His grace to all who are eager and sensitive to receive it. The various media of revelation are discussed—Nature, the sacred lot, dreams, chance events, human experience, the written word, in all of which there is nothing peculiar to Israelite faith. The uniqueness of revelation in the Bible consists of the combination of certain moments of special significance combined with the personality of a particular prophetic individual. The chiefest of these events is the Exodus from Egypt, with additional examples in Deborah and Esdraelon, and Isaiah and Sennacherib's attack on Jerusalem. Dr Rowley has certainly emphasised the very great importance of the Exodus experience, but he could have underlined it still more markedly. It is impossible to overestimate the importance in Hebrew history and religion of this greatest of the ancient Acts of God. Rev. 15.4 is of the utmost importance here:

'they sing the song of Moses the servant of God, and the song of the Lamb'.

The second lecture deals with the Nature of God. Once more Professor Rowley deals, one by one, with all the elements portrayed in the Old Testament, and then concentrates on what is unique in Old Testament thought. Once more the procedure is sound and in every way to be commended. What we all want to know about the Bible is what is unique in it. What does the Bible say that no other book says? What has the Bible to say about God, that nothing else has to say? The most important element is to be found in God's character. He seeks to save Israel not only from her enemies, but from herself. His holiness is the antithesis of all moral stain. His faithfulness, His truth mean that He is to be relied on. In this connexion it is important to realise (as doubtless Dr Rowley will agree) that 'truth' to the Hebrew is not a proposition which is to be accepted as being right and correct, but something that can be relied on. Professor Rowley lays great emphasis, as we would expect from his previous publications, on the elective grace of God, and he shows how God's reluctance to give up the struggle leads to the idea of the Remnant. He claims that Israel's attainment of a monotheistic faith is 'not easily to be accounted for on simple evolutionary lines'. Some of us would state this in stronger terms and say that monotheism never came out of animism, fetichism and the rest.

The third lecture deals with the Nature and Need of Man. A reference to the phrase 'image of God' leads to an excursus on the prevalence of images in Old Israel with a discussion as to what is meant by saying that man is made in the image of God. The author continues by discussing the nature of man, maintaining that from the beginning man is more than an animated body, like the animals; it is assumed from the beginning that man can have fellowship with God. He was created to serve God on earth as the angels serve Him in heaven.

The fourth lecture deals with the interchange of emphasis of the individual and the community which is characteristic of the Old Testament, and the fifth with the Good Life. Here it is rightly pointed out that the prophetic demand for righteousness is religious in its origin. God demands righteousness because He Himself is righteous. The Good Life is that which is lived in harmony with God's will and draws its inspiration from communion with God. In the lecture on Death and Beyond, Dr Rowley discusses in turn all the passages which have been quoted by all the writers of the subject. He holds that there has been no Persian influence on Hebrew thought of a resurrection, and he refers to Daniel 12.2 as

the one certain and undisputed reference to the resurrection of the dead. The evidence from the Old Testament is meagre, but what thought there is on the subject is an extension of ideas that are fundamental in Old Testament ideas as to the nature of the Good Life on earth. The concluding lecture deals with the Day of the Lord, mostly thought of as near, but always as a day of direct and manifest action by God. This leads to discussions of the related themes of the son of David, the Son of Man and the Suffering Servant.

The book fulfils all that we have grown to expect from Professor Rowley. It is competent, balanced, and thoroughly well indexed. It is essentially safe. The difficulty which confronts every writer is apparent here. There are so many interwoven strands in most of the subjects dealt with that it is far from easy to keep to the main theme under discussion. In spite of all the semi-side-issues which have continually to be dealt with, the main themes are always clearly apparent, but every chapter should be read twice before the reader turns to the next. NORMAN H. SNAITH

The Siege Perilous. By S. H. HOOKE. S.C.M. Press, 1956. 21s.

THE volume is a collection of nineteen papers which Professor Hooke has read before various societies during the last twenty years. All except three have been previously published, but it is good to have all these essays collected together. We are thus able to form more easily a judgment of the exact place which Dr Hooke occupies in that sphere which he has made peculiarly his own. The sub-title calls the collection 'essays in biblical anthropology and kindred subjects'. One outstanding feature of the book is the happy and cultured style. This seems to be a characteristic of anthropologists. At any rate, it shows the same mixture of wide reading, comprehensive knowledge, happy phraseology and charming wit which is a feature of another well-loved anthropologist, the late Dr R. R. Marett.

The title of the first essay provides the title of the whole volume. But the perilous adventure is not confined only to the Presidency of the Folk-lore society; it is inherent in Professor Hooke's whole approach. He has devoted many years of a long and useful life to building a bridge between three branches of study in which he has been deeply interested: anthropology, archaeology and biblical studies. The risk is one inherent in all such studies, that the search for similarities should lead on the one hand to a too easy recognition of them, and on the other to a neglect of the differences which do, as a matter of fact, make all the difference. An outstanding example

of the perils of such a method of approach is to be seen in Frazer's *The Golden Bough.*

This volume is all the more welcome because since Professor Hooke edited *Myth and Ritual*, he has often been unjustly held responsible for all the vagaries of the wildest of the patternists. Here we can see that, whilst Professor Hooke goes a good deal farther than many of us would do in 'patternism', he is far more moderate in his views than many of his Scandinavian friends. He allows, for instance, a great deal more for the influence of Moses in the Israelite world of thought and practice than many patternists do, or indeed than he himself did at one time.

The papers are too miscellaneous to admit of detailed description or discussion. For all who would seek to understand the work of the patternist school, the second essay, that on 'Time and Custom' is important. This gives the basis for the theory that all the peoples from Euphrates to the Nile shared a common ritual mythology and that the regular performance of these rites ensured the prosperity of king and people. For Time is not only a stream, but a continuing cycle, conditioned by the cyclic changes of the natural, and especially the agricultural world. Not all will agree with Dr Hooke's patternist explanation of Elijah on Carmel and away to Horeb, nor with his separation of the Cain and Abel story from the Eden story and the explanation that the murder of Abel is a ritual murder to promote fertility. Some essays deal with other than patternist themes. Of these some are specially interesting and informative: the Early History of Writing, the Sign of Immanuel, and the one really technical essay in the collection, the Corner-Stone of Scripture. Every careful reader will learn a great deal from this volume.

All Professor Hooke's friends wish him well and congratulate him that for him the last half of Deut. 34.7 has been astonishingly fulfilled with a continued joyousness of spirit which Moses never knew.

NORMAN H. SNAITH

The Old Testament in Modern Research. By H. F. HAHN. S.C.M. Press, 1956. 16s.

THIS book was originally published in America in 1954, and it is well worth publishing here also. It is an account of the various developments in the modern study of the Old Testament. It covers a wide field and is well documented. The author begins with an account of the first 'modern' approach, the rise and development of literary criticism. Here he confines himself almost wholly to the study of the Pentateuch and to recent work on Ezekiel. This is because it is in the most recent developments in the literary study of these two spheres, that the author (and many will agree with

him) has become convinced that this type of study has passed its peak of usefulness and has 'reached the point of steadily diminishing returns'.

We therefore turn to other avenues of research: the anthropological approach initiated by Robertson Smith, the effect of Frazer's *The Golden Bough*, the work of Durkheim, the 'magical' aspect of Mowinckel's *Psalmenstudien* (evil-doers and the New Year Feast), and so through to the 'myth-ritual school'. Next, we turn to what the author calls the 'religio-historical' school, which makes full use of what is known of contemporary religions and now has the whole of the Canaanite material from Ugarit at its disposal. And so, to the impact of Form-Criticism, the sociological approach, the effect of archaeology, and finally to the theological approach.

The book does not deal with philology and textual criticism. For a fuller survey of what has been done in all fields during the last fifty years, the reader will need also to read *The Old Testament and Modern Study* (ed. H. H. Rowley). Each book has its own sphere, and Dr Hahn's book has its own arrows of direction. There is a minimum of criticism on the part of the author, but there is sufficient for his purpose. The way in which the probing in this direction and now in that direction is portrayed makes a very readable book, though some scholars may be surprised to find who their bed-mates are. The book is a valuable one, and every one should read it, who seeks to get a picture of the work of the scholars, and how and why they have reached out and studied in the ways in which they have done.

NORMAN H. SNAITH

Hebrew Man. By KÖHLER LUDWIG. S.C.M. Press, London, 1956. Pp. 189. 12s. 6d.

THIS English translation, by Peter R. Ackroyd, of Professor Köhler's *Der Hebräische Mensch*, first published in 1953, will undoubtedly make the 'Hebrew Man' a living person for lovers of the Bible. The charmingly simple style reminds us that the results of deep scholarship need not be clouded in uncertain language. Here we have the individual man of the Old Testament pictured in such a delightful fashion that we can see him rejoicing in his robust health, struggling with illness and contemplating the mystery of death. The 'Man' we meet in his whole life from boyhood's education to entering on family responsibilities in marriage, learning war, playing his part in the life of his village community, becoming aware of the importance of sound judgment in the affairs of business and of personal relations, learning to appreciate the wonder of his distinctive faith in the God who let him be born as a member of 'my people'.

Dr Köhler says he aimed 'to picture the Hebrew in all the conditions and experiences of his life'. He has abundantly achieved his aim. Much of this he has done by giving us the inner meaning of the Hebrew vocabulary, thus throwing glowing light on well over four hundred verses of Scripture. It is a pity that an index of the *Hebrew* words referred to was not included.

Perhaps seeking simplicity has made him naïve at times, as when he tells us that the image of God in Gen. 1.26, refers 'primarily to his upright stature, which distinguishes him from the animals'. Though he does go on to say: 'Man is beautiful by the will of God.'

His survey of what the Hebrew Man had to face in the way of disease, 'the halt, the lame, the blind', justifies his conclusion: 'those who were afflicted one way or another would be so numerous as hardly to be believed.' This helps us to understand the problem of healing which faced our Lord among His Hebrew people.

One of the most illuminating sections deals with what the Hebrew called 'sōd', 'counsel' and 'council', the circle of debate and discussion within which the accumulated wisdom of the elders and the smart flashes of the younger men combined to create proverbs, as they tossed thought and word together in their free conversation in their evening conclaves.

If we ask how the Hebrew Man came to know his faith, we think of the priest and the prophet with their well-known functions, but Dr Köhler reminds us of the place that preaching must have had. 'In about 700 there began in Judah a great preaching activity which leaves its traces in all the writings of the second half of the seventh century. Where we meet with it, the sermon style is already mature and fully developed. It must therefore have come into being earlier. Preaching is never without a purpose.' In such a view Deuteronomy finds its place.

The end of Hebrew Man's upbringing and environment is that he 'thinks in the forms of justice. His ideal is the righteous man.' Professor Köhler's skill in describing this should free us from hardening conceptions of the law.

The success of this book, originally lectures delivered at the University of Tübingen, lies in its giving the picture of the normal man, and not of the 'abnormal' sinner or saint. In doing so it reveals the value of the Hebrew tradition as based on a distinctive doctrine of God in relation to a particular people.

R. A. Barclay

Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. By F. W. Grosheide. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Michigan, 1953. $5.00.

Professor Grosheide, the author of this exposition of 1 Cor., is

one of the older Dutch expositors who is practically unknown in this country, but many will be glad that his work on this important epistle has been made available in English. It is the author's conviction that the problems to which Paul addresses himself in 1 Cor. are pre-eminently ethical; there is, consequently, little emphasis on Christian doctrine in the exposition. But his handling of the Greek text makes plain that he is at once a competent and a deeply devout scholar, and one who has developed a remarkable gift of comparing Scripture with Scripture. His long and careful expositions of those passages where Paul treats of the Christian and pagan concepts of knowledge, of Christian liberty, and of marriage relationships and divorce make this Commentary particularly relevant to the situation today. The exposition is particularly illuminating on the Holy Spirit.

Those who are accustomed to using the Gnomon, or the expositions of Denney, Bruce, and Dods in the E.G.T., will consider that Dr Grosheide tends to be a little discursive here and there, and will be surprised by the absence both of references to works of other scholarly expositors and of a bibliography. The introduction might also be thought to be inadequate (a mere six pages); but the Commentary of 400 pp. is illuminating and scholarly. This volume is one of a series planned to cover the whole of the NT, and if all the volumes maintain the high level reached in this exposition then this New International Commentary will be a genuine contribution to our understanding of the NT. J. G. S. S. Thomson

The Epistle of Paul to the Churches of Galatia. By Herman N. Ridderbos. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Michigan, 1953. $3.50.

This is another volume in The New International Commentary on the New Testament. This exposition of Galatians is to be warmly commended, not because it betrays great erudition, but because it succeeds in communicating the spirit of the Epistle, and brings to the reader an acute awareness of the fundamental problems with which Paul was grappling. Dr Ridderbos, one of the younger Dutch NT scholars, expounds with insight and sympathy the issues that were at stake in the law-grace controversy that raged among the Galatian churches. His verse by verse commentary maintains a high spiritual level, and should prove of value to the preacher today who is desirous of showing the relevance of the Galatian controversy for the Christian community in our day. The author's notes on law, faith, promise, covenant, the place of the Holy Spirit in the life of the Christian, etc., will provide much good material for the pulpit.

Dr Ridderbos shows a scholarly restraint when dealing with the

South-North Galatian theories, and the identification of Paul's journey to Jerusalem mentioned in Gal. 2. He believes that the Letter was written to the churches in south Galatia, and that the Jerusalem journey is identical with Paul's visit to the Church Council whose important decisions are set out in Acts. 15; but he makes it clear that no one can speak pontifically on these problems.

Those who will wish to follow up these controversial matters will be disappointed to find that there is no bibliography provided, and that the references to other authorities in the course of the Commentary are not numerous. But this a helpful exposition. It is true to the spirit and ideals that prompted the writing of Galatians, an epistle that has exerted a great influence in the course of the Church's history.

J. G. S. S. Thomson

The Epistle to the Romans. By Vincent Taylor. Epworth Press. 8s. 6d.

This is the first volume in a new series of Epworth Preacher's Commentaries. These commentaries seek 'to explain the original meaning of each biblical passage and to indicate its relevance to human need in the present situation'. They are intended 'specifically for preachers and particularly for those who feel themselves ill-equipped to study the more advanced works of scholarship'. It is therefore most interesting that this first volume should be written by one, whose commentary on Mark is such an advanced work of scholarship. Dr Taylor's Mark is a model of what a comprehensive commentary should be. His new commentary is a model of compression, where the whole scholarly apparatus is largely kept out of sight, and the fruits of wide scholarship are made easily available. The limitations of a commentary of this kind have been accepted and adorned.

Dr Taylor is convinced 'that the chief service one can give to preachers is to explain what Paul says as accurately as possible'. He recognises that, in this Epistle, even the English Revised Version (the text on which the commentary is based) can sometimes be obscure, and the characteristic Pauline terms often misleading. The latter difficulty he meets by placing at the beginning of the commentary a glossary of such Pauline words as cause difficulty for those who have not studied them. 'Body', 'flesh', 'righteousness', and other key words of Paul's thought are succinctly defined. For the rest, he continually offers translations or paraphrases to bring out the exact meaning of the Greek text, and quotes renderings from his great predecessors, who have commented on Romans, and from Modern Versions. A further aid to understanding is the numerous biblical cross references, by which the reader is stimulated to seek the sense of the passage before him with the help of parallel

passages—so much more useful than a reference to another commentary, which the reader may not possess. Dr Taylor is deliberately very sparing in his reference to other authorities, except where he thinks it important to indicate differences of opinion.

Dr Taylor disclaims any attempt to do the preacher's work for him. But many preachers will find much help in these economical yet rich paragraphs, which come at the conclusion of sections of the commentary. Here is a sample: 'Several themes for preaching are suggested by this section (1.1-7). Paul's conception of his Mission ("the slave of Christ", called, sent, and dedicated to the service of the Gospel): the Nature of the Gospel (rooted in the purpose of God and made known in his Son): the Names of Jesus (Jesus, Christ, Son, Lord): the Marks of a Christian (a slave, beloved of God, called, separated): the New Vocabulary (grace, faith, peace, obedience).' Preachers who follow such advice as these paragraphs give, are not likely to preach on the fringe of the Gospel. Dr Taylor's guidance measures up to his expressed conviction that 'biblical theology is the preacher's bread without which hearers languish'.

JOHN GRAY

The Formation of the Pauline Corpus of Letters. By C. LESLIE MITTON. Epworth Press. 8s. 6d.

THE Pauline letters occupy about one quarter of the New Testament, and while a wealth of scholarship has been expended on these, not a great deal of thought has been given to the formation of the Pauline Corpus. To this problem Dr Mitton addresses himself, seeking to discover possible answers to a limited number of questions—the emergence of the Pauline letters as a collection, the date and circumstances of their publication, and, most tentative of all, the identity of the collector. Part of his purpose is to make more widely known answers to these questions, which have been offered by the American scholars E. J. Goodspeed and J. Knox in books not always easily obtained in Britain.

Briefly, this book seeks to challenge the 'conventional' explanation of the origin of the Pauline Corpus. This 'conventional' explanation holds that Paul's letters were esteemed by the Churches to which they were sent, that gradually collections were made, and finally our present letters were accepted as Scripture. The 'unconventional' explanation, for which evidence is produced with much persuasiveness and scholarship, claims that not only did the letters cease to be valued and read, but that Paul himself was almost forgotten. The publication of Luke-Acts revived interest in him, and in what he had written. One of his admirers, who already knew one or more of his letters, set himself to collect others for publication,

possibly around A.D. 90. This admirer could have been Onesimus, Bishop of Ephesus, who might be the Onesimus of the Epistle to Philemon. The Epistle to the Ephesians may be a letter composed by the collector as a preface to the whole and as a summary of Pauline teaching.

Thus baldly stated this 'unconventional' reconstruction has a definiteness and a completeness, which Dr Mitton would not himself claim for it. Indeed, he only claims three conclusions, 'which have a far greater measure of probability about them, even if they do not achieve the level of complete certainty'. These are that the Pauline Corpus most likely emerged as a whole, that the publication date might well be about A.D. 90, and that the place of collection was 'in or near Ephesus'.

Even these tentative conclusions at once raise objections, as do many of the details of the closely reasoned argument. Most open to question is the suggestion of 'the long period of neglect into which the epistles appear to have lapsed between A.D. 60 and A.D. 90'. But Dr Mitton has his evidence, and even if our verdict is the careful Scottish 'Not Proven', this is a book to read before rejecting its conclusions out of hand. JOHN GRAY

Some Christian Words. By W. R. MATTHEWS. George Allen and Unwin. 7s. 6d.

Dialogue on Destiny. By GEORGE W. BARRETT and J. V. LANGMEED CASSERLEY. Longmans. 4s.

A NOTABLE and welcome feature of recent biblical scholarship is an intensive study of the meaning or meanings and the history of great words in Scripture. At the head of the list and in a class by itself is Kittel's monumental *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* in five volumes. Several of its main articles have now been published as separate manuals in English. Next in value comes *A Theological Word Book of the Bible*, edited by Alan Richardson, and it is an almost indispensable tool for the diligent minister. Then there are smaller but most serviceable books by Anderson Scott, William Barclay and John Burnaby. And now the Dean of St. Paul's contributes another. This kind of study may degenerate into a tyranny of terms, but on the other hand it is both a safeguard and a dynamic for the theological exactness which is vital to good expository preaching—the only kind of worthwhile preaching which will 'never run dry.'

Dr Matthews is a very competent theologian, and there is a special conciseness about all he writes. His book consists of broadcast talks, and this accounts for the popular and colloquial style.

No doubt this also explains the absence of Scripture references, and it is easy to see that a study of such words—Holy, Sin, Forgiveness, Cross, Resurrection, Heaven, Hell, Life Eternal, Sacrifice, Salvation, Peace, Mercy—could become just a string of texts. Dr Matthews succeeds in his purpose to get at the heart of each word and to state clearly what the word means when set in the enterprise of the Christian life. The material therefore is elemental rather than elementary. At the close of the book, three studies on Jesus' thought about Himself are added—appropriately enough, for He is the Word made Flesh.

Dr Matthews comes down on the side of those who believed that the Bible does not teach the natural immortality of the soul, and that Christians do not just survive death but are raised to new life. He also seems to favour the interpretation of the eschatological fires as destroying fires, involving the extinction of the impenitent—which the second book calls 'a merciful nothingness'.

The *Dialogue on Destiny* is not just a study of words, but it covers four great themes—end of the world, death and after, heaven and hell and kingdom come—to which Dr Matthews also gives much attention. These dialogue sermons were given at Trinity Church, New York, by two theological professors who carry on the debate together and in co-operation with a puzzled, doubtful interrupter. The style is even more popular and colloquial, but there is good meat here too. For this dialogue method it is claimed that the advantages are that it never loses sight of real questions which people are certainly asking, that it is easier to listen to two voices than to one, and that it avoids a too individualistic presentation of the faith.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Beauty and Bands. By KENNETH E. KIRK. Hodder and Stoughton. 12s. 6d.

THE late Bishop of Oxford was usually regarded as one of the highest of the high, but he could never be accused of being the driest of the dry. There is clarity and pungency in all he writes; the mind of the reader is always kept on the alert, though often in disagreement.

This is a Memorial Volume, compiled by Rev. E. W. Kemp, Fellow and Chaplain, Exeter College, Oxford. It consists mainly of a selection of the Bishop's addresses to his Diocesan Conference and his monthly letters in the Diocesan Magazine. Dr Kirk attached the greatest importance to this part of his work, and he gave mind and heart to the continuous effort to communicate the deepest truths and his convictions on big current issues in a form adapted for popular consumption. His episcopate extended over seventeen

years, and by this steady output of well-written and easily-read material he extended his influence widely.

The first chapter contains an address, based on Zech. 11.7, and delivered in the last year of his life at the consecration of a bishop; and it is this address which gives the book its title. Not only bishops but all Church workers would profit by seeking that unity of personal beauty of character with the 'shackles and limitations of administrative cares and responsibilities' which Dr Kirk so impressively expounds.

The book closes with four good sermons on great texts—Ps. 31.20; Luke 1.68; Mark 10.29; and Luke 3.12-14. There are very serviceable chapters on doctrinal questions like the Virgin Birth, Infant Baptism, Holy Communion, The Holy Trinity, and the Communion of Saints; while other chapters are given to capital punishment, and the modern disillusionment.

It is probable, however, that most readers will be specially attracted to what he has to say on orders, the ordination of women, and episcopacy. Those who want to know what a High Churchman holds on these matters will find it expressed in these pages in no unequivocal terms, and some of it represents what Dr Kirk was writing on these matters at the time of his death. Not everyone will accept his depreciation of the things which are 'of dogmatic necessity'. A full Gospel can be presented to men, not without a doctrine of the Church as an essential, but without any particular doctrine of the structure of the Church, for any such particular doctrine does not belong to the very core of Christianity. Reunion of the divided Church could never come, nor could even helpful steps towards that goal be taken, on the terms of the completeness and organic wholeness which Dr Kirk defines. The fulness of the Church does not lie at any point or place in the traditions of any of the existing Churches, but in the Church that is to be, when all the Churches realise that it is only by dying to their past, in the sense of renouncing some part of their tradition, that they can save their true life and be born anew. All Churches should pay heed to what he says (p. 135) on the decline of preaching.

GEORGE S. GUNN

The Renewal of the Church. By W. A. VISSER 'T HOOFT. S.C.M. 12s. 6d.

The New Being. By PAUL TILLICH. S.C.M. 10s. 6d.

THESE two books are in a sense closely related. The former deals with the spiritual renewal of the Church at important crises in history and the latter with the recreation of the Christian soul by the action of God. By renewal, Dr Visser 'T Hooft does not mean

mere innovation, the creation of something different for the sake of adaptation to historic circumstances; nor does he mean the replacing of the Church by some new religious movement. He perceives a difference between the *Una Sancta*, the Body of Christ, which needs no renewal, and the Church in history, the *ecclesia peccatorum*, which stands constantly in need of renewal. And in these Dale Lectures which were delivered at Mansfield College he discovers in the course of a survey which covers the Old and New Testaments, and the history of the Church to the Reformation period, six different attitudes towards the renewal of the Church. There have been those who regarded the Church as the perfect Society which in the very nature of the case cannot be changed. The Roman Catholics acknowledge the need for renewal but only in the sense of development. Modernist movements, on the other hand, claim that the Church must adapt itself to the new cultural developments even if it involves the essential contents of the faith. There are eschatologists who argue that renewal can take place only when the present dispensation is replaced by a new dispensation. For others, renewal means the immediate realisation on earth of the perfect Church as was attempted by the Montanists. The sixth position is described by Luther in the following terms: 'It is not yet done and accomplished, but it is going on. It is not the end but the way. It is not all glistening and shining, but it is all being swept.' This is the position accepted by Dr Visser 'T Hooft as most closely agreeing with the biblical evidence. The conditions necessary for the renewal of the Church today he finds in repentance which involves a break with the old world; re-edification which means the action by which the Holy Spirit re-creates the people of God; the building up of a true fellowship by which a congregation ceases to be an amorphous mass of people and becomes a true family of God; the discovery of the apostolic nature of the Church whereby evangelism is recognised as being the normal concern of the whole Church. It will be seen that this book deals with problems which are very relevant for the present situation and should provide useful material for the basis of lively discussions in study groups.

Dr Paul Tillich's book consists of sermons preached mostly to academic audiences. It falls into three parts: The New Being as Love, The New Being as Freedom, The New Being as Fulfilment. The sermons reveal a deep penetrating understanding of the Scriptures and there are frequent flashes of insight which will delight all students of the Bible. In the first sermon, for example, on Forgiveness, there is an illuminating interpretation of Luke 7.36-47. Theological eye-brows will no doubt be raised at some of his statements, as for example when he says that baptism does not matter,

only a new creation (p. 18). I do not think that St. Paul would have said that. But such statements only challenge us as every good sermon should. The book should help many to work out a solution to many of the personal and social problems which trouble men and women today.

E. KENNETH LEE

A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham. Ed. by EUGENE R. FAIRWEATHER, M.A., B.D., Th.D., Associate Professor of Dogmatic Theology and Ethics, Trinity College, University of Toronto. S.C.M. Press, London. 35s.

THIS publication, Volume X, in the well-known Library of Christian Classics and the latest contribution to it, is one of several items in that series devoted to the exemplification in English translation of the works of the medieval theologians. In the present case, the selection covers Scholastic theologians (from the twelfth century onwards) other than St. Thomas and including those 'outside the Thomist tradition'. Ranging from St. Anselm, 'the Father of Scholasticism', to William Ockham, whom Luther was to reckon his 'dear master', it is a somewhat unequal Miscellany, though this is probably an inevitable feature of such a compilation. St. Anselm, who occupies well nigh half of the volume, is represented by the bulk of two treatises—the *Proslogion* and *Cur Deus Homo*—as well as by selections from his work on the Virgin Conception and Original Sin, his Prayer to St. Mary and excerpts from his letters to Pope Paschal II on the question of Investitures, along with extracts concerning him from Eadmer. Other writers from whose works briefer selections are made comprise Anselm of Laon, Abailard, the Victorines—Hugh, Richard and Adam, Peter Lombard, Stephen Langton (better known as a statesman), Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta and Duns Scotus. These are concerned with the exposition of more strictly theological questions. Professor Fairweather, however, has noted that the work of the Schoolmen 'was intimately connected with the activities of political thinkers, lawyers and canonists, with whom they shared both methods and problems'. Accordingly, the interactions of theology and canon law are displayed in selections from Ivo of Chartres and Gratian; John of Salisbury discusses from a 'hierocratic' standpoint the nature of monarchy and tyranny; while Ockham handles the question of the Origin of the Supreme Civil Power. There are also a few examples —not unfamiliar—of the hymnology of the period. The volume illustrates the wide variety of topics which occupied the attention of the Scholastic writers and the method which became characteristic of them is shown in Peter Lombard, 'the Master of the Sentences'.

In the general introduction, the editor has an interesting discussion of the intellectual achievement of Medieval Christianity and accompanies it by an up-to-date bibliography of the literature dealing with medieval history, the church, culture, theology and philosophy; while the various sections of the work have a separate introduction and bibliography for each century. These add considerably to the usefulness of the *Miscellany*.

In the preparation of this volume, the editor has been fortunate in having the assistance of Professor Etienne Gilson and other specialists. It will not satisfy all readers because some will wish to have more than a brief sample of the later writers whose works are included. But within the limits imposed upon his selection, the editor has achieved, on the whole, a fair representation of the various aspects of medieval theological thought. In the translation, a commendable effort has been made to avoid 'a word for word rendering at the expense of intelligibility'; and the text is certainly intelligible and reads smoothly. D. E. Easson

Codex Climaci Rescriptus Graeccus. By Ian Moir. The University Press. Cambridge, 1956. 30s.

This is a small book into which a great deal of work has been put. Dr Moir has deciphered and transcribed the palimpsest, now in the Library of Westminster College, Cambridge (eight plates give the reader some idea of the complexity of the task), and has provided a detailed study of its history, palaeography and contents, together with a collation against the Received Text, a discussion of the text, and a set of tables setting out important data.

The MS is unique in that it contains an early attempt at a synopsis of the Gospels, together with an unusual selection of excerpts from Matthew and John written as a continuous text. One problem is to account for the quite remarkable omissions in this second part; another, to explain the system of section numbers, which differs entirely from that of Eusebius and Ammonius. In regard to the text, the MS shows in Mark a clear connexion with the Caesarean group, while in Matthew and John it seems to have had some connexion with D and with ℵ before the latter was subjected to correction. The palimpsest has thus an importance of its own for the study of the text of the New Testament.

Dr Moir expresses the hope that, having regard to the conditions under which the work was revised for the press, discrepancies will not be too numerous. In point of fact a fairly careful study reveals but one error: on p. 85 'thirty-six' should be 'thirty-five'.

R. McL. Wilson

The Qumran Community: Its History and Scrolls. By Charles T. Fritsch. The Macmillan Company. New York and London, 1956. 23s.

Of the making of books there is no end, in particular of books about the Dead Sea Scrolls. The masterly volume by Millar Burrows, published late in 1955 in America, is now available in an English edition. Fortified, according to his publisher, by a study of Hebrew, Mr Edmund Wilson has composed a popular account. And an enterprising American pastor has put out a paper-backed volume, selling at fifty cents, on the meaning of the Scrolls. All this is evidence of, and will stimulate, the keenest interest in the Scrolls on the part not only of scholars but of the general public; and this is all to the good. Unfortunately, it is to be feared that some of the slighter and more popular books may command the widest sale—unfortunately, because some of them accept quite uncritically the more sensational flights of fancy indulged in by certain individual scholars, and some of them are guilty of casting quite unwarranted aspersions upon the *Neutestamentler*.[1]

That New Testament scholars generally did not rush to study the Scrolls, and have not adhered in a body to some of the more venturesome theories that have been propounded, is not due to any mere obscurantism, nor is it the result of the motives which inspired Demetrius of Ephesus (Acts 19.24-7). In the first place, documents in Hebrew discovered in Palestine were naturally regarded as the concern of the Semitist, the more especially since one of the first to be discovered was a manuscript of Isaiah. Only when it began to be clear that the group to whom the documents had once belonged was no ordinary Jewish community, and when it became evident that the Scrolls offered the prospect of a completely new light upon some aspects of life in Palestine in New Testament times—only then did the new discoveries become immediately the concern of the New Testament scholar. Nor were they slow to take up the issue—witness Matthew Black's Edinburgh Inaugural of 1952,[2] to take but one example. Since then the interest has grown with the growth of our knowledge.

In the second place, just as it is legitimate for a scholar to advance a hypothesis, so is it legitimate for others to suspend judgment pending fuller and more conclusive evidence. Knowing as he does

[1] Cf. L. J. Collins in *Theology LIX* (April 1956), 162ff, reviewing Edmund Wilson's book. Also T. A. M. Barnett in *Canadian Journal of Theology*, II, 3 (July 1956), 171ff, esp. 175f.

[2] See *SJT*, 6 (1953), 1ff. Dupont Sommer's *Aperçus Preliminaires* (Paris, 1950) appeared in an English translation by E. Margaret Rowley in 1952. The importance of the Scrolls for NT studies had already been stressed by K. G. Kirton [*ILZ*, 75 (1950), 81ff].

of theories once stoutly advocated but now long consigned to the limbo of forgotten things, the scholar is not inclined to commit himself finally until he can be sure of his conclusions; and some of the hypotheses advanced are still extremely hypothetical. The major interest of the Scrolls, in fact, and the one which gives to them a revolutionary significance for the study of primitive Christianity in general, and the New Testament in particular, is not that they reveal a group of pre-Christian sectaries who might have been copied by the early Church, or a Teacher of Righteousness who anticipated Jesus even to an atoning death and an expected return in triumph—these points are still the subject of debate. The major interest is that the Scrolls reveal an aspect of Jewish life of which our knowledge was formerly meagre in the extreme. If the community of Qumran was not actually Essene, it was almost certainly Essenic in character; where once we had to depend on brief and perplexing accounts in Philo and Josephus, we now have first-hand evidence in the documents of the sect itself. Moreover, the new evidence shows beyond question that many elements in the Fourth Gospel which once were held to be Hellenistic were in fact naturalised in, if not indigenous to, the very soil of Palestine. That there should be parallels to the New Testament in the Scrolls is not surprising, nor is the scholar troubled—the Gospel itself was cradled in Galilee and Judaea. But as yet there is no clear evidence to touch the originality of Jesus, despite all the ancestral Jewish lore which he undoubtedly employed, or to suggest that the Qumran sect is to be regarded as the *fons et origo* of the Christian Church. Gamaliel's counsel (Acts 6.34-9) is still apposite: the Essenes vanished from the stage of history, so much so that their very existence could be doubted; the Gospel of Jesus Christ is still proclaimed.

These criticisms, it should be emphasised, do not apply to the book now under review. They had to be made to warn the reader against more superficial and specious studies. Professor Fritsch, writing deliberately for the general reader, has provided a very convenient introduction to the study of the Scrolls, with an eleven-page bibliography listing most of the books and articles which appeared between 1953 and the summer of 1955, which will enable those who wish to carry their studies further to find the material they require. The book itself contains an indication of the fluidity of the present situation, in a postscript on p. 49 relating to the so-called 'Lamech Scroll', which was reported in February 1956 to be in fact an Aramaic version of Genesis.

The first chapter relates the well-known story of the first discovery and describes the subsequent excavations; the second deals with the history of the community, and the third discusses the caves and the

manuscripts. The fourth chapter is a timely reminder that Qumran is not the only site at which discoveries have been made, and deals with the manuscripts found at Khirbet Mird and Murabba'at. The four remaining chapters deal respectively with the Qumran community and the manuscripts and with the relations between the community and the Damascus sect, the Essenes, and the New Testament. A useful feature of the chapter on the Essenes is that Philo and Josephus are quoted at length, in translation.

Inevitably, there are points which call for criticism. Some phrases have a transatlantic ring to British ears, which is only natural, but others seem to be genuine errors. 'Novitiate' occurs twice where one would have expected 'novice' (pp. 64, 109, n. 16). There are some cases of unnecessary repetition, e.g. on p. 41, where the first sentence of a new section is almost identical with the last sentence of the section before. 'Marcherus' (p. 50 n. 1) is surely 'Machaerus'. And while it may be right to hold, with Dupont-Sommer (p. 119), that the Jewish sect of the Covenant 'directly and immediately prepared the way for the Christian Church', one may not be altogether happy about the wording of the statement (p. 122): 'There is little doubt that (Jesus') own Messianic consciousness was strongly influenced by (the Essenes') interpretation of the Old Testament Prophets.'

On the whole, however, the volume may be commended as a clear and instructive introduction to the subject, with sufficient documentation in the notes and bibliography to enable the reader to follow up recent studies and form his own conclusions.

R. McL. Wilson

Anglican Orders and Defect of Intention. By Francis Clark, S.J. Longmans, Green and Co. 25s.

Anglican Orders. By A. A. Stephenson, S.J. Burns and Oates. 7s. 6d.

In 1896 Pope Leo XIII published the crushing Bull *Apostolicae Curae*, declaring that 'ordinations performed according to the Anglican rite have been and are completely null and void'. He based his judgment on two counts: that the form of the Edwardine Ordinal was defective and insufficient; and that 'with this intrinsic defect of form has been combined a defect of intention'. About intention we shall speak in a minute, but we must first note that the Papal objection to the Edwardine Ordinal was that it was a Protestant rite, aimed at ordaining 'ministers of the Word and Sacraments' and not priests with power '"*to consecrate and offer the true Body and Blood of the Lord*" in that sacrifice which is no "*mere commemoration of the sacrifice performed on the Cross*".'

Ever since then Anglo-Catholics have sweated to prove that the

Bull was mistaken; that in fact the Edwardine Ordinal was sound by 'catholic' standards and that the intention to ordain in the 'catholic' sense was also present. But in this they have been considerably hampered on the one hand by the plain facts of the case and on the other by an inability to come to terms with Leo's use of the word 'intention'. The plain fact about the Edwardine Ordinal was its Protestant character. It was a Reformation rite, springing out of and expressing the Reformation concept of Church and ministry. But no less of a difficulty has been this doctrine of intentions continually misunderstood and misapplied—not only on the Anglican side, but by some Romanists as well. Father Clark lists no fewer than seven different interpretations! His book is concerned just to expound *Apostolicae Curae* on intention, and there is no doubt in my mind that he has succeeded in giving the proper interpretation. To go through his closely knit, intricate argument would be quite impossible here. Enough to set out his conclusion.

The defect of intention referred to '*did* mean the personal intention of the ordaining minister—the *intentio faciendi*' (p. 78). Historically, of course, this is to be applied to the consecration of Matthew Parker in 1559. His case is quite vital from both arguments. Apart altogether from intention, his consecration would still be pronounced invalid, because of the defect of the form of the Edwardine Ordinal. But we are concerned with intention only. Did his consecrations intend to consecrate Parker to an episcopacy that was part and parcel of the Roman priesthood—or to avoid misunderstanding, of the 'catholic' priesthood—or to an episcopacy that was an integral part of the Protestant ministry of the Word and Sacraments? Certainly, says Father Clark, to the latter. Therefore they did not intend to do what the Roman Church does in its consecrations, but deliberately intended not to do it, to exclude it. Therefore, Anglican Orders must be pronounced invalid on account of *defectus intentionis*.

No one would object to Father Clark writing from his own Church's point of view. In the result, all must surely praise his objectivity and fairness. I confess that I found his book very exciting—difficult, certainly, and to follow the train of the argument is often like trying to grasp an eel—but yet exciting and certainly admirably stated.

Father Stephenson's *Anglican Orders* is much slighter, more controversial and polemical. He comes to the same conclusion, in effect, that *Apostolicae Curae* meant by intention, the intention of the ordaining minister; but the most of his book, which is aimed against Dom Gregory Dix and Dr E. L. Mascall, is concerned with the defect of form in the Edwardine Ordinal.

What are we to make of all this? Both books are aimed at Anglo-

Catholics. They recognise quite correctly, that low, broad and old-fashioned high Churchmen will not be at all worried at finding themselves invalidated by the Pope. Indeed, they will probably be only the more confirmed in their position! Anglo-Catholics, however, have got themselves into an exceedingly awkward position. They try to maintain their status as Anglicans while at the same time sharing in the basic theological presuppositions of Rome. Consequently they are forced to make the Edwardine Ordinal as ambiguous as possible, so that it shall be valid in form. Consequently also they suffer the fearful impediment of having to defend themselves against arguments that in fact they accept in principle. They are vulnerable to attack from Rome in a way that other Anglicans are not. And it would seem that Rome is taking advantage of the Church of England – Church of South India situation to launch a powerful campaign against the ambiguity of their position.

I should hesitate to say that Father Clark has made their positions hopeless. History is littered with groups holding untenable positions long after they were marked down for demolition. No doubt the debate will continue. Loop-holes will still be found, new variations of old arguments brought forward; but all this cannot really hide the fact that Anglo-Catholics are in a most unenviable dilemma.

T. H. L. Parker

Trinity College, Glasgow: Centenary Volume. By Stewart Mechie. 1856-1956. Collins. 10s.

How the present reviewer wishes he had had access to such a book as this nine years ago, when he went up to Trinity College as a first-year student! Here is a volume which tells in small compass a magnificent story—the story of the first hundred years of a training college in the educational and vocational training of the Protestant Church in Scotland. As the author, Mr Mechie, so concisely and quite admirably shows chapter by chapter, Trinity College carried on its work despite changing conditions on every hand. As the city of Glasgow spread outwards in all directions, so that Trinity came to exist almost in the centre of the city, and as unions and disunions took place in the Kirk, and as Principals and Professors came and went, Trinity remained not too much altered in its character and purpose, and, broadly speaking, the nature of the syllabus was not subjected to devastating alteration or even over-extreme shifts of emphasis. Principal John Mauchline makes mention of this remarkable fact in his Foreword.

Mr Mechie has set out in just sufficient detail the general changes in the city affecting the neighbourhood of Trinity and Gilmorehill, the story of the College coming into being in response to real need

in Glasgow, some well-known, but ever interesting, anecdotes on 'heresy' cases and disputes which affected members of the staff, and he has reviewed chronologically the Principals and staff of the College up to the present. Attention has been given to those sons of Trinity who went into spheres other than the pastoral ministry of the Church in Scotland, and the writer has wisely added a chapter on needs and hopes for the future. It is to be hoped that his appeal on behalf of the College fabric and for endowments of the Senate Fund will meet with ready response, as a tribute to Trinity's magnificent work through the years.

The second half of the volume, by Mr Mackintosh the Librarian, deals with the College Library, and here the bibliophile will marvel at the valuable contents which have come to be deposited through the century. True to himself as all students fondly remember him, he does more than outline the library's contents. He tells not only of the library's growth under temporary Librarians, of the deposits of collections arising from Church unions, but he does so both historically and with nice 'tit-bits' of information which grant the reader an insight into a most fascinating and priceless collection. He is enthusiastic, as colleagues and students will expect, on the rarest works. A special note on the Tischendorf Collection and the Mearns Hymnological Collection merits praise, not only for its clarity and conciseness, but for the scholarly contributions on the Librarian's own part.

In both parts of the book there is evidence of considerable research and the enthusiasm and judgment displayed by both writers will make this book a 'must' for present and future students at Trinity. Yet, there are many past students—and students of other Theological Colleges in Scotland and abroad—who will revel in the revelations given. Perhaps students of past and present will look again at the furnishings of the College which tell such a story of grand, human effort, both physical and intellectual. It is gratifying to see such excellent photographs of Principals, Professors and Lecturers right up to date and to have chronologies in the Appendices.

Congratulations to the Principal and Senate of Trinity College, Glasgow, and thanks to Mr Mechie and Mr Mackintosh for a Centenary Volume worthy of the heritage of the Protestant Church in Scotland!

JOHN MACDONALD

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, THE BANNER OF A SECT[1]

by The Rev. D. W. GUNDRY

I

The age-old device of using a text is an extremely useful one. A text summarises—or should summarise—what the preacher has to say; and, even if, as is often the case, the congregation forget the contents of the sermon almost straight away, there is just a chance that they will remember the text. As an eighteenth-century divine wisely observed in advising young clergymen, 'Propose one point in one discourse, and stick to it; a hearer never carries away more than one impression.'[2] The text and the one point of this paper is evident from the title: 'The philosophy of religion, the banner of a sect.'

It is a salutary thing, once in a while, to leave the *minutiae* of theological scholarship, and re-consider what we as theologians —each with his own specialism, though, it is to be hoped, still theologians—are engaged in. We must ask ourselves, 'What is theology? How does it differ from the sciences and the humanities? And, if it does differ, has it any distinctive contribution to make to knowledge?' These are very important questions, requiring us to examine the presuppositions upon which theology stands. In other words, we cannot escape having some kind of total picture of theology; and this total picture is our philosophy of religion.

The term 'philosophy of religion' has, however, a certain ambiguity. In one sense it is a particular branch of theological study. Narrowly this may mean the study of a few theories about religion put forward by certain philosophers. Broadly it may mean not only this but the psychology of religion and the history of religions as well. In another sense 'the philosophy of religion' may refer to our personal overall view of religion—

[1] A paper read to the Theological Society of the University College of North Wales, Bangor, 9th March 1955.

[2] From an ordination sermon preached by Paley in 1781.

the total picture, to which I have already alluded. In fact these two senses, the departmental and the comprehensive, are intimately related; for, even if Monsieur Jourdain was surprised to discover that he had been talking prose all his life, we should not be surprised to discover that we too are philosophers of religion quite as much as the famous men named in our philosophy of religion syllabuses.

Now we cannot pretend that our philosophy of religion—our total picture of theology—is anything like that of by-gone ages. At least, the Protestant can make no such claim. The nineteenth century, as is well known, produced a revolution in Protestant theology from which hardly any Protestant escaped unscathed. If travail of soul has any cathartic effect on proud human nature, Protestants generally should be by now severely chastened and ennobled people; but we can hardly admit, even so, that the present confusion of Protestant theology is very helpful to a world which has lost its bearings and is looking for a reliable guide.

The old, pre-nineteenth-century conception of theology was that of faith seeking rational expression—*fides quaerens intellectum*; and this lay behind the two-fold division of the queen of sciences into natural theology and revealed (or supernatural) theology, the one treating of religious truths learned through the natural light of the reason, the other treating of the special revelation of God in the person, ministry and teaching of Christ. Medieval, like modern, Scholasticism presented a picture of the supernatural revelation crowning imperfect human intellect. It was a theocentric system. Even the Reformation, which is not to be confused with the Renaissance and its anthropocentric outlook, brought about little change in the structure of Christian theology. Most of the great Protestant divines until the end of the eighteenth century accepted the classical dualism of faith and reason, the two-fold division of theology into revealed and natural.

It was the nineteenth century which revolutionised theology, as it revolutionised almost everything else. The beginnings of this revolution are, of course, to be detected in the eighteenth century, but then they were rather a source of embarrassment. Not so with the Victorians. These iconoclastic, self-made men gave Protestantism a complete re-orientation, which by the

beginning of this century had banished theology and put in its place *a* philosophy of religion, which was to become *the* philosophy of religion, the overall picture of religious knowledge. The impotence of Christianity today is in no small measure sufficient tribute to the efficiency they brought into their work. If there was anything nineteenth-century folk, including the theologians of the period, did it was to work hard; but, contrary to their expectations, they did not get on.

II

With these preliminary remarks I must now expound my text; and I can best do this by quoting it in its context. You will find it in the preface of Dr Austin Farrer's book *Finite and Infinite*, one of the best recent apologies for rational theology. Here are his own words:

> What is the philosophy of religion? In its general sense it is a range of topics which seminary teachers have not the time to expound separately. Towards the middle of this soft amalgam the student encounters a harder core, centred on the traditional arguments for the existence of God. . . . More properly 'philosophy of religion' is the banner of a sect; for it describes its subject of study according to a Kantian or post-Kantian conception of philosophical inquiry. According to this conception, certain types of human experience and human activity are accepted as occurring, and the philosopher's business is to extract from these the *a priori* principles or universal forms presumed to be embedded in them. As, then, we may have a philosophy of science, of morality, or of art, so we may have of religion, if religion is to be reckoned a genuine and distinctive type among the operations of the human spirit.[1]

It is clear from this quotation that Kant is the villain of the piece. A few generations ago any such accusation would have been regarded as *lèse-majesté* by Protestant theologians; but at this time of day we are beginning to see the Kantian sect for what it was in relation to Christianity. They were philosophers determined to fit Christianity to a purely humanistic world-view. Reinforced by the newly-emerging human sciences, e.g. anthropology, psychology, sociology, the philosophy of religion in this sense—this phenomenological assessment of religion—gained widespread acceptance among Protestant theologians over the past hundred years.[2] By now it is the most commonly

[1] Austin Farrer, op. cit., London, 1943, p. vii.

[2] The actual term 'philosophy of religion' is Hegelian, rather than Kantian, in

held view of theology, certainly among laymen, often even among theologians, at least in their official capacity. In fact, theology has tended to become simply a portmanteau term to cover the several studies of religion pursued on the lines laid down by Dr Farrer's Kantian or post-Kantian sect. The strange thing is that so many theologians are members of this sect without knowing it. Probably the majority of professional teachers of theology in our universities are sectarian in this sense; while almost all those concerned with university policy in regard to theology are bound to be, as things are.

Let us for a few moments glance at the present conditions of theology in the universities; for here we shall find a practical illustration of how theology has been deprived of its own autonomy and sentenced to kneel at the feet of the humanities and sciences. What we are pleased to call theology today, as for a long time past, has consisted in fact of: (1) the Bible designed to be read as literature; (2) Church history, including the history of Christian doctrine, treated on lines analogous to the history of any other institution, e.g. the British constitution or democracy; and (3) the remainder of traditional theological studies—Dr Farrer's 'range of topics which seminary teachers have not the time to expound separately'—as sub-divisions of anthropology or sociology or some cognate social science.

Permit me to enlarge a little on each one in turn. In respect of the Holy Scriptures, we can hardly but admit that here the emphasis has fallen and still falls far too heavily on the historical-critical method. In its thorough-going form this branch of theological study seldom rises above the consideration of the Bible as anything more than a noble product of the human spirit—a subsidiary branch of semitic and hellenistic studies. It is, however, to the lasting credit of biblical scholars that many of them have never been quite at ease about this tacit assumption; but, until recently, they have rarely spoken out on the subject, and, in order to escape awkward questions, have generally diverted their attention to problems of textual criticism or have tried to believe that the person and work of Christ can be studied satisfactorily without reference to a total

origin. Kant speaks of 'Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason'. If Christian theologians had remembered this, they might have been less inclined to fall under his spell.

theological picture. But rebellion is abroad; and, however alarmingly reactionary they may appear at first sight, we must see in the newer schools of exegesis a belated but necessary reassertion that biblical studies are not the same thing to the theologian as they are to the humanist.

Again, in most universities tolerating theological studies, systematic theology has given place to the history of Christian doctrine. 'History' is a very dangerous word. If it means simply a chronicle it is harmless enough; but historians generally disdain the designation of chronicler, or even of antiquary. The Hegelians and Darwinians, in uneasy concert, long ago made sure that subsequent generations, including ourselves, should only understand history as a process of evolution. And, in consequence, the history of Christianity is no more than the tracing of the development of Christian thought and institutions, as if they were one more facet of human achievement. The history of religions fits in here too, but has wider terms of reference: for 'Christian religion' read 'religion'.[1] The same phenomenological method is employed. Trace the history and you will understand. The fact of the matter is that we do not understand. There have been few more blatant ways of pulling the phenomenological wool over the eyes of the soul than the writing of histories of religion, whether of the Christian religion or religions at large—particularly religions at large.

The phenomenological study of religion has its formal basis, however, in the philosophy of religion as a special subject of study. Here the triumph of Kantianism is particularly evident. To quote Dr Farrer's words again: 'According to this conception, certain types of human experience and human activity are accepted as occurring, and the philosopher's business is to extract from these the *a priori* principles or universal forms presumed to be embedded in them.' And by philosopher we must no longer understand 'philosopher' in the old-fashioned sense. It would probably be more accurate to say 'human scientist';

[1] It is significant that the term 'history of religions' which is of German origin (*Religionsgeschichte*), is only rarely used in the English universities. There 'comparative study of religions', a less committed term, with which Anglican theologians feel easier, is more common. The occurrence of the history of religions in the theological curricula of the Scottish universities undoubtedly points to the close connexion between Scottish and German theology in the last century. Probably the study of the history of religions in the University of Wales owes its inception to Scottish rather than English influence.

for, with the virtual disappearance of metaphysics from philosophy, we are left simply with logicians, psychologists and sociologists.

The suppression of theology is almost complete. Were it not for hurting the feelings of churchmen by excluding them entirely from the universities, theology as a faculty—as an independent branch of knowledge—might well be dispensed with.[1] An appropriate expansion of appropriate arts and social science departments could cover the ground completely for studying religion after this non-theological, phenomenological fashion. But there are signs of an awakening.

Contrast the position of theology in two universities, and this is clear. The Victoria University of Manchester is suitably so named not only because of its founding in the middle of the last century, but also because of its conception of theological studies. There the one compulsory subject for all theological students is 'comparative religion'. The Kantian sectarianism is professed unashamedly. Theology is not the study of the being of God and the revelation of God, but the study of religion as a social phenomenon. It is not without significance, I suggest, that the mid-twentieth-century University of Nottingham not only teaches no 'comparative religion' but openly admits having a professor of Christian theology.

This awakening is not accidental: it is not simple reaction, but the inevitable accompaniment of the breakdown of liberalism as a working creed. Mr Noel Annan in the first of a recent series of broadcast talks on Church and State speaks of 'the liberal theory of Church and State which until recently was held by many political theorists in this country'.[2] His use of the past tense is significant; for he goes on to point out how 'the liberal theory was a compromise'. Hitherto theology, certainly in the universities, has been very much subjected to the liberal compromise, both administratively and in the strict academic sense. The liberal conception of theology has tended to be two-faced: on the one hand a man could be sectarian in the ecclesiastical sense in private life, but on the other he had to be a Kantian sectarian in the university. He could believe in the

[1] One is bound to mention at some stage that Christians themselves were not blameless in this matter. The denominational bickering of the Victorian era gave added strength to the exclusion of theology proper from the universities in favour of the philosophy of religion.

[2] *The Listener*, 10th February 1955.

Christian revelation at home; but in the university he must treat Christianity as one of many inventions of the human mind. Most people, including most theologians, were hardly aware of this victimisation. So authoritatively has this dichotomy been insisted on that few have dared to challenge it.

But now this particular part of the nineteenth-century liberal fabric is collapsing along with so much of the rest. The 'gentlemanly' compromise is no longer tenable. While the majority of responsible citizens in this country were professing Christians after some fashion outside the university, the official Kantian sectarianism within could be counter-balanced in life as a whole. Even theological professors were apparently able to reconcile this dualism within themselves: Kantian sectarians in the lecture-room, they preached the Christian Gospel in church on Sunday. Fifty years ago Troeltsch, for example, openly advocated such a policy; but today it is unworkable.

In an age when men professed a Christian allegiance, when they still unconsciously clung on to the traditional forms of religious beliefs and institutions, the phenomenological study of religion could be kept in its place—at least as far as each individual was concerned. But today the picture is different. Most people are professing Christians only in the loosest sense. And where theology is concerned most intelligent laymen have come to believe that the phenomenological study of religion is the only study of religion.

It is here that the professional theologian who is in any way concerned with the reinstatement of theology finds himself confronted with an administrative difficulty. How can our arts and science colleagues, who in many universities presume to dictate what shall be the structure of theological studies, although they would not tolerate any dictation from theologians as to the structure of scientific or humanistic studies, be convinced that theology is not the same thing as the scientific or humanistic study of religion?

Doubtless the philosopher of religion and his supporters have ostensibly one strong argument in their favour. The allegedly objective study of religion in the universities is often justified on the ground that the university can be no party to denominationalism. There must be no credal basis: the university must be non-sectarian. But in fact what utter nonsense! In

refusing to admit traditional Christianity, the so-called liberal university has substituted one sect for another.

In practice, of course, our present-day university faculties of theology are not non-denominational but inter-denominational; for it would hardly be possible to teach theology on non-denominational lines, since all its teachers have their own denominational allegiances. Absolute non-denominationalism would only be possible with a staff composed of teachers who were forbidden to belong to any Christian Church or, for that matter, to any religious institution. But the modern university has never dared to go so far.

Nevertheless, in theory, if not in practice, non-denominationalism looms in the background. Even if the philosophy of religion as a subject or department of a faculty of theology is unlikely to be completely sectarian in Dr Farrer's sense, because the teacher of the subject will probably be a professing Christian, yet the total official picture of theology does tend to be that of a Kantian sect. As I have already tried to show, the fact that theology is regarded as an appendage of the humanities and social sciences is sufficient indication that the essential nature and purpose of theology are widely misunderstood.

III

Theology is not the study of human ideas about God or about religion as one of several human institutions. Let the sociologists and philosophers proceed with that study if they will; it is unlikely to prove anything more than most such studies in the end—something of interest but of no vital importance to the soul of man. Theology is, as its etymology clearly shows, the science of God. The Christian, like every theist for that matter, believes first in God and then seeks a rationalisation of that faith: theology is *fides (in deo) quaerens intellectum*. This is quite distinct from the method of the philosophy of religion, as it has been so commonly understood since the time of Kant, that of studying religious ideas with a view to finding a faith. A. N. Whitehead unwittingly gave the show away when he defined religion in this sense as 'the hopeless quest'.[1]

If, however, we reject the classical method of theology and

[1] *Science in the Modern World*, Cambridge 1926, p. 268.

prefer a phenomenological method, then let us not delude ourselves that we are theologians when in fact we are simply philosophers of religion. Let us, in this case, openly fly the banner of our sect; and let us not perpetuate the humbug that a university is non-sectarian. We cannot help being sectarian. Are we philosophers of religion or are we theologians? If the former, then let us advertise, as we should in all honesty, that man might just as well look for his salvation to the faculty of science or of arts as to the faculty of the philosophy of religion masquerading as a faculty of theology.

FRONTIERS OF MEANING[1]

by The Rev. Professor JOHN McINTYRE

It is an interesting commentary upon the place of theology in our Western culture and society to observe how many of the phrases we normally associate with it carry overtones of conflict and argument. 'Science and religion', 'faith and reason', 'reason and revelation', 'history and the Gospels', 'proof and belief'—not all of them antithetic to one another, but all of them areas within which there has been in the last century in all cases and much longer in some, much violent discussion. So the picture has been built up of theology as contained within a ring of frontiers, across which it seeks to parley with those on the other side, to exchange meanings, to transfer information, if only to the extent of saying what each thought of the other. On one of these frontiers theology had a long conversation with science as to the understanding of the Genesis story of Creation in the light of evolutionary theories, or of the Christology of the two natures and the one Person in the light of modern psychological views of the unity of personality; across another frontier, with the historians as to what constituted the historically credible or possible and as to whether theological presuppositions distorted historical narrative; across another frontier with the sociologists, as to whether human responsibility could still be affirmed in the midst of the vast tissue of modern economic, social and political pressures; again with the moralists, over the reconciliation of grace and freedom and the imperative of morality with the indicative of faith; while time would fail to tell of the Gideons, the Baraks and the Samsons, who have broken swords with philosophers over the veridical nature of religious knowledge, over the proofs of Divine existence and the nature of Revelation. All of which is commonplace and obvious and the general picture is fairly clear. Theology is represented as standing within certain frontiers separating it from proximate fields of study and action; as having a language of its own and concepts of its own; and as endeavouring to transfer these

[1] Inaugural Lecture, Edinburgh University, Nov. 1956.

meanings across the frontiers like so many parcels, in the hope that when they are untied on the other side, they will be clearly understood. No one is surprised, either, if some of the parcels come back unopened. In the very familiarity of the picture, however, lies its greatest danger, for it is a basically false conception of the relation of theology both to contemporary culture and society *and* to its own language and subject-matter. It is my purpose today to indicate *how* this picture has come to be false, if in fact it ever were true.

Four considerations have been particularly effective in this regard, the first to be found in what I have called proximate fields of study and action to theology and religion; and three others to be found within theology itself.

A

To begin with, certain changes within the proximate fields of study and action have led to the removal of several of the frontiers of controversy separating them from theology, a process assisted by a revision by theologians themselves of some of the contentions that led to controversy. By bringing these matters together, we discover that many of the old criticisms of theology have become false, and a great deal of the Church's apologetic irrelevant. E. L. Mascall has illustrated very comprehensively the ways in which the frontiers of science and religion have changed (*Christian Theology and the Natural Sciences*). For example, it was held in the latter half of the nineteenth century and in the earlier part of the twentieth by many scientists that the scientific account of reality, in measurable modes and quantities, with completely specifiable space-time location, and in accordance with determined laws, was the only true account of reality; and that accordingly religion dealt with subjects that were either illusory or completely non-existent. The refutation of the claim of religion to veridical knowledge of reality was based on the assumption that the relation of the scientific picture to reality was quite intelligible and capable of formulation. It is within this area that a considerable amount of radical thinking has been done in recent years, for instance, by Stephen Toulmin, with his contention that the concepts appearing in scientific theories are not the objects of observation (the 'real' objects of an earlier science), but must be interpreted

in accordance with defined principles in order to have that reference, and in any case it is only an indirect reference. So, too, R. B. Braithwaite, using the different language of calculi, deductive systems and models, arrives at a somewhat similar conclusion that the logical necessity that holds within the system of the scientific theory does not indicate any similar necessity in the structure of the facts which it describes. If, then, scientific theories are deductive systems which enable the scientist to co-ordinate and correlate data and to predict the occurrence of phenomena which fall within the scope of the theory; then, there is no longer any reason for maintaining the old twentieth-century objections to theology, for alleging the invalidity of the claim of faith to be in touch with reality.

Further, determinism, once believed to be the basis of a scientific rejection of the claims of Christianity, has come up for radical revision within the boundaries of science itself. The emergence and acceptance of quantum physics has led to a change in the views generally held concerning causality in the natural world. Now it is not suggested that the human will escapes from the net of the old determinism by acquiring the qualities of the alpha-particle—though that is how some Christian apologists would interpret the significance of the indeterminacy principle of modern physics for Christian theology. That type of indeterminacy is not desired for human beings. Unpredictability of action is usually regarded as more of a vice than a virtue. Human behaviour of the highest sort is always relatable to antecedent motives, intentions and behaviour patterns. The negative implication of the quantum theory for the analysis of human behaviour is that it can be no longer confidently affirmed to be mechanically determined. This conclusion is sometimes backed up by some more positive, if also more questionable, affirmation, such as that of J. C. Eccles (*The Neurophysiological Basis of Mind*, quoted Mascall, op. cit., p. 225) that 'the dynamical patterns of neuronal activity that occur in the cortex during conscious states are different in kind from the rest of matter-energy in the natural world and from the condition of the cortex when it is not in association with consciousness'. There is, therefore, a gleam that suggests the ultimate possibility of the will modifying the neuronal network, and the existence of such a suggestion is itself an indication of

how far the situation has changed from the days of the classical science-religion controversy.

But theology has also assisted in this change, particularly by its revised attitude to the question of evolution. The Papacy in the Encyclical *Humani Generis* (quoted by Mascall, op. cit.), has affirmed that 'the teaching of the Church leaves the doctrine of evolution an open question, as long as it confines its speculations to the development of the human body, from other living matter already in existence'. The qualification is by no means a narrow one, and would even permit a view which erected no sharp division between living and non-living matter at a point lower than man in the evolutionary scale. Christians, of some denominations at least, are coming to see that it is not desirable to insist on a theological judgment on the question of the production of animate from inanimate nature. In the matter of determinism, too, theology has realised that the real alternative is not libertarianism, and that human choices are much more influenced by social, economic, political and cultural pressures than the opponents of determinism ever properly appreciated; in fact, that both sides to the old freewill-determinism controversy were in error.

This consideration of the relation of science to religion is an illustration and must remain so—an illustration of the way in which one of the frontiers over which theology has had to speak in the past has collapsed. Another illustration could be drawn from the controversy between the scientific historians and the Christian theologians who claimed historicity for the events recorded in the Gospels. The concept of scientific history has always seemed to me to be an extrapolation into an alien field of standards and attitudes acceptable and natural primarily in physics and chemistry. At any rate, the norms of objectivity and detachment were extended into the social sciences of history, economics, sociology and even psychology. Faith, presuppositions, interpretation, were thought to distort historical perspective and to preclude detached, objective, unemotional judgments. The kind of writing which Christianity practised was clearly seen to be the antithesis of such objectivity. It was based on firmly held presuppositions; it rather shamelessly insisted that you required to have the subjective, prejudiced attitude of faith in order to understand what it was all about.

Kierkegaard had written in 1848, 'Subjectivity is truth', but while that statement had to wait almost a century before it kindled in the thought and culture of Western Europe in another existentialism which took little else from Kierkegaard, nevertheless his words affirmed explicitly what was vaguely felt to be the truth by many supporters of the Christian position in the controversy over the historicity of the biblical narratives and events. In recent years, considerable thought has been given by historians to their own methodology and to the canons of historicity, and though some still undoubtedly stand by the concept of scientific history and to the old pseudo-scientific standards, nevertheless, in the main, these have been abandoned. It is now clear that all historiography is perspectival, originating from some given point in the economic, political, cultural and moral structures of society and in the course of history itself. The way to deal with this situation is not to strive to achieve some supra-perspectival standpoint which synthesises all the perspectives: to do so would be to strive to be as God: but to recognise frankly that the history we write *is* perspectival. By doing so we avoid the error of absolutising some quite relative judgment, and set ourselves the task of discerning the circumstances which provide our perspective. The only way to historical truth, on these terms, is by comparison of perspectives and never by the rejection of them, *ab initio*. This is another way of saying that we shall never have presuppositionless history but that we shall take every care to ensure that we have correct presuppositions.

Such views make it a good deal easier for us to talk about the historicity of the Gospel narratives. We are not free to say simply that the presuppositions of the authors were the best: we shall have to discuss the matter at greater length than that; but at least, on these views, we are still in the argument, which was more than could be said of the old state of affairs. Further, just because there has been an easing of pressure from scientifically-minded historians upon theologians to produce scientific historicity for the Gospel narratives, the latter have had the freedom, which they have quickly used, to discover what precisely the status is, of the varied collection of stories, miracles, parables, letters and apocalypses of which the Scriptures are composed. To the historian, then, it should be of interest to

know that theologians are no longer committed to a literalistic interpretation of these situations as they were in the days when scientific history was in vogue on both sides of the history-theology frontier.

It is impossible, of course, to apply this same kind of general analysis to the relation of philosophy to theology—largely because of the varieties of philosophy. Some philosophers in every age of the Christian Church have found no difficulty in accepting the facts of the Christian faith. Some in every age equally have been in constant opposition. Between these extremes there have been all shades of opinion, and it is no more possible to generalise today than it has ever been. This much we can say: certain theological activities have been regarded with great suspicion by many philosophers; for example, the so-called proofs of divine existence have been the subject of constant examination by philosophers (Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, de Burgh, Dawes Hicks, Laird—to mention only a few at random); the affirmation of Revelation, with its implication that there is Truth that man can not of himself discover; the separation of the Supernatural from the natural by the chasms of Creation and Redemption; the acceptance of Holy Scripture as standing in a special relation to the criterion of truth. The interesting aspect of the present situation is that out of a protracted neglect of these topics has come a new willingness to consider them in philosophical circles. The essays collected and edited recently for the S.C.M. Press by A. C. Flew and Alasdair Macintyre in *Essays in Philosophical Theology* indicate the different outlook which is emerging. The significant fact is that this difference of outlook should have coincided, as we shall see, with a new alertness within theology to its own methodology, use of language and proof.

Let us make the following comments on this first contention —that changes within proximate fields of study to theology have led to the disappearance of old frontiers of controversy over which meanings had to be exchanged. (*a*) My first comment is that we must be very cautious in our expectations of the consequences that may follow this change. It in no way implies that science can now be used to prove the truth of Christianity, that science can be regarded as a propaideutic to faith, or that their experimental investigations will finally lead

scientists to belief. Nor must we be tempted to think that we have at last silenced the sceptics who doubt the veracity of the Evangelists and that we need give no further thought to that subject. In the same way, too, it would be quite erroneous to run off with the notion that the stage is now set for a medieval synthesis of philosophy and theology: some of us stubbornly may still believe that that is not the best way for philosophy and theology to be related to one another. (*b*) Secondly, it does mean that there is a new openness for conversations between theology and the other academic disciplines which has not existed for a century and a half. This is a particularly noteworthy feature of an age which is said to be one of mutually exclusive specialisations. I have come to wonder whether that is not another of the myths about academic life which sorely needs to be exploded. Certainly, the openness of theology to science, history and philosophy would suggest that in some areas of academic life the frontiers of specialisation have been breached. (*c*) Thirdly, for theology I would plead that it be no more relegated to the isolation which was often its lot when the old criticisms were generally accepted. Some of the younger Universities have taken that isolation rather seriously and assumed prematurely that it was the halfway stage to the exclusion of theology from the academic curriculum. All that they have done, by the establishment of the secular University, is to perpetuate in their constitution and curricula rather curious eighteenth- and nineteenth-century notions of science, history and philosophy and of the relation of these to theology.

B

But it would be wrong to leave the impression that theology has become open on its frontiers solely because of changes in proximate fields of study and action, or because it has revised its own ideas of the causes of controversy. Certain contemporary emphases in theology in regard to its own subject-matter have operated in the same direction. They are three-fold and to these I now turn.

(1) First of all, there has been a very extensive analysis of the most commonly used words of the Christian vocabulary, full justice being done to their specific Christian connotation and to etymological derivations. The most outstanding example is

the German Kittel's *Wörterbuch*, several articles of which have been translated into English. Another smaller collection of word-studies was edited by Professor Alan Richardson. Two facts of importance for our present purpose stand out in connexion with those word-studies. On the one hand, no matter how strange and pre-Christian or even non-Christian the origin of many of these words, they acquire in their new context a definitely Christian meaning. It is as if the words were baptised into a genuinely Christian status and usage, by being brought into contact with the realities of the Christian Revelation. The fallacy of an older Liberalism was to assume that if a word was to be found in a Christian and a non-Christian context, it must be taken to have an identical connotation in both. The word κύριος (Lord) is a good example. This word was very common in the Mystery religions prevalent in the Middle East in the first century A.D. and it was the title applied by Christians to Jesus. Consequently, it has been argued, the Primitive Christians deified Christ as did the followers of the Mystery religions with their heroes. The next step is to deny the Deity of Christ as affirmed in the Creeds. So, too, the term ἀπόστολος (Apostle) with its semitic equivalent שליח which had several Judaistic legal and constitutional shades of meaning at the time of Christ, came to have a very specialised significance when used by Him of His followers and when it passed into the common usage in the Primitive Church. In fact, much confusion has been caused in the present controversy over ministerial orders through the attempt to allow as the sole clue to the Christian meaning of the word ἀπόστολος the pre-Christian derivative significance of שליח. The recent word-studies have, among other achievements, clearly demonstrated the fact that Christian terminology within the limits of the Christian Revelation is *sui generis*.

On the other hand, no attempt has ever been made to deny the non-Christian origin of much Christian terminology. When Christianity gave its message to the world, it did not invent a new and peculiar symbolic system in order to do so. It employed the only language that men had, to convey through it the divine meanings of its message. It is with something of a thrill that most students of the Bible learn that the language in which the New Testament was written was not a specially sacred language, but that of the market-place and the barrack

room, the household and the family. It was earthed in the ordinariness of ordinary life. The same thing happened later in the Church's definition of her dogma: the language used was that of her contemporaries, often of the philosophers, but never a completely new terminology of her own invention.

These biblical word-studies of which I have been speaking have revealed to us the complex relation in which biblical language stands to its non-biblical antecedents—on the one hand, of being organically united with it because of a certain identity of meaning, and on the other, of being discontinuous with it insofar as the language is transformed in its new sphere of reference. This complex relationship is both the joy and sorrow of biblical language: its sorrow, in that because of the identity of meaning it is assumed often by its critics to connote no more than its non-Christian antecedents; and its joy in that the continuity allows a way by which the understanding, rightly led by the Spirit, may come to the fuller biblical connotation. The story of orthodoxy is the history of the attempt of the Church, under God, to maintain the right proportions in this dual relationship.

It might appear, then, proper to say that all biblical or theological language is essentially analogical, justice being done to the complexity of the relation of biblical to pre-biblical language by the negative and positive elements in the analogy. So much, I think, would be true of the origins of biblical language, but it is now no longer true of its general structure. For example, when the term 'Father' was first applied to God, such a use of the term would be analogical, the *analogatum* being human fatherhood, known to everyone in his daily life. But once the application has been made and it is understood that *this* is what fatherhood really means, then it is improper to go on speaking of it as an analogical usage. *It* becomes the logically primary, and human fatherhood the secondary. It seems that the same might be said of most of the other biblical terms: hope, faith, love, justice, goodness, truth and so on. To have said so much is not, however, to have destroyed the continuity between the biblical terms and their origins: that affirmation is left untouched by any claim that change of reference entails transference of logical primacy.

The relevance of this theological interest in biblical words to

our earlier contention that it is false to think of the Bible and theology as within strictly guarded frontiers across which esoteric meanings have to be passed, will now be obvious. Not only is a great deal of the language used in the Bible ordinary language; but even the more technical biblical language has its origins outside of the Bible and the Church and Revelation, and the existence of these origins is the refutation of the idea that biblical language is indigenous to the Church. Its sonship, like that of the rest of us, is adopted.

(2) The second important emphasis of our time which has led to revision of the picture of theology confined within frontiers is that upon *communication*. Not only has the Church been interested in the intrinsic significance of the language she has received in the Gospels and in its pre-Christian origins; she has also become acutely aware of a further responsibility awaiting her, namely, that of communicating the message of these Gospels to a world to which much of its content was offensive or alien. The execution of this responsibility is usually presented in terms which assume that the Church herself, as if possessed perfectly of a first-century mind, completely understood the κήρυγμα and that her only worry was to discover the alchemy to transform it into twentieth-century terms intelligible by the people on the other side of the frontier. This presentation I find false in two respects.

(i) It fails to recognise the extent to which the Church's own thinking is permeated by twentieth-century concepts and terminology. I do not deny for one minute—it would be both foolish and impious to do so—that the Church has the mind of the Spirit and that through Him the deep and hidden things of the first century are revealed to us in the twentieth. But we must not allow our piety in this direction to carry us to unrealism in others. We cannot know the meaning of 'ransom' in our bones, in the way in which a first-century slave did who longed often for the glad day when he would be freed. We who have depopulated the aerial spaces of the principalities and powers and demons which existed there for the early Christians cannot reconstruct emotionally the sense of liberation which they experienced when they heard of 'Christus Victor', how ever much we try to enter intellectually into the world-view which they held. It is difficult for us, too, to think ourselves

into what the first-century Jewish convert to Christianity felt when he called Christ 'Messiah'. We may then reckon that we are more akin to the first-century Gentiles in this matter, until we remember that they had the idea of κύριος in their minds when they accepted Christ as Lord—altogether different from, and yet being compared with, the gods many and the lords many whom their fellows worshipped. In other words, the problem of bridging the gap between the twentieth century and the first does not occur only when we endeavour to communicate the Gospel to our twentieth-century contemporaries. It is present right from the moment when we seek to understand the Gospel for ourselves, and to see it to be true for ourselves. The recognition of such a problem does not imply that we are precluded by twenty centuries from knowing the Gospel. It does argue the power of the Spirit to make us 'contemporary disciples' of Christ; but it should also compel us to realise that our acquaintance with the Gospel is a complex thing, and that it is achieved, not by the annihilation of those things that we share with our contemporaries, but through their clear affirmation. In brief, the most serious frontier of meaning is not that which the Church most frequently takes it to be—that between the Church and the world—but rather that between the language of the twentieth century and the κήρυγμα of the first.

(ii) My second reason for finding fault with the idea that the Church perfectly understands the first-century message but is in a quandary about its twentieth-century equivalent is that that is not the correct order. As a sequel to what has just been said, if we are courageous enough, we shall go on to say that the language in which the Church itself apprehends the Gospel is the language in which it shall also communicate it. On the contrary, if we feel that we have not quite achieved the language of communication, then we are obliged to ask ourselves whether we have yet achieved the language of understanding. The answer is that we possibly have not. The point at which the Church begins to understand the message is also the point at which it has found the medium of communication. It is interesting to notice how many of the words which are used in contemporary communication of the Gospel are not original to the events of the Incarnation as the Bible describes them. This is obvious to us when we think of a Christology which speaks of

two natures and one Person, or when we reflect upon the language of the doctrine of the Trinity, which is still the medium which we use in our exposition of the doctrine of God. But it is not so obvious to us that the modern predominant employment of the concept of Revelation to describe the events and significance of the Incarnation is not a usage of the first-century Church, nor are the very varied ways in which we relate the Incarnation to what we call 'history', regarding Christ as the centre of history, speaking of the mighty acts of God in history, claiming that the Redemption wrought in Christ is effectual for the whole of history and so on. The social, economic, cultural environment has penetrated our understanding far more than the purists in the interpretation of theological speech have ever appreciated. Even in our understanding of the message we have already begun to employ the language of communication.

But this penetration has not been confined to speech. The doubts of our contemporaries, the problems that the faith creates for them, are to a very great measure *our* doubts and *our* difficulties. St. Anselm demonstrates this fact for us once we appreciate the real function of the interlocutor Boso in his *Cur Deus Homo*. Boso, you will recall, throughout the dialogue expresses the difficulties which some of his twelfth-century contemporaries find in the Christian doctrine of the Atonement. In fact, Boso succeeds in bringing together most of the really important problems that arise in connexion with this doctrine. He presses Anselm with these problems, returning again and again to them once he has had time to reflect upon Anselm's answers and judged them unsatisfactory. You may interpret the dialogue in the traditional way and say that Anselm, sure and convinced of his faith, is seeking to refute the criticisms of the outside world—certainly driving back the hordes of scepticism at the frontier. That traditional interpretation does not, to my mind, do justice to the tension that exists throughout the dialogue or to the earnestness with which Anselm struggles with Boso's difficulties; so that a truer account of the situation is to say that Boso is the representative *not* of any outsiders but of St. Anselm himself. Boso is St. Anselm's *alter ego*, and the dialogue is a conversation of St. Anselm with himself. A child of the times, he shares the difficulties which his contemporaries

discover in the faith. His *Proslogion* reflects the same spirit, and it is the correct spirit in which theology is to be studied and theological affirmations to be made. Its text is: 'I believe; help Thou mine unbelief.' As soon as theology forgets or denies it, theology becomes the attempt to walk by sight and not by faith—a false *theologia gloriae* and no longer a *theologia crucis*.

If that be so, then the old controversies over the difference between dogmatics and apologetics, and about whether apologetics is a permissible activity for a Church serious about the Revelation of God in Christ, were really all rather artificial, and certainly sprang from wrong premises about the Church's relation to the Gospel. In order to understand the κήρυγμα, in order to appropriate it for purposes of dogmatic exposition and didactic presentation within its own frontiers, the Church must come to terms with the difficulties and problems which it shares with its contemporaries across the frontiers. In a way, then, to question the possibility of the Church having an apologetic is to question the possibility of its having even a dogmatic; for, humanly speaking, by achieving a proper contemporary understanding of its given message, it is already more than half way to an apologetic.

The inner structure of proclamation, the close relatedness of the Church, to the society, culture and economy within which it is set—these facts reinforce the conclusion to which we have already come by considering the broken or changed frontiers between theology and proximate fields of study and action, and by indicating the implications of the present-day interests in Bible-words and their origins—namely, that the relation of Church language to ordinary language is not that of two fields of knowledge separated by frontiers of meaninglessness. There are, in fact, no such frontiers.

(3) However, what finally establishes the conclusion for me is the third emphasis in contemporary theology apposite to our subject—namely, the emphasis upon the centrality of the Incarnation (including in that term, of course, the Atonement) for all our theological thought. Justice has already been done to this centrality in many areas—for, example, in our affirmations concerning society, history, the interpretation of the Old Testament, the doctrine of the Church, eschatology and so on. But the relevance of the Incarnation to the understanding of (i) how

we are to interpret biblical-theological language; and (ii) how biblical-theological language and ordinary language are related to one another, has not always been appreciated. If the relation of the Word to the flesh is to be taken as normative of our conception of how the Word of God proclaimed is related to the speech which is the medium of its expression, then certain important facts are to be noted concerning that speech. Thus, it will be seen that it is not some special theological speech that is to fulfil this role, but the ordinary language and terminology of every day. Nor is it simply creaturely language, the means of communication among finite beings, and perhaps failing in its task because of its finiteness. It is *sinful* language, reflecting the brokenness of our condition, a stammering which is neither totally erroneous nor total nonsense. It is language which stands in need of redemption, and which receives this in its new sphere of reference. But in this reference it can never arrogate to itself any divine attributes; its union with the Word of which it is the bearer is hypostatic and it is one which takes place ἀτρέπτως and ἀσυγχύτως. Theological language, therefore, must always remember the text, 'He that standeth take heed lest he fall', for its status as *theological* language is determined by the fact that God has elected it to this office in Christ in the Word proclaimed. We do well to bear this in mind when we are tempted to cast an aura of sanctity and sempiternity about our doctrinal formulations.

This being the case, it becomes clear that the relation between biblical-theological language and ordinary language is not that of two areas of speech that meet at a frontier where we are obliged to translate one set into another that is totally disparate. The relation is ultimately as irreducible and mysterious as that of the divine to the human in Jesus Christ, in the real presence that is the Sacrament of Holy Communion, in the Word written which is the Bible, and in that indwelling of grace which is moral regeneration. In their origins the words are the words of the world; in union with the Word, they are born again into new significances. It is, you might say, this secular origin of all biblical-theological language which is the basis for evangelical communication. Communication consists, then, of a process of using secular words in a biblical-theological, or more precisely still, in a revelational reference, so that these

words come to have that same reference for our hearers. Without that substratum of identity there would be no communication but only 'speaking with tongues'. With it, however, a course is laid for the Word whose freedom is in the Spirit.

C

It is in this kind of context that I should like to define the task of Philosophy of Religion and Apologetics—the two subjects comprised by the title 'Divinity'. All too often in the past, Philosophy of Religion has been practised out of relation to the ordinances of the Church, thereby being denied those insights into its own subject-matter which is to be derived from knowledge of God within the fellowship of believers and in the Christian Sacraments; whereas Apologetics has similarly presented to the world—at the frontier, in our former language—a decimal of the total Gospel. In the new reference, the task of Philosophy of Religion is to be understood by relating it to the God-given task of the Church to proclaim the Gospel to the world. Could we perhaps describe the situation by saying that Philosophy of Religion is the Church's taking seriously her responsibilities to this task of proclamation in the following directions?

(i) To make herself understood when she proclaims the message. It is recognised at once that the true understanding of what is said in proclamation of the Gospel and in all biblical-theological language depends upon the working of the Holy Spirit, 'the subjective possibility of Revelation'. But there is a sense in which the work of the Holy Spirit, if I may so put it, is simplified, if we have made wise choices in our diction and in our figures. To use the language of the Roman Catholic publishers, in Philosophy of Religion, the Church seriously endeavours to secure a *Nihil obstat* to the message of the Church. The time is past when we could deliver ourselves of a message, regardless of its reception by our listeners, of understanding or misunderstanding. In the light of what we have already been saying about the language of the Church, we may add that since biblical-theological language is in origin secular language, then there is a responsibility to see that in the communication the new reference of the language becomes determinative of its connotation. This responsibility becomes more

important than it has ever been in the history of the Church because we live, as is so often said, in a post-Christian age, in which Christian language has become debased. To maintain integrity of communication in this environment is no small responsibility, but it is an inescapable one.

(ii) We must also affirm that Philosophy of Religion represents the Church's attempt to understand its own message. This responsibility is maintained on two grounds. On the one hand, as we have seen, the Church shares the difficulties of the generation in which it lives, with regard to the Gospel. In Philosophy of Religion, these difficulties are stated more explicitly than we would expect them to be in a dogmatic presentation of the *κήρυγμα*. On the other hand, the Church in every generation uses for the communication of the Gospel expressions and analogies which do not belong to the givenness of Revelation, ideas which are so widely accepted that they come to have the authority of the original language of the Bible. It is out of a hardening of such usage that literalism, fundamentalism and scholastic orthodoxy spring. That this may happen at any point in the history of the Church's proclamation is sufficient indication of the necessity for Philosophy of Religion, that is, of the Christian religion.

(iii) Philosophy of Religion is the Church's taking seriously her responsibility to understand her own methodology and particularly her own criterion of truth and her methods of proof. To the outsider, and to many within, theology seems to consist almost exclusively of positive affirmations with little attempt at proof. In fact, there is a great deal of very elaborate demonstration in process all the time, and it is the function of Philosophy of Religion to abstract the structure of such proof and to examine its validity. So the question of a criterion of truth is inevitably raised. I know of no more ticklish problem in the whole field of Christian theology today in any of the Churches. But Dogmatics is so much concerned with the content, the subject-matter of doctrine, that it finds little time to become self-consciously critical of its own criterion of truth. At a time when most academic disciplines are questioning their methodology, Philosophy of Religion asks how the Church's doctrinal formulations are related to the Holy Scriptures which are the final authority; what, too, interpretation means in the hands of

the exegete, the expositor and the dogmatic theologian, and how far one may move along this scale of interpretation without losing the thread of connexion with the original text. While these appear at a first glance to be formal matters, it is obvious that they will soon affect the content which is informed by them in the actual practice of the Church's communication.

(iv) Philosophy of Religion is the Church seeking to make its message relevant. In this form it may be called apologetics. In fact, as we have seen, apologetics has come to have a bad name, but the error has lain not so much in what it was doing as in how it was trying to do it. The Church's message has to be relevant, and this requires some acquaintance on the part of those who preach it with the situation to which it is directed. In the past, this situation has been wrongly equated with the Senior Common Rooms of our older Universities. There has been little sense of the problems which ordinary people have experienced in regard to the faith, particularly those caught between the upper and the nether millstones of the economic pressures of an industrialised, commercialised age. One thing I should like to see emerging from the 'Tell Scotland' Campaign of the Church is a much more effective apologetics. Mrs Kathleen Bliss recently said that, from her discussions with many people in connexion with her programme preparation for the B.B.C., she had formed the conclusion that the two groups chiefly estranged from the Church at the present time are the 'intellectuals' and the industrial groups. If so, then there is still a great apologetic work to be done in the fields not only of science and religion, and of philosophy and the faith, but also of communism and of the relation of the Christian faith to the socio-economic order.

(v) Since religious knowledge carries with it the claim to truth, there will always be a question—and, I trust, an answer to the question—of the validity of such knowledge. Whatever we have to say about the proofs of divine existence, and there is little that has not been said about them, we must recognise that they represented a genuine attempt to come to terms with this question of validity. If they have failed in that attempt, it seems to me intellectual dishonesty if not also moral cowardice to abandon the project and ignore questions of validity. For if we make the claim to truth, *ipso facto* we are obliged to face

questions of validity and see them through to the end. If we speak of knowledge of God, we must meet inquiries about what kind of knowledge this is, how it is related to other kinds of knowledge if it *is* different, and whether it should be called knowledge, and so on.

If Philosophy of Religion can assist the Church in honouring these responsibilities, it will have gone a long way in keeping open those frontiers between theology and those proximate fields of study and action of which we spoke earlier, which have been closed for so many decades. If the opportunity of that openness is grasped now, there is just the possibility of the re-integration which our present sectionalised culture desperately needs. That way, too, lies the possibility that the new exciting movements within academic theology will flow out into the wider life of the Church.

FAITH AND BAPTISM

by The Rev. WILLIAM LILLIE

I

In the Acts of the Apostles there are ten accounts of individuals or groups of people being baptised. In six of them there is either a statement that the candidate for Baptism believed or a reference to belief in what immediately precedes the account of the Baptism. In the other four cases as well, Baptism was obviously preceded by a response of faith on the part of the candidate; the crowd at Pentecost had been told to repent and receive the Word; Saul of Tarsus had just had a most dramatic experience of conscious conversion; Lydia's heart had been opened to give heed to St. Paul's message; and one form of the story of the Ethiopian eunuch describes Philip as demanding belief as a condition of Baptism, and the eunuch as confessing his belief; if this be a later addition, it provides even stronger evidence that in the practice of the early Church the response of conscious faith preceded Baptism.

This evidence that faith was a necessary antecedent of Baptism may be compared with the evidence in the Synoptic Gospels that faith was a necessary condition for our Lord performing a miracle. This too looks strong evidence, for of twenty-four appearances of the word *pistis* in the Synoptic Gospels, twenty occur in connexion with a miracle either actual or potential (as in 'removing mountains'). These occur in connexion with the withering of the fig-tree, the stilling of the sea, and seven or eight healing miracles (those done on the centurion's servant, the paralytic with four friends, the woman suffering from an issue of blood, the Syrophenician woman's daughter, the epileptic boy, the Samaritan leper and one or more blind persons). The verb *pisteuein* which is certainly used much more widely in the Synoptic Gospels appears in connexion with one of the above miracles and also with the healing of Jairus' daughter. What we find is that, of the total number of miracles individually recorded in the Synoptic Gospels (somewhere between twenty-

five and thirty), in only ten or eleven cases is there any reference to faith at all, and even in the eight or nine healing miracles where there is such a reference, the faith in five of them is explicitly stated to be the faith of someone other than the actual patient; only in the case of the woman with the issue of blood, in the case of the Samaritan leper and in one or more cases of blindness is the faith that of the person cured. This is entirely in harmony with the statement that Jesus did not do many mighty works in Nazareth 'because of their unbelief'; the unbelief was probably not so much that of the actual sufferers as that of the whole community. It is also in harmony with the assertion frequently made that, while in the Synoptic Gospels (actually in the few cases we have mentioned) the response of faith precedes a miracle, in the Fourth Gospel, the belief of the disciples or others is often described as the consequence of a miracle. (John 2.11, 4.53, 6.14, 9.38, 11.45, 21.7.) The most that we can make of the evidence of the Gospels on this matter is that miracles occur in an atmosphere of faith or that there is an undetermined link between faith and miracle. It is possible, even in face of the evidence in Acts, that the link between Baptism and the response of conscious faith may be of a similarly undetermined kind.

Those again who, from the evidence in Acts, try to formulate a fixed causal connexion between Baptism and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit find themselves in a similar uncertainty. In four of the ten examples in Acts there is no mention of the Holy Spirit at all. In the cases of Saul and, presumably although not explicitly, of the three thousand baptised on the day of Pentecost, the gift of the Holy Spirit immediately accompanied Baptism. In the cases of the Samaritans and of those at Ephesus, who had been baptised with John's baptism, the Holy Spirit was given a considerable time after they had been baptised. In the case of Cornelius and those with him the Holy Spirit was given with Pentecostal signs before Baptism took place. (The Baptism of Simon Magus was never completed with the gift of the Holy Spirit.) Here too, while there is a clear implication that Baptism and the gift of the Holy Spirit are linked together, it is impossible to make a rule as to whether the gift of the Holy Spirit accompanies or follows or even precedes Baptism.

To return to our present subject, the evidence, so far as it goes, does indicate that, in the case of adults, the response of conscious faith was the usual antecedent of Baptism in apostolic times. Indeed this has been accepted by the whole Church as the normal state of affairs in adult Baptism, and we shall see in what follows that this practice is perfectly consistent with a doctrine of Baptism which admittedly puts the emphasis elsewhere, and demands infant Baptism. Even in the case of adults, however, it is likely that some of the adult members of households baptised in New Testament times and some of those baptised later in the tribal conversions of the early Middle Ages and in the mass movements in modern missionary work did not share fully in their leaders' conscious understanding and acceptance of the Christian Faith. This limitation in their faith before Baptism does not, in the experience of modern missionaries, prevent their Baptism being followed in some cases at any rate by clear evidence of the fruits of the Holy Spirit, and a growth to their full manhood in Christ.

II

What is this 'faith' with which we are concerned in Baptism? An examination of the uses in the New Testament of the noun *pistis* (commonly translated 'faith') and of the verb *pisteuein* (commonly translated 'believe'), suggests three aspects of meaning. These are not to be thought of as three different meanings, but as three emphases in an unambiguous word. When St. Paul, for example, is using *pistis*, it is often quite impossible to say on which aspect he is laying emphasis in a particular case.

(1) 'To believe' means in the New Testament, as in ordinary Greek and ordinary English, to accept a statement as true. Statements vary, of course, in their religious importance; it is more important to believe that our Lord rose from the dead than to believe that Lazarus rose from the dead. It has been a practice of ecclesiastical leaders to try to formulate those theological statements which every Christian should accept or, in certain sects, which every candidate for Baptism should accept. What corresponds to this in the New Testament is the use of the verb *pisteuein* for the action of those who accepted the apostolic *kerygma*, but, as is natural in a book using popular

ways of speech as the New Testament does, we find 'believe' used for anything from the acceptance of a particular statement (e.g. John 4.50) to the acceptance of the central doctrines of the Christian faith (e.g. John 20.29, 31). There are two particular uses of this kind, which are suggestive of the nature of Christian faith—the belief that a miracle will take place (the most common use of *pistis* in the Synoptic Gospels implies this and something more), and the belief that a prediction will be fulfilled; Christian faith characteristically looks forward to the future.

It is, however, not essentially to a statement, even a statement of Christian theology, that Christian faith is the response. The definition of the *Catholic Encyclopedia* that faith is 'an act of understanding, whereby we firmly hold as true whatever God has revealed' is in danger of laying too much emphasis on 'intellectual conviction', although Romanists escape this by adding an act of will, in which the believer deliberately accepts what the Church teaches. Theological statements, naturally enough, can be understood often only by those with some theological training, and certainly not by the 'babes' of the New Testament to whom the Gospel is revealed. Christian faith, as the Reformers clearly saw, is a response to the Word of God, the assent or Amen to what God has spoken 'in many and various ways'. He has spoken through the Holy Scriptures, and supremely through our Lord Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh. He is, in Himself, the truth of God's Word. For we must remember that the Hebrews and their New Testament successors did not think of truth, merely as a characteristic of statements, as the Greeks and even we moderns tend to do. The steadfastness of God is the ground of all truth[1]; the common word for 'truth' is derived from the word for 'faithfulness' or 'steadfastness' in the Old Testament. It is because God is altogether true to Himself and consequently to His promises, that man can accept His Word, and this acceptance is something far bigger than a mere intellectual assent to statements; it involves the whole being and living of the man who accepts the Word of God. We are clearly moving to a second aspect of faith.

[1] This is brought out fully in an article by Professor T. F. Torrance, 'One Aspect of the Biblical Conception of Faith' (*Expository Times*, January 1957).

(2) 'To believe' means to rely on a person, or to put one's trust in him. This is what is expressed in our English idiom, 'to believe in', and most characteristically in the Greek idiom, *pisteuein eis*, which occurs thirty-two times in the Fourth Gospel, and frequently elsewhere in the New Testament. It may appear logical to suppose that this second aspect is secondary to and dependent on our first aspect of meaning; we can only believe in a person when we believe the assertions that he exists and has certain qualities. Yet, in the Bible, this second aspect is certainly the primary and fundamental meaning. In Greek thought a statement was true, because it was logically based on another true statement, and *pistis* was inferior to reasoned knowledge, because the statements accepted by *pistis* were not so logically deduced. In the Bible, the statements accepted by faith are the statements with the most certain foundation, and so superior to all others; they are based on the faithfulness and truth of God. This is why 'believing *in* God' is primary; we believe what is given of His Word in the assertions of Scripture, because we believe *in* His faithfulness and truth. It is in this aspect we see most clearly how the New Testament idea of faith depends on the Old Testament concepts of 'steadfastness', 'reliability' and truth. After all we have something similar in our common usage; when I say, 'I believe in Sir Winston Churchill', my intention is not to make a statement about myself or my qualities of character, but about Sir Winston Churchill, although, of course, I do indirectly tell something about myself. Similarly our Christian statement, 'I believe in Jesus Christ', is primarily a statement about Jesus Christ, not about our own psychological condition. To believe in God is to find reliability and faithfulness in God, and the biblical view is that, by laying hold of that reliability, the believer himself becomes reliable. Principal Whitehouse brings out the characteristics of this reliability by contrasting the doubts of the unbelieving man in Deuteronomy 28.64-67, and the summons to the believer in Isaiah 26.3ff.[1] There can be no better exposition.

(3) 'Faith' sometimes appears as a quality of character, a virtue parallel to the two other theological virtues of hope and *agape*, something that can grow in us, so that we pray, 'Lord,

[1] In *A Theological Word Book of the Bible*, p. 75.

increase our faith.' In ethics, a virtue is defined as a quality of character or a disposition to do what is right in a particular direction, along with the habit of acting in accordance with the disposition. It is insufficient to think of faith as the disposition to believe certain statements or to trust certain persons; it is in this fashion that the world thinks of believers as credulous and gullible. What is essential in Christian faith is the steadfastness of the One believed in, and the consequent truth of His Word in action. For an understanding of this virtue, we need to adopt the biblical distinction between faith and sight (2 Cor. 5.7); this distinction could have been made properly under (1) but might have caused confusion there. What is grasped by faith, whether the steadfastness of a person or the truth of a statement, is not seen directly by the natural man; this is why *pistis* and *pisteuein* in the New Testament so often refer to miracles and fulfilments of prophecy—things which people cannot *see* directly. Cardinal Gasparri's *Catholic Catechism* refers to faith as a 'supernatural virtue',[1] and there is, indeed, a supernatural insight in all the three theological virtues. In faith, the believer sees the hand of God in events where the unbeliever sees chance or causality; he hears the Word of God in words that are mere human opinion to the unbeliever. In hope the believer sees the working out of the purpose of God in events that, to the unbeliever, lead nowhere. In *agape*, the believer sees what is genuinely lovable in a person, whom the world regards as entirely unlovable. This supernatural insight is a gift of God and in each case it is because the 'virtue' is supremely present in God that He gives it to His people. We have already seen that man wins faith by grasping the faithfulness of God, and the theological virtue certainly includes faithfulness as well as what we ordinarily call 'faith' or belief. It is a theological commonplace that we love both God and our fellow-men, because 'He first loved us', and the same is true of hope. Indeed the three theological virtues have so much in common that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them, and Protestant theologians have sometimes tended to include them all under faith. Much of the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews—the chronicle of faith—deals with what we should more naturally call 'hope'; 'the assurance of

[1] J. Baillie, *The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought*, p. 86.

things hoped for' is one part of the definition of faith in this chapter. Again the loving of a person and the believing in that person are inextricably bound up with each other. The theological virtues are not acquired by effort like the moral virtues; love and hope produced by human effort would be spurious and rightly regarded as sentimentality and wishful thinking. Indeed we commonly regard hope and love as qualities which grow in us, as we grow in Christ, and it is strange that some should speak of faith as if it were a pre-condition of entering the Christian life at all. It is doubtful, however, whether it is helpful to regard faith as a disposition; the Bible emphasis is certainly not on this aspect. Faith, is rather an activity between persons, or as Dr Brunner says, 'a relationship of person to Person'.[1] It is the activity in which man says and acts 'Amen' in response to the Word of God in speech or action.

III

How then does faith find its place in the Sacrament of Baptism?

Baptism is in its nature a sacrament of anticipation and of promise. Taken by itself the sprinkling with water in the Three-fold Name looks like a mere empty observance, and there have even been Christian theologians who tend to regard it as such.[2] If, however, we look at it in any meaningful way, we see *by faith* more in the sacrament than the visible rite. If we regard Baptism as a sacrament of cleansing, it is not only the cleansing of pre-baptismal sins, but the assurance that the baptised person can have this cleansing in the Blood of Christ renewed each day of his later life. If with St. Paul we regard Baptism as being buried with Christ and rising with Him from the dead, then our Baptism is an anticipation of every new beginning in Christ made here on earth, but also an anticipation of the final resurrection of the body, and we grasp both of these anticipations by faith. If again we see in the Sacrament of Baptism the sign of the Baptism of the Holy Spirit, then it is the earnest of our daily renewal by that same Spirit; even those who arbitrarily postpone the full receiving of the Holy Spirit to some later Confirmation would admit that in Baptism we have the pledge and assurance of such a receiving. It is

[1] J. Baillie, op. cit., p. 97.

[2] N. Snaith, *I Believe in*, pp. 112, 113.

faith that sees these anticipations and promises in the sacrament of Baptism, and believes in their fulfilment; the believing congregation must see in every Baptism, 'the assurance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen'. In the case of an adult Baptism, there is somewhat less room for this kind of faith, for we can see in the adult's confession the promise of things-to-be, but in the case of infant Baptism all that is to be can only be grasped by faith. This anticipation in faith was certainly present in the Baptism of our Lord at the hands of John the Baptist; it was the first step on the way to the Cross—'the Baptism' with which He had to be baptised, and in which He was to 'fulfil all righteousness'.

Here, in the faith of the congregation witnessing a Baptism, we have something analogous to that atmosphere of faith in which some if not all of the miracles of our Lord took place. In a place, like Nazareth, where there was general unbelief, 'he could do no mighty works', and in a congregation where there is no belief, no assurance that the promise of an infant's Baptism will have a fulfilment, it is possible that He can still do no mighty work through infant Baptism. In our experience there is little opportunity for the child having his faith aroused by stimuli from the Christian fellowship or having his faith encouraged by the infection of the faith of others in such a congregation. Principal Baillie writes, 'It is in fellowship, and only in fellowship, that God reveals Himself.'[1]

This is evident in one particular regard. One of the most helpful ways of regarding faith is as a response to the Word of God, and our Protestant tradition has always given the Word of God a primary place in the sacraments. 'Where Christ Jesus is not preached (mark well what I say, preached . . .) there have the sacraments neither life nor soul', says Knox.[2] Obviously the preached Word is not received by a child at the moment of his Baptism, but this does not mean that the Word has no part in his Baptism. Indeed we may find here the strongest reason for our practice of making parents or sponsors promise 'to teach the child the truths and duties of the Christian faith'. If they, as representatives of the Christian congregation, fail to do this, the child will not hear the Word, and so his Baptism will remain incomplete. 'How are they to hear

[1] J. Baillie, op. cit., p. 108. [2] Knox's *Works*. Ed. Laing, vol. VI, p. 14.

without a preacher?' Here again the faith of the congregation proclaiming the Word of God is necessary to the child's responding to that Word in faith.

Yet, as we have seen, the Word of God is not primarily the preached Word; it is the Word Incarnate, Jesus Christ Himself. The believing congregation sees at each Baptism of a child Jesus taking a child in His arms and blessing Him in a personal encounter; this is why we read the story of Mark 10 as a part of the sacrament. Here we must ask whether there may not be some sense in which the infant child in this encounter begins to make the response of faith. Those opposed to infant Baptism strenuously deny this; it is perfectly clear to them that an infant is altogether incapable of anything that can be called faith. If we regard an infant as entirely incapable of responses —a *tabula rasa* entirely passive in receiving impressions—anything that Baptism could do would be a mere mechanical or magical change, and not only convinced Baptist thinkers but a great many ordinary Christian people instinctively revolt from such a mechanical view of Baptism. But the infant is not a *tabula rasa*; he is already a human being, who makes an extraordinary variety of responses, as any mother can testify. Most of a child's responses may certainly be reactions entirely irrelevant to Baptism or faith or the Christian life. There is, however, one response the beginning of which it is impossible to date, which may be very relevant—the response of trust in his mother. Professor Torrance has reminded us that certain uses of the Hebrew root of the word we have translated 'steadfastness' and 'faith' indicate that 'the vivid picture of the constancy and steadfastness of a parent to her child lurks behind the Old Testament concept of faithfulness'[1]; so an analogy between the response of a child to his mother's care and the response of a child to God's care is by no means unbiblical (cf. Isa. 49.15). The trust of a child in his mother is not a conscious trust, but the child in sober truth depends on his mother for almost everything, and most of his reactions to external stimuli are bound up with this dependence. The child will grow to realise consciously this dependence, but the precocious recognition of it is usually a sign of defect and not completeness of trust; the older child who needs constantly to

[1] *Expository Times*, vol. LXVIII, p. 111.

tell himself that he trusts his mother is not the best example of childlike trust. Our argument is that there may be a trust in God as unconscious but as capable of development into a full faith as a child's trust in his mother present even from the time of his Baptism. What Principal Baillie says of the faith of an adult is true of the growing faith of a little child, 'Beliefs are not likely to be explicitly reflected upon, or explicitly formulated and affirmed, until some doubt of them appears. When I trust somebody or have *fiducia* in him, I am manifestly at the same time believing certain things about him to be true, yet I may find it very difficult to say exactly what these things are—I may even flounder helplessly in the attempt to assign the reasons for my trust'.[1] Here, of course, the child is far more inarticulate than the adult, but *fiducia* in God may be really there. Principal Baillie quotes the English Puritan, John Flavel, 'A man must be a believer before he knows himself to be so.'[2] Those who hold that every Christian must have a single Damascus road experience of consciously accepted adult conversion reject all this and link the sacrament of Baptism with this experience of new birth. If, however, we accept in seriousness our Lord's saying about little children, that 'To such belongs the Kingdom of God', we may believe that the more normal experience is that the child's trust in God develops in similar fashion to the child's trust in his mother; this, of course, does not mean that the child's growth in faith will be a smooth and even progress; many children are not like that in their trust in their mother. Our belief is that in our Baptism we have the assurance that, however often we fail and go wrong in our spiritual growth, we can turn in confidence for cleansing to our Heavenly Father. Even the prodigal son does not need to be re-adopted as a son when he returns to his father's house; and the elder brother, although he does not see it, needs to come in faith for a daily renewal of his cleansing. Once we admit that a conscious faith may grow out of an unconscious dependence, as appears to happen in the case of a child with his mother, there seems no sound reason for denying that a child's faith may have its beginning in his Baptism.

Even in the matter of conscious assent to religious truths, we are in danger of giving an entirely unscriptural advantage to

[1] J. Baillie, op. cit., p. 92.

[2] Quoted J. Baillie, op. cit., p. 89.

the grown-up person. A child assents to the 'Jesus loves me', taught him by his mother just as really as an adult assents to the Nicene Creed. The adult has normally a more reasoned faith than a child, as indeed becomes an adult; but an illiterate woman on the mission-field may go on all her life expressing her faith in the words, 'Jesus loves me; this I know.' One would suspect a professor of theology of a double personality if he found these words an adequate expression of his faith, and yet, as faith, the faith of the illiterate woman or even of the little child may be as real and whole-hearted as the faith of the professor who can give a systematic account of the Christian doctrine he believes. Those of us who have taught little children in day-school or Sunday-school find in the response of many children to the Christian truths taught a sure evidence that the Holy Spirit may be given to a little child, and does not wait to be received in an adult's deliberate profession of faith. Calvin maintains that what Scripture reveals 'will not find credence in the hearts of men until it is sealed by the interior witness of the Holy Spirit'.[1] The credence that little children sometimes give to such truths as they are able to receive shows that this seal is present.

We have been speaking of faith as the response of the congregation, as the response of adults, as the response of little children, and even as the rudimentary response of newly baptised infants. Yet Christian theology maintains that all these responses of faith are genuine only so far as they share in the faith of Jesus Christ, 'the faithful *Amen* of man to God'.[2] Jesus Christ is not only the revelation of the faithfulness of God on which such emphasis has been laid; He as man in perfect obedience even unto the death of the Cross made the only adequate response of faith to the faithfulness of the Heavenly Father. When the Holy Spirit was given on the Day of Pentecost, all who received that promised Baptism of the Spirit were incorporated into the Body of Christ, so that His faith became theirs; and each child received in Baptism into that Body becomes a sharer in the faith of Jesus Christ, 'the Amen, the faithful and true witness'. This is why St. Paul can say, 'It is

[1] *Institutes*, I, ch. vii, 4.

[2] T. F. Torrance, article previously mentioned, to which I owe much in this paragraph.

no longer I who live but Christ who lives in me'; his faith is Christ's faith. We can here gain some insight as to why Baptism is appropriate at the very beginning of the Christian life even for an unconscious infant. If we have any part in our own Baptism, even the decision in faith to seek Baptism, there may be a danger of our putting some reliance on that conscious decision, and so our conscious decision and even our personal faith become those 'works' on which St. Paul saw the folly of putting reliance. What matters in Baptism is that God has been eternally faithful to us, and that Christ has made in His life and death the one perfect response of faith, in which through Baptism He makes us sharers. As it is the Love of God shed abroad in our hearts which moves us to Christian love, so the Faith of Christ is seen growing in us both in the form of intellectual belief and in the form of trusting reliance, which the Church has always regarded as the evidences of Christian faith.

THE REDEMPTIVE MISSION OF THE CHURCH

by The Rev. Professor J. F. PETER

The title given to this paper makes clear what it sets out to do. The 'mission of the Church' is the work which the Church is meant to carry out, and the inclusion of the epithet 'redemptive' indicates that what is in mind is the Church's mission in relation to the world (she has also her Godward mission of offering worship). The aim, then, is to indicate the principles by which the Church must be guided as she seeks to fulfil her manward vocation, which is one of bringing men to redemption; and I propose to draw out these principles by following three lines, which I call the primary, the secondary, and the tertiary, because I believe that they should always be thought of in that order, though I do not think it possible for any of them to exist without the others. The mission of the Church, primarily, is to bring men into confrontation with God; secondarily, it is to bring men into the fellowship of the Church; tertiarily, it is to redeem society as a whole.

One other preliminary comment: when we speak of 'the mission of the Church', we mean the mission which is to be engaged in by the whole Church. There is abroad too much of the spirit which someone (I believe it was William Temple) deplored when he remarked that when people say 'Why doesn't the Church do something?' they usually mean 'Why don't the Bishops say something?' It is upon us all, everyone in his particular station in the Church and in the community, that there rests responsibility for realising the Church's mission.

I

The primary line along which the Church's redemptive mission must run is that of bringing men into confrontation with God.

We would all, I think, agree with John Baillie when he says that 'there is no more hopeful element in the philosophy of our time than the reopening of the question of our knowledge of

one another',[1] for in a number of ways the conclusions which have been drawn from the study of that question have enabled to be stated with greater clarity what takes place when a man comes to know God. What happens then is that a man and God meet together in a relationship, the characteristics of which can be delineated to some extent by following the analogy of person to person encounter on the human plane. And the essential element in that encounter, it has been convincingly shown, is the imparting and receiving of knowledge that is not inferential in character.

But while sharing with all knowledge of other selves this characteristic that it is of an immediate or non-inferential kind, our knowledge of God has also characteristics peculiarly its own. The uniqueness of the divine-human encounter is that, as Brunner says, it is a relationship 'indissoluble, two-sided, yet never interchangeable, and in a specific sense one-sided'.[2] It is 'indissoluble' and 'two-sided', in that God is always the God of man and man is always the man of God; it is 'never interchangeable' and 'one-sided', in that the initiative in this relationship is always God's, and man's place in it only secondary.

Having this understanding of the nature of the divine-human encounter—to bring men into which is the primary line of the Church's redemptive mission—it behoves us to take notice of three practical consequences.

1. The first of these is that all our attempts to win men must be made with the recognition that the work of redemption can be wrought only by God Himself.

These attempts of ours to win men take many forms: we write pamphlets, we engage in private conversation, we make broadcasts, we screen films, we organise clubs, and so on (and I reiterate that such attempts are not the concern of ministers only, but of the whole Church); but the form by which I shall illustrate the point here being made is that characteristically Christian activity—the preaching of a sermon.

When we preach, our primary concern is not to convey information, or to impress an audience, or to attract attention,

[1] John Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God* (Oxford University 1939), p. 201.
[2] Emil Brunner, *The Divine-Human Encounter* (E.T. by A. W. Loos, S.C.M. 1944), p. 33.

though such considerations must sometimes weigh with us as secondary concerns); what we have then as our purpose—that is, if we know rightly what we are about—is uttering such words as God will be pleased to use as a means of confronting with Himself this and that individual in the congregation. A sermon, if it is one which achieves its lofty purpose, is not a matter of this man speaking to other men. As J. N. Alexander puts it, 'a sermon is not talking about God in the third person, but God Himself speaking in the first person, striving through your message and mine to establish an "I and Thou" relationship between each individual listener and Himself.'[1]

I am sure that an appreciation of this would make people much less readily critical than they often are of the preacher as a person, of his idiosyncrasies in the pulpit, and of what appear as his deficiencies in the technique of preaching. I am sure that an appreciation of this would make ministers much more concerned than they often are with perfecting their technique so that their idiosyncrasies and deficiencies will be the less likely to obtrude in such a fashion as to attract the listeners' attention to themselves. And I am sure also that such an appreciation on the part of all of us would make us much more reverent and fearful as we prepare and preach, or listen and criticise. For those in the pew and him in the pulpit, to expect God Himself to speak is the norm of preaching; and the positing of this norm here has brought out, by concrete reference to this one way in which men are won, what must be in our minds when we think of every other way. The work of redemption must be wrought by God Himself: we can but put forward our efforts, in the hope and expectation that God will be pleased to make them His own. And who, having that hope and expectation, can be satisfied with putting forward anything less than his best?

2. The fact that our primary line of mission is to bring men into confrontation with God has this second practical consequence: that it is God Himself we must lead men to know, not propositions about Him.

I am one of those who believe that we have lost a very valuable thing in our departure from the practice of instruction by catechism; for to have adhered more closely than we have done

[1] *The Expository Times*, vol. 60, p. 287.

to that method, with the oft-recalled summary of the main tenets of the Faith which it supplies, might have provided a stauncher bulwark than we appear to have at present against the inroads upon our membership made by humanistic ideology on the one hand and sectarian proselytism on the other.

But I am aware of the danger which is involved in an undue emphasis upon that manner of instruction—the production of the churchman for whom religion is an intellectual exercise, who knows every answer in the Catechism, but lacks the personal faith for which the Catechism is meant to be an expression, but never a substitute.

In personal faith (*fides propria*), the Reformers said, there may be distinguished knowledge, assent and trust (*notitia*, *assensus*, and *fiducia*); and while it may be true that their insistence upon the necessity of knowledge (for without knowledge, they felt, there could be only that implicit faith (*fides implicita*) 'by which one induces the mind to believe what the Church believes',[1] and which they deplored as the characteristic of Rome) led some of them to give knowledge too important a place; the majority of Reformed theologians held fast to the conviction that the essence of faith is trust, and that assent of faith is no theoretical assent but a practical one, an *apprehensio fiducialis*.

And with this emphasis upon the necessity of trust we must agree, for this is what Jesus understood as the core of a right relationship with God. As John Baillie has said, 'No word seems to have been oftener in our Lord's mouth that this word "faith", yet it is as plain as possible that for Him its primary meaning was not *credence* but rather *reliance*. What Jesus meant by faith in God was a willingness to cast oneself without fear upon His love.'[2] What He meant by faith, in other words, was the giving of oneself in a personal relationship.

With this emphasis upon the necessary part in faith of trust, I said, we must agree. But there lies before us always the temptation, when we are dealing with other people (especially, perhaps, young people), to assume that signs of the presence in them of *notitia* are sure signs that their understanding is of the order *apprehensio fiducialis*; or at any rate, to assume that, when

[1] Johannes Cocceius, *Summa Theologiae ex Scriptura repetita*, XLVI, 33 (quoted in H. Heppe, *Reformed Dogmatics* [E.T. by G. T. Thomson, Allen and Unwin 1950], p. 532).

[2] John Baillie, *The Interpretation of Religion* (Clark 1929), p. 377.

signs of the presence of *notitia* have been elicited, our work is at an end. We assume that because they can say what is the chief end of man, they are in fact enjoying God; or that because they can readily turn to this and that passage in the Bible, they know Him to whom the Bible witnesses. But these are conclusions which we must not assume since, if our mission is to bring men into confrontation with God, it is God Himself we must lead men to know, not propositions about Him.

3. A third consequence of practical importance following from what I have characterised as the primary line of the Church's mission arises from a consideration of the place of media in the personal confrontation of man by God.

While acknowledging that it is God alone who can carry out the work of redemption, and that it is God Himself whom we must lead men to know, we must take account of the fact that God is pleased to bring about this confrontation by way of media. For example, when the glory of a sunset leads me to bow in adoration of Him who has created such things, I am convinced that the God whom I thus adore has Himself put this evidence of His majesty before my eyes; yet I am convinced also that my adoration rose out of my observing the sunset. Similarly, when a particular sermon 'strikes home' at this or that aspect of my life, impelling me to the forsaking of some habit, or to the taking up of some new responsibility, I am convinced that it is God Himself who has spoken to me; yet I am convinced also that the challenge I feel it impossible to disregard came to me only as I heard that particular sermon.

Examples of this kind could be multiplied; but enough has been said to indicate that while the knowledge we have of God is ours because He confronts us with Himself, we always have that knowledge given to us as we come by knowledge of other things. Our knowledge of God, then, is both immediate and mediate; and it is important for all that we do in the carrying out of our mission to understand the place of media in this mediated immediacy (this phrase is John Baillie's)[1] of our knowledge of God.

The position is that it is *along with*[2] the story of Abraham, or

[1] John Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God*, p. 178.

[2] John Baillie makes use 'without prejudice' of the Lutheran phrase, 'in, with and under'; op. cit., pp. 178ff.

of Daniel, or of Jesus, or of some extra biblical character, that we sense a significance which it has for us here and now; it is *along with* the reading of a passage from a letter which Paul or someone else wrote to the Galatians or to Timothy, that we read a message which applies to ourselves; it is *along with* the glory of the sunset that we sense the majesty of creative power; and so on. These are media with which God brings Himself to us. They are not, on the one hand, things by means of which we could, unaided, rise to knowledge of God for, unless God Himself should decide to use them, they would not be media at all but simply others among the many things which fill our lives. Nor, on the other hand, are we able to dispense with them, along the mystics' line, as obstacles which hold God away from us. As the media of His choosing, they play an essential part in the mediating to us of His immediacy, and we have no knowledge of God apart from our knowledge of them.

Now here is the point of greatest practical significance in this regard: media being what they are because of God's own decision to constitute them such, it is not within our power to determine what things in our experience, or in the experience of others, will mediate to us, or to them, the immediacy of God. *Ubi et quando visum est deo*, as the classical theologians put it.

This recognition of the complete freedom of God to act where and when He sees fit does not mean that we are prevented from seeking our knowledge of God in some things rather than in others. We may assume that our own experience will probably follow such lines as that of others before us has followed, or those which our own has followed in the past; and we may therefore expect God to make Himself known to us in, say, the Bible rather than in a newspaper. What we may not assume is that God *must* confront us every time we open the Bible, or that He will *never* do so when we are reading a newspaper.

Similarly, in regard to the knowledge of God to be had by other people, we may assume that their experience will probably follow the lines which others have followed; and it is our duty to do what we can to put them in positions where such 'likely' media are present: we may, for example, invite them to come to church, or encourage them to read the Bible. And the fact that we cannot assume that God is bound to confront our fellows whenever they act in accordance with our exhorta-

tions does not alter the fact that we should, with all appropriate humility and tact, encourage them to do such things. God may speak to us, as Barth says, 'through Russian communism or a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub or a dead dog'; but that does not mean that 'we are commissioned to spread what we so hear as an independent proclamation. God may speak to us through a pagan or an atheist, and in that way give us to understand that the boundary between Church and the profane still and repeatedly takes a course different from that which we hitherto thought we saw. But that is not equivalent to saying . . . that we should have ourselves to proclaim the pagan and atheist thing we heard.'[1]

These are the facts we should remember concerning the place of media in the bringing of men into confrontation with God.

II

The secondary line along which the Church's redemptive mission runs is that of bringing men into the fellowship of the Church, this phrase being understood to include the work of strengthening in their realising of their privileges and responsibilities those who are already within her fellowship, as well as that of adding new members.

The Church is a divinely instituted organ, the Body of Christ, 'the fulfilment of Him who is being out-and-out fulfilled',[2] and part of God's scheme of redemption. As the Lord adds daily such as are being saved, it is to the Church that He adds them.[3] The idea that one can be a Christian without being a Church member is a comparatively recent heresy which has arisen, Hodgson suggests, because nineteen centuries of the distinctive way of thinking and living which Christianity brought into the world have produced so many outcroppings of minds and lives of this character outside the membership of the Church, that we have come to think of Christianity as concerned primarily with individual lives, and of Church membership as some-

[1] Karl Barth, *The Doctrine of the Word of God* (E.T. by G. T. Thomson, Clark 1936), pp. 60-61.

[2] Eph. 1.23, as translated by John Foster in *World Church* (S.C.M. 1945), p. 34.

[3] Acts 2.47. I am aware that the best authorities omit τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ; but, as Moffatt remarks in a footnote to his translation, the omission makes it difficult to get sense out of the Greek.

thing extra which a Christian may or may not take seriously.[1]

It is instructive to observe the part which what I may be permitted (without thereby being though of as carrying a brief for certain deplorable features of Roman, or Anglo—or even Scoto!—Catholicism) to call, as the New Testament calls it, 'the tradition' (ἡ παράδοσις) played in the experience of a man of so primitive a period, and of such firm conviction that his relationship with Christ was of a direct kind, as was the Apostle Paul. One statement only must suffice to illustrate it—a statement which is familiar because of the place it has in the Communion service: 'I received from the Lord that which also I delivered unto you.'[2] The word translated 'also' is to be particularly noticed, as Cullmann points out,[3] because its reference to the manner of the delivering indicates that Paul received the tradition in the same way as that in which he passed it on; and his manner of passing it on, as is well known, was by word and epistle.[4] Nor must Paul's assertion that he received the tradition 'from the Lord' be thought of as excluding the possibility of his having received it through the medium of other persons; the words 'from the Lord', as Cullmann says further, 'can mean a direct receiving from the Lord, without it being necessary to think of a vision or of excluding middle members through whom the Lord Himself imparts the παράδοσις. The significance of those words, 'from the Lord', is to refer back to Christ as the One who stands, not only at the beginning, but also behind the transmission of the tradition, that is, the One who is at work *in* it.[5] Paul, then, was an apostle who, as the bearer of the tradition was also the bearer of direct revelation; and it is in that same function that there rests in the whole Church today—enshrined especially, if you like, in the ministry —the Church's apostolicity.

This summary consideration of one statement by Paul may be considered enough to show that this idea of 'the tradition' is not one that can be overlooked in any proper consideration of the New Testament conception of the Church. Add to it the references to 'tradition', 'receiving' and 'delivering' which are to be found elsewhere in Paul's writings, and in other parts of

[1] Leonard Hodgson: *Christian Faith and Practice* (Blackwell), as quoted in *The Expository Times*, vol. 62, p. 226.
[2] 2 Cor. 11.23, *ego*.
[3] *S.J.T.*, vol. 3, p. 185.
[4] 2 Thess. 2.15.
[5] Op. cit., p. 189.

the New Testament, and the conclusion is inescapable: if we would be true to the New Testament norm, we must ourselves take seriously, and we must lead others to take seriously, the place which the tradition transmitted by the Church should fill in the experience of converts, both recent and of long standing.

I hope it will be understood that, in speaking thus of the necessary place in the convert's life of tradition, I am not intending to suggest that everything in the tradition of the Church is of equal and binding authority, as emanating from the Lord. Jesus Himself condemned His contemporaries for laying aside the commandment of God to hold the tradition of men.[1] But we must acknowledge, with the framers of the Westminster Confession of Faith, that there are some things necessary for man's salvation which are not expressly set down in Scripture, though they are 'by good and necessary consequence' to be deduced therefrom, and that 'there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and the government of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the Word'.[2] It is of the utmost importance for all to recognise how easily it can happen—and, it may be added, how frequently it does happen —that without an appreciation of what the Church can teach, an individual's 'deducing' and 'ordering' leads him far astray.

'It is no more necessary', writes Stephen Neill, 'for every single Christian to discover by the direct guidance of the Holy Spirit every single aspect of Christian life, obligation, and conduct, than it is necessary for every mathematical student to discover for himself the proof of the theorem of Pythagoras. . . . Mere tradition cannot give light, yet the strivings and experiences of past generations have not been in vain. . . . This does not deny the right of Christians to criticise tradition, as Luther did, in the light of their own understanding of the word of God. It does not deny that vast area of Christian liberty where the Christian is personally responsible to God alone for his actions, and where his choice is unfettered except by his duty to God under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. But it does recognise . . . that the Holy Spirit works in us not in isolation

[1] Mark 7.8. [2] I.vi.

but because we are members of the fellowship of the Body of Christ.'[1]

To carry out the Church's mission, therefore, we must give due attention to this secondary line along which it runs. It is a very serious thing to create the impression—which I fear some of our more fervent evangelical preaching does create—that one can be a Christian without going to Church. We must never be content with getting people to the stage of a 'decision for Christ'; we must get them to the stage of a decision to take their place in Christ's Church. The latter is a more difficult thing to do; and it may be that the evangelists who remain content with having done the former are the ones most aware of that fact.

III

The tertiary line along which the Church's redemptive mission must run is that of redeeming society as a whole.

There will be little disputing the fact that we have come to the end of an era. 'There can be descried in the events of the last ten years', writes Max Warren, 'an increase in the tempo of change which makes it urgent for Christians to recognise that they are not living in a world of gradual transition, but in a world which is already new, shaped to a new pattern, and animated by forces which challenge all our old ways of thinking.'[2]

This era which is dying out began at the Renaissance, which may be characterised as the protest of individual man, standing in his own right, against feudal man, with his closely defined social hierarchy and his rights derived from his duties in his proper station. But the relentless pursuit of self-determination has brought about much that leaves us full of anxious foreboding. Politically, our pursuit of self-determination has made us suspect and fear each other; intellectually increasing specialisation has given us a mass of tabulated facts which, because they are unrelated, lack proper meaning; economically, exploration and expansion have brought exploitation and depression; socially, there has come about a hierarchy based upon slick finance and political patronage. In these circumstances, it is

[1] *S.J.T.*, vol. 1, pp. 93-94.
[2] Max Warren, *The Christian Mission* (S.C.M. 1951), p. 22.

not surprising that the age of Renaissance individualism should be showing signs of having run its course. It is, as Warren says further, 'a "yesterday" which the older among us can remember clearly, and whose twilight, lit by the flashes of a world at war, linger still'.[1] But it *is* a 'yesterday', and it is only its 'twilight' which lingers.

The effect which this situation must have upon the carrying out of our mission to the contemporary world, apart from its underlining of the truth that none of us liveth to himself and no man dieth to himself,[2] is well expressed by Farmer when he writes: 'The modern man thinks in terms of the world. He opens his newspaper and reads—the world. He goes to the films and sees—the world. He listens to the radio and hears—the world. Almost unconsciously everything is projected on to and takes its dimension from that vast background. A message which however well intentioned does not contrive to lift men's eyes beyond the limits of their parish or their denomination or even their own individual salvation—crucial as that is—will seem too small to be true.'[3]

Thus the character of the contemporary situation demands a Gospel which relates itself to society as a whole. But we ought not to need the features of this or any other age to teach us something which is implicit in the Gospel itself.

No one will deny that Peter gave an apt summary of the earthly life of Jesus when he said of Him that He 'went about doing good'.[4] Nor will anyone deny that those who would be His followers ought themselves also so to walk, even as He walked.[5] 'As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you,'[6] He said; and the nature of the mission which He fulfilled, in which the relieving of physical distress played so large a part and which was always one of service for others, makes it plain that the mission devolving upon us must include its due measure of active concern in the same direction. And what Jesus thus teaches in example, He makes no less clear in precept. His parable of the Good Samaritan,[7] with its pointed application that those who would live must go and do likewise. His declaration that all the law and the prophets hang upon loving

[1] Idem, p. 23. [2] Rom. 14.7.
[3] Quoted in *The Expository Times*, vol. 60, p. 286.
[4] Acts 10.38. [5] 1 John 2.6. [6] John 20.21. [7] Luke 10.

one's neighbour as oneself, along with loving God,[1] His exhortations to the love of one's enemies and the doing of good to those who hate one,[2] and to giving freely as one has received,[3] make it beyond any question that those who would obey His injunctions as well as copy His example must be giving themselves ever and again to the service of their fellows; and that without any thought of benefit which might thereby accrue to themselves.

'But', voices may here be heard in objection, 'this social duty of the Christian is carried out, not by redeeming society as a whole (whatever meaning you think that phrase has), but by each one of us doing good to the deserving cases which come within his reach.' And those who raise that objection will be quick to seize upon the distinction which Thomas Shearer makes when he draws attention to an ambiguity in the use of a word like 'society' or 'community', which may refer on the one hand to a number of individuals whose lives are bound together, or which may refer on the other hand to an abstract whole, a sort of corporate personality, transcending the individuals who compose it. Shearer goes on to point out that when Amos castigates those who afflict the just and take a bribe and turn aside the poor in the gate from their right, he is not speaking of corporate action. 'He is denouncing those rich men (individuals) who by their selfishness are causing suffering to the poor (also individuals); and he is urging the rich individuals to reduce the suffering of the poor ones by giving up their selfishness.'[4] Amos' words may be rightly taken as a plea for 'society' —but only in the sense of society as a number of individuals; his teaching does not encourage the view that the group, as a whole, has interests to be served different from, or above, those of the men and women who compose it.

Now a noting of these points may save us from a subtle temptation: that of allowing our consideration of improvements to the structure of society as a whole to take the place of our extending a helping hand to the individual on the road. Someone has remarked that the reason why the priest and the Levite passed by on the other side may well have been that they were hastening to a meeting of the Committee for the Protection of Lonely Travellers!

[1] Matt. 22.40. [2] Matt. 5.45. [3] Matt. 10.8.
[4] *The Expository Times*, vol. 61, p. 378.

With this important emphasis upon the place of the individual (both as receiver and giver) I heartily concur; but it does not validly follow, as some think it does, that Christians can treat lightly, or even discount altogether, any idea of their having a mission to redeem society as a whole.

For one thing, our doing good to all men must have regard to the form of the society in which they live. Shearer's distinction notwithstanding, society is something more than the sum total of the individuals who happen at any time to be in it. Transcending their thoughts and actions, but undoubtedly influencing them, is a framework of laws, customs and pressure which for their removal (where removal of them is advisable, for not all laws, customs and pressures are evil), require not only the persuading of individuals, but the organising of them into collective action. I should say that to some extent the possibility of such organising has been open to Christians in every community. But for us, in our situation, the possibilities are well-nigh boundless; and the Church's redemptive mission will fall short of fulfilment until her every member, in his station, is alive to the possibility of his influencing his fellows towards the bringing about of a better social order. It can be done by individual canvassing, by letters to the press, by personal example of civic service, by proper use of the ballot-box, and so on. The Church which would, in the pursuit of her redemptive mission, do good to all men, must endeavour to improve the shape of the society in which all men live.

And to this that has been said, there may be added consideration of the thought which was Paul's when he wrote, 'it pleased the Father that in Him should all fulness dwell; and, having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile *all things* to himself . . . whether they be things in earth or things in heaven',[1] and when he wrote, 'the *whole creation* groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now'.[2] Whatever be our understanding of such words, or our admission that we cannot understand them at all, they indicate clearly that we have not exhausted the content of the Gospel when, in the exercise of our mission, we have won this and that individual.

Perhaps I should make explicit that, in speaking thus of the redemptive mission of the Church to society, I am not pleading

[1] Col. 1.20. [2] Rom. 8.22.

for a recrudescence of the 'social gospel' which was propounded with such enthusiasm by the liberals of a generation ago, but which (if I may use words which John McIntyre applied to another idea), is now 'regarded by self-respecting philosophers and theologians with that degree of lorgnette disdain which contract bridge-players reserve exclusively for those who are simple-minded enough to play auction'.[1] Today the most significant statements concerning the Church's responsibility to society base their teaching upon a doctrine so impeccably orthodox as that of the Incarnation, arguing that since the Word became flesh, and a human life was disclosed as part of God's way of working, there can be no aspect of any man's life —neither his home, nor his work, nor his recreation, nor anything else—which is not 'holy'; and all must be the concern of the Church, because it has been shown to be the concern of God.

It is along these three lines—bringing men into confrontation with God, bringing them into her own fellowship, and redeeming society as a whole—and along each of them continuously, that the Church's mission runs. It rests upon each of us individually, and upon all of us collectively, to see that none of its aspects lies neglected.

[1] In his Inaugural Lecture, published in *The Australian Christian World*, April 1947.

THE *FILIOQUE* CLAUSE[1]

by The Rt. Rev. THE BISHOP OF DERBY

The Church of England in the sixteenth century cast off allegiance to the Papacy and underwent (more especially in the critical years 1549, 1552, and 1559) a considerable measure of doctrinal purification and reformation. The Reformation was in England, however, carried out on conservative lines, and the main dogmas of the Faith, as set forth in the traditional Creeds, were accepted and handed on without question. One of the XXXIX Articles (Article VIII) lays it down that 'The three Creeds, *Nicene* Creed, *Athanasius*' Creed, and that which is commonly called the *Apostles*' Creed, ought thoroughly to be received and believed: for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture.'

Doubtless the Anglican Reformers accepted, as did St. Thomas Aquinas before them,[2] the tradition which ascribed to St. Athanasius, the great champion of the Faith in the fourth century, the authorship of the document known as the *Quicunque Vult*; and they further accepted without question the so-called 'Nicene' Creed in its Western form (that is, with the inclusion of the clause *Filioque*). It is now known that the *Quicunque Vult* cannot be the work of St. Athanasius. Like the so-called 'Apostles' Creed', it is a document of Latin Christianity, and its date is thought to be not earlier than the first half of the fifth century. It contains the words *Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio . . . procedens*, thereby resuming what had been current teaching in the Christian West from the days of St. Ambrose and St. Augustine. The actual interpolation of the *Filioque* clause into the text of the Creed used in the Liturgy (the so-called Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed) is commonly held to go back to the Third Council of Toledo in 589, though of course the fact that the Council may have quoted the Creed with the added clause does not prove that the Creed had never

[1] A paper written for the Anglican-Orthodox Conversations in Moscow, July 1956.

[2] Thom. Aquin., *Summa Theologica*, I, Quaes. xxxvi, Art. 2 ('dicit Athanas. in *Symbolo suo*').

circulated before in that form; and conversely it has been held that the disputed clause was not in fact added at Toledo, but was wrongly inserted into the Acts of the Council by later copyists. A further suggestion is that the *Filioque* clause was brought into the Nicene Creed from the *Quicunque Vult* by Latin monks who desired to harmonise the two documents.[1] Certain it is that *the clause is an interpolation, irregularly brought into the text of the Creed, and devoid of canonical authorisation.* It is to be noted that at the Lateran Council of A.D. 649 the Creed was recited without the *Filioque*, as it was also at the Sixth General Council at Constantinople in 680: and that in 809 Pope Leo III, in response to a complaint by some Latin monks at Jerusalem that they were being accused of heresy for singing the Creed with the new clause, on the one hand defended their Western theology but on the other hand disapproved of the interpolation into the Creed, and had the true text of the Creed in Greek and in Latin (*without* the *Filioque*) inscribed on silver shields and hung up in St. Peter's at Rome. Not until about A.D. 1014 does the *Filioque* seem to have been officially incorporated at Rome into the text of the Creed. The differences between the East and the West were beginning to harden into a schism less than a century afterwards, and the affirmation by the West of the Double Procession of the Spirit was one of the grounds of complaint.

The Scriptural basis of the doctrine of the Procession of the Spirit from the Father is to be found in the words of John 15.26 ('the Spirit of truth, which *proceedeth* from the Father'). Two other passages in St. John's Gospel, John 14.26 ('the Paraclete, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name') and John 20.22 (Jesus 'breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost') refer doubtless to the temporal mission of the Holy Ghost, sent from God and from Christ to be the source of life, witness, teaching and spiritual power in the Christian Church. Elsewhere in Scripture the Spirit is described not only as the 'Spirit of God' (Rom. 8.9, 1 Cor. 2.11) or the 'Spirit of your Father' (Matt. 10.20), but as the 'Spirit of Christ' (Rom. 8.9), the 'Spirit of Jesus Christ' (Phil. 1.19), or the 'Spirit of (God's) Son' (Gal. 4.6). The passage of Scripture which comes nearest to suggesting a

[1] George Every, *The Byzantine Patriarchate* (S.P.C.K., London, 1947), p. 87.

Double Procession of the Spirit (at once from God and from Christ) is Rev. 22.1, where the 'river of water of life, clear as crystal' proceeds 'out of the throne of God and of the Lamb': a comparison with John 7.38, 39 ('He that believeth on me . . . out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water. But this spake he of the Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive') makes it clear that the 'river of water of life' in Rev. 22.1 is intended to signify the Spirit.

The Patristic teaching with regard to the Holy Spirit in early centuries has been carefully studied and summarised by the late Dr H. B. Swete in his book *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church* (Macmillan and Co., London, 1912). I quote from him as follows:

> It was explicitly taught by the Church in her symbol [i.e. in the Nicene Creed] that the Source of both the Son and the Spirit is the Being of the Father, and that the sole difference between the derived Persons is that the Son is from the Father by generation and the Spirit by procession. It was assumed that the procession of the Spirit, like the generation of the Son, has reference to the essential life and not to mission only; the mission of the Paraclete, it was seen, rested on and arose out of His eternal dependence on the essence of the Father. Other spirits are sent by God to do His pleasure, and these too are from God, but as the work of His hands (δημιουργικῶς): the Spirit of God alone proceeds from God in the sense of deriving His being from the being of God (οὐσιωδῶς).
>
> The Son and the Spirit then have this in common that both are eternally and essentially 'from God'. Both Persons have their Source in the Father, who is the one Source of Godhead (ἀρχή or αἴτιον, *principium*). Neither Person is inferior or posterior to the Other; as they eternally co-exist, so they simultaneously come forth from God. From these premises it would seem to follow that the eternal procession of the Spirit must be, like the eternal generation of the Son, from the Father alone; and this view was strongly held by some of the Greek theologians long before the separation of East and West. But the great majority of those who dealt with the question saw that the mediating position of the Son in the order of the Divine life involved His intervention in the procession of the Spirit. On this ground the Divine Essence is conceived as passing eternally through the Second Person into the Third, so that while the Second derives His being immediately from the First, the Third proceeds mediately, through the Second.[1]

The later Western view is derived from, or at least was predominantly influenced by, St. Augustine. I again quote Swete's words:

[1] Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, pp. 368f.

The Father and the Son are (he taught) the common Source of the Holy Spirit; He proceeds from Both. But He proceeds from Both as one Source, and by one spiration. Procession from the Father involves procession from the Son, since the Father and the Son are one in substance; together with the eternal life of the Father's Essence, the Son receives also the power to communicate that Essence to the Holy Spirit. Thus guarded, Augustine's doctrine is not exposed to the charge of involving two 'principles' of Divine Life, a supposition which he explicitly rejects: and it does not differ seriously from the Greek theory of the transmission of the Divine Essence through the Son. But while it appealed to the Western mind, which regarded it as completing the doctrine of a consubstantial Trinity, the East viewed it with growing mistrust, which became active hostility when it was discovered that the *Filioque* had been added to the Latin Creed. Thus to this day Augustine's view rests only on Western authority, and cannot be regarded as an integral part of the Catholic faith. The doctrine upon which the whole ancient Church was agreed is that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son.[1]

Both Eastern and Western theologians were desirous of teaching the doctrine that the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity are 'co-eternal together, and co-equal'. There has at times been on both sides misunderstanding. The late Dr T. B. Strong, sometime Bishop of Oxford, in his *Manual of Theology*, suggests that to Western minds the phrase 'proceeding from the Father through the Son'—the doctrine taught by St. John of Damascus[2]—might appear to imply too great an emphasis on the idea of subordination, the subordination of the Son to the Father and of the Spirit to the Son, though with a valuable insistence upon the truth that the Father is the one and only eternal Source of the Godhead. The West sought to lay emphasis rather on the idea of coinherence (*περιχώρησις*) of the three Persons, the truth that the action of one Person involves the co-operation of all, so indissoluble is the unity of the Godhead. To say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son would not suggest to the minds of theologians in the West the idea of a twofold origin or principle of Deity; it would simply affirm, with the indefiniteness of inadequate knowledge, the co-operation of the Son in that which the Father does.[3] On the other hand it has been argued

[1] Swete, op. cit., pp. 370f.

[2] Joh. Damasc. De Fide Orthodoxa, I, 12 (*δύναμις τοῦ πατρός, ἐκ πατρὸς μὲν δι' υἱοῦ ἐκπορευομένη*).

[3] T. B. Strong, *A Manual of Theology* (A. and C. Black, London, 1903), pp. 169-73. (The actual words quoted above appear on p. 172.)

that to the theologians of the East the *Filioque* doctrine, quite apart from its having given rise to an illegitimate interpolation in the Latin text of the Creed, 'might reduce the Spirit to a power or grace of the Father and of the Son, a possession of the Church and her hierarchy, not the Lord and Giver of Life to the Church'.[1] Of course, no Western theologian would dream of approaching such teaching: and it is possible, in view of the misunderstandings to which it has given rise, to regret keenly that the *Filioque* clause was ever allowed, even (as it would appear) at first accidentally, to gain admission into the Western version of the Creed. Being there, it should certainly be interpreted in the sense of the phrase used by St. John of Damascus ('proceeding from the Father *through* the Son').

Yet on the whole it must be regarded as unlikely that the Anglican Churches, notwithstanding the admissions freely made by their theologians (*a*) that the original insertion of the *Filioque* into the Creed was unauthorised and (*b*) that it is necessary to guard carefully against any such idea as that there could be more than one ultimate source in the Godhead, would be willing, in view of the long period of some 1,200 years during which the words 'and the Son' have been recited as part of the Creed in the West, to discontinue the use of the clause, or (still less) to condemn it. In the nineteenth century, when in Germany Conferences between Old Catholics, Anglicans, and Orthodox Theologians were being held at Bonn (1874, followed by a second Conference in 1875), the anticipation or fear that, in the outcome, the Western theology of the Holy Spirit might be surrendered by those taking part on the Old Catholic and Anglican side caused the late Dr E. B. Pusey, the famous Tractarian leader, to refuse to take part in the Conferences and to withdraw from his membership of the Anglican and Eastern Churches Association. Pusey in fact published in 1876 a considerable pamphlet *On the Clause 'And the Son' in regard to the Eastern Church and the Bonn Conference* in the form of an Open Letter to the Rev. H. P. Liddon[2]; and although at the time Pusey stood almost alone in his opposition, it is not impossible that even today there might be a similar line taken

[1] G. Every, *The Byzantine Patriarchate*, p. 187.

[2] H. P. Liddon, *Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey* (Longmans, Green and Co., London, 4 vols., 1897): vol. IV, chap. XII, pp. 292ff.

by those Anglican theologians (who as a recalcitrant minority do still exist in the Church of England) in whose eyes the remote hope of a *rapprochement* between Anglicanism and Rome appears more to be cherished than the possibility of an understanding between the Anglican Churches and Orthodoxy.

The official line taken by Anglican authority (as expressed, for example, through the utterances of successive Conferences of Anglican Bishops at Lambeth) is different. The Report of a Committee of the Lambeth Conference of 1888 made favourable reference to the Bonn Conferences, and so did the Report of the Lambeth Conference of 1897.[1] In 1921 there was published a document headed *Terms of Intercommunion suggested between the Church of England and the Churches in Communion with her and the Eastern Orthodox Church*, drawn up at the request of an Eastern Churches Committee appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury[2] and eventually taken as an initial basis of discussions at Lambeth in 1930 between the Patriarch of Alexandria and other Orthodox Representatives and Bishops of the Anglican Communion.[3] The suggested *Terms of Intercommunion* included the following paragraph, headed *Of the Filioque Clause*:

> Whereas in the Western Church at some time in the sixth or seventh century the words *Filioque* were added to the Creed, we agree in acknowledging that this addition was not made 'in an ecclesiastically regular manner'; and that in assemblies of Easterns and Westerns the one Creed of the Universal Church ought to be recited without those words; but we are also agreed that, since the added words are used in an orthodox sense, it is lawful for any Church which has received the Creed as containing these words to continue so to recite it in the Services of the Church.[4]

In 1932 there was published the *Report of the Joint Doctrinal Commission appointed by the Oecumenical Patriarch and the Archbishop of Canterbury for consultation on the Points of Agreement and Difference between the Anglican and the Eastern Orthodox Churches*. It contained the following paragraphs:

> (3) *The Creed of the Church*
>
> We agree in accepting as the Creed of the Catholic Church that which is sometimes called the Nicene, sometimes the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan, which was put forth by the Council of Chalcedon and has been accepted

[1] See *The Six Lambeth Conferences 1867-1920* (S.P.C.K., London, 1920 and 1929).
[2] G. K. A. Bell, *Documents on Christian Unity*, Series I, pp. 77ff.
[3] See the Report of the *Lambeth Conference of 1930* (S.P.C.K., 1930), pp. 131ff. and 138ff.
[4] Bell, op. cit., p. 81.

by the whole Catholic Church. We accept the following statement of the Council of Chalcedon concerning the Creed: 'These things having been defined by us with all possible accuracy and care, the Holy and Oecumenical Synod has declared that it is unlawful for anyone to present or compile, or compose, or believe, or teach to others, any other creed.' We recognise, therefore, that it is unlawful for a Church to put forward any other Creed as the teaching of the Catholic Church, or to add to or subtract from the Creed. Yet it is not unlawful for the several Churches to use as their Baptismal Creed some other Creed agreeable to the tradition of the Church, as in the Western Church that which is known as the Apostles' Creed. Nor is it unlawful for a Church to use any other such document in the Services of the Church or for the instruction of the faithful, provided that it is agreeable to Scripture and Tradition.

(4) *The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*

On the difference which has prevailed between the East and the West concerning the doctrine of the Holy Spirit we record the propositions adopted by the Conference held at Bonn in the year 1875. While we reject any proposition or form of expression which implies the existence of two principles or ἀρχαί or αἰτίαι in the Holy Trinity, we consider as acceptable the teaching of St. John of Damascus and of earlier Greek Fathers that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son.[1]

The propositions adopted by the Bonn Conference of 1875, to which reference has been made, were as follows:

I

1. We agree in receiving the Oecumenical Creeds and dogmatic decisions of the undivided Church.

2. We agree in acknowledging that the addition of the *Filioque* to the Creed did not take place in an ecclesiastically regular manner.

3. We acknowledge on all sides the representation of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, as it is set forth by the Fathers of the undivided Church.

4. We reject every proposition and every method of expression in which in any way the acknowledgment of two principles or ἀρχαί or αἰτίαι in the Trinity may be contained.

II

We accept the teaching of St. John Damascene on the Holy Ghost, as it is expressed in the following paragraphs in the sense of the teaching of the undivided Church.

[1] *Report of the Joint Doctrinal Commission etc.* (S.P.C.K., 1932, pp. 12-14); also in Bell, *Documents on Christian Unity*, Series III, pp. 38ff.

1. The Holy Ghost issues out of the Father, as the Beginning (ἀρχή), the Cause (αἰτία), the Source (πηγή), of the Godhead.

2. The Holy Ghost does not issue out of the Son (ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ), because there is in the Godhead but one Beginning (ἀρχή), one Cause (αἰτία), through which all that is in the Godhead is produced.

3. The Holy Ghost issues out of the Father through the Son.

4. The Holy Ghost is the Image of the Son, who is the Image of the Father, issuing out of the Father and resting in the Son as His revealing power.

5. The Holy Ghost is the personal production out of the Father, belonging to the Son, but not out of the Son, because He is the Spirit of the mouth of God declarative of the Word.

6. The Holy Ghost forms the link between the Father and the Son, and is linked to the Father by the Son.[1]

[1] Bell, *Documents on Christian Unity*, Series I, pp. 87f.

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11. G. K. A. Bell, *Documents on Christian Unity*, Series I (Oxford University Press, 1924) and Series III (O.U.P., 1948).

2 CORINTHIANS 5.1-10[1]

by The Rev. R. F. HETTLINGER

I

This passage must surely be unique in the variety and contrasts of the interpretations proposed by commentators and theologians. Not only are there at least three main lines of exegesis distinguishable, but within and across these general lines scholars disagree radically as to the source of St. Paul's teaching, its relation to 1 Cor. 15, its value as evidence of the Apostle's thought, and even its basic subject matter. Thus while Windisch (*Commentary on II Corinthians*, in loc.), W. L. Knox (*St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles*, pp. 128-43) and Rudolf Bultmann (*Theology of the New Testament*, I, pp. 201-2) regard the passage as evidence that St. Paul had modified traditional Jewish eschatology by introducing Hellenistic themes, Walter Grundmann (articles on ἐκδημέω, ἐνδημέω in Kittel's *T.W.N.T.* II, pp. 62-4), W. D. Davies (*Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, pp. 308-14) and Schweitzer (*The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle*, p. 134) maintain that the language can be explained without recourse to direct Hellenistic influence. Whereas Davies (op. cit., pp. 310-11) and Bultmann (op. cit., p. 201) believe that between 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5 the Apostle's thought had undergone a significant development, G. B. Stevens (*The Pauline Theology*, p. 343 note 1), H. A. A. Kennedy (*St. Paul's Conception of the Last Things*, pp. 264-72), Alfred Plummer (*II Corinthians*, pp. 160-4), L. S. Thornton (*The Common Life in the Body of Christ*, pp. 284-6) and H. L. Goudge (*The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, pp. 45-55) deny any such development. The majority of scholars assume that—whatever its ambiguities—the passage is intended to express some coherent doctrine,[2] but Plummer (op. cit., p. 161) writes, 'We are not to suppose that St. Paul had a clearly defined theory respecting these

[1] A paper read to the Cambridge Theological Society on 22nd November, 1956.

[2] Schweitzer, for example, writes with irony of 'those who refuse to admit that Paul was a logical thinker, and proclaim as the highest outcome of their wisdom the discovery that he has no system' (*Mysticism*, p. 139).

mysterious subjects'.[1] Finally, while Albrecht Oepke (articles on γυμνός, ἐκδύω and ἐνδύω in *T.W.N.T.*, I, 773-4, II, 318-20) maintains that the passage is concerned only with the Parousia, Davies (op. cit., p. 311) believes that 'There is nothing in the text to suggest Paul's hope of surviving to the Parousia'.

Before considering the main lines of exegesis in recent literature, it will be helpful to indicate the major points of controversy in the interpretation of the text:

(*a*) Is the clothing upon with 'our heavenly habitation' (v. 2) something that happens at the Parousia, or does it follow immediately upon the dissolution of 'the earthly house of our tabernacle' (v. 1)?

(*b*) Does v. 3 mean 'On condition that we shall continue to be clothed with our physical body until the Parousia and shall not die and be left naked before it', or 'Assuming that we shall share in the Resurrection at the Parousia and not be condemned to the nakedness which is the fate of unbelievers', or 'On the assumption, of course, that being clothed with a heavenly habitation at death we shall not be found naked'?

(*c*) Does v. 4 mean 'We groan, being burdened with anxiety lest we have to depart this life through death, instead of being preserved alive until the Parousia', or 'We groan, being burdened with the limitations and sufferings of the physical body, longing for the speedy coming of the Parousia', or 'We groan, being burdened with the physical body, longing for deliverance through death and the clothing upon with the heavenly habitation'?

(*d*) Is the manifestation before the judgment seat of Christ in v. 10 an event which will happen for all at the Parousia, or will it happen at death for those who die before the Parousia?

The exegesis favoured by most English speaking commentators in recent years is that propounded by H. L. Goudge in the *Westminster Commentary*.[2] According to this view vv. 1 and 2

[1] As a result of this assumption Plummer's customary clarity escapes him when discussing the general meaning of the passage, although his treatment of the text is, as usual, invaluable. On pp. 148, 152-3 he writes as if the nakedness of v. 3 were an actual possibility in the mind of the writer—though compensated for by the hope of being with the Lord; on pp. 144, 149 he seems to suggest that the Apostle's certainty of receiving a spiritual body had given him the assurance that he would *not* be left naked at death; on p. 161 he quotes with approval the saying of Wernle to the effect that death and resurrection are indistinguishable in St. Paul's expectation.

[2] Other writers who accept this position are: L. S. Thornton, op. cit., pp. 284-6;

refer to the hope of the Resurrection Body to be received at the Parousia; vv. 3 and 4 reflect St. Paul's fear lest he should die before the Parousia and endure a period of nakedness instead of passing directly from the present physical body to the state of Resurrection; vv. 6-8 express his victory over this (natural but) unworthy fear in the light of the truth reaffirmed in v. 5; vv. 9 and 10 are a reminder that, whether we survive to the Parousia or die before it, we shall all have to face the judgment of Christ at the Last Day.[1]

The great attraction of this interpretation is that it fits neatly enough into the traditional conception of Pauline eschatology, and involves no departure from the teaching of 1 Cor. 15. Indeed, its supporters make a good deal of the argument that St. Paul could not have changed his mind or varied his thought without giving substance to the criticism that he was 'corrupting the Word of God' (2 Cor. 2.17). The dictum of Wernle to the effect that 'the man who wrote the great Resurrection-chapter in 1 Corinthians did not possess the capacity for altering his opinions which belongs to the modern theologian' is quoted by several writers as if it finally settled the matter. The fact that this exegesis, if correct, requires us to suppose that the Apostle underwent a significant change of mind within the compass of ten verses is, however, overlooked.[2] For nothing less is involved in the contrast between the 'instinctive horror' (Plummer) with which, on this view, he envisages death in vv. 2-4,[3] and the *preference* for death expressed in vv. 6-8. Nor can the difficulty be met by playing down the obvious meaning of εὐδοκοῦμεν μᾶλλον in v. 8, which the RSV rightly translates 'we would rather'. F. V. Filson (op. cit.,

F. V. Filson, *The Interpreter's Bible*, vol. 10, pp. 326-32; Oscar Cullmann, *Christ and Time*, p. 239; A. M. Ramsey, *The Resurrection of Christ*, p. 108; Richard Hanson, Torch Commentary, p. 47.

[1] H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul's Conception of the Last Things*, apparently takes this view on pp. 265-6; but on p. 270 he rejects the view that γυμνοί refers to believers who die before the Parousia and offers no alternative translation. R. H. Strachan, in the *Moffatt Commentary*, p. 100, follows Kennedy.

[2] L. S. Thornton, for example, dismisses the contrast between vv. 2-4 and 6-8 as a 'change of mood' (op. cit., p. 285); but surely the Apostle would have been no less open to criticism if he had allowed emotional reactions to colour his theology than if, on the basis of further reflection, he had introduced a new theme into his eschatological doctrine.

[3] J. N. Sevenster writes, 'It is clear that Paul looks forward to this state of being γυμνός shrinking from it. He can only think of that "being naked" with fear, because he longs to put on the heavenly dwelling' (*Studia Paulina* p. 204).

p. 327) translates this phrase 'think it good' or 'are quite content' as if the μᾶλλον did not exist in the text. Goudge says, 'Though it is not the discarnate state that St. Paul desires, the fuller vision of the Lord will more than compensate for it' (op. cit., p. 48). But what the Apostle says is that he not only desires, but actually prefers that state from which, as Goudge maintains, he shrank a few verses earlier. The sense of v. 8 is not essentially different from that of Phil. 1.23: 'having the desire to depart and be with Christ; for it is very far better'—except that when he came to write Philippians he no longer expected to be released by death from his earthly service.[1]

If some adequate reason for this supposed change of attitude to death could be found within the passage, there might be more to be said in favour of Goudge's exegesis. But if it be suggested that it is the recollection of the gift of the Spirit as the earnest of the Resurrection in v. 5 which is the source of the new confidence of vv. 6-8, we are bound to ask how this fundamental truth could have escaped St. Paul's mind in writing the previous four verses—in view of the fact that he had been very much aware of it when writing 1.22. Moreover, on the assumption of the interpretation in question, the Spirit is the earnest, not of a certain state between death and Parousia, but of the clothing upon which can come only at the Parousia.[2] Now since, on this view, the hope of being clothed at the Parousia was fully in St. Paul's mind when writing vv. 1 and 2, and *nevertheless* he shrank from the possibility of death in vv. 3 and 4, how could the recollection of the fact that the Spirit assured him of embodiment *at the Parousia* produce the radical change of attitude to the intervening period which he displays in vv. 6-8?[3] There is indeed no basis upon which the two parts

[1] Some scholars have minimised the problem by ignoring the close connexion between 2 Cor. 5.8 and Phil. 1.23. Schweitzer (op. cit., p. 135) makes the remarkable statement that it is only in Phil. 1.23 (in contrast with 2 Cor. 5.1-9) that Paul for the first time speaks of entering immediately on death into 'the being-with-Christ'. Sevenster (op. cit., pp. 206-7) argues that in Philippians Paul is comparing death (which is desirable) with life (which is oppressive), whereas in 2 Corinthians he is comparing death (which is undesirable) with preservation alive to the Parousia (which is desirable)—but this ignores the vital fact that, on Sevenster's interpretation, both views of death stand in direct contrast in the one passage in 2 Cor. 5.

[2] εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο in v. 5 presumably refers back either to ἐπενδύσασθαι or to καταποθῇ τὸ θνητὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ζωῆς in v. 4, or to both.

[3] Nor is the hope of being with Jesus at death one which first occurs to him when writing 2 Cor. 5.6-8. Cf. 1 Thess. 3.13, 4.14, 5.10.

of the passage can be reconciled if the 'nakedness' of v. 3 is understood as a reference to the condition of the Christian who dies before the Parousia. In Oepke's words: 'Dass Paulus einen Zwischenzustand im Sinne von Phil. 1.23 (σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι!) als grauenvolle Nacktheit empfunden haben sollte, wäre kaum verständig' (*T.W.N.T.*, I, 774). The only logical position for those who maintain this interpretation is that of Allan Menzies, who, in his commentary on 2 Corinthians (pp. 34-6), gives as a general heading to the section 'What is to happen to the Apostle if he succumbs to his trials; two views', and understands vv. 1-5 to be dominated by 'old-world beliefs', while vv. 6-8 are dictated by natural feeling, which the Apostle makes no attempt to adjust to the view that goes before. But it is hardly convincing to see St. Paul in the role of a modern liberal-minded lecturer, presenting his students with two alternative doctrines to choose from!

There is, however, another serious objection to Goudge's interpretation. It necessarily assumes that εὑρεθησόμεθα in v. 3 is a reference to the Parousia and that ἐνδυσάμενοι refers to the condition of Christians who are alive in their physical bodies when Christ returns—in contrast to the naked dead. Goudge writes in commenting on v. 3, 'We are "clothed" when we still retain our earthly bodies; we are "unclothed" or "naked" when we have laid them aside at death' (op. cit., p. 47). But for three reasons it is unlikely that this was St. Paul's meaning:

(*a*) The relation of ἐνδυσάμενοι to εὑρεθησόμεθα, as Plummer pointed out, 'shows that it refers to some *future* clothing, which, *when it takes place*, will prevent the calamity of being found γυμνοί like the souls in Sheol' (op. cit., p. 147, my italics). If St. Paul had meant 'continuing to be clothed as we are' he must have written ἐνδεδυμένοι rather than ἐνδυσάμενοι. The phrase might conceivably, though not naturally, mean 'if, now that we have put on clothes, we shall not be found naked' —but what *Jew* would talk about the physical body as something that he had put on?

(*b*) It is very doubtful whether the distinction between ἐνδυσάμενοι in v. 3 and ἐπενδύσασθαι in vv. 2 and 4 can be pressed, as if the first meant 'clothed with our physical bodies' and the second 'clothed over with our spiritual bodies'. Else-

where (1 Cor. 15.53) St. Paul uses ἐνδύσασθαι for the putting on of the Resurrection Body; why, then, should he have used it in 2 Cor. 5.3 for the possession of the natural body in contrast to the Resurrection Body, when he could so easily have used some such phrase as 'we that are alive, that are left' (1 Thess. 4.15) or 'to abide in the flesh' (Phil. 1.24). It is much more likely that this is another example of St. Paul's use of a simple and a compound verb in an identical sense in the same context—presumably for the sake of variety.[1]

(*c*) If εὑρεθησόμεθα is a reference to the Parousia it must be of the Parousia as judgment that St. Paul is thinking. The parallel uses, to which Dr J. A. T. Robinson has drawn attention,[2] in 1 Peter 1.7 and 2 Peter 3.14 are concerned with the quality of the Christian's life on this earth as it will appear when 'dis-covered' under the testing of God's judgment at the Last Day. We should therefore expect that the alternatives of which the Apostle speaks in v. 3 would be alternative conditions or states with some significance as regards the *Judgment*; but in fact (on the view in question) whether he was to be ἐνδυσάμενος or γυμνός affected only the temporary condition of the writer and was irrelevant to his standing before God. Why then did he speak of being *found* 'clothed with the physical body, not naked in death', rather than being clothed or naked 'at His Parousia' or 'When He is manifested' (cf. Col. 3.4)?

Cumulatively these arguments would seem to make a strong case against the view that St. Paul underwent a change of mind in this passage from envisaging and fearing the possibility of being left naked in death to desiring and preferring that condition because it meant fellowship (even though disembodied) with Christ. There are insurmountable objections to understanding γυμνός as a reference to the condition of dead Christians and ἐνδυσάμενος as a description of the present physical life.

[1] Plummer, op. cit., p. 147, quotes Rom. 15.4 and Eph. 6.13 as other examples.

[2] Dr Robinson, *The Body*, p. 77 note 1, makes the interesting suggestion that εὑρίσκεσθαι may have been almost a technical term for being 'dis-covered' at the Parousia. In addition to the passages from 1 and 2 Peter quoted above, Mark 13.36 and Matt. 24.46 might seem to support this view. But it is doubtful whether it can be pressed in St. Paul. He nowhere else uses εὑρίσκεσθαι unequivocally in an eschatological sense except in Phil. 3.9. 1 Cor. 4.2, 15.15, 2 Cor. 11.12 and Gal. 2.17 are conceivably but not certainly references to the Last Judgment. See below.

II

An attempt to meet these difficulties and yet to interpret this passage within the framework of the eschatology of the earlier epistles has been made by Albrecht Oepke in a series of articles in Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch* (*γυμνός*, vol. I; *ἐκδύω* and *ἐνδύω*, vol. II; *παρουσία*, vol. IV). Oepke maintains that the section is concerned only with the question of the Parousia and the Resurrection at the Last Day. Verses 3 and 4 reflect the writer's concern, not lest he should be disembodied *before* the Parousia, but lest he should be denied a part in the Resurrection and share the fate of unbelievers at the Parousia. 'Unter *ἐκδύσασθαι* ist daher nicht das Ablegen des Leibes seitens der Gläubigen beim Sterben vor der Parusie, sondern das Schicksal der Nichtgläubigen zu verstehen, die im Sterben, vor oder bei der Parusie, ihren irdischen Leib verlieren, ohne doch den Himmelsleib zu haben, welcher der Gläubigen bei der Parusie wartet' (*T.W.N.T.* II, p. 319). It is well known that Plato (*Crat.* 403 B) uses the word *γυμνός* to describe the bodiless soul—a condition desirable to the Greek mind but abhorrent to the Jew, and an appropriate word to describe the condition of the unrighteous in Sheol. Oepke cites instances from a Samaritan liturgy and from an early Gnostic fresco to illustrate the use of nakedness as a symbol of defencelessness before the condemning judgment of God (*T.W.N.T.* I, 774).[1] This is in itself far from conclusive evidence for the Pauline use in 2 Corinthians, but it deserves more serious consideration than it has so far received. Oepke's interpretation would at least offer a way of escape from the intolerable contradiction between the two parts of our passage in which Goudge was involved. If, as Oepke maintains, the state from which St. Paul shrinks in vv. 3 and 4 is that of *final* and *eternal* nakedness, there is no reason why he should not immediately afterwards have expressed his desire in vv. 6-8 to see Christ face to face. The condition which he fears in vv. 3 and 4 is one which he might enter if he survived to the Parousia but became apostate

[1] The parable of the Wedding Garment is not really germane to the argument, although Irenaeus associates 2 Cor. 5.4 with it in *Adv. Haer.* IV. 36.6, because the intruder in the parable (Matt. 22.11-14) is obviously not supposed to be naked and without *any* clothing. Similarly in the Apocalypse (7.9, 14) the saints are contrasted with sinners, not because they are clothed and the unrighteous unclothed, but because they have *washed* their robes. But see also Rev. 3.18.

in the meantime; the condition which he prefers in vv. 6-8 is that which he will enter now if he dies in Christ. Indeed, if the desire expressed in the latter verses is soon satisfied, and he finishes his earthly course within the faith he will be assured of Christ eternally (cf. 2 Tim. 4.6-8) and delivered once and for all from the fear of being a castaway (1 Cor. 9.27) which is ever present with those who remain in the physical body and live by faith and not by sight. Oepke's position also gives a more satisfactory sense to v. 5 than that of Goudge. The present indwelling of the Spirit is the earnest of God's will to fulfil what He has begun (cf. Phil. 1.6) whatever may be the possibilities of human failure and faithlessness—and this gives the Apostle courage, even when absent from the Lord.

Oepke's arguments do not seem to have received adequate discussion among English speaking scholars, but they have been subjected to severe criticism on the Continent. J. N. Sevenster (*Studia Paulina*, pp. 204-6) rejects the position on the ground that it requires as a corollary the assumption that St. Paul did not believe in the resurrection of the wicked. But in reply to Sevenster it must be said (*a*) that the passages which he cites (2 Cor. 5.10; 1 Thess. 4.6; Rom. 14.10, 12) do not necessarily refer to the judgment of the wicked *dead* at the Last Day, but are sufficiently explained as references to the judgment on sinners and believers *alive at the Parousia*; and (*b*) that later Jewish thought had more and more approximated the conception of the lower part of Hades (as a temporary state prior to judgment) to that of Gehenna (as a final state after judgment)[1]—a tendency which must have made it logically difficult to maintain the significance for the wicked dead of a final Judgment at the end of the Age. The view held among others by Plummer (op. cit., pp. 162-3), Charles (*Eschatology*, pp. 394-6) and Stevens (op. cit., p. 357[2]) that St. Paul did not believe in a resurrection of the wicked for judgment cannot be so lightly cast aside, and it is quite feasible that he should have regarded continued nakedness rather than Resurrection as the

[1] Cf. Davies, op. cit., p. 316. The question whether all the dead or only some would be raised was a matter of debate among the rabbis. Cf. Strack-Billerbeck, IV.1166ff.

[2] Stevens points out that the attribution to St. Paul of the belief in 'a resurrection both of the just and of the unjust' in Acts 24.15 is not, of course, decisive in view of the silence of his epistles on the subject.

fate of the wicked at the Parousia. It was many years before a Christian theologian thought it necessary to argue for the provision of Resurrection Bodies for unbelievers in order that they might be provided with teeth for the purpose of gnashing![1] A fellow-contributor to the *Theologisches Wörterbuch*, Gottlob Schrenk (article on βαρέω, vol. I, pp. 556-9) dismisses Oepke's view on the ground that 'ἐκδύσασθαι darf nicht auf die φθορά des Nichtchristen bezogen werden, weil doch bei Paulus die Glaubensgewissheit der σωτηρία vorliegt'. But the fact that in the dialectic of his thinking St. Paul could combine complete confidence in Christ's will and power to save with a humble recognition of the possibility that he personally might not attain to final salvation is shown by a comparison of Phil. 1.6 and 3.11. Oepke's position cannot be rejected simply because it implies that the Apostle did not take for granted the certainty of participation in the Resurrection at the Last Day.

Perhaps a more substantial difficulty concerns the meaning of εὑρεθησόμεθα in v. 3. While there is no necessity, as we have seen above, to assume that this is a reference to the Last Judgment at the end of the Age, the word most naturally implies some situation in which a man is subject to examination and found to be ἐνδυσάμενος and not γυμνός. But if Oepke is right these alternatives are *a consequence of* judgment, and the verse can be paraphrased 'wenn anders wir ja *nach Anlegung* (des Himmelsleibes) nicht nackt werden erfunden werden' (*T.W.N.T.*, II, p. 320). Schrenk attempts to avoid the difficulty by distinguishing between the hope of being clothed in Christ (and therefore justified at the Last Judgment) in v. 3, and the fear of the possibility of physical death[2] before the Parousia in v. 4. But this distinction involves the conclusion that a Christian who died before the Parousia would be ἐνδυσάμενος in the sense of v. 3, even though he were ἐκδυσάμενος in the sense of v. 4, and it is surely most improbable that St. Paul would have used the same terms in such different senses in consecutive verses. Rather than attribute such obscurity to the writer it is better, if not entirely satisfactory, to assume that εὑρεθησόμεθα is here used in a sense similar to that of Phil. 2.8,

[1] The reference, which I owe to G. W. H. Lampe, *Eschatology*, p. 35, is to Methodius.

[2] Schrenk seems to suggest that St. Paul feared physical death as such—even though he denies that he thought of it as leading to nakedness.

'found in fashion as a man' (*σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος*)[1] where no particular examination or discovery is implied, but simply the existence of a fact known to God and man. Then v. 3 can be paraphrased: 'If indeed we shall be in the eyes of God members of the risen Body of Christ and not condemned to the fate of unbelievers who have no part in the Resurrection but are left in the nakedness of Gehenna.'

Along these lines I believe Oepke's exegesis can be defended, and that, as regards internal consistency, his interpretation of the passage is to be preferred to that of Goudge. But it remains open to serious objection when viewed in relation to its context. Most commentators recognise that the preceding passage (2 Cor. 4.7-18) is concerned with the problems raised by the possibility or even the probability of the Apostle's death before the Parousia. It is obvious from a comparison of the language of this section with that of 2 Cor. 1.8, 9[2] that he has in mind the terrible afflictions which had befallen him recently in Asia 'as a result of which the Apostle was convinced that in all human probability his hours were numbered' (Plummer, op. cit., p. 17). God had then delivered him (1.10), but the possibility that his body might succumb to the pressure of travel, persecution and ill-health had to be faced. For one thing, his death might prove a real test for the Corinthian Church, which so needed his guidance; so he assures his readers in 4.7-15 that his departure will turn out to be for their good, and will in fact redound to the greater glory of God. That it is indeed physical death that he envisages is clear from 4.14: 'He who raised the Lord Jesus will *raise us*[3] also with Jesus and present us together with you'; and Dr Dodd has also suggested that 4.12 may mean 'though he will die, his readers will survive until the Advent' (*New Testament Studies*, pp. 110-11). But the prospect of the decay of the physical frame to the point of total dissolu-

[1] Cf. Matt. 1.18, '*εὑρέθη ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχουσα*'.

[2] *Θλῖψις* occurs in 1.8 and 4.17 (cf. *θλιβόμενοι*, 4.8); *ὑπερβολὴ* in 1.8 and 4.7, 17; *δύναμις* in 1.8 and 4.7; *βαρέω* in 1.8 and 5.4 (cf. *βάρος* 4.17); *ἐξαπορέω* in 1.8 and 4.8 and *nowhere else in the NT*; *ζάω* or *ζωή* in 1.8, 4.10, 11 and 5.4; *θάνατος* in 1.9 and 4.11.

[3] It is extremely unlikely that the meaning is that God will deliver him from death in the future as he did in the instance in Asia mentioned in 1.8-11. Of the 38 other uses of *ἐγείρω* in St. Paul's writings 36 refer to the raising of Christ or of Christians *from the dead*. The only exceptions are Rom. 13.11 (awake from sleep) and Phil. 1.17 (raise up affliction).

tion (4.16[1]) raises questions for his personal future—questions which are also of concern to his friends with whom he had expected to survive to the Parousia (1 Cor. 15.51). So he reminds himself and them that, in comparison with the relatively slight and temporary affliction of the present, the invisible hope which is being prepared is one of 'vast and transcendent glory' (4.16-18). 'For, if we die, as now seems probable,' he writes in v. 1 of chap. 5—what? According to Oepke, 'we shall (we hope) receive a building from God *at the Parousia*'! But this is an intolerable anticlimax. Having dwelt on the problems raised by the fact that he may *not* now survive to the Parousia, the Apostle is supposed to express his assurance of something that will happen if he *does* survive to the Parousia. In the context of considering the faith which gives him confidence *even if he is called upon to die now* he declares, according to Oepke, his urgent longing for something that will happen, not when he dies, but at some future time *whether he dies or not.* Having led up to a statement of what will happen to him at death, he gives his readers a description of that which will certainly not take place at death—namely, the clothing over with a heavenly habitation. Ἐὰν ἡ ἐπίγειος ἡμῶν οἰκία τοῦ σκήνους καταλυθῇ in 5.1 cannot be translated, as if it contained an additional καί, to mean '*even if* we die now, we shall receive (at the Parousia) a building from God'. Both logically and grammatically it requires to follow it some statement which further illuminates or explains what will happen in the particular instance of death before the Parousia. Thus Oepke's exegesis finally fails to carry conviction because it is based on a presupposition which is in direct contrast to what is demanded by the context—the entirely arbitrary assumption that 'der Gedanke an einen Zwischenzustand scheidet 2 Cor. 5.3 daher wahrscheinlich ganz aus' (*T.W.N.T.*, I, p. 774).[2]

III

We must now consider the more radical suggestion that

[1] διαφθείρω normally implies 'a completed process of damage' according to Moulton, and Milligan, *Vocabulary*, p. 157.

[2] This latter criticism applies with even greater cogency to the view of Goudge discussed above. If Goudge is correct we have St. Paul saying in vv. 1-4, 'If we die we have a habitation from God, for which we groan so long as we do not die but survive alive to the Parousia—for if we die now we are left naked without any habitation'!

between 1 and 2 Corinthians St. Paul's thought underwent a significant development, and that in this passage he no longer associates the hope of a spiritual body exclusively with the Parousia. Among those who take this view are W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, p. 311, W. L. Knox, *St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles*, pp. 128, 136, R. H. Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 395, Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, pp. 201-2, C. H. Dodd, *New Testament Studies*, p. 110, C. V. Pilcher, *The Hereafter in Jewish and Christian Thought*, pp. 165-8, and H. A. Guy, *The New Testament Doctrine of the Last Things*, p. 117. According to this view we have in 2 Cor. 5 a declaration of faith which follows on naturally from the discussion of the prospect of death in chap. 4. The Apostle, having for the first time given full and serious attention to the difficulties raised by the delay of the Parousia and the increasing number of Christians who have died, declares that those who 'sleep in Jesus' are not left without a covering in nakedness until the Parousia are clothed but at death with a heavenly habitation from God (vv. 1-4). Verse 5 indicates the basis of this new affirmation—it is a fresh, but logical, deduction from the fact that the Christian already experiences the earnest of the final Resurrection in this life; those who have been baptised into Christ have already put on a new Body—that of Christ (cf. Gal. 3.27; 1 Cor. 12.13) and can never again be naked. Thus the contradiction between vv. 1-4 and 6-8, which is such a stumbling-block to the exegesis of Goudge, is also resolved—they are both elaborations of the same truth from different points of view. In vv. 1-4 the future state is seen as deliverance from the limitations of the flesh, in vv. 6-8 as deliverance from the limitations of faith. Finally, if this interpretation is correct, the reference to the judgment in vv. 9-10 is integral to the argument, instead of being a superfluous appendage[1]: whether we survive to the Parousia or depart this life through death we cannot escape the testing of our obedience at the tribunal of our Master—so, comforting as this new insight of faith is, it makes no essential difference to the way we spend our remaining time, whether short or long.

[1] In Goudge's exegesis we are left with the difficult idea that Paul expects (vv. 6-8) to enjoy (disembodied) the fellowship of Christ at death, and then to stand before His Judgment Seat to receive sentence for bodily action only at the Parousia.

Before attempting to justify this exegesis in detail we must take account of two common objections to the general principles involved. It is said that such an interpretation implies that St. Paul had abandoned Jewish eschatology for Hellenistic mysticism, and that he had directly contradicted his own teaching in the earlier Epistles. The degree of 'Hellenisation' involved must not, however, be exaggerated. Even W. L. Knox, who believed that 2 Cor. 5 represents 'a complete revision of Pauline eschatology in a Hellenistic sense' (op. cit., p. 128) was careful not to speak of 'a revision of Pauline eschatology in a completely Hellenistic sense'. Knox clearly recognised that 'Paul was too good a Jew and too poor a Hellenist to describe the soul as being delivered from the clothing of the body so that it might ascend to heaven naked' (op. cit., p. 137). Bultmann even thinks that the passage, despite the fact that it 'comes very close to Hellenistic-Gnostic dualism', contains indirect polemic against the Gnostic view that the soul soars aloft free of any body (op. cit., pp. 201-2). The truth is that St. Paul is heir to a synthesis between Hellenism and Judaism which goes back to the Wisdom literature[1] and had been further advanced by Philo, and to speak of a direct contrast between Greek and Hebraic traditions in first-century Judaism is really nonsense.[2] There are certainly Hellenistic elements in 2 Cor. 5, but they do not first make their appearance in this Epistle, and they are always qualified by Jewish categories of thought.

It is generally agreed that between 1 and 2 Corinthians St. Paul did undergo some experience which called in question the earlier assumption that he would probably survive to the Parousia (1 Cor. 15.51). There is every reason to suppose that this experience was the 'affliction which befell us in Asia' (2 Cor. 1.8-9), to which reference has already been made. Unless it is to be dogmatically assumed that St. Paul was incapable of, or prohibited from development in his thinking—a ridiculous assumption for any one who regards Ephesians or even Colossians as Pauline—the possibility that this experience

[1] *Vide* his use of σκῆνος rather than σκηνή in this passage. The latter is used everywhere else in the NT and LXX, *except* here and in Wisd. 9.15, where σκῆνος (also used by Plato, Hippocrates and Democritus) occurs.

[2] W. D. Davies has shown conclusively that first-century Judaism had been 'largely influenced and modified by Hellenistic conceptions of immortality' (op. cit., p. 320).

caused him to elaborate his thinking about the state of dead Christians in the light of his own near approach to death cannot be lightly dismissed. Moreover, the extent of the modification and contrast between 2 Cor. 5 and 1 Cor. 15 must not be exaggerated. R. H. Charles pointed out (op. cit., p. 395) that the analogy of the seed in 1 Cor. 15.37 most naturally suggests a continuity of bodily organism rather than a hiatus between death and Parousia. It is true that in 1 Cor. 15 St. Paul still preserves the traditional Jewish identification of Resurrection and the end of the age. But there is inherent in his thought a contradiction which might naturally lead, on further reflection, to the suggested modification in 2 Cor. 5. The traditional Jewish doctrine of Resurrection was specifically associated with the end of the age for the very good reason that resurrection of the body was understood to involve the same material elements as had formed the natural body—and which, therefore, could not constitute the new Resurrection Body until the whole physical world of nature was transformed.[1] St. Paul makes it clear, however, that in his view 'flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God' (1 Cor. 15.50). The analogy of the seed is not pressed to show that there is a material continuity between the natural and the Resurrection Body, as if the one were evolved from the other.[2] But in thus abandoning the doctrine of an identity of material elements, St. Paul was undermining the logical necessity for postponing the hope of a heavenly clothing until the Parousia. Moreover, he believed that resurrection had already become a reality in the person of Christ before the end of this age and the transformation of the material universe. When writing 1 Cor. 15 he expected the Parousia and the end of this age so shortly that the significance of this fact

[1] Although some Rabbis had arrived at a less materialistic conception of the Resurrection (Davies, op. cit., pp. 316-8) the traditional view was widely held in popular thought, and it may well be that some of the Corinthians suspected St. Paul of teaching a crudely physical resurrection.

[2] St. Paul's use of the analogy of the seed is obviously very loose. A seed is not strictly 'naked' (1 Cor. 15.37) even when sown, and the flower or plant is not something 'put on' over the seed (1 Cor. 15.53, 54; 2 Cor. 5.1) to 'swallow it up' (1 Cor. 15.54; 2 Cor. 5.4). The popular Jewish doctrine was revived by Tertullian, who sought to demonstrate, against the Gnostics, that flesh and blood *can and do* inherit the Kingdom of God (*On the Resurrection of the Flesh*, 50), and St. Augustine devoted considerable ingenuity to the task of showing how the material particles of the physical body will be gathered together to form the Resurrection Body (*City of God*, XX.20; XXII.12). The whole idea is now widely abandoned (cf. *Doctrine in the Church of England*, p. 209).

for those who 'sleep in Jesus' was not developed; but the seed of the conviction, expressed in 2 Cor. 5, that the clothing of the dead in Christ does not wait upon the Parousia may perhaps be reflected in the fact that he asks, not 'what manner of body do they *receive* (at the Parousia)?', but 'with what manner of body do they *come* (with Christ)?' (1 Cor. 15.35).[1] At least, the proposed interpretation of 2 Cor. 5 along these lines can be seen to be a logical development of, rather than a contradiction of the distinctively Christian themes of 1 Cor. 15. And this exegesis is further confirmed by the striking fact that in those epistles which follow 2 Corinthians St. Paul never speaks of the resurrection of the dead at the Parousia, but of the *revelation* (ἀποκάλυψις) of the sons of God (Rom. 8.19) or of their *manifestation* (φανέρωσις) with Christ (Col. 3.4).[2]

There is another aspect of St. Paul's thought which points naturally to the view that the Christian is clothed rather than naked at death. Dr J. A. T. Robinson, in his illuminating study of the Pauline doctrine of *The Body* draws attention to the fact that 'The resurrection of the body starts at Baptism. . . . Because of our incorporation into Christ the new solidarity is continually being built up within us' (pp. 79, 80).[3] The Christian is already clothed with Christ (Gal. 3.27) and has already 'put on the new man' (Eph. 4.24). He already knows what it is to 'walk in newness of life' in the power of Christ's Resurrection (Rom. 6.4; Col. 2.12) and to be raised up to

[1] It is true, of course, that the tradition of the Empty Tomb does imply some relation between the physical elements of our Lord's natural body and His Resurrection. But it is questionable whether this can be regarded as determinative, since both the Empty Tomb and the Resurrection appearances in physical form were necessary to convey to men *still in the natural body* the truth of the Resurrection. In any case, St. Paul does not refer to the Empty Tomb as evidence of the Resurrection, nor does he argue from the Resurrection Appearances to the *character* of the Christian's Resurrection Body.

[2] It is quite consistent with this change of emphasis that in those epistles which follow 2 Corinthians St. Paul's references to judgment are not associated particularly with the Parousia (e.g. Rom. 14.8-12; Col. 4.1; Eph. 6.5-9). The Parousia is no longer the point at which the sentence of God is passed, but the point at which it is proclaimed universally and its consequences perfectly achieved.

[3] I cannot, however, follow Dr Robinson in his virtual identification of the Resurrection Body of Christ and the Church (op. cit., pp. 51, 52 note 1). St. Paul speaks of the Church as growing into the fulness of the Body (Eph. 4.11-16; cf. 2.20-2); but he can hardly mean that the Resurrection of Christ is yet incomplete. There is surely a parallel here with the thought of the Church's suffering 'filling up' the Passion (Col. 1.24; cf. 2 Cor. 4.10). Just as the once-for-all suffering and death of Calvary overflows in the life of the Church, so Christ is already in 'the body of His glory' (Phil. 3.21) but by the Spirit continually conforms (2 Cor. 3.18) or cultivates (2 Cor. 4.16-18) the Church to that glory.

heavenly places (Col. 3.1-3; Eph. 2.6). It is true, of course, that the full realisation of this new life waits upon the Parousia even in the latest of the Pauline writings (Col. 3.4; Eph. 1.13, 14); but in the light of his emphasis upon the truth that Christians share in the Resurrection in this life, St. Paul can hardly have regarded death as an interruption of that incorporation—as nakedness.[1] Once he had given serious consideration to the status of those 'in Christ' who died before the final consummation we should expect to find that the doctrine of the Body of Christ led to a hope of further embodiment at death. And this thought is reflected in the language of 2 Cor. 5.1, which echoes the saying attributed to our Lord at His trial: 'I will destroy (*καταλύσω*) this temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build (*οἰκοδομήσω*) another made without hands (*ἀχειροποίητον*) (Mark 14.58). The false witness claimed that this was a threat to destroy the Temple; in fact it was a promise of His own Resurrection (John 2.19-22) which had been (intentionally?) confused with a warning about the coming destruction of the Temple in Mark 13.2. St. Paul has been speaking of the fact that his identification with Christ in his passion has, throughout his ministry, been a means whereby the risen life of Christ has been manifested in his body (2 Cor. 4.10, 11). Now, taking up Jesus' own words, he gives expression to the great affirmation of faith: 'If we are identified not only spiritually but physically with the death of Christ, we know that our participation in the life of Christ assures us of continued embodiment in Him[2] and empties death of the shadow of nakedness' (2 Cor. 5.1-5).

The crucial test of the interpretation here suggested, however, is its ability to justify itself by exact exegesis of the text, and it has been a weakness of those maintaining this view that they have failed to meet this test. With considerable misgivings I append a proposed translation (with explanatory phrases in

[1] In the course of a most helpful correspondence Dr Robinson tells me that he understands the change of emphasis between 2 Cor. 5.3 where St. Paul fears 'the inevitable prospect of nakedness' (*The Body*, p. 77) and 2 Cor. 5.8 where he rejoices in the assurance of having 'a body which cannot leave us entirely naked' (op. cit., p. 78) as parallel to the change of emphasis between Rom. 7 and 8. But this interpretation is open to all the criticisms raised, convincingly in my view, against Goudge (see above).

[2] Compare the reference to the building 'in the heavens' (2 Cor. 5.1) with 1 Cor. 15.49: 'as we have borne the image of the earthly, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly (Man).'

italics) in the hope that others will criticise or improve on it. No one would claim that any exegesis can give an entirely satisfactory sense to the complex—and appalling—syntax of the passage. I have already pointed out the difficulties faced by the alternative interpretations when they are related to the text, and I would not claim more for the following rendering than that it comes at least as near as any other to making sense of the language, while being a great deal more consistent with the context and with the general tenor of the Apostle's thought.[1] In a case such as this, where no obvious meaning is demanded or conveyed by strictly exegetical considerations, these secondary elements must play a large part in determining the meaning.

5.1. For we know that if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, we have a building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.

2. In this *tent* indeed we groan *because of the afflictions and temptations which oppress us*,[2] longing to be clothed upon with our heavenly habitation—

3. on the assumption *of course*[3] that when we shall have put on this clothing[4] *at death* we shall not be found naked *before God*[5]—

[1] I am greatly indebted to Professor C. F. D. Moule for much patient help in this connexion, as well as for suggestions and criticisms in other sections of this paper. He is responsible for delivering me from many errors, but is not responsible for my conclusions, with which he is not in complete agreement.

[2] I assume that the 'groaning' (vv. 2 and 4) is the result of the failing and decay of physical powers mentioned in 4.16. There are striking parallels between this passage and Rom. 8 (cf. Rom. 8.8 and 2 Cor. 5.9; Rom. 8.18 and 2 Cor. 4.17; Rom. 8.23 and 2 Cor. 5.5), where the 'groaning' is concerned with deliverance from the natural body with its weakness and pains, and not with anxiety about the possibility of death before the Parousia.

[3] V. 3 seems to be a parenthesis inserted to meet a possible misunderstanding arising from the new thought of vv. 1 and 2. It occurs to the writer (or perhaps to his amanuensis) that the idea of groaning for freedom from *this* body might be interpreted as a desire for total disembodiment on Platonic lines. He therefore interposes a *caveat* before taking up the thought of v. 2 in v. 4 by repeating the phrase ἐν τούτῳ στενάζομεν almost verbally. The meaning of v. 3, therefore, is not 'if indeed, as we hope, we are clothed and not naked', but 'of course, on the supposition that being clothed we shall not be found naked' (Plummer, *in loc.*). It is not nakedness but embodiment in a fuller and freer life of which St. Paul is assured.

[4] The reading ἐκδυσάμενοι (D*, F, G, d, e, g, Tert.) is to be rejected as 'an early alteration to avoid apparent tautology' (Plummer, *in loc.*).

[5] The ideas of resurrection and justification are closely related in St. Paul's thought, as we may see from Phil. 3.9, 10 and Rom. 4.24, 25. By faith we already experience the first-fruits of this hope in baptism, and already enjoy both newness of life and peace with God (Rom. 6.4; 5.1); but there remains a future fulness of resurrection (Rom. 6.5) and a future confirmation of justification (Rom. 5.9). St. Paul here affirms that not only at the Parousia but also in death he is assured, by the indwelling of the Spirit, of both fuller embodiment and acceptance by God. There will be no interregnum of disembodied gloom or uncertainty about the final assurance of justification.

4. for indeed, we who are in this tent groan, being burdened[1] *with the pains and limitations of the physical body, but this is* not because we want to be unclothed[2] *like the Greeks,* but *because we want* to be clothed upon, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life.
5. Now He who has prepared us for this very thing is God, who has given us the foretaste of *that spiritual clothing in* the Spirit.
6. So we are always of good courage, *even when facing the unknown experience of death*; and we know that while we are present in the *physical* body we are away from the Lord—
7. for we walk *in this life* by faith, not by sight, *and in that respect, though not in spirit, we are separated from the Lord—*
8. we are of good courage, I say, and would rather be absent from the *physical* body and at home with the Lord.
9. So whether we remain *in this body until the Parousia* or depart *to be with the Lord* we make it our aim to please Him;
10. for we must all *either at death or at the Parousia* appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each one may receive good or evil, according to what he has done in the body.

IV

For St. Paul himself the significance of this development in thought between 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5 was important, but not central. Even when he expected personally to die before the Parousia he did not abandon his belief in the imminence of the end of this age. We might liken his experience to that of a man aged 65 in 1933 who then foresaw the inevitable conflict between Hitler and the democracies, and expected war to come soon and within his lifetime. The same man after Munich, now aged 70, might have doubted whether he would live to see the event, while being no less convinced that it was inevitable and bound to come soon. Then again, after the invasion of Czeckoslovakia, his expectation of seeing battle joined might revive. Thus, although in 2 Cor. 5 St. Paul is concerned with the question of what happens to those who die before the Parousia, he does not allow the hope of the Parousia to fade into a distant future. When writing to the Romans a few years

[1] A further confirmation of the exegesis of vv. 2 and 4 as referring to the burden of the physical body, rather than to the burden of anxiety about survival to the Parousia is found in the fact that *βαρέω* is almost always, and notably in 2 Cor. 1.8, which is directly in the writer's mind, used for physical oppression rather than for mental anxiety or fear.

[2] The weak point in this translation is the rendering of *ἐφ' ᾧ οὐ θέλομεν* which ought strictly to mean 'because we do not want' rather than 'not because we want'. But *οὐ* does land up in some extraordinary positions in St. Paul, and in defence of my translation I can claim that both R.V. and R.S.V. assume that St. Paul meant to write *οὐκ ἐφ' ᾧ θέλομεν.*

later he speaks of the night as far spent (Rom. 13.12), looks for a speedy 'bruising of Satan' (Rom. 16.20) and perhaps envisages the possibility of being alive at the Parousia (Rom. 8.11, 23). When writing to the Philippians he has become convinced that (despite his personal preference) it is the will of God for him to remain in the physical body until the Parousia for the sake of the Church (Phil. 1.23-6; 3.20; 4.5). Once the immediate impression of his experiences in Asia faded it was the imminence of the Parousia that filled his thought rather than the hope of being clothed upon at death.

But the significance of this interpretation of 2 Cor. 5 for later Christian ages is obvious. The fact that for nineteen centuries the Parousia has not come and Christians in their millions have died has inevitably made the question of the 'intermediate state' of much greater interest for us than it was for the Church of the first century. Patristic and medieval theology developed a doctrine of the Last Things which attempted to give expression to the hope of individual blessedness at death and at the same time regarded the soul as disembodied until the Parousia. The Reformers on the whole accepted this position, and the Westminster Confession characteristically speaks of the souls of the departed as 'received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies' (xxxii). But the objection to such language is that, while giving a technical place to the Resurrection of the Body, it in fact empties that idea of any positive content. If the dead as disembodied souls are able to enjoy the full vision of God in the highest heavens (an idea, incidentally, which orthodox second-century writers agree in repudiating), the reunion of soul and body can hardly be said to add anything essential to the achievement of man's true destiny. The difficulty has arisen because a distinction has been drawn between the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the individual body, rather than between the further clothing (at death) of the individual member of the Body and the full resurrection (at the Parousia) of the whole Body. The Last Day has been thought of as the addition of something to the soul in its individuality, rather than as the perfection of the person in its corporateness.

This passage, seen in the context of the whole Pauline *corpus*,

gives us a clue to how the Apostle might have answered some of the questions which later generations have raised. For him the Parousia remains significant for the Christian who dies before it, not because he must wait naked until that Day, but because the work of Christ in His Body can only be perfected then.[1] The fact that individually we have the assurance of being clothed between death and Parousia does not mean that we can enter into the fulness of life in the Body of Christ apart from our brethren. Only at the Parousia will the sons of God be manifested in glory (Rom. 8.19, 21; Col. 3.4); only then will the Church be presented glorious and without blemish (Eph. 5.27; cf. 2 Cor. 4.14); only then will there be brought about 'the realisation of man's obedience which is to carry with it the release and harmonisation of all the universe'.[2] It may be significant that, although St. Paul speaks in 2 Cor. 5 of the reception, at death, of a heavenly habitation, of being clothed and not naked, he does not speak of the Resurrection of the Body in this connexion.[3] As members of the Body of Christ we continue, after death, to be clothed in Him; but the resurrection and redemption of the Body is not achieved until the end of the age (Rom. 8.23; Eph. 4.30). And it may be appropriate, in conclusion, to draw attention to the fact that John Calvin declared this to be the more suitable interpretation of 2 Cor. 5: 'It is not certain whether he means by this term (building of perpetual duration) a state of blessed immortality, which awaits believers after death, or the incorruptible and glorious body, such as it will be after the resurrection. . . . I prefer to understand it as meaning that the blessed condition of the soul after death is the commencement[4] of this building,

[1] It is a weakness of the otherwise invaluable treatment of the subject by W. D. Davies (op. cit., pp. 318-20) that he implies (following Dr Dodd) that the end of the age has no significance at all for eternity. *Per contra*, Charles, op. cit., p. 399, John Baillie, *And the Life Everlasting*, pp. 246-51.

[2] C. F. D. Moule, *The Meaning of Hope*, p. 55.

[3] The fact that St. Paul does not use the word σῶμα for the habitation mentioned in 2 Cor. 5.1, 2 is not an argument in favour of the alternative interpretations discussed above. If, as they maintain, he was referring to the final state of resurrection at the Parousia, his failure to use the natural and traditional term is the more remarkable.

[4] Dr J. A. T. Robinson draws my attention to the fact that this phrase may suggest that for Calvin the 'clothing upon' begins at death, whereas in the NT it begins at *baptism*. That this was not his meaning is clear from passages quoted by Dr T. F. Torrance, *Kingdom and Church*, pp. 92-6. On the other hand, although St. Paul speaks of the 'building from God' as something the Christian now has (2 Cor. 5.1) he still looks forward to a future 'clothing upon' (2 Cor. 5.2) at death

and the glory of the final resurrection is the consummation of it' (*Commentary in loc.*, Pringle's translation, pp. 217-8).

(if the exegesis proposed in this paper is correct). In other words, although baptism and not death is the decisive moment for the Christian, he does enter at death upon a significantly new stage of that embodiment in Christ which will be consummated at the Parousia.

BOOK REVIEWS

Briefwechsel, vols. 1 and 2. By JOHANN GEORG HAMANN, edited by WALTHER ZIESEMER and ARTHUR HENKEL. Insel Verlag, Wiesbaden. Subscription price: paper covers, DM. 25 each; cloth bound, DM. 28. *Hamanns Hauptschriften Erklärt*, vols. 1 and 7. General editors, FRITZ BLANKE and LOTHAR SCHREINER. Bertelsmann Verlag, DM. 23 and 22. *Hamann-Studien*. By FRITZ BLANKE. Zwingli Verlag. s.Fr. 16.

JUST 200 years ago, on 17th April 1757, a young German, 27 years old, disembarked at Harwich from Königsberg. He was employed by a Riga merchant, and had come to England for business purposes. Little is known about these affairs. What we do know is that during his 14 months' sojourn in London Johann Georg Hamann was led through poverty, sickness and friendlessness to a new life, by way of a conversion which dominated his whole future.

This conversion is vividly depicted in his brief *Gedanken aus meinem Lebenslauf*, an autobiographical sketch written while he was still in London. It might be called a conventional conversion in the sense that it came about through the reading of the Bible; but with Hamann this meant the *whole* Bible, several times through. But like most conversions it was also a gathering up of the past and a surge forward in a single direction. But the direction Hamann took is easier to discern than the single-mindedness with which he took it. Dr Fritz Blanke in his collected studies of Hamann has done splendid service to the understanding of Hamann by indicating some of the interests which radiated out from this conversion, while never losing sight of the centrality of Hamann's Christian faith. Hamann's relation to Lessing, his conflict with his friend Kant, his strange and moving association in the last years of his life with the Princess Gallitzin and her circle of Roman Catholic friends and directors, and most of all his deep and highly significant relation to Luther—these and other themes are treated by Dr Blanke with affectionate insight and scrupulous scholarship. It is no derogation of his work to say that much remains to be done. In particular, Hamann's relation to Hume and Kant needs thorough examination, as does the whole matter of his English connexions and interests. It is to be hoped that what work will be done in future will, like Dr Blanke's, rest content with indicating the immense radiation of Hamann's interests without trying to subsume them under systematic categories.

It may be of interest to list here the material published by English-speaking scholars. There are only two separate works, first, by the veteran American scholar Walter Lowrie who, after a lifetime devoted to the study and translation of Kierkegaard, has still found time to offer his views on Hamann in a pamphlet entitled *Johann Georg Hamann, an Existentialist* (Princeton, 1950); and second, *Unity and Language, a Study in the Philosophy of Johann Georg Hamann*, also by an American scholar, James C. O'Flaherty (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1952). Of essays in periodicals there is likewise little to mention. The writer of the present review has the honour of having written the first to appear in English, 'The Living and Speaking God' (*Hibbert Journal*, April 1944), which is chiefly concerned with Hamann's doctrine of the 'Word'. Philip Merlan has written three separate essays under the general title of *Parva Hamanniana*, but especially an essay in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 'Hamann et les Dialogues de Hume' (no. 59, 1954). In addition, there are one or two essays on philological matters which are of less interest to readers of this *Journal*.

This meagre material contrasts strikingly with the wealth of studies in other languages, especially of course German. The course of Hamann criticism and interpretation is given in a masterly survey by Karlfried Gründer in vol. 1 of the *Hauptschriften Erklärt*, the volume being completed by a very fine piece of bibliographical research by Lothar Schreiner. This admirable introduction is followed up by vol. 7 of the planned series. Edited by Lothar Schreiner, the text of Hamann's *Golgatha und Scheblimini* (as established by Josef Nadler in his recent edition of the complete *Werke*) is given at the top of the page, followed by brief notes on words and allusions, and a running commentary in the bottom part of the page. This project of text and commentary of the main works is planned to fill eight volumes, the eighth to be an Index.

This recognition of Hamann's importance might be considered tardy, were it not that only now are his ideas becoming intelligible to a number of different kinds of people: theologians, philosophers, semasiologists, and religious people. The literary artists and critics of Germany have always understood him, but the restricted influence which they remitted to him shows that they did not understand him fully—and perhaps could not fairly be expected to do so. By them, through the approval of Goethe, and the enthusiasm of Herder, who was Hamann's direct disciple, Hamann has always been acknowledged as one of the sources of the *Sturm und Drang*, and the whole Romantic movement in German literature and life.

Added to this new wealth of scholarly work on Hamann, a complete and definitive edition of the Letters is now appearing. Vols. 1

and 2, now available, cover the years 1751 to 1769. Vols. 3 to 7 will cover the years to Hamann's death in 1788, and vol. 8 will consist of Notes. Each volume consists of about 520 pages. Most of the letters in vol. 1 appear now for the first time in print. The correspondence with Herder will appear in its entirety, as well as the whole remarkable range of Hamann's correspondence with Kant, Moses Mendelssohn, Nicolai, Matthias Claudius, Lavater and others of that great intellectual efflorescence in Europe.

What is to be expected as a result of this admirable conjunction of scholarly zeal and publishing enterprise?

The answer to this question must lie in the answers which our time gives to the questions raised by Hamann. To his own time, as Hamann himself knew, he was an enigmatic figure, a voice crying in the wilderness. The sobriquet 'Magus im Norden' has usually been taken to mean a mystical and strange figure; but it is better to take it, as Dr Blanke suggests, with literal exactness as a reference to his central Christian loyalty: like the Wise Men of the east, this wise man of the north was looking with fresh eyes at the star of Bethlehem. But the common tendency to regard him as a kind of magic figure is undoubtedly connected with the elusive and chaotic nature of his writings.

No attempt can here be made to resolve the problems. But at least some of them can be indicated. The link with Kierkegaard is perhaps the most obvious theological entry into Hamann's thought. Kierkegaard found in Hamann, along with Socrates, the main inspiration for his work, conceived, that is, as the problem of *becoming a Christian*. He saw clearly (see the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, E. T. 223f) that Hamann's unsystematic and pregnant style was not entirely a sign of literary impotence; it was at the same time the choice of existence rather than thought, of perceiving and suffering rather than cool abstraction. Hamann's passionate subjectivism lit the way for Kierkegaard's thoroughgoing critique of Hegel's system. Hamann's unswerving hold on revelation, on historical facts, on the givenness of God's Word, lies behind Kierkegaard's continual struggle to hold to faith as *the* way to a full Christian life.

This comes out clearly in Hamann's *Golgatha und Scheblimini*. This was written as a counterblast to the work of the Jewish rationalist Moses Mendelssohn, *Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum* (1783). The immediate social aim of this work was to secure the emancipation of the Jews. The nature of religious discipline, and its relation to the powers exerted by the State, are the ostensible themes. In fact Mendelssohn's work is a remarkable amalgam of Jewish thought with the dominant ideas of the *Aufklärung* about the

world and God, reason and revelation. In his own words 'Judaism was to consist, according to the will of its founder, of: 1. Doctrines of religion and propositions, without which man cannot be *aufgeklärt* and happy. These . . . have been recommended to reasonable acknowledgment in line with the nature and evidence of eternal truths. The supreme Being has . . . written them in the soul with a writing which can be read and understood at all times and in all places. 2. Historical truths . . . accepted in faith . . . 3. Laws, prescriptions, commands and rules of life.' But in essence it is the eternal truths which command Mendelssohn's main respect, for he goes on to say: 'Though this divine book is really intended to be a law book, with rules and prescriptions, all the same it includes an inexhaustible treasure of truths of reason and doctrines of religion, which are so closely bound up with the laws that they are a unity. Every law is based upon or related to eternal truths of reason. . . .'[1] In effect, therefore, Mendelssohn identifies Judaism with natural religion.

Hamann's attack, therefore, was an attack upon the whole theology of the *Aufklärung*. He speaks in the name of the revealed biblical truth of the Old as well as the New Testament. It was Dilthey (following Hegel) who saw most clearly that Hamann was presenting a positive and objective Christianity, which was grounded in the condescension of God to historical events. Christianity has to do with 'temporal truths of history, which happened at one time, and never recur—facts which became true at one point of time and space in a context of causes and effects, and which can therefore be thought as true only from that point of time and space . . .' (*Golgatha und Scheblimini*, ed. Schreiner, 103). With this basic affirmation Hamann, in this as in all his writings, sought to establish an understanding of the Word which is only in our time becoming recognised at its true worth. In his concern with language, with the meaning of creation, with the overcoming of the subject-object dichotomy—in these concerns Hamann was far in advance of his time. If there are signs today that the autonomy of the *Aufklärung* is at last reaching the end of its way, then the theonomy which is its possible successor can be in no small measure helped to realisation by the thought of Hamann. The beginning which has been made in the works under review is a splendid augury for the furtherance of this task, and the band of scholars joined in this enterprise are to be congratulated on the amplitude and exactitude of their plans.

R. Gregor Smith

[1] These excerpts from Mendelssohn are taken from Schreiner's very full summary in his introduction to vol. 7 of the *Hauptschriften Erklärt.*

The Pauline View of Man. By W. D. Stacey. Macmillan, 1956. Pp. 253. 25s. net.

Sir Malcolm Sargent said the other day that at the present time there are far too many composers writing orchestral music and hoping to get it performed. One wonders sometimes whether there are not too many Paulinists writing theology and hoping to have it read. Life is too short for the weariness of repetitious reading, and a lot of present-day scholarship cannot see the wood for the trees. St. Paul could be 'all things to all men'—with one tremendous exception: he could never by any conceivable possibility be dull; yet so often he is made to appear precisely that. The New Testament is far and away the most exciting book in the world, but it is sorely maltreated when its commentators are more taken up with contending theological viewpoints than with the communication of the saving Word, more interested in Barth saying '*Nein*' to Brunner than in anyone saying 'Yes' to Jesus Christ: although to assist and promote that 'Yes' is exactly what both these great theologians—and every true *Neutestamentler*—are striving for.

This somewhat impatient ebullition is, however, simply the prelude to saying that the present book can stand in its own right. It is a wise and weighty contribution to the study of Pauline anthropology—if indeed one can use that term of the writings of St. Paul who was so little of the 'systematiser' that some of his interpreters have forced him to be.

The theme demands an adequate discussion of Hebraic and Hellenistic backgrounds, and in the book before us this is ably done. On the one hand, terms like *nephesh*, *ruach*, *basar* are carefully examined; on the other, one of the most interesting chapters concerns the Greek view of man from Homer to the Hellenistic age. The writer shows that, just as Judaism had penetrated the Graeco-Roman world both physically and spiritually, so Hellenism had been making inroads into the soul of Judasim. He raises the important question as to how far Paul's usage of a term like *συνείδησις* reflects the influence of the Stoics. He has, moreover, the sense to see that though the technical terms of the mystery cults are found in Paul their connotation is quite different.

It is a pleasure to welcome a writer who is prepared to ascribe to the Damascus revelation a greater theology-forming value than to any environmental influence or syncretistic tendency. 'The statement that the Old Testament plus a Stoic idea makes the Pauline notion is a thoroughly false equation, for, in the intensity of his experience, Paul leapt ahead of all his precursors, Jew and Greek. To begin with backgrounds and influences is to begin in the wrong place. Paul's knowledge of the Spirit was first-hand. Paul did not

gather ideas. He met a Person' (p. 145). 'Paul's knowledge of the Holy Spirit set the basis of his anthropology' (p. 127). Everywhere in Paul the divine initiative is paramount. This insight controls the very use of language. Commenting on the comparative infrequency of the term ψυχή and the constant use of πνεῦμα, the writer remarks that 'in Christian experience, ψυχή the term for purely human vitality became unimportant. πνεῦμα, the term that began with God but proceeded into man, became central' (p. 126).

One great merit of the book is negative: its insistence on the essentially unbiblical character of the σῶμα-σῆμα dichotomy. This is a real service, for even though Pfleiderer's dualistic interpretation of the anthropology of the epistles has long since been discarded by Pauline scholars, a good deal of 'popular Christianity' still suffers from this confusion and labours under this grievous error: it is unwittingly Platonic rather than biblical. It is interesting, by the way, to note that the writer accepts the authenticity of Ephesians, as he is perfectly entitled to do, theories like Goodspeed's having failed to win more than a very qualified acceptance.

Mr Stacey's general position could be characterised by saying that he belongs to the school of the late Professor H. A. A. Kennedy, one of the most accurate, balanced and discerning Pauline scholars of this century. It is much to be desired that all Kennedy's work should be reprinted: his books are still, after more than a generation, as important as ever.

Occasionally in these pages one encounters judgments that are open to question. 'The spirit of faith is thus explained as the disposition of the human spirit towards faith under the influence of the divine Spirit. The various spirits which dwell in man are effects of the Spirit of God' (p. 132). Is this truly biblical? Is πνεῦμα here not being reduced from its true Pauline status? The chapter on 'The Inward Man' would have gained something by reference to the interesting discussion of ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος in Ernst Percy's *Die Probleme der Kolosser- und Epheserbriefe*. In commenting on passages in the epistles, particularly Romans, where Paul strings together quotations from Old Testament books, the writer does not raise the question of 'Testimonia', nor does he make any reference to the fascinating treatment of the subject in C. H. Dodd's *According to the Scriptures*. In a future edition Mr Stacey would add considerably to the value of his chapter 'Points of View' if he included some account of a work with whose massive scholarship all Pauline studies must now reckon, Johannes Munck's *Paulus und die Heilsgeschichte*. The name of Sir William Ramsay is misspelt twice on p. 30.

But Mr Stacey is warmly to be thanked for such a discerning and

really serviceable piece of work. Here is a book in which sound scholarship and spiritual insight are notably blended.

JAMES S. STEWART

England und die Geschichte der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte. By JOSEF BOHATEC. Edited by OTTO WEBER. Verlag Hermann Böhlaus. DM. 12.

THE great Calvin-scholar Josef Bohatec died on 4th June 1954 at the age of seventy-eight. For over forty years he had taught in the Reformed theological faculty in Vienna. But his writings on Calvin date from as early as the first decade of the century, and he was one of what must indeed now be the diminishing company of those who celebrated the fourth centenary of the Reformer's birth with published writings. His major works, however, appeared very much later. *Calvin und das Recht* came out in 1934, *Calvins Lehre von Staat und Kirche* in 1937 and *Budé und Calvin* in 1950. All these belong, in fact if not in date, to the Hitler period, and, as Otto Weber says in his Foreword: 'they meant that he was taking up a position. . . . Josef Bohatec was well aware of what he was doing. He was a quiet man; but there was something he prized far above quietness.'

The present small—but excellently produced—book contains the only three unpublished writings he left, and they all deal with the English struggle to work out the political implications of law and freedom in the seventeenth century. The first treats of *The Petition of Right* and the *Agreement of the People*, taking into special account Sir Edward Coke and Ireton. The second is a long essay on Milton's concept of freedom. And the third, considerably shorter, discusses James Hamington and the influence of Aristotle. Not the least interesting thing about the book is to see what a man with such a different national background, profoundly influenced by Calvin's political outlook and who has himself had to reckon with the problems of freedom and rights in practice, makes of that violent crisis in the development of the English constitution.

T. H. L. PARKER

The Servant of the Lord and Other Essays on the Old Testament. By H. H. ROWLEY. Lutterworth Press. 25s.

Die Erwählung Israels nach dem Alten Testament. By T. C. VRIEZEN. Zwingli Verlag, Zürich.

Die Weissagungen über Israel im Neuen Testament. By GOTTLOB SCHRENK. Gotthelf Verlag, Zürich.

Gottesdienst in Israel. By H. J. KRAUS. Kaiser Verlag, München.

L'Homme dans l'Ancien Testament. By GEORGES PIDOUX. Delachaux et Niestlé, Neuchâtel et Paris. 4 fr.

The Thought of the Prophets. By Israel Mattuck. Allen and Unwin. 9s. 6d.

Ezekiel and Alexander. By L. E. Browne. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

Jonah and Daniel. By Anthony Hanson. The Christian Literature Society.

The Bible in its Ancient and English Versions. Ed. H. Wheeler Robinson. Clarendon Press, Oxford, and Geoffrey Cumberlege. 21s.

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Amos. By R. S. Cripps and D. M. G. Stalker. S.P.C.K. 25s.

Archaeology and the Religion of Israel. By W. F. Albright. Johns Hopkins Press and Geoffrey Cumberlege. 28s.

This review article takes account of a number of books on important aspects of Old Testament study which are engaging the attention of scholars today.

The first is the volume of collected essays by H. H. Rowley in which the writer handles with his accustomed mastery a variety of highly controversial subjects. The problem of the Servant of the Lord is treated in the two opening essays and will be found of the utmost value by anyone who wishes to be up-to-date on a debate which shows no sign of drawing to a conclusion. Dr Rowley attempts to combine the Messianic theory (championed by C. R. North) with the collective theory. He argues further that there is no serious evidence of the bringing together of the concepts of the Suffering Servant and the Davidic Messiah before the Christian era, that they were distinct concepts which both had their roots in the royal cultic rites and that they became integrated in the thought and teaching of our Lord Himself. Other essays deal with recent discussions on the nature of Old Testament prophecy (in particular the questions of prophetic ecstasy and the cultic prophet), with the chronological order of Ezra and Nehemiah and with the light thrown by archaeology on the Patriarchal Age. In the field of Old Testament Introduction there are well documented surveys of the interpretation of the Song of Songs and of discussions on the unity of the Book of Daniel.

Coming now to single monographs, the reviewer would draw attention in the first place to the book by T. C. Vriezen of Leiden, which shows how relevant to current world problems Old Testament theology can be. Vriezen handles with unusual penetration the problem of the Election of Israel. He maintains that Election is not something on which the Christian Church may presume, any more than Israel was entitled to do. Moreover the question of Israel's Election is a matter for God and not for us. The book

includes a very thorough study of the word בָּחַר (*baḥar*). The author rightly insists on the importance of isolating, in the first instance at least, the concept of Election from the other related concepts which define Israel's relation to God. 'Election' is essentially a Deuteronomic concept. Moreover Israel's Election implies not a status but the call to a task. Deuteronomy, however, conceived it as the call to obey God's law in isolation from the world. It was the Second Isaiah who went further and saw it as the call to be a light to the nations and to make God's law universally recognised.

A closely related topic is discussed by Gottlob Schrenk. He comes to the conclusion that in the consummation Israel is to have its share, yet only its share, and that there is no question at all of a national future for Israel being promised by the prophets. That this is a vital religious issue today is clear. Schrenk has done a service by collecting the New Testament evidence in such a convenient form.

A very different type of problem is the subject of H. J. Kraus's book, which may be regarded as a sequel to his *Die Königsherrschaft Gottes im Alten Testament* (Mohr, Tübingen). The new volume, which, like its predecessor, represents a considerable contribution to the understanding of the ancient Hebrew cult, gives the reader an impression of the change which has come over the study of Hebrew religion. The old Hebrew cult is being brought to life in a new way. Kraus is at pains to show that in Israel the Feast of Tabernacles was 'denaturised' through being associated with a feast of covenant renewal, pointing back to actual historical facts which, difficult as it is to ascertain them, cannot be explained away by any hypothesis of myth. Particular emphasis is laid on the special celebration in the autumn every seven years at which the Code of Deuteronomy was read (*v.* Deut. 31.9-13). In his treatment of the covenant with David and the covenant at Sinai-Horeb, which a scholar like Rost sets in a certain opposition to each other, Kraus insists that the Davidic king only stood in the covenant with David, if he also stood in the Sinai-Horeb covenant. There is a welcome coincidence of view here with that taken by A. R. Johnson in his *The Sacred Kingship in Ancient Israel.* Two points of special interest in Kraus's book are, first, his suggestion that the account of the ordering of the Israelite camp around the Tabernacle in Numbers reflects the cultic practice of an early recurrent pilgrimage festival (a *hajj*) in pre-monarchic Israel, and, secondly, that the canonical prophets were consciously fulfilling the function of the mediator of the divine law in succession to Moses, as defined in Deut. 18, a function which was, in North's view (see Bertholet *Festschrift*),

also fulfilled by the so-called minor judges (Judges 10. 1-5 and 12.8ff) and which, in the first of the Servant Songs (Isa. 42) is assigned to the eschatological Servant of the Lord.

Georges Pidoux offers a treatment of Hebrew psychology which is in line with much important work done in recent years by men like Pedersen in Denmark and H. Wheeler Robinson and A. R. Johnson in this country (see especially the latter's *The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel*).

Several smallish but useful books may be mentioned. Israel Mattuck's book will be found of real value as an exposition of its subject, though the discriminating reader will detect the line of division between the Jewish and Christian faiths making itself visible. The Jewish thinker fails to take account of what a Christian recognises as man's radical inability to obey God. L. E. Browne's *Ezekiel and Alexander* presents a most ingenious argument in favour of regarding the Book of Ezekiel as a prophecy in code from the peroid of the campaigns of Alexander the Great. There are certain serious objections to the theory, but what is especially significant in this monograph is that its author is in line with the new tendency once again to regard the Book of Ezekiel as substantially a unity. The special interest of the well-written little text-book by Anthony Hanson is that it is written primarily for Indian students at Serampore College, and that it illustrates the Old Testament most effectively from Indian religion and makes it clear that much is to be gained from contrasting Hebrew religion and the ethnic religions as they can be studied today.

Notes may be added on three important books which have reappeared, one as a reprint with an additional essay, the other two as new editions.

The attractive and useful symposium of essays on the Hebrew Bible and the Greek, Syriac, Latin and English versions, edited by the late H. Wheeler Robinson, has been reprinted with the addition of a short appendix on the Dead Sea Scrolls from the pen of W. D. McHardy. Some indication is given of the value of the new discoveries for the textual criticism of the Old Testament, in particular of the Book of Isaiah. It will be a long time before the complete harvest is gathered in and it was rightly felt that a volume which was intended as a students' text-book should so far as possible be brought up-to-date.

One must be grateful that time was granted to the veteran scholar R. S. Cripps to prepare, with the competent assistance of D. M. G. Stalker, a new edition of his commentary on Amos. The commentary itself is substantially as it was before, but in a sizable preface to the second edition, in the composition of which D. M. G.

Stalker had a large share, account is taken of much of the work done on Amos during the years since the original publication of Cripps's book. It would obviously have been better if the whole book could have been rewritten, but that was out of the question. What we are given in the new preface is (1) notes on recent archaeological discoveries which are felt to be relevant; (2) a section on the date of Amos in which the author reasserts and argues for his previous view; (3) a discussion of matters of introduction with special reference to the oral theory of the Uppsala school; (4) a section on the attitude of the prophets to sacrifice in which the author continues to favour the view that they were not radically opposed to the sacrificial cult as such; (5) some additional notes on difficult passages and on the new light shed on Hebrew poetic form by the Ras Shamra and Mari texts; and (6) a brief reference to the modern tendency for exegesis to become more theological and practical in character.

Finally a second revised edition of W. F. Albright's work has been made available. One of the most important changes is the revision of the chronology necessitated by the archaeological discoveries made just before the War, especially at Mari and Tell el Atchana. This book is an indispensable sequel to Albright's earlier volume *From the Stone Age to Christianity*. They should both be read for their own sake and for the better understanding of the work of the brilliant group of Albright's followers who now form something very like a school.

NORMAN W. PORTEOUS

God in the Psalms. By GEORGE S. GUNN. The Saint Andrew Press. 21s. net.

IT is now many years since Dr Gunn gave his course of Cunningham Lectures. It is readily intelligible that a lecturer, having chosen such a subject as 'God in the Psalms' and having had, perforce, to deliver his lectures by a certain date, should desire time to revise them before sending them forth in printed form and should then find the years lengthening out as he works upon a seemingly inexhaustible theme; but the result now is a volume of mature thought and of deep insight.

It is concerned with the operation of God's will in the pageant of history, in conflict with every evil will and in the claims made on the individual soul, and with His self-revelation in nature, in the midst of man's conflicts for faith and in the act of worship. When in his initial chapter entitled 'Approaches and Assumptions' the author speaks of the predominant association of the psalms with Israel's organised worship, of the prophetic foundation of the thought of the psalmists and of the originality of the psalmists in

spite of any borrowings they may have made, consciously or unconsciously, from Egyptian psalms or Babylonian penitential hymns, he will not encounter serious opposition. He believes that the psalms of the Old Testament may range in date from the early monarchy to the end of the Persian Empire, but contends that considerations of date and authorship are not of primary importance for his immediate purpose, because 'the real values of the psalms are independent of fixed conclusions about these matters. They belong to the region of universal applicability.' Of the greatest of the psalms that is undoubtedly true; no worshipper is concerned when the twenty-third psalm was written. But is it true of all? Is it true of the imprecatory psalms, for instance? After quoting in this connexion the late J. E. McFadyen to the effect that 'these psalms express a passionate belief in the moral order which is for a moment thwarted and contradicted by the triumph of wrong', he goes on to say: 'However wild and cruel their spirit may appear or be, it has to be considered that they arose in minds which held firmly to the conviction that God would give victory to the better cause.' But if their spirit is thus wild and cruel, are they in the full sense universally applicable? And is not that question raised again when the author, although he does defend them as greater than hymns of hate and as written by men sorely tried by misfortune, has to say that we should not ask God to let our eyes feast upon the suffering of our foes. It is notable that he has to refer ever and anon to the greatest of the psalms, by which it must be implied that there are others which fall below the highest spiritual level.

That leads to another interesting point. Dr Gunn is concerned with the theological approach to the psalms. Against the objection that 'to search for theological conceptions in a most varied book of poetry is to resort in an unseemly way to an inevitably fruitless source, inasmuch as the writers of these religious lyrics are not directed consciously by theological conceptions or presuppositions', he can affirm that the Israelite prophets were not often systematic theologians, and that their insights arose, under the guiding of the Holy Spirit, among the perplexities and tensions of the human situation as they confronted it, and he can speak, less convincingly it is true, of the 'beautifully inexact and splendidly unsystematised expression of a poet's thoughts'. But the psalms do not offer a problem so simple as that; they are not the expression of the thoughts of one psalmist so that we may hope to arrive at his dominant conceptions, or of one epoch so that we may expect to learn where it found the burden of the Lord lying heavily upon it and where it found its consolations. They contain the praise and the plaint of many and in time may span ten centuries. In such a situation can

a theological approach mean anything other than a study of its highest theological thought, together with continual reference to utterances, cries and fears which came indeed from sincere followers of the Lord and contenders for the faith but from men of dimmer sight and in a lower class in the school of divine knowledge?

The book is probably at its best in the chapters dealing with the essentials and the stresses of personal religion. Here Dr Gunn with the key of a fine understanding does unlock the treasures of the psalms and show the heart of man in its deepest needs and in its true satisfactions. In his final chapter on 'Fulfilment in Worship', drawing from, among others, his own old teacher, Adam C. Welch, he deals very thoughtfully with the triumph of the priest in the post-exilic era of the restored Judaean community and with the continuing and saving influence of the cult-prophets in that era (even if a more explicit reference might have been expected to the influence of Ezekiel).

This is a book which will repay study and, if what it has to say will not always meet with general acceptance, it will set going many trains of thought.

JOHN MAUCHLINE

Het Woord Gods bij Augustinus. By DR A. D. R. POLMAN. J. H. Kok, N. V. Kampen, 1955. Pp. 256. f. 8.90.

DR POLMAN, who has already written on certain portions of the teaching of Augustine, has now undertaken to set out the theology of this Church father in four volumes. That is a large task, but for it he possesses most of the essential qualifications, as is clear from the first of the projected volumes, which has now appeared. The fact that its theme is 'The Word of God in Augustine' may be a mark of the author's spiritual affiliation, as indeed he himself pleasantly observes. But the remaining volumes may show that this is the right starting point.

Throughout this volume Augustine is given ample room to speak for himself. Quotations in the author's own translation and summaries, as far as possible in Augustine's own words, of paragraphs in his writings, make up a large part of each chapter. This may seem to be a somewhat scissors-and-paste method of writing a book. It is also, as Dr Polman is aware, a method that has its dangers. But his acquaintance with Augustine's many writings, the readiness with which he adduces everything that bears upon his subject and the respect he pays to context and dates, assure the reader that he has done his utmost to avoid them.

He begins with an exposition of Augustine's doctrine of the Word of God—Christ. Augustine's conception of this Word, he finds, underwent a considerable development. At first he thought of

Christ as the eternal Word interpreted in a strictly neo-Platonic sense. But this thought of Christ, although never wholly abandoned, gradually gave place to the biblical thought of him as the Saviour of the world. The effect of this development was far-reaching, and Dr Polman repeatedly returns to it. In it he distinguishes two stages. But he recognises that no firm line of separation can be drawn, that Augustine never wholly escaped from the influence of neo-Platonism and that ideas borrowed from it, in part christianised but still operative, are found in his latest writings.

Ch. 2 is devoted to Augustine's doctrine of the Word of God as Holy Scripture. His references to inspiration indicate that he believed in what has been called 'organic inspiration'. He maintained that Scripture is true and trustworthy in all its parts. His doing so was rooted, however, not in a dead formalism but in religious and pastoral considerations. According to Augustine the clear portions of Scripture contain all that is necessary to salvation. It is true that he recognised unwritten apostolic traditions, but Dr Polman finds that those which he actually accepted refer not to anything pertaining to the field of dogmatics and ethics but only to certain customs and usages.

The theme of ch. 3 is Augustine's doctrine of the Christocentric character of Holy Scripture. This doctrine lay near to his heart, and it is shown with what interest and vigour he maintained it against the denials of Jews, of Pelagians and especially of Faustus the Manichaean.

The place which Augustine assigned to the preaching of the Word of God in the conduct of public worship is a matter, Dr Polman observes, which merits far more attention than has yet been paid to it. In his own discussion of it in ch. 4 he dwells on Augustine's conviction that God himself works through and with the preached Word. To this he adds an exposition of Augustine's view of the relation to this work of the work of the preacher. Dr Polman refers to the bewildering variety of the subjects which Augustine handled in his sermons, but asserts nevertheless that increasingly Christ and the grace of Christ became the central message of his preaching.

A large part of ch. 5 is devoted to the question, What constituted for Augustine the criterion of canonicity? Of special interest is Dr Polman's approach to Augustine's statement, *Ego vero Evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae Ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas*, and his conclusion that it provides no ground for the assertion that he set the authority of the Church above Scripture. Dr Polman allows that by the *regula fidei* Augustine meant the Apostles' Creed and not Holy Scripture. But for him this Creed was simply a précis of what Scripture clearly contains. Consequently in requiring that the inter-

pretation of obscure passages in Scripture should consist with the *regula fidei*, he was but extending his own rule: Explain the obscure passages by those that are plain.

The subject of ch. 6 is the place of Holy Scripture in personal spiritual life. In expounding this Augustine often referred to Scripture as the Handwriting of the promises of God. These promises being sure, they ought, he maintained, to be preached with strong certainty, and Christians ought to keep reading the Book in which they are recorded that with wonder and gratitude they may trace what God has fulfilled and still will fulfil and be themselves moved by these rich promises to holy obedience.

Finally in ch. 7 Dr Polman recalls Augustine's teaching that when the believer comes to the Fatherland, he there sees 'face to face' and this is where Scripture is fulfilled.

This outline of the contents of the book may serve to indicate with what thoroughness practically all aspects of its subject have been explored. An index of quotations would be helpful, but this may be reserved for the concluding volume.

George Ogg

An Approach to the Theology of the Sacraments (Studies in Biblical Theology No. 17). By Neville Clark. S.C.M. Press, 1956. Pp. 96. 8s.

As the title of the series suggests, this study is confined to the two 'sacraments of the gospel'. The origin and significance of each sacrament is discussed separately, and the final chapter attempts a synthesis of the two 'within the wholeness of Christian faith' (p. 73). This last chapter of fifteen pages, while on a higher level than much of what precedes, gives the impression, as does the book as a whole, of attempting too much.

Mr Clark, with Cullmann, assumes too readily that Jesus foresaw His death as early as the time of His baptism. 'At Jordan Jesus received his calling as the Servant of the Lord, accepted his vocation of redemption through suffering, acknowledged his baptism in terms of the cross' (p. 18). The first of these statements alone can be accepted without reservation, but the others must depend on a view never, however, stated, much less discussed, which puts the first Servant Song in Deutero-Isaiah, echoed in the voice at the baptism of Jesus, on the same level as the last two, which alone foretell the sufferings of the Servant. The most we can say with any confidence is that Jesus later spoke of His death as a baptism (Mark 10.38; Luke 12.50). The connexion between this and Pauline baptismal doctrine is obvious, but Mr Clark makes no mention of Eph. 5.14 which, if it is, as is widely held, an excerpt from an early

Christian hymn, testifies to a pre-Pauline origin for this kind of thought.

In his discussion of the Last Supper Mr Clark is very critical of recent exponents of the paschal theory, and shows scant appreciation of the monumental work of Jeremias which is acknowledged even by those who disagree with him. He writes rather naïvely that 'scholars such as Dalman and Levertoff were aware of most of this a quarter of a century ago' (p. 42). What possible relevance has this sort of remark to the validity or otherwise of the theory in question? He rejects both the passover and the *haburah* theories of the Last Supper, which he concludes was an ordinary meal. Yet the passover ghost cannot be completely laid even by Mr Clark! 'As the Jewish passover stood between the Exodus-Sinai deliverance and the messianic age, so the eucharist stands between the passion-resurrection and the parousia' (p. 70), and he adds in a footnote that 'this is the point at which the passover background becomes relevant for the understanding of the last supper'. But what does Mr Clark make of this background? Precisely nothing. It must further be said that he underestimates the complexity of the problem of the original form of the words of institution and takes only four pages to arrive at a result which is little else than arbitrarily eclectic. The amount of space devoted to the Lukan account is strangely disproportionate to its alleged importance (following Goguel), which again it is hard to reconcile with the decision to 'side with the general consensus of opinion that the Markan Gospel is St. Luke's primary source' (p. 39). The authorities given for this view are J. M. Creed and an unnamed writer (actually S. M. Gilmour) in *The Interpreter's Bible*, vol. viii. The reviewer is well aware of defections from the Proto-Luke camp, but not of any 'general consensus of opinion' with regard to the primary source of St. Luke in the passion narrative or in his Gospel as a whole.

Mr Clark seems much happier in attempting a synthesis of sacramental theology than in preparing the way for it by examination of the biblical data. He refers to the danger of considering baptism and the eucharist in isolation, and believes this is largely due to appropriating the Spirit to baptism and Christ to the eucharist, and to overlooking the necessity of a Christological interpretation of the one and a pneumatological interpretation of the other. The conviction that 'the last supper and thus the eucharist is through and through sacrificial in implication and significance' (p. 63) is an interesting approach to the catholic standpoint. But discussion of what is usually understood by the 'eucharistic presence' is deprecated as 'misleading' and 'perhaps more characteristic of an earlier age' (p. 72). But surely this remains one of the liveliest of issues?

On p. 47 1 Cor. 10.16 is misquoted, and the next verse is translated differently on pp. 51 and 67; at p. 55, footnote 18, the page reference is missing; there is a misprint in the quotation from Tertullian at p. 57, footnote 4; and *nulla Spiritus* occurs on p. 77.

A. J. B. Higgins

Are We Blind Also? By B. C. Plowright. James Nisbet and Co. Ltd. 12s. 6d.

Here is still another book about revival and evangelism, but it reaches to universal depths of earnestness and insight. Mr Plowright describes himself as an ordinary working minister and his book as temerarious. He further explains that it is the product of two streams of thought, 'crystallised out in the handling of small groups of non-Christian inquirers outside the Churches and as well of groups inside the Churches, and it is the result of close study of the forms which revivals have actually taken in the history of the Church'. The main conclusion of the book, supported by penetrating analysis of decisive periods in Church history and of the inward character of our own time is that 'the Protestant Churches are trying to heal the wounds of the world too slightly'. Manifestly all this is of crucial importance.

The opening chapter with its heading 'The new confidence of the Church' hardly prepares us for the course of argument which is to be followed. There is, he maintains, a new assurance in the Church —'it has got its tail up'. The various Churches have 'found each other' from 1910 onwards, grown more conscious of their underlying unity, with a new sense of the changeless worth of the Bible—in a world where 'we are as helpless as the rabbit under the wheels of a lorry', where it is now certain that the rivals to Christian faith are built on shifting sand.

Having started with this buoyant analysis, he finds it necessary to proceed to a vast 'And yet. . . . Are the affirmations behind the Church's new confidence true?' The question asked by the Pharisees in John 9.40, gives its title to the book. Is all our assurance 'sightlessness, spiritual glaucoma'? A careful examination is made of how the Jewish religion turned to blindness in inevitable conflict with Jesus. Is the Church in the same peril, the new Israel repeating the blunders of the old Israel, and unable to discern the signs of the times? There are some good pages on what Jesus meant by 'the signs of the times'; and 'ye must be born again' is addressed not only to the individual, but to the Church.

Mr Plowright is in agreement with all who see a fundamental unity between the old and the new Israel, with a decisive discontinuity because of the reality of the Incarnation and all its implica-

tions. The Church has to be marked by concern for every phase of life, and the real fellowship of the Church must be in body as well as soul; only so can the full Gospel of love and forgiveness validate itself. These are the qualities which make the Church indestructible, and the book traces with genuine ability three main phases of Church history in which the real character of the Church suffered decline.

Now the new time is upon us, and the world has doomed itself to live on the edge of disaster. The Roman Catholic Church has lost prestige, and contemporary Protestantism, though basically stronger, is in a similar position. There is 'a blight of frustration everywhere', and there is a recapitulation in our time of the three main epochs of the past. There is a widespread tendency to sacrifice every other freedom for economic security, and a swing everywhere to authoritarian government in one form or other.

By far the most important chapter of this book is the last, 'A Church Reborn', raising even the possibility that Christ may have to go outside the Church for the fulfilment of His purposes for our time; and that in turn raising the urgent, practical issue 'Is our evangelism right?' It is almost certain that the central dilemma of all evangelism today lies in the doctrine of the Kingdom of God, in what the Church has to offer men in Christ's name by way of hope, not just after death nor at the end of history, but within history. All other tensions in evangelism are marginal compared with this. It is much to be desired that Mr Plowright will soon develop the argument of his last chapter in another book, for the issue cannot be left just as he leaves it. The actual implications of the rebirth of the Church have to be stated more definitely and fearlessly, for agonising changes in structure and method will be necessary.

Like many other writers, Mr Plowright uses the terms 'redeem' and 'redemptive' in a loose way, sometimes in relation to the action of God, but more often in relation to the efforts of the Church. There is a vast difference. 'Redeeming' is the work of God alone. The Church is a redeemed, but not a redeeming community. The redemption is absolutely complete in what God has done in Christ; but the world is not yet *saved*, until it makes the response of faith and obedience to the finished work of the Redeemer.

This book carries the reader onwards with a great sweep of argument. It is written with intensity of feeling and warmth of expression, and its perceiving of man's plight is prolonged, searching, reverent, and charged with flaming love. Great strains are being put on character today by the new patterns of modern life, and it may well be felt that there are few in the Church or outside who are able to discern or even desire to discern the things of which

this book is so full. There is hardly a quotation in it; and all its substance, built up from many sources, has passed through the alembic of a powerful mind. Its value for preaching is immense, and its chief declarations deserve to be proclaimed. Moreover, it is always very close to actual life—did not Mr Plowright recently write an article on 'Dishwashing Divinity'? GEORGE S. GUNN

Prayer. Asking and Receiving. By JOHN R. RICE. Sword of the Lord Publishers, Illinois. $2.50.

Rediscovering Prayer. By JOHN L. CASTEEL. Hodder and Stoughton. 12s. 6d.

The Spiritual Life. By EVELYN UNDERHILL. Hodder and Stoughton. 6s.

Method in Prayer. By W. GRAHAM SCROGGIE. Pickering and Inglis. 6s.

Prayers and Praises. By NATHANIEL MICKLEM. Independent Press. 6s.

IT is highly probable that more people say their prayers than read their Bible; and so books on prayer are likely to be more welcome than on any other great Christian theme, save perhaps temptation and the future life.

Dr John R. Rice is a well-known evangelist in America. He is editor of a weekly magazine, *The Sword of the Lord*, which stands for 'the verbal inspiration of the Bible, the Deity of Christ, His Blood Atonement, Salvation by Faith, New Testament Soul Winning and the Premillenial Return of Christ. It opposes modernism, worldliness and formalism.' A very great deal depends on the sense in which these terms are understood; and it is certain that many devoted and consecrated people in the Church would not be in agreement with Dr Rice in his interpretation of them. Apart from such disagreement on approach and background, the substance of this large book is good. There is no important aspect of prayer which is omitted; a searching use is made of the Scriptures, and there is impressive evidence of how prayer works.

The second book is deeper and more satisfying. The author is a Congregational minister who is Professor of Homiletics at Colgate-Rochester Divinity School. Behind the title lies the conviction that more people in their hunger for God are turning to prayer. Prayer begins in our meeting with God, in our response to His initiative; its fulness is rediscovered only by the practice of praying; and it is the sure means of triumph over materialism. As such, it is not for the specially devout or the spiritually endowed alone, but for all human beings. The most impressive chapters of an excellent book are those dealing with the Human Conditions of Prayer, Prayer and

Forgiveness, the Patterns of Prayer and Devotional Reading. It has the great merit of nourishing the experienced and encouraging the searcher, at one and the same time; and it is worthy to stand beside A. J. Gossip's *In the Secret Place of the Most High.*

There are notable affinities between the second and third books on our list. A new edition of Evelyn Underhill's book, first published in 1937, is to be welcomed. Based on four broadcast talks, and dealing with the nature of the spiritual life as communion with God and co-operation with God, it is in every sense a beautiful book—in thought, expression, spirit—and in production too. Even those who find the flights of mysticism difficult will be grateful to be helped by such a book into that full life for which we are made.

Readers of Dr Graham Scroggie, veteran Bible expositor, will recognise in this small book his chaste language and finely-chiselled phrases. The division of the subject is conventional—adoration, confession, petition, intercession, thanksgiving; but what other division is really possible? To open on the note of adoration and to end on the note of thanksgiving which includes all that goes before is absolutely right. The last chapter contains a brief, fascinating summary, in Dr Scroggie's characteristic method, of Prayer in the Bible, its Life, its Laws, its Legacy. Five great prayers of Lancelot Andrewes are quoted at the end of the appropriate chapters.

The last book will indeed fulfil its intuition, to assist ministers and others in dry seasons. It is also a reissue of a book which was first published in 1941. There is much insight in the introductory essay into the difficulties which ministers have in maintaining devotional habits. Dr Micklem has also included his Murtle Lecture in the University of Aberdeen in which he expounds the inner life of religion by following the thirteen clauses of an ancient Latin prayer. The bulk of the book consists of prayers and praises for morning and evening of each day of the week and for Holy Communion. In another book, *A Book of Personal Religion*, Dr Micklem had told us what to do in this field, and the book now reviewed is meant to tell us how to do it.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Jesus Shall Reign. By WILLIAM LILLIE. The Church of Scotland Youth Committee. 6s.

The Church under the Cross. By J. B. PHILIPPS. The Highway Press. 8s. 6d.

DR LILLIE who has given the greater part of his life as a minister to teaching in a missionary college in the Punjab and is now a lecturer in Biblical Study in the University of Aberdeen is uniquely equipped to give to ministers and youth leaders a reliable and inspiring

'presentation of the World Church', and he has done so. The selection of the material in so vast a field is admirably done, and the whole build-up of the book is excellent.

The first section opens with a study of how the Church had to be a World Church, and then the stages of its development are outlined. The second and largest of the three sections describes the part which the Church of Scotland has played, and information from all the fields is up-to-date. A final section deals with the changing environment of the missionary movement and the new problems and tasks; and the concluding chapter makes the whole issue cluster around the local parish church. Several charts, graphs and maps assist the reader.

Mr J. B. Philipps has written his book for the Church Missionary Society, and it is based on reports and letters from far-separated areas of the world. Some of these make sad reading, some exhilarating. The scope of this book is much more restricted than Dr Lillie's. It is meant to scatter ignorance in the home Church, and it is full of admiration for missionaries, 'these outriders of the King, these pioneers of the new humanity'; and it should help in producing new missionaries.

As the recent translator of Acts, Mr Philipps sees 'a strong similarity in feel and atmosphere' between Acts and the Church in the modern world—and especially in the sure sense that God is at work. The title of the book might indicate that its main theme is the persecution of the Church in many areas today. But it is more than an account of sufferings imposed from without. Its greater concern is with actual problems and tensions caused by factors within the missionary situation itself—the rise of new leadership, the change over to indigenous control, temptations to take the easy way and avoid the unpleasant and costly, the increase of nominal Christians as the generations pass, petty frustrations, the throwing off of Christian loyalties, the resurgence of superstition and paganism. All these are features of life under the Cross. For many a missionary and native worker—as indeed for many a minister at home—there is the Cross of spiritual loneliness. And some seek to substitute for the real Cross 'a plastic Cross'. It is an inescapable essential of Christian witness to be 'under the Cross'. This documentary account of work in every continent calls for hard thinking on all the complex questions of policy and strategy, and bids us beware of all easy solutions; the Cross in that sense has to be in the head as well as the heart. Evidence is not wanting also of the power of the Cross to transform the most evil of people and to straighten out the most difficult personal relationships.

George S. Gunn

The Reformed Pastor (A Treasury of Christian Books). By Richard Baxter, edited by Hugh Martin. S.C.M. Press. 8s. 6d.

Here is a little book which should be read by everyone who holds a pastoral charge. Dr Martin has done a great service to pastors and preachers in making available Baxter's famous book in this handy form. He has wisely refrained from adding copious notes, and has been content to let Baxter speak for himself. A good deal of what Baxter wrote just over 300 years ago is applicable today. One cannot read it without being driven to reconsider one's own way of life, without being conscience-stricken about the inadequacy of one's own preaching and ministry, and without being drawn to repentance and new resolution. It was originally written as an address to a gathering of clergy and ministers, and in this edition it would form an excellent 'set book' for a clerical study group. Whether he studies it alone or in the company of others, the thoughtful reader is bound to be 'recalled to faithful service'—and that is the sense in which the word 'Reformed' is used in the title. Baxter's address is based on Acts 20.28, part of St. Paul's Charge to the Ephesian Elders. The matter is subdivided under the headings 'The Oversight of Ourselves', 'The Oversight of the Flock' and 'Application'. Although in places Baxter seems to have been carried away by his own eloquence into verbosity, on the whole his exposition is clear, incisive and compelling.

This edition of the book is well produced, and Dr Martin's 'Foreword' is brief, but adequate. There is one misprint on page 95, where 'regard' should be corrected in any future reprint to 'reward'.

T. A. Littleton

Recovery of Faith. By Radhakrishnan. Geo. Allen and Unwin, 1955.

Radhakrishnan, in spite of his many political activities, has found time to write yet another book. *Recovery of Faith* is published in the *World Perspective Series* which already contain contributions by Dr Konrad Adenauer and Jacques Maritain.

In *Recovery of Faith* Radhakrishnan continues the apologetic work which has been his main intention in most of his writings. He writes, as a Hindu, and commends the Hindu way of life to Modern man. It is true that the avowed purpose of the book is to show the underlying unity behind all Religions, but the basic categories of thought by which this is done remain essentially Hindu. Samsara —the endless running on in birth and death–karma—the inescapable nexus of deed and consequence—the essential identity of the inner soul (Atman) with the Supreme Spirit (Brahman), these are the household ideas of Hinduism and Radhakrishnan continues to defend and commend them in *Recovery of Faith.*

There is an excellent chapter in which he deals with the challenge of Communism. Radhakrishnan shows here that he is at home with the thought of the Marxists. He is sympathetic to their ideals of equality and social justice. At the same time, he is very critical of the failure of Marxism to appreciate the realm of the spirit, and consequently, its inability to deal with life in its fulness. He is aware of the fatal bureaucratic tendencies which lead to the abuse of power where executive action is made an exclusive instrument in the hands of a single party. He pleads with the Marxists to shed their bondage to Marx, Engels, and Lenin. He asks that they realise that today we live in a different world, where the old categories of thought, even of Marxism, are inadequate. We must, he urges, have an open mind and constantly re-interpret and readjust our thinking.

Radhakrishnan is aware of the duality of human life and of evil as being endemic to history, but he does not see that this sin has affected the whole of man in such a way that the world of the spirit is also involved. There is no inner spirit world, in the depths of the human consciousness, where a man can take refuge. This dimension too is pervaded by human sin. That is why he fails to understand the significance of the Cross, as the means whereby God deals with human sin in a radical way and makes forgiveness and reconciliation possible.

BRYAN DE KRETSER

The Fasti of the United Free Church of Scotland, 1900-1929. Edited by JOHN A. LAMB. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh. £4 4s.

THANKS to the labour of Hew Scot and his successors the Church of Scotland has been provided with a more or less authoritative account of the succession of her clergy from the Reformation until the union of 1929, while the United Presbyterian and Free Churches have similarly been served by Small and Ewing until the union of 1900. Their work has now been continued to provide a continuous record of the ministry of the United Free Church until the union of 1929. In scope it thus covers a period from William Blair, born in 1830 and inducted to the Leighton Church at Dunblane in 1856, to men born in this century and ordained in 1929. Such a book has a restricted appeal, especially when its candour has been limited by the fact that many of those recorded, and still more of their close relations, are alive today. The piquancy of Hew Scot's first edition is lacking, but within the terms of his remit the editor, Dr Lamb, has shewn a meticulous accuracy far transcending that of his predecessors. Errors are almost untraceable, but, inevitably, there are some omissions. Thus the parentage of Isaac Henry Clyde is not given, though it may be found in the entry for his brother

James Montgomerie Clyde. The parentage of David McQueen is lacking, though his father has a separate entry. These are small things, but the Fasti exists to supply them. However, to have asked for more would have been asking too much of human nature. One can only marvel at the patience which has reduced to order such a mass of facts. In particular the index, so important in a work of this nature, is a model of its kind.

Much material for the religious history of Scotland is here. The religious revivals and Church disputes of the eighteenth century, which gave birth to Lowland congregations of the Secession and Relief Churches, had negligible results in the Highlands, at least so far as the rise of dissenting congregations was concerned. United Presbyterian congregations were to be found along the shores of the Firth of Clyde where Glasgow merchants made their influence felt. The congregations at Campbeltown and Southend 'were composed almost entirely of families which came over from what they called the Low Country to Kintyre in Covenanting times'. Apart from a non-Gaelic congregation in Oban, the United Presbyterian Church had only three congregations in the West, at Lismore, Portree, and Stornoway; their total membership was ninety. Apart from the towns of the Moray Firth, Inverness, Wick, and Thurso, its strength in the North consisted of five congregations with a total membership of about 350. These small congregations often built churches accommodating several times their membership and left posterity with a false impression of their numbers. Contrasting with this failure in the Gaelic areas is the large number of United Presbyterians in Orkney and Shetland, where one congregation alone, with 950 members, far exceeded the whole Gaelic strength. This was later reflected in the number from Orkney and Shetland who refused to enter the union of 1929. Nor did the United Presbyterian Church make great headway, outside of the towns, in any part of the northern countryside. 'It is hard', said Small, 'for our thinly planted congregations to hold their own in Aberdeenshire.'

On the other hand the Free Kirk had evoked widespread response in the Highland parishes. At the time of the union of 1900, Free Churches were planted in the West Highlands and Islands even more plentifully than parish churches. Their congregations were as large as the population permitted and their evangelical life was intense. But here alone was there a general rejection of the union. Elsewhere stray groups revelled, but in the West the bulk of the membership refused to enter the United Free Church. In the cities and the South, union brought strength, but in the West Highlands it brought disaster which the small surviving congregations never quite overcame. Of nine congregations in Skye, four lost all their

buildings; one congregation was lost completely; the rest were gravely weakened, four so seriously that they were later closed. In the Presbytery of Lewis, every former Free Church congregation lost all its property. Three congregations were lost completely. In many cases the incomplete union of 1900 and the subsequent proceedings leading up to the decision of the House of Lords in 1904 lay like a dark shadow upon Free Church congregations. Much unchristian bitterness and vindictiveness was shown by each party during its temporary ascendancy, and few can look back on the dispute with complete satisfaction. In passing it may be noted that one minister, though critical of the union, remained within it until the House of Lords, decision awarded the property to the minority in 1904; he promptly joined them, only to have his church and manse allocated by the parliamentary commission to his former, but now ejected, congregation which had been forced to worship in a rented hall. Yet the bitterness passed, the union was cordial and effective, and by 1929 it was almost impossible to tell to what party congregations had once belonged.

The Free Church penetrated every section of Scottish life, but the United Presbyterian Church was more limited. Poorly represented in some areas, it was also unsuccessful in striking roots among some classes of the community. Originally strong among weavers and other skilled workmen, it gradually became a strongly middle class body. Its working class members were not typical of their class. Turning over the pages of the Fasti it is hard to avoid observing how its congregations in working class and industrial districts steadily declined in numbers and influence. Its large and flourishing congregations were, almost without exception, in the suburbs. The Free Church was more successful in contacting and retaining the working class, and several of its congregations here recorded have maintained vigorous life in poorer working class districts.

In the Lowland countryside, the work of the Free Church was wider by far than that of the United Presbyterian. Thus in East Lothian outside of the towns the United Presbyterians had two congregations, while the Free Church had eight; in Wigtonshire the United Presbyterians had eight, and the Free Church seventeen. But few of the rural congregations had real strength and their history is generally one of decline. The union of 1900 was frequently followed by local unions between adjoining churches of the two parties, just as the union of 1929 has been followed by the union of many of these with local parish churches. The truth is that the Scottish countryside was unable to support, or to justify the existence of, so many small charges. Not loyalty, but dissension, was the

reason for their number. Arising out of this is the fact that whereas many distinguished men passed their whole ministry in country parish churches, few notable clergy of the United Free Church did so. Men like Dr Adam Philip were notable exceptions. For the most part it seems to have been taken for granted that an able United Free Church minister might spend some part of his youth in a country charge and then remove to his proper sphere in the city. Along with this went an exaltation of the preacher's office at the expense of the pastor's.

It is an astonishing fact that a Church of such real spiritual strength was unable to recruit from its own ranks sufficient men to fill its charges. Never at any time does the United Free Church seem to have produced sufficient divinity students. It continually recruited clergy from English nonconformist denominations and, in particular, from the Presbyterian Church of Ireland. Baptists, Methodists, Congregationalists, all presented themselves as recruits, as did even the Unitarians and Episcopal Methodists. The truth appears to be that the United Free Church, inheriting the national traditions of 1843, was straining its resources beyond its ability. Its strength lay in the towns and cities, particularly in the suburbs; it required a responsible and self-reliant laity, and tended to become a middle class body; but to maintain a nation-wide ministry in every rural parish was beyond its resources both in men and in money.

Despite occasional light relief, as in the case of the minister awarded the gold medal of the Order of the Striped Tiger, circumstances have restricted the entries to little more than bare records of parentage, education, ministerial service, and publications, so that a reader, otherwise uninformed, would learn nothing of the devoted pastoral work of such men as Thomas Notman and John Stewart Lawson, or of a ministry such as that of George Herbert Morrison. One would scarcely guess at the importance of preaching in the United Free Church, so far as formal records go. Those who were brought up within the United Free Church and, after 1929, served in former parish churches will remember, as they read here, how much has been gained by the union of 1929, but something also has been lost. That strong evangelical life which flowed in the United Free Church can best be sensed in the lists where one entry after another tells of scholarship and great ability given to the work of Foreign Missions. The brief account of Fergus Ferguson points to the turmoil of religious thought, and those of such men as A. B. Davidson, James Denney, T. M. Lindsay, H. R. Mackintosh, and Sir George Adam Smith to an abounding scholarship.

Dr Lamb has provided a worthy memorial to the ministers of the United Free Church of Scotland. Accuracy in detail and its correct

marshalling, the first demands made on such a volume, have been abundantly fulfilled.

JAMES BULLOCH

Peregrinatio: Studien zur reformatorischen Theologie und zum Kirchenproblem. By ERNST WOLF. Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1954. Pp. 358.

IT is gratifying to have in one volume the more important essays of this eminent Church historian, now at Göttingen. Ernst Wolf's energy and initiative, coupled with profound theological insight and concern, have been a major factor in preserving and deepening the rich stream of German theology in this strenuous generation. His is one of the great voices through which we are enabled to hear the bearing of Reformation theology, and of Luther in particular, upon the problems of our own day, notably upon the problem of the Church and the churches. All these essays have appeared elsewhere, but it may be useful to indicate what has now been gathered into this more permanent form. The first four essays are of wider scope than the rest. The first, published as No. 6 in *Theologische Existenz Heute* in 1934, is entitled 'Martin Luther: the Gospel and Religion'. The second is the chapter on Luther's preaching of Christ from 'Jesus Christus im Zeugnis der Heiligen Schrift und der Kirche' which belongs to the same critical epoch. There is an essay on Conscience as a theme in Reformation theology, and 'Sola Gratia?' from the Bultmann 'Festschrift'. There are two essays on the problem of the Church in the world, one of them on the question of Natural Law in Aquinas and Luther. The rest are direct discussions from various angles of the doctrine of the Church and its unity. The last essay, on 'Konfessionskunde' as a theological discipline, reveals most clearly the proportions of his mind and motives. This brief notice of a massive contribution to theological scholarship is excusable only on the ground that those who can profit from it most directly will need no further information.

W. A. WHITEHOUSE

Cardinal Robert Pullen. An English Theologian of the Twelfth Century. By F. COURTNEY, S.J. (*Analecta Gregoriana* Vol. LXIV). Romae, Aedes Univ. Gregorianae, 1954. Pp. xxiv + 285.

PULLEN was the first English Cardinal. His ecclesiastical adventures as well as his pioneering work in Scholastic theology afford a pleasing glimpse into twelfth-century Church life. This masterly account of his life and his writings gathers together all that is ever likely to be known about him. After 53 pages of closely documented introduction, the book is devoted to a full account of his theological efforts. No great claims are made for Pullen nor for his twelfth-century contemporaries in general. 'Their originality is seen chiefly

in the ingenuity with which they solved a succession of individual problems which arose in their commentaries on the Bible.' *Sententiarum Libri VIII* is the major work by which we know him. It was designed 'to interpose a course of systematic doctrinal instruction between the literal and allegorical reading of the sacred text'. Pullen 'avoids the tedious habit of making a chain of "authorities"; rather his method is so to absorb the teaching of authority that he can express it again in his own language'. Pullen, like Hugh of St. Victor and Abelard, finds it desirable to engage in preliminary philosophical discussion before writing on the major theological mysteries. Apart from its historical fascination there is much value in a book which enables a modern theologian to work alongside a congenial pioneer in the initial stages of theological wrestling where the issues have not yet been crystallised in the glossy syntheses of thirteenth-century Scholasticism.

W. A. Whitehouse

The Messianic Idea in Israel. By Joseph Klausner. George Allen and Unwin. London, 1956. Pp. 543. 30s.

One wonders what purpose there can be in publishing now a translation of a book so utterly out of date as this. No doubt its importance lies in its completing the trilogy with the books on Jesus and Paul, and in Klausner's own reputation. He is really writing for his own people, to recall them to their messianic heritage and to lift up their eyes to the 'shining future, which our greatest and most venerated dreamers await'.

A number of footnotes making contact with fairly recent work do not conceal the fact that this book is written against the background of a scholarship much of which has now largely sunk below the horizon of importance. One would have no idea from it that things had changed since Wellhausen, Duhm or Gressmann. Modern Jewish scholars are as completely ignored as Christian ones. The development of form-criticism and 'history of tradition', the new lines of work on the Psalter begun in the 1920's, the interest in the cultic background for messianism, the investigation of the kingship in Israel and the Near East, are entirely unknown. If they had been even known and rejected, this book could not have been written as it is.

For in a wider sense the whole atmosphere here is old-fashioned. Messianism is an 'idea' or even an 'ideal'. The scholar manipulates the developing ideas, so that they take their position under the various banners of 'spiritual', 'ethical', 'political' and so on. The use of categories is adopted without self-criticism. In spite of occasional assaults on Christian scholars 'since they themselves are rationalistic theologians from the soles of their feet to the tops of

their heads' (imagine Duhm or Marti as 'theologians'!). Klausner is a clear liberal humanist. The nineteenth-century tone of the whole appears most clearly when messianism becomes 'the ideal of unceasing progress, of continuing spiritual increase'.

All this is a pity, for there remain things to be said in favour of Klausner's book. His criticism is wisely conservative in many places; this conservatism, however, curiously did not extend to the Psalms, of which only a few are pre-exilic and these mainly irrelevant to messianism. He interests the reader by carrying the origins of messianism back to Moses; but disappoints him by the quite general and imprecise considerations advanced to support this really important thesis. To the modern study of messianism in the OT this book contributes practically nothing.

The best part of the book is the third section dealing with the Tannaitic period. But through no fault of Klausner's, it is this section which would now need so thorough a reappraisal in the light of the Qumran discoveries.

JAMES BARR

Teach Yourself Hebrew. By R. K. HARRISON. London, 1955. Pp. 215. 10s. 6d.

THIS is an attempt to meet the widely-felt need for a simpler introduction to Hebrew than the standard grammars provide. A fair criticism will be based not upon philological details but upon how far the desired simplicity has been attained and how well detail unnecessary at an elementary stage has been eliminated. By such a test this grammar will not be found to have fulfilled its own excellent purpose. It still follows the pattern of the standard grammars, i.e. the order of systematic philological organisation rather than the natural progression of learning. Many details remain which could be left till later; the beginner does not need to hear of Athnah and Silluq before he learns even the definite article. Terms like 'Mil'el' and 'Milra'' could be eschewed, still more 'daghesh forte dirimens'.

The essential for elementary pupils is to advance to a basic reading knowledge as quickly as possible. A systematic treatment has its place in a reference grammar and not in a 'Teach Yourself' book. It is disproportionate for example that a whole chapter is given to the verbal pronoun suffixes (five pages, with fearsome tables), while the Lamedh He verb, which is easy to learn and extremely common in use, receives only just over a page in the last chapter. This verb should be learned immediately after the regular verb.

But the most serious immediate disadvantages in this book is the number of misprints. What would be tolerable in a book of a

different kind could not fail to be a source of confusion to students. It is astounding to find the words 'to drink' or 'to weep' both spelled with Aleph on the same page (p. 134), or עִירִים for 'cities' (p. 57). Even the tables of verbs at the end have errors. Pp. 192 and 194 list active verbs as 'stative' and vice versa; the Lamedh He table gives the absolute infinitive in -oth, a very rare form, which would probably be marked wrong in an elementary examination. Until such evident errors are remedied the value of this book will be limited.

JAMES BARR

The Beloved Captain. By DONALD HANKEY, edited by RONALD SELBY WRIGHT, with a Foreword by LT.-GEN. SIR JAMES CASSELS. Geoffrey Bles, London. 9s. 6d. net.

I HAVE always been a great lover of these writings. Consequently I am delighted that this selection has been made, and I hope that it will be widely read. The pieces seem to me to have been most skilfully chosen, and the introduction and notes tell the reader exactly what he wants to know about the author.

JOHN BAILLIE

A Book of Family Prayers. By HUBERT MCEVOY, S.J. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1956. 5s. net.

THIS small book should prove most helpful to heads of families and others who are called upon to conduct prayers in small communities. Though prepared for Roman Catholics, it contains many useful suggestions for others. There are morning and evening prayer services for every day of the week, and selections from Prime and Compline. Graces before and after meals and prayers for many family occasions are provided. Much comes from liturgical sources, which are indicated. There are useful short introductions to various sections. Many will regret the use of 'You' in place of 'Thou' as an address to God in some parts of the book. The volume itself is beautifully produced, most satisfying in every way. The paper is good, the lay-out clean and well-balanced, and the binding and the book-marker are very tasteful. Altogether the book is a pleasure to handle and should be an inspiration to use.

JOHN A. LAMB

THREE CRITICAL ISSUES IN TILLICH'S PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY

by The Rev. Professor NELS FERRÉ

With the death of Whitehead and Berdyaev the field of philosophical theology has been left all but empty of first rate creative thinkers. Tillich stands nearly alone as undeniably a primary source of constructive philosophical theology. Such forefront leaders of modern Christian thought as Barth, Brunner Aulén and Nygren seem somewhat bound by traditional Christian formulations.

Tillich's approach is inclusive and open. Nothing seems alien to his spirit, but everything must be accounted for in its being, meaning and context. Tillich is a scientist in his respect for fact, a philosopher in his demand for explanation, and a theologian in his insistence on relevance for life. Art and politics, depth psychology and cultural analysis, for instance, are amply and vividly at home in his thought. Such a comprehensive grasp, however, never impedes, but actually abets detailed analysis. Seeing things steadily and whole does not prevent concern either for rich complexity of composition or for active decision, whether personal or social. With Tillich there is pressing need to synthesise rational and existential thinking, for his approach combines organismic wholeness with a clear recognition of the discontinuities of existence. Above all, however, Tillich is the profound wrestler with reality who refuses intellectual short-cuts and spiritual sedatives. Even though he is easily at home both in the history of thought and in major contemporary problems, he is a scholar who, as Whitehead would put it, is not fettered by 'the "larned" tradition', but is a seer of first magnitude.

In this essay I want simply to raise three critical issues in Tillich's thought: (1) a personal God, (2) supernaturalism and (3) theological method. The order in which I present these issues has been chosen deliberately for the reason that I believe Tillich's theological method rests upon prior determining assumptions.

I

The issue of a personal God is not easy, especially for the philosophical theologian. It presents strong pros and cons. In the light of these, Tillich's contribution may become a bit clearer.

On behalf of those who hold to the position of a personal God it can be pointed out, *historically*, that all three great living religions of the West, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, are built around belief in such a God. Greek and Nordic religions, too, even though not monotheistic, put ultimate emphasis on the personal; and even primitive religions, it is held with a good deal of evidence, often assumed as ultimate a personal God. *Metaphysically*, furthermore, belief in a personal God is not marred by reductionism, i.e. by ignoring the persisting problems of consciousness and of personal being; nor does it fail to interpret reality in terms of, and within the context of, the highest category of being we know. In the history of evolution each category of being becomes more meaningful and may be thought of as fulfilled in terms of the next. At least there is continuity of relation downwards from the highest to the lowest level, but there is no necessary and predictable continuity in the reverse direction. Of this order, personal being is the climax that cannot be explained by, but may help to explain, the other levels. *Religiously*, moreover, faith in a personal God leaves the worshipper in no alien and hostile world. Rather, the ultimate has capacity for being known, is available to trust, and provides the ground for the persistence of finite personalities for fulfilment beyond death. Without any attempt at a comprehensive summary of reasons for belief in a personal God, we can nevertheless suggest that there is historic, metaphysical and religious strength in such a position.

On the other side of the ledger, however, there is also strength. *Historically*, we are aware of the prior appearance of the impersonal. History may thus suggest that the personal came from, or is the product of the impersonal. Some great universal religions, moreover, like Buddhism, identify the personal with separation and estrangement from reality. Such religions have an enviable record both for satisfying their devotees and for providing conditions for peaceful civilisation.

Many of the leading thinkers of the West, too, for instance philosophers like Spinoza and Hegel, have accepted the impersonal as ultimate. *Metaphysically*, furthermore, the non-personal realms in their vastness make the personal seem most tiny; and, except for minor parts, they seem to have no direct relation to the distinctively personal. There is also a demonstrable dependence of the personal on the impersonal. How precarious and fugitive is personal life within the ongoing forces of impersonal existence! As a matter of fact, we observe an impersonal realm existing apart from the personal, but not vice versa. The personal, again, seems always to be localised, i.e. to be connected with some specific body and with some selective span of attention, whereas localisation is limitation. The infinite ground of being, it is suggested, cannot be localised whereas we know no personal being that is not localised. Even though by consciousness and thought the personal can transcend precisely such bodily limitations, a person seems always to be connected with some definite place. *Religiously*, to continue, the problem of evil prevents all easy acceptance of a personal God. If a well-intentioned, competent, personal God is in charge of our universe, why, it may be asked, is there a world like this? Many people also report that they have genuinely tried to make contact with a personal God by prayer, thought and faith, but in spite of long persistence have had to give up the attempt as hopeless. If there is a personal God who is religiously available, why should He be so hard to reach? There are also sub-personal and even anti-personal forces at work, even within persons, like the death wish. Death of persons, in any case, is a constantly observable fact; fulfilment after death seems at best the inference of divided reason or the report of faith.

Obviously I have no more than suggested some strengths and weaknesses connected with the intellectual acceptance of a personal God. For philosophical theology, in any case, it is a major problem. As an answer to this question Tillich has suggested the category of the 'transpersonal'.[1] What is the value of this proposal with regard to the philosophical strengths and weaknesses adhering to faith in a personal God?

[1] See his vigorous treatment of this issue in his *Biblical Faith and the Search for Ultimate Reality*, James Nisbet & Co., 1955.

The transpersonal position affirms that although ultimate reality is not personal as such, i.e. although there is no personal God as *a* being who is the ground of all reality, nevertheless the personal is a veritable and significant ingredient in the ground of being. Only Being-itself, beyond all finite qualifications and irreducible to terms other than Itself, is literally to be ascribed final reality. God as ultimate, eminent being is thus not *the personal* ground of all else; but neither is He impersonal in Tillich's thought, for even as Being-itself resists non-being and works everywhere for unity and harmony, just so that which makes for personal being and harmony is part and parcel of ultimate reality, receiving its power, indeed, through being part of, and participating in, ultimate reality. In a true, though symbolic sense, it can therefore be said that God is living, personal and loving. Even beyond justice and power God is symbolically and effectively Love, fulfilling both.[1] But ontologically, Being-itself is the ground of everything, not only of the personal; and therefore God is transpersonal in some such sense as red is truly in the neutral white where all the colours are. Red is, and is available for redness, in the spectrum for analysis, and, as a separate colour, for beauty and function. Nevertheless, the white that includes the red is white as such without separate redness. Even so God as personal does not lack status in ultimate reality, but the personal is never present as such in Being-itself, even though it is religiously available as reality and as power for persons and for society in need of help and companionship.[2]

Three positive points at least can be made for Tillich's transpersonal position. First, it provides ultimate unity of being. At the heart of reality is oneness, harmony of being. His position, secondly, also allows for diversity of being and adequacy of description. He has not reduced history to *maya*, thought to nescience, nor all reality to history. He never denies or belittles either the personal or the impersonal realms. He even allows for the full actuality of the demonic as an aspect of existence. Besides unity and adequacy, thirdly, the transpersonal position of Tillich provides a religiously available God, for He is to be approached in biblical terms as living, personal

[1] See *Love, Justice and Power*.
[2] Cf. the God above all Gods in *The Courage to be*.

and living. Tillich has presented us, consequently, with a view beyond most simply personal or simply impersonal positions. Because of his strong stress on history, his analysis cannot be, as it sometimes is, dismissed merely as Neo-Platonic or Hindu. The biblical insights in Tillich's thought are also too strong for such equation.

In spite of the strength of Tillich's transpersonal position, however, and without denying the need for taking into account both the personal and the impersonal aspects of our data, can it not be that the personal as such does not disappear ultimately by merger, but is in charge of the impersonal? Even hierarchically such a relationship would bind more organically together than does Tillich's position, ultimate reality and our world of experience, and would strengthen our trust in the personal Ultimate. Such a view, however, could hardly be sustained unless the control were to eventuate in some solution of our problems as persons. Such a solution to be organic and consistent with our experience of freedom, moreover, requires time. If God as personal, then, is most real, cannot our world of experience be a pedagogical process that provides time, a process made possible, indeed, by the very existence of the impersonal as that passivity of God which makes our freedom real? Perhaps the fullest explanation of our existence as a whole does not demand some ultimately undifferentiated unity, but is rather obtained in the light and power of the selective, revelatory *personal* Event of the Christian faith. If so, the Cross can give us the clue to both the meaning and the conquest of evil (the fact of which often becomes the ground for not believing in a personal God). Then also, beyond our knowing and imagining, the scene for the solution must extend beyond our earthly life, making death not man's final frustration but a condition for his final fulfilment.

It may also be that personal existence does not involve the limitation connected with localisation. If God is not a spiritual Personality, but a personal Spirit, the ground of being can be living Love, both having ultimate self-being and capable of self-manifestation in different forms for different purposes, although always present everywhere in some sense. Tillich presupposes limitation in metaphysical terms to be the presence of relations. The absolute, he takes for granted, is never

relative; the ultimate unity is also, mathematically speaking, never differentiated into the many. Could we not, however, start with distinctively Christian presuppositions, in which case God is not limited within or without unless He is limited in love or in the ultimate control of love? In such a case, the Absolute (*Agape*) is not limited, but expressed by relations. As a matter of fact, perhaps the basic question, even on this issue of the transpersonal, is whether we should start with being and define God in its terms or whether we should start with God as *Agape* and define being, becoming and even non-being in terms of God. Obviously an essay as short as this cannot more than suggest issues. Tillich has given us a strong position. There is also, I believe, a distinctively Christian position that, without denying the impersonal or without avoiding the discussion of God's relation to this realm, yet finds the living, personal God of love to be rock-bottom Reality, a position that I, at least, have found to be open to increased intellectual confirmation and dynamic self-verification.

II

The issue of supernaturalism is for modern man both intellectually and emotionally confused. Intellectually he often thinks of the supernatural as the preter- or anti-natural, and emotionally as the occult. Writers like Heim have therefore used instead the word 'suprapolar', Reinhold Niebuhr the 'superhistorical', and Thornton the 'superorganic'. The issue, however, remains the same, namely: Does reality centre in our world or in a reality more than, other than and beyond it upon which, or whom, the world in fact depends? Is God other than, more than and in some real and significant sense prior to the world rather than merely a part of it or even the whole of it?

The weaknesses of supernaturalism are basically that it seems a needless or arbitrary category, and that it can occasion, or even be the result of, the desire to escape from the problems and responsibilities of this world. Aristotle and Occam have weightily reminded us that no referring away of our problems beyond the known world either explains them or solves them. Emotionally, besides, such other worldly reference may even help us to avoid our real problems of personal and social

demands. Tillich has pointed out, for instance,[1] that those who refuse to believe that death is real and final for human beings do not take life seriously either. They never face their real problems in this life because they have postponed their solution to some fancied life after it.

The strength of supernaturalism centres in the fact that it avoids naturalistic reductionism to sensation in epistemology and to the physical in ontology. For this reason it can help explain becoming. If the world remained steadily a mixture of good and bad without basic change, supernaturalism would be a redundant category. The evidence we have, on the contrary, is that there have emerged level upon level of new actualities, while these, in turn, as they ingress or appear in the cosmic process, are both organically and accumulatively related to it. Such an organic and accumulative series of becoming bespeaks prior creative Ground.[2] In the light of the total history of nature and man, supernaturalism is, consequently, a strong candidate for the highest possible bestower of intellectual adequacy. Emotionally, too, it has been seen that the great reformers of men's moral and spiritual life have perhaps usually been believers in a reality beyond this world. Socrates (in spite of current attempts to reduce him to an existentialist), Jesus, Saint Francis, Schweitzer and Gandhi, for examples, cannot be read out of court easily. The experience of total religious dependence, history shows us, is capable of generating creative and responsible thought and action.

Tillich's usual position on this critical issue of supernaturalism versus naturalism has been a refusal to be bound by either position. In his earliest writings—of the first two decades of this century—he spurned supernaturalism with vigour on the ground that it was in fact determined by its reference to naturalism. Ultimate reality, for him, could not be thus confined. At the same time he has scrupulously avoided the scientific kind of naturalism with its usual methodological monism. In response to my direct question on the issue of supernaturalism in a previous book[3] he replied, however, that if choice had to be made he would be an 'ecstatic naturalist', one who by the ecstatic

[1] In a sermon given in White Temple, Miami, Florida, January 1956 and on other occasions.

[2] For a detailed analysis see Chapter 4 of my *Faith and Reason*.

[3] *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, The Library of Living Theology.

reason goes beyond our limited methods and experiences but who will never allow the positing of a world beyond this world.

His own position can perhaps best be explained as akin to Kantian transcendentalism. He accepts the fact that reason never deals with *the* ultimate reality of some transcendent realm beyond our actual world, but works critically, rather, with the analysis of the world we know, finding, if we may use Kantian terminology, principles of validity. In his own language, 'transcendental' necessity becomes *das Unbedingte*, the unconditioned (later 'unconditional') beyond, before and underneath experience, not as some transcendent realm, but as an analytical, universal necessity for experience and history. Mixed with elements from Boehme and Schelling, his ultimate category becomes some mystical Being-itself, the unconditional that resists non-being and makes for harmony of being. Not a transcendent or other-worldly realm of reality, then, but a transcendental or unconditional necessity for experience and history—this is a clue to Tillich's thinking.

Transcendentalism—the unconditional *for*, not as such *in* experience—avoids several pitfalls and emotional drawbacks of both supernaturalism and naturalism and speaks, besides, especially in Tillich's distinctive form of it, a vigorous, creative word. His use of symbols, within this method, as pointing to truth beyond literal language, while also participating in reality beyond direct expression, stays clear both of an objectivist position that equates knowledge with reality and also of a subjectivist position in which there is no objective counterpart in reality to the symbols employed.[1] His symbols both relate to reality and fail literally to indicate it. They have, none the less, a rare evocative power. They elicit lively subjective response to reality and appeal powerfully to religious apperception. Symbolically Tillich's theological analysis is centrally Christian and potently needed. The real crux of the adequacy of his position, however, concerns the nature of the objective counterpart, ultimately, of his symbolic analysis of the Christian faith. Especially is this question of adequacy a matter of the significance and the permanence of the personal, to which we now turn.

[1] To what extent *das Unbedingte* is a limiting concept or *das Ding-an-sich* is a nice point.

The issue of supernaturalism versus Tillich's kind of transcendentalism is not so much whether this world or a world of prior reality is central for faith and thought, since Tillich's thought, in its actual drive, never becomes a limiting naturalism; but the issue is rather that of the significance and the permanence of the personal. With relation to God there is no problem as such in Tillich's thought. Whatever is ultimately personal by its participating in Being-itself is, according to Tillich, everlasting and ever potent. Nothing of personal significance, he holds, can therefore ever be lost; it is permanent. One is strongly reminded at this point of Whitehead's position.

The real issue is, rather, with regard to God's relation to man; and with regard to the significance and permanence of the personal in man. If God is not personal in the sense of conscious knowledge and will, there can be no personal communion between God and man. The subject-object relation is said to be transcended in reality, but so is, in fact, the Subject-subject relation. Whitehead's stand has at least the Fellow-sufferer and the Companion who understands. Nothing of this, as objective, ultimate reality, is to be found in Tillich. The deepest significance of finite spirit, however, I believe, is its capacity to have intercourse with the infinite Spirit. Being-itself unfortunately affords no such significance, *really*, and offers no hope or help for prayer as an I-Thou relation. Neither can man count on the personal Purpose of God in providence. What happens to him is not, at the deepest, ordained by a loving Will who creates and controls, directly and indirectly, human lives and the order of nature. We can participate in Reality, adjust ourselves to It by powers inherent in It and available to us, but God never literally acts in our behalf, answers prayers, or shares His purpose in special providence. The security, the intimacy, and the fullest creative conditions for personal growth within the eternal Purpose are therefore gone. If such an impersonal unconditional is ultimate, we must, of course, face the fact. I believe, however, that Christian supernaturalism is not only religiously but also intellectually more adequate. In the next section this point will be developed.

Even more important precisely for the nature and character of ultimate reality is the question concerning the permanence

of the personal in man. Tillich is insistent that we must face the fact that death is real and final. He even believes that modern man is particularly hurt by his refusal to take death with full seriousness. But whether specially, as in the Resurrection of Christ, or generally, as in the everlastingness of personal life, the issue of supernaturalism will not die. The Christian faith holds that man is created by God for God and for fulness of life in fellowship. It holds that death is not frustration but fulfilment. It holds that everlasting life is both a new kind of life in Christ, in *Agape*, and a life that lasts. Such faith is not easy emotionally; intellectually it staggers the critical reason. Nevertheless, it is a firm implication, in some way, of the character of God as *Agape*. Life everlasting, I believe, is a necessary condition for an adequate view of that Ultimate which can account most suggestively for both origins and ends and offer, besides, a blueprint and power for the solution of our personal and social problems.

In Tillich's view, whatever is ultimately personal in man lasts because it belongs to Being-itself. The personal, however, is effectively buried in the grave of the undifferentiated Itself. The personal never remains beyond death as persistence of persons. The impersonal has therefore won. If Tillich were not explicit on the nature of his transpersonal ultimate, the interpretation of his position could be made that the persistence of the personal, though not as individuality, is mostly an affirmation that our kind of personal existence, now in this life, will be fulfilled in some new kind of being where the separations and estrangements of our finite existence are transcended, even while the kernel of self-being exists in such fulfilment. Or we could think that he means that we must leave this issue with faith in higher hands. As the case stands, however, there is a basic contention between Tillich's 'trancendentalism' and Christian supernaturalism that will not down. All the same, Tillich's view will offer itself as a strong position for those who believe Christian supernaturalism to be primitive mythology and yet cannot acquiesce in the intellectual reductionism and emotional thinness of scientific naturalism.

III

It may seem a strange procedure to take up last the question

of theological method. I do so because I believe that in Tillich's case method is the result of system. It is obvious that in theology, as Tillich himself says, 'method and system determine each other'.[1] For Tillich, however, the presuppositions of his thinking are the occasion for his method. 'For systematic theology this means that its method is derived from a prior knowledge of the system which is to be built by the method.'[2] Such is his avowal for the method of systematic theology in general inasmuch as it must necessarily centre in its object of ultimate concern and revelation, concretely, explicitly and totally. Yet beyond this specific consideration, in Tillich's case, theological method in general is determined by his assumption that 'our ultimate concern is that which determines our *being or not-being*' (italics ours),[3] for this assumption gives actual content to the revelatory event or centre itself. His systematic theology thus becomes filled ultimately by his philosophical presuppositions.

Let us once more look first through Tillich's eyes at other main choices for method. 'Supranaturalism', as he calls it—introducing thereby an unnecessary dichotomy by the very use of terms—gives us a 'sum of revealed truths which have fallen into the human situation like strange bodies from a strange world.'[4] If supernaturalism is accepted as meaning an arbitrary and unrelated body of knowledge to be taken on external authority, it should, of course, be rejected outright.

The second choice for method is naturalistic. This, Tillich teaches, makes the mistake of taking the answers from human existence whereas human existence itself is what needs both to be explained and to be delivered from its estrangement. Theology speaks *to* man, not *from* man. In this assertion, too, Tillich speaks acceptable truth.

The third method he surveys is dualistic, building a supranatural structure on a naturalistic basis. It involves natural theology, using such devices as proofs for the existence of God, derived from the data of man's situation. Tillich holds this method to be false, since man's situation states problems, but never affords theological answers.

Instead, Tillich substitutes the method of correlation, where-

[1] *Systematic Theology*, p. 60.
[2] ibid.
[3] ibid., p. 14.
[4] ibid., p. 64.

in the intent of 'natural theology' is accepted in the realm of the analysis of existence, and the intent of 'supranatural theology', in the realm of theological answers. Existential questions receive theological answers in mutual interdependence. As a matter of fact, however, he goes on, there is neither a basis of comparison between philosophy and theology nor a true possibility of conflict, since they deal with different spheres, or operate on qualitatively different planes. No more than with Kierkegaard is there any direct passing by discursive or synthetic reason from existence to essence. Philosophy deals with the structure of being by the analysis of existence; theology with meaning, ultimately, unconditionally, totally and infinitely. Man's existence can be grasped in existential questions and analysed by philosophy in terms of pure reason; then theology, from its full focus of the revelatory event, answers man's existential problems and offers solutions to his intellectual needs. Since the *logos* is both on the side of existence and the side of essence, and since essence and existence come together in the revelatory event, the method of correlation is not arbitrary, but a partially confirmatory affair. This is so since no other answers can ever meet man's real needs of life and knowledge so well as the revelation of the concrete truth of Jesus as the Christ. There can, furthermore, be interaction between the two realms inasmuch as not even a theologian lives always within the theological circle, but must relate himself and his thought more or less to 'the situation' of concrete experience.

At this point what to me is Tillich's chief difficulty becomes most clearly apparent. He presupposes that the problem of being versus not-being is ultimate, that Being-itself, as infinite, cannot ever be defined or contained within history and experience, and that, therefore, the most that can be said of revelation *literally* or *directly* is that it constitutes an unconditional demand for being and harmony of being. Being-itself, for Tillich, is the only non-symbolic or literal definition of God. This basic assumption controls the content of the revelatory event. The interpretation of Christ, without historic justification, becomes controlled by the relation of essence to existence. The historical Jesus, consequently, in Tillich's thought, merely became transparent to the Christ by refusing to make anything finite, infinite, and thus transmitted to us through a

concrete life the synthesis of essence and existence, not in such a way that essence ever *became* existence or the infinite, but in such a way that existence became perfectly transparent for essence, revealing for us the unique non-recurring *Kairos*.

When Tillich is thus understood, we can see why he can, at the same time, be utterly cavalier about the historic Jesus and yet also be completely insistent that in Him the Christ has come. With Tillich Christ meets the demand for constructing a bridge between essence and existence, and also the requirement for a centre of the theological circle that is both perfectly universal and completely concrete. Tillich's two definitions of the power of Being-itself, namely to resist non-Being and to make for harmony of being, correspond respectively, I believe, to God's power of creation and his power of redemption. The power for such universal creativity and for unification and purification of meaning is precisely Christ as the *Agape* of God.

If, therefore, Tillich had started with Christ as the *Agape* of God instead of with a mathematical-metaphysical idea of Being-itself, he would have started with a concrete Incarnation that affords the highest explanatory as well as saving power. The difficulty with his position, as I see it, is that he presupposes an indefinable, undifferentiated Being-itself that cannot be incarnated as such in history. He inherits the problems of Aristotle's *Actus Purus*. Accepting as fact the claim that not only can the transcendent not be known but also that there is no transcendent realm as such beyond, or other than, the world we know, Tillich operates, as we have seen, with a method akin to Kant's transcendental analysis whereby there are universal forms for experience that never exist as such independent of experience, but are nevertheless unconditionally presupposed by and requirements of experience. Actually this unconditional demand for being and for unity of being for Tillich has been revealed through the Christ, but Christ has not revealed a personal God or a supernatural realm beyond experience and this world.

This presupposition of Being-itself as a transcendental power—God as the Ground of being that does not exist as an eminent, transcendent person or realm—lies at the heart of Tillich's system and determines his method. I believe, however, that if he would begin with the concrete Christ as *Agape*, he

could find as ultimate through Him the God who is personal Spirit, an uncreated Reality, supernatural but not supranatural. He could also devise a theological method which, while keeping all his positive insights, would at the same time allow for a more positive, though dialectical, relation to philosophy.[1] He could keep the ultimacy and distinctiveness of both his theological centre and circle, with their subjective demands for faith and commitment, even while having in Christ as *Agape* a meaning that relates concretely and realistically to all of life and thought. He could then keep Incarnation of being as well as of meaning, in the full, literal sense, and, with Calvin and Luther as well as the Early Fathers, find a doctrine of the Church as in some real sense *incarnating* as well as *representing* the Kingdom. He could further arrive at a living faith in everlasting life not only as that unification and purification of meaning in which 'the personal' participates in and beyond personal existence, but also as the eventual and everlasting fulfilment of both the purpose of God and the life of man.

In his description of the Christian faith phenomenologically, however, and in his actual analysis of life and social conditions, Tillich has been profoundly motivated by the central Christian fact and meaning. He need for the most part only accept as true what he describes as Christian! He has given us forefront depth and creativity of philosophical and theological analysis. He has also been unafraid and yet forbearing in his dealing with movements and issues unsympathetic to his thought, evincing that great and generous spirit that marks him as something of a saint as well as a prince of scholars. To acknowledge with gratitude both intense and extensive indebtedness to him is only to declare oneself an active part of the contemporary world of theological formulation.

[1] My reasons for so believing are developed in *Faith and Reason*, Chapter 3, and *Christian Faith and Higher Education*, Chapter 7.

THE RELEVANCE OF KIERKEGAARD TO THE DEMYTHOLOGISING CONTROVERSY

by The Rev. J. HEYWOOD THOMAS

The controversy which has this forbidding name arose as a result of Bultmann's essay 'New Testament and Mythology'. The essay appears to have evoked a very loud and fierce criticism in Germany and has become the bone of contention among its theologians. This controversy has spread to America where Bultmann's friend Professor Paul Tillich has put before the theological public not only the issue involved in the debate but also his own unhesitating support of Bultmann's programme. It has also come to us in Britain through the publication of Professor Henderson's *Myth in the New Testament*, and the 'documents in the case' in the volume *Kerygma and Myth*. First let us see what it is that Bultmann has to say.

Bultmann claims that the New Testament Kerygma is embedded in the definitely mythological setting of ancient cosmology and Jewish and Gnostic redemption stories. For the New Testament writers the universe is a three-storied edifice consisting of heaven, earth and hell. The top of the universe is heaven; beneath it is the earth, and at the bottom is hell (*Sheol*). The earth is more than the scene of man's natural mundane existence: it is also open to invasion by demons and spirits who may literally take possession of men. 'Man is not in control of his own life. . . . Satan may inspire him with evil thoughts. Alternatively God may inspire his thoughts and guide his purposes. . . . History does not follow a smooth unbroken course; it is set in motion and controlled by these supernatural powers.'[1] The present age is in fact held in bondage by Satan and the 'powers' of sin and death. It is hastening towards its end, which will come very soon in the form of a cosmic catastrophe.

This mythical cosmology is the setting against which the Gospel message of the redeeming act of God is proclaimed. The mythology is not only background, however; it is the

[1] *Kerygma and Myth* (London, S.P.C.K. 1953), p. 1.

presupposition of the message and the very language in which it is spoken. The proclamation is that the last time has now come. Jesus Christ, the pre-existent Son, is sent by God 'in the fulness of time', and appears on earth as a man. He dies the death of a sinner on the Cross and makes atonement for the sins of men; His resurrection means that death has been stripped of its power. So the beginning of the new age is at hand because the dominion of demonic powers is at an end. The risen Christ quite literally ascends to heaven to the right hand of God where He is made 'Lord' and 'King'. He will shortly return on the clouds of heaven to complete His work of redemption and abolish sin, suffering and death finally and completely. Till this will take place, those who belong to the Church are joined to Him by means of the sacrament of Baptism or Communion. Those who believe already enjoy the first fruits of salvation, for the Spirit, working in them, attests that they are God's adopted sons and so guarantees their final resurrection.

Bultmann's contention is that all this is plainly mythology and its sources in contemporary mythology can in fact be traced. 'To this extent *the Kerygma is incredible to modern man, for he is convinced that the mythical view of the world is obsolete.*'[1] The problem which inevitably arises, then, is whether the New Testament contains a truth which is quite independent of its mythical setting. Clearly, the answer of any Christian theologian is that it does. Bultmann's point is that, if we are so convinced, then we must undertake the task of stripping the Kerygma from its mythical framework, of 'demythologising' it. He makes a somewhat lengthy examination of the inability of modern man to accept the mythical world-view, and it becomes clear that he is concerned not only with the question of the conflict between the myths and our scientific discoveries, but also with the problem of the conflict between the myth and our contemporary metaphysical *Weltanschauung*. There is, he says, no point in asking modern man to accept the mythical world-view because there is nothing specifically Christian in it. Moreover, it would be impossible for him to do so—because one does not accept a world-view by making up one's mind to accept it but rather as a result of inspecting the evidence in its favour. The New Testament mythology cannot be accepted

[1] op. cit., p. 3.

by modern man for more than one reason. First, the world-picture it presents was discredited by the fact that the end of the world which the Apocalyptic claimed to be imminent just did not occur. Secondly, the advance which has taken place in science and technology with the resulting advance in man's knowledge and mastery of the world render the New Testament view of the world meaningless to modern man. 'There is no longer any heaven in the traditional sense of the world. The same applies to hell in the sense of a mythical underworld beneath our feet. And if this is so, we can no longer accept the story of Christ's descent into hell or his Ascension into heaven as literally true.'[1] Then again, the New Testament mythology faces the still stronger challenge of modern man's understanding of himself. Whether he regards himself as 'pure nature' or as 'pure spirit' he regards himself as essentially a unity. He is not the dichotomy which the New Testament understands him to be.

Confronted with this mythology which is impossible for him to accept the modern theologian must use drastic measures according to Bultmann. We 'cannot save the Kerygma by selecting some of its features and subtracting others'; the mythical view must either be accepted or rejected *in toto*. Bultmann describes the real purpose of myth as being that of presenting man's understanding of himself in the world. 'Myth should be interpreted not cosmologically but anthropologically, or better still, existentially.'[2] In dealing with a myth then we must ask what the writer is saying about his own existence. 'Hence the importance of the New Testament mythology lies not in its imagery but in the understanding of existence which it enshrines. The real question is whether this understanding of existence is true. Faith claims that it is, and faith ought not to be tied down to the imagery of New Testament mythology.'[3] In his attempt to give us an existentialist interpretation of this mythology Bultmann deals with the contrast between the life of faith and human existence apart from faith. That is, he takes the two sets of stories in the New Testament and recasts them into 'existential' statements. According to the New Testament, he says, the life of the man without Christ is the life of anxiety. This man is at the mercy of certain forces which are

[1] op. cit., p. 4. [2] op. cit., p. 10. [3] ibid., p. 11.

indifferent or even hostile to him. He is the slave of the very sphere that he had hoped to master. 'Whereas hitherto he might have enjoyed the world as God's creation, it has now become 'this world', the world in revolt against God. 'This is the way in which the "powers" which dominate human life, come into being, and as such acquire the character of mythical entities.'[1] The man of faith, on the other hand, finds his security not in things visible but in the invisible world. His confidence is in the grace of God. 'It means faith that the unseen, intangible reality actually confronts us as love, opening up our future, and signifying not death but life.'[2] The grace of God brings forgiveness of sins by which Bultmann means 'deliverance from the bondage of the past'. At the same time faith means obedience, for it involves our turning our back on all attempts to contrive our own security and resolving to trust in God alone. This detachment from the world is eschatological existence.

The New Testament faith is always faith in Christ. Can this be a remnant of mythology that awaits translation? Bultmann admits that it does seem as if the decisive event of Jesus Christ were a relic of mythology. The problem, he says, is that the existentialist philosophers have given us an account of being which is the same as the New Testament and yet independent of it. At the same time these philosophers are convinced that all we need is to be told about the 'nature' of man in order to realise it. The New Testament does not give us a doctrine of man's 'nature' in this way, but rather proclaims the event of redemption in Christ. The existentialist philosophers agree that man is fallen but regard him as able to achieve his real existence by his own decision. For the New Testament the fall is total. 'Man's radical self-assertion blinds him to the fact of sin, and this is the clearest proof that he is a fallen being. Hence it is no good telling man that he is a sinner. He will only dismiss it as mythology. But it does not follow that he is right.'[3] In fact, this is the point where man can do nothing and the very point where God steps in and acts. This affirmation of sin and of what God has done for us cannot be demythologised. The story of the event of Jesus Christ is a combination of myth and history, and Bultmann is led to say that the mythological

[1] op. cit., pp. 18-19. [2] ibid., p. 19. [3] ibid., p. 31.

language is simply an attempt to express the meaning of the history. The remainder of the essay illustrates this conclusion by examining the two crucial incidents in the Christ-story, the Cross and the resurrection.

We have endeavoured to give a clear and impartial account of Bultmann's essay. What we now wish to do is to show how relevant Kierkegaard's understanding of the Christian faith is to this controversy. There is one obvious point which we can mention at once—that one can discern the influence of Kierkegaard in Bultmann's idea that existentialism is the proper method of interpreting mythology. That there lies behind Bultmann's work a definite existentialist philosophy has been admitted by Gotz Harbsmeier, who is one of his warmest supporters. 'Harbsmeier . . . has agreed that for Bultmann, Heidegger's analysis of being is the cradle in which the (Christian) message is laid.'[1] Professor Henderson points out that the seriousness with which Bultmann considers the claim that this analysis has superseded the Christian revelation indicates how close to each other these two views are for Bultmann. We have mentioned Heidegger's analysis of being as the presupposition of Bultmann's demythologising programme. We shall now suggest four ways in which Bultmann's essay leads us back through Heidegger to Kierkegaard. The first is by means of this concept of being. Kierkegaard's philosophy was a philosophy of existence, and Heidegger's interest is also in being and existence. As Ruggiero puts it:

> Almost a century later the motives of the Kierkegaardian thought return in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger but they return depersonalised and emptied of their religious content. More closely linked together, they give us a kind of parabola of existence in the act of emerging from nullity when after an ephemeral journey, it relapses into nullity once again.[2]

Heidegger takes over Kierkegaard's special use of 'existence' as something essentially personal. The basic concept in his ontology is the contrast between *Dasein* and *Vorhandenheit*, the being of a person and that of inanimate objects. Heidegger protests against the way in which philosophy has used categories of the former which are really applicable only to the latter. In his

[1] I. Henderson, *Myth in the New Testament* (London, S.C.M. 1952), p. 21, *Vide Kerygma und Mythos*, p. 59.
[2] Ruggiero, *Existentialism*, p. 31.

analysis of *Dasein*, Heidegger stresses two things as characteristic of it: *Entschlossenheit*, being open to oneself, and *Befindlichkeit*, the sense of fortitude or of being cast into the world. To know our own existence in this way is an essential part of that existence. To understand our being means indeed for Heidegger a real change in our being. It is this which lies behind Bultmann's understanding of Christian faith as a change affected in the Christian—as Thielicke says, nothing happens in Bultmann's interpretation of Christianity except consciousness. The second way in which Bultmann points back to Kierkegaard via Heidegger is in his view that the proper method of interpretation to be used in demythologising is the existentialist. It is clearly a result of his acceptance of Heidegger's views according to which change in my *Dasein* comes about only through a change in my understanding of myself. And this is Heidegger's expression of the Kierkegaardian theme that existence is something that can be understood only as I am concerned with it. Thirdly, Bultmann has suggested that Heidegger's idea of the fallenness of man is the same as the Christian idea. Not to understand one's existence is for Heidegger to live unauthentically, and in unauthentic existence one is in a state of fallenness. This state is characterised by the self's failure to find itself. This failure is revealed in the way I think of myself as one of many, which means that I have lost myself among 'the others' so that I am a *man*. In this we can easily discern the influence of such typically Kierkegaardian ideas as the error of objective existence, the distrust of the crowd, the loneliness of personal existence. The final point is that Bultmann appears to be indebted to Kierkegaard for his basic interpretation of what Christianity is, namely something which the individual must decide for himself. Whether this is evidence of direct influence or not it is impossible to say and is anyhow irrelevant. It is sufficient to note the resemblance which would indicate indebtedness. Professor Henderson says:

> A persistent feature of Bultmann's exposition of Christianity (is) the emphasis which he lays upon decision. Time and again he sets aside doctrines which would protect the Christian from the necessity of coming to a decision. . . .
>
> And he is at pains to emphasise that even when demythologised the New Testament message will not be something self-evident or provable to the

man of today but only a possible way in which he can interpret his own existence. In the last resort modern man will have to decide, whether or not he is to accept that particular interpretation of his life.

This emphasis on decision will have a familiar ring to those who come to Bultmann via the existentialists. As the late Dr H. R. Mackintosh has said, to think existentially is to think not as a spectator of the ultimate scenes of life and death; but as one committed to a decision upon them. And indeed a determination that man shall not be spared the toil and sweat of decision accounts for . . . Kierkegaard's dislike of a *Volkskirche* into which a man could be born. . . .[1]

It is thus true to say that Kierkegaard is relevant to the demythologising debate as one of the sources of Bultmann's thinking.

Our main interest, however, is to show how what Kierkegaard has taught us can be made a criticism of Bultmann's view. This criticism, we would suggest, is threefold.

1. Bultmann makes essentially the same mistake as Hegel in his assumption that understanding the truth is a necessary part of being the truth.
2. In his existentialist interpretation of the mythology Bultmann seems to be very close to the too empirical understanding of faith which Kierkegaard associated with Schleiermacher.
3. The demythologising of the New Testament means a translation of Christianity into a philosophy. This was the error Kierkegaard found in the Hegelian theologians. This can be done only at the price of losing certain distinctive elements of the Christian faith.

We shall consider these three points in turn.

(1) First, then, one of Bultmann's basic assumptions is that I am changed only by understanding myself. We have seen how he has arrived at this position through the influence of Heidegger. How is it wrong? It may be argued that there is a very real point in such a statement, and doubtless it does make us more aware of the interplay of thought and action. Yet in the end it seems indistinguishable from the Hegelian confusion of understanding Christianity and living Christianity. Bultmann does insist on the element of decision—one must

[1] Henderson, op. cit., p. 23. The reference to Mackintosh is to *Types of Modern Theology*, p. 219n.

decide to accept this view of oneself. This is, nevertheless, only a pale image of the decision which Kierkegaard described when he talked of deciding to accept God and of the decision to follow Jesus Christ. It is thus impossible to agree with Professor Henderson (p. 29) that the relation between Heidegger and Bultmann in this respect is 'harmless enough'. To accept it is to forget the difference between the understanding of the truth of Christianity and living that truth. If I am changed only by understanding myself better, then all religion would be in the sphere of immanence as Kierkegaard would have said. However, this is a purely theological difficulty except in so far as it oversimplifies the logical description of religious faith. We see this oversimplification better if we compare Bultmann's position with that of Hegel and also with what is traditionally regarded as the Socratic theory of virtue. Hegel had been so concerned to absorb Christianity into the System that he was oblivious to the dangers to which this exposed faith. The most important was that the vital distinction between knowing the faith, that is an intellectual grasp of it, and believing the faith, accepting it as one's way of life and living it, could no longer be drawn with any certainty. In the same way Bultmann seems so intent on showing that the existentialist way of interpreting myth is the proper understanding of myth that he leaves no room for the distinction between the knowledge of this interpretation and the living commitment to the message thus obtained. We can see how very like Socrates this is. Socrates is reputed to have taught that virtue was knowledge, and that to know the good was to do it. The obvious difference between knowing the good and doing it was no less obvious to Socrates than to anyone else. Despite this, he maintained that there was a necessary connexion between knowledge of the good and its performance. Bultmann's position is slightly different—but not very much different. According to him to understand the mythologically proclaimed Gospel constitutes a necessary part of its living. Thielicke has complained that for Bultmann 'the real event takes place in human self-consciousness', and whether Bultmann succeeds in answering what Thielicke means by this charge or not, it is difficult to see how he can avoid the criticism which I have sought to express by quoting Thielicke's words. I am well aware that I am concentrating on one item in the

long and intricate argument that Bultmann has produced. This does not involve any violence to his meaning, however; and therein lies the difficulty. It seems undeniable that he makes the directive quality of religious belief dependent on our understanding of this interpretation of our existence. It is difficult to bring out this point clearly; but what I have been trying to indicate is a basic confusion, resembling Hegel's confusion of understanding and existence. The confusion is similar to Hegel's, not only because the same things are confused, but also because the confusion results from an abstract metaphysics which is concerned with the question-begging and misleading notion 'Being'. Once we start talking in terms of Being then an existentialist analysis can easily become almost identical with religious living. However attractive this existentialism of Bultmann's may be, it is very suspiciously like a new Gnosticism.

(2) Our second Kierkegaardian criticism of Bultmann is that his interpretation of faith is dangerously like the empirical reduction of the meaning of the word 'faith'. This was the criticism that Kierkegaard made of Schleiermacher and Hegel. We need not consider the latter here, but it is very interesting to notice that Thielicke also compares Bultmann and Schleiermacher. He is quite emphatic in the charge of subjectivism which he makes, and he makes it by referring to Schleiermacher. 'All we have to do is to substitute Schleiermacher's famous "self-consciousness" for Bultmann's term, "understanding of human life" (after all, the two terms are practically synonymous), in order to see this.'[1] He insists that if we are to understand the New Testament message with Bultmann as an 'understanding', then 'the emphasis lies on the subjective element' with the result that there is 'no room for an historical revelation in time, at least not in the sense of an intervention on the plane of reality'.[2] Thielicke's point seems quite justified, but on the basis of what we have learnt from Kierkegaard's criticism of the empiricism of Schleiermacher we can extend this argument. That there seems no room for an historical revelation in miracle or the event of Jesus Christ is symptomatic of something deeper. And this is that the danger of such a view as Bultmann's is that it has no need of God. If the end we have in view in our activity as religious men is to derive a mode of

[1] *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 146. [2] ibid.

understanding oneself, there is no need to have any objective constituent to this experience other than ourselves. It could be argued that this would not be subjectivism—that is where Thielicke fails to grasp the great subtlety of the position Bultmann describes. There is a real difference between Bultmann's 'understanding of human life' and Schleiermacher's 'self-consciousness'—at any rate as Schleiermacher used this phrase. For the latter expression meant nothing more than that we enjoy certain feelings, and this way of talking is dangerous because feeling can always be translated into the language of appearance without making any reality-claim. However, the phrase Bultmann uses is not subjective in the same sense, though it too must be criticised in the same way. Here, however, the error involved is that of failing to make any reality-claim over and above what is implied by talking about myself and other human beings who are all quite real objects. The weakness of Schleiermacher's position was that it 'made faith too inward' so that faith could be translated in terms of 'it seems' without any remainder. Bultmann makes the same mistake in a different way. If what I want is to understand myself then it matters not whether there is a God or not. Indeed all that is required is myth (in the pejorative sense of the word), a story which will evoke in me the necessary attitude towards myself. And if this is so then religious faith has disappeared. I am far from suggesting that religious faith has nothing to do with understanding ourselves. On the contrary, religious faith necessarily moves in this way from the commitment to God towards a unification of our experience in terms of it. But there is a great difference between saying 'We are convinced that there is a murderous lunatic at large and so we are going to avoid the place where we saw a suspicious character yesterday, etc.', and saying, 'Our conviction that there is a murderous lunatic at large *is* that we are going to avoid the place, etc.' In fact, in this case the second sentence is nonsense. The same difference (in logic) is seen in this other analogy, which is perhaps a better case. Take two people listening to the Beethoven *Sonata Pathétique*. They discuss the music after the recital and agree that it was the greatest aesthetic experience they have ever had. 'Somehow', says one, 'I could see whole vistas of experience being disclosed as I listened.' It would be

quite wrong to say that this man's enjoyment of the *Sonata Pathétique* was his new understanding of life. This is not nonsensical, and one can build up a story which would give it meaning. But in our story it is not true to say this. Now this is very close to Bultmann's case and it helps us to see the point that needs to be brought out. This is that the strength of Bultmann's position is that we do tend to make it a test of true religion that it should reveal myself to myself. Thus Jesus Christ says that it is not only adultery that is wrong but those thoughts that a man harbours and cherishes in his heart. It is only as we practise the presence of God that we begin to understand our sinful nature. We cannot and do not deny this. In the same way we do not mean to say that Bultmann in fact does not think that religion is an awareness of an objective fact. Our point is quite simply that he does not succeed in saying this, for his view implies the opposite. When we consider, as Thielicke does, the Christological element of our faith as well as its basic theism, it becomes quite clear that Thielicke is justified in his belief that Bultmann's formulation will not suffice. For at the very heart of the Christian faith is the assertion that a historical person was the perfect revelation of God. Again this does indeed enable me to understand myself and purify my heart as nothing else can, and moreover necessitates my doing so. But this is not what I *mean* when I say that Jesus Christ is God.

(3) Finally, it is by no means clear that Bultmann has avoided the pitfall which was described by Kierkegaard as being the fate of all Hegelian and indeed of all systematic philosophers. We may ask, then, whether Bultmann in his attempt to rid the New Testament of its mythology has not translated the mythology and the message enshrined therein into a philosophy. Clearly some of his critics have no doubt that he has actually done this. Thus, for instance, Thielicke says:

> It is impossible to remove the mythology, as Bultmann tries to do. In other words, it is impossible to substitute the world view of modern science for the biblical mythology by what he calls 'interpretation'. This is because it involves the substitution of an abstract philosophy of existence for a kerygma rooted in history.[1]

[1] *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 164.

One would have liked to see a clear discussion of this by Bultmann, but he never does more than make casual remarks on the topic. Bultmann's only answer seems to be that there is not the contradiction between the philosophy he uses and Christianity that Thielicke claims there is. Thus Schumann says that Bultmann's 'guiding conviction is that it is possible to have a formal analysis of human existence which can be detached from every "existential" attitude, from every actual disposition to one's own existence'.[1] But Bultmann, quoting these very words, agrees with Schumann that this is impossible. This confirms our suspicion that it is not very clear what the argument is about, that neither Bultmann nor Schumann has asked what question each is trying to answer. The question that concerns us is whether Bultmann has, by his demythologising, translated the Gospel into language which inevitably distorts it. And it is irrelevant to this question whether there is in fact the agreement which, according to Schumann, Bultmann finds between 'the Christian understanding and a philosophy of existence not orientated upon the event of Christ (Heidegger and others) on the negative side—i.e. the fallenness (*Verfallenheit*) of human life'.[2] The question is indeed whether you can ever translate Christian statements into other language which is secular in the sense that it is not logically dependent on a Christian framework. The question is not an empirical but a logical one. Is the scheme of assertions which will be the translation of the mythological form of the Christian Gospel logically equivalent to Christian theology or doctrine? When the question is framed thus we see that it is not at all to the point to argue, as Bultmann does on p. 196, that pure analysis of Being without reference to God not only is possible but also makes sense. The confusion in the argument would have been avoided in part at any rate had not Bultmann used this highly ambiguous word the meaningfulness of which is far from certain. It makes no difference to our question whether the analysis he proposes can in fact be carried out. The important point is whether statements which, be they pictorial and mythological or not, are logically dependent on the concept of God can be translated into language which is by definition logically independent of this concept. Clearly the answer is a negative one. It would be a reduction

[1] *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 185. [2] ibid., p. 184.

of the religious man's statements. Bultmann does not seem to appreciate the force of this, for he ardently denies that he is claiming for existentialism the position of being the 'right' philosophy. The point is not that we think his method too *a priori* and not sufficiently empirical, that he does not leave room for corrigibility. The error is logical and not empirical, and a logical error cannot be repaired by patchwork. No such language will do.

It is therefore not surprising to find Schumann maintaining that in fact Heidegger's analysis is not identical with the Christian view of the nature of human existence.

> To be fallen to 'nothingness' is quite different from being fallen to sin and guilt and being fallen under the wrath of God. It is simply impossible to agree on a formal understanding of human fallenness, and then to diverge, one side believing that human life is fallen to 'nothingness', and the other that it is fallen under the wrath of God. The understanding of fallenness in the two cases is not identical.[1]

And if the concept of fallenness is not the same in the two cases then it must follow that the interpretation of sin will be inadequate. Thielicke contrasts the biblical conception of sin with the abstract philosophical conception, and he contends that Bultmann sides with the philosophers.

> Sin is man's consciousness that he is lost, and therefore it is not in any real sense an event. At most it is but the shadow of an event projected on the screen of our understanding of human life. . . . Sin is thus a phenomenon of the ego on the same level as the philosophical understanding of human life.[2]

The same strain and tension is again seen in the way Bultmann regards Jesus Christ. Schniewind, in discussing Bultmann's description of the paradox of Jesus, brings out Bultmann's anxiety to do justice to the ἐφάπαξ of Christ. Yet Schniewind is himself very doubtful whether he maintains 'its full force undiminished'. 'One cannot avoid the impression that he places the event of redemption in some transcendental sphere far beyond the relativities of history.'[3] When he replies to these criticisms Bultmann makes the very puzzling comment (p. 118) that 'an eternal idea is just as discernible in the mythical presentation of the Cross as it is in pagan mythology'. If by this he means to say that this is the meaning of the Cross

[1] *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 185. [2] ibid., pp. 150-1. [3] ibid., p. 85.

then he is indeed guilty of an abstraction that leaves us with no distinctively Christian message.

In making these comments on the demythologising debate I have been anxious to see how the lessons we learn from Kierkegaard can be used as criteria. He himself would not have countenanced any dogmatic pronouncements, and to imagine that we either can or should dispose of Bultmann's work by such comments as these is a mistake. If, however, our comments are at all helpful in a negative way, it confirms the view that Kierkegaard is a useful guide.

THEOLOGICAL THINKING

TWO ACCOUNTS: BARTH AND AQUINAS

by Dr R. A. MARKUS

Of all great theologians Karl Barth lends himself perhaps least of all to any attempt at reconciliation on a superficial level, to a reconciliation which would obscure the basic differences between his position and that of his opponents. And yet, his work exerts a compulsion on his readers to rethink their positions in its light. It does this even more by the echoes it seems so often to contain of the judgment under which all human thinking stands, than by the challenge of its clarity and its authentically Christocentric character. The 'confessional conversation' to which his work cannot but give rise must proceed piecemeal, by patient and painstaking discussion of Christian theology topic by topic. I want to examine one particular topic of theological discussion in this paper: that of the nature and structure of theological thinking itself. I shall try to outline and to compare two of the most highly developed and consciously thought-out accounts of what theological thinking consists in: the accounts given by Barth, and by St. Thomas Aquinas. Fundamental though this question is, it is well to remind ourselves at the outset of its restricted canvas. For whatever convergence we may discover in the two accounts of what theological thinking is, there may be endless scope for divergence concerning some of the topics relevant to these accounts. I may instance those of the Bible, faith, revelation—all of them concepts central to our inquiry, yet concepts on which agreement can scarcely be taken for granted. For this reason, too, the outline I shall give here of these two accounts must be more or less curtailed.

Barth's theology—to take this first—springs from the demands of the pastoral situation. Its origin and its mode of procedure both have their source in the predicament which faces the preacher confronted with his congregation and called upon to make the word of God heard in its midst. For Barth, the Christian theologian's task is conceivable only in this context.

As he put it, addressing a gathering of pastors in 1922, 'I do not come to you armed with a new and astonishing theology, but I want to take my place *among* you with a theology—which may be your own—which consists simply in an understanding of and sympathy for the situation which every minister faces.'[1] This situation can succinctly be described by saying that the minister stands between Bible and congregation. His task is to make its message heard and understood, to utter the word of God to human listeners in *their* language.

For Barth, the Bible is for men the gateway to a new world. This is how he has described the radical novelty of this world in one of his most moving addresses: 'It is the Bible itself, it is the straight inexorable logic of its march which drives us out beyond ourselves and invites us, without regard to our worthiness or unworthiness, to reach for the last highest answer, in which all is said that can be said, although we can hardly understand and only stammeringly express it. And that answer is: a new world, the world of God.'[2] . . . 'It is not the right human thoughts about God which form the content of the Bible, but the right divine thoughts about men. The Bible tells us not how we should talk with God but what he says to us; not how we find our way to him, but how he has sought and found the way to us; not the right relation in which we must place ourselves to him, but the covenant which he has made with all who are Abraham's spiritual children and which he has sealed once and for all in Jesus Christ. It is this which is in the Bible. The word of God is in the Bible.'[3]

Barth stops short of allowing us to identify the Bible with revelation without further qualification; but nonetheless, it is our only means of access to revelation, it *contains* the Word of God. And this means that it is our only way to receive some glimpse into God's mind, to see ourselves and our world as it is seen and present to God's mind. All our thinking about the world and about God is distinguished from the Bible's simply by their being ours, while the Bible's is not ours, but contains God's thoughts. Our task in trying to follow its ways is to respond in faith; indeed, Barth has described faith as consisting precisely in this daring to abandon ourselves to being carried

[1] Reprinted in *The Word of God and the Word of Man*, p. 103.
[2] loc. cit., p. 34. [3] ibid., p. 43.

along by its current.[1] It would take us too far afield to enter here into his account of faith. But although faith is a gift beyond the natural capabilities of sinful men, once the gift is received, it involves the whole man with all the capacities and abilities with which he happens to be endowed. 'It is our part', Barth says, 'to conform [to the meaning of the world as seen in the Bible] by labouring to relate ourselves, our daily task and our hour of history to God the Creator and Redeemer. It is not a meaning apart from other meanings, for in it all others—the meanings of natural science, of history, of aesthetics, and of religion—are at once included and concluded. . . .'[2]

A decisive part of the Church's response to the Word of God heard in faith is what Barth calls 'proclamation'. 'Proclamation is human language in and through which God Himself speaks. . . . If human language claims to be proclamation, that can only mean that it claims to serve the Word of God, to point to its having previously been spoken through God Himself.'[3] To this task the preacher has to bring whatever equipment he is endowed with; for he is called on to utter to his hearers the words which may speak to them the Word of God, in so far as his words are put at its service and in so far as it accepts and appropriates his words. For no man can utter the Word of God —this much is axiomatic for Barth no less than for theologians of the Thomist tradition. What a man can do, and must do, if he is called to the task, is to make the Word of God heard in the particular setting in which he finds himself, to speak the language of his fellows and to proclaim the message of the Bible in *that* language. This is possible for the simple reason that his thinking and his language are, though not identical with the thought and language of the Bible—he does not merely repeat its words as written in Hebrew and Greek—but related to them: he translates the words into English or German, or whatever it may be, comments on them, explains them, and tries to embody their substance in his own thought and language. God, in the Bible, has spoken human language: on this single fact rests the possibility of translating the words he has spoken into further human languages—and once you

[1] loc. cit., p. 34. [2] ibid., p. 52.
[3] *The Doctrine of the Word of God* (Vol. 1, part 1 of the *Church Dogmatics*, Eng. tr.), p. 57.

are launched on the process of translation, there is no limit to the creative activity which may be brought to the task.[1] It is not, as Barth puts it, human language that grasps revelation, but revelation which has grasped human language. And having grasped it at one point, in the Word of God as attested in the written words of the Bible, no limit can be assigned to the possibility of endless expansion of this grasp of human language by revelation. In trying to understand and make understood what the Bible has to say, we expand, so to speak, our initial 'yes' to it, given in the assent in faith to God's Word, into a 'yes' which involves all that is relevant in our own mental world.

The possibility, however, of bringing to bear on the unfolding of the content of revelation all human language and all human thinking, brings with it an ever present danger: that of infidelity to the Word received, even in all good faith; or that of yielding to the subtle and besetting temptation of substituting one's own improved version for the authentic *embodied* in one's own. In all her speech about God, Barth reminds us, 'the Church is aware of her exposure to fierce temptation in speaking of God, aware also that she has to reckon with God for her speaking'.[2] This is the point at which systematic theological discipline, which Barth calls dogmatics, has its part to play. Its task is simply to guard against the persistent danger of a gap widening between the Church's proclamation and the revealed Word of God. The theologian, as indeed every Christian, knows that the possibility of indefinite expansion of the human language put at the service of the Word of God carries with itself the risk of infidelity and inaccuracy; he knows that all attempt to penetrate to a deeper understanding involves the risk of misunderstanding. Hence the need for a discipline of a renewed confrontation of the language of the Church's proclamation with its sole criterion and origin, the Word of God. To quote Barth's preliminary definition: 'As a theological discipline, dogmatics is the scientific test to which the Christian Church puts herself regarding the language about God which is peculiar to her.'[3] Barth lays all the stress on the essentially critical, and, if need be, corrective function of dogmatics. Just because there is nothing in all human language that is ultimately incapable, in

[1] Cf. op. cit., p. 390. [2] op. cit., p. 1. [3] ibid.

principle, of relevance to our speech about God, in the last resort all our speech can be put to the question just in so far as it claims to proclaim the Word of God. Proclamation becomes material for dogmatics in so far as it is man's word, in spite of the claim and expectation that it has to tell man the Word of God to be heard in faith.[1]

At one point this account seems to offer a striking contrast, as we shall see, with the Thomist account of theological thinking. This is Barth's relative indifference to the question—a vital one to St. Thomas—whether theology is a 'science'. He is very much on edge in the presence of the claim that theology is a science—the claim could compromise the uniqueness of its subject-matter and of its final court of appeal. He allows it nevertheless, and thereby reminds us of what dogmatics shares with all other scientific disciplines: it is a human inquiry into truth, it is a discipline subject to exacting standards of its own and has a method of procedure appropriate to its task.[2]

It would hardly be too far-fetched to say that St. Thomas' account of theological thinking is dominated by his concern to answer the question how theology can be a science. When we speak of 'science' in this context, we must, of course, have in mind the Aristotelian conception of a body of knowledge capable of organisation in a syllogistic, or at any rate in a deductive structure. In such a structured body of knowledge conclusions and the premises or first principles from which they follow are exhibited in such a way to display their logical relations; and to grasp them in these relations will be to understand them 'scientifically'. We can then re-phrase the question in this form: how is it possible to have such an organised, deductive structure of knowledge where we are, in an unusually literal sense, 'in the dark' concerning the premises or first principles from which deduction must start?

This indeed, was the problem which the medieval Aristotelians solved in what now appears as a revolutionary way.[3] The reason why earlier theologians could not readily commit themselves to calling theology a science lay in the fact that in calling a body of knowledge a 'science' one was asserting, precisely,

[1] op. cit., p. 51. [2] Cf. op. cit., pp. 3-11, 315-30.
[3] For a masterly statement of the position, cf. M.-D. Chenu, O.P., *La théologie comme science au XIIIième siècle*, Paris, 1943.

that it aspired to and achieved a state of rational transparency and coherence which theology could not claim without surrendering its special task: that of being concerned with what is believed by faith and known only in the fragmentary and darkened manner appropriate to sinful men in the flesh. 'Faith' and 'science' were mutually exclusive ways of knowing, and theology could not abandon its concern precisely with the content of the Christian Church's faith in God's revelation.[1]

How then, are we to speak of theology as a 'science' without compromising the crucial truth that it has its source in and concern with what is known by faith? St. Thomas formulates his own prolegomena to dogmatics—so we may surely call the first question of his *Summa theologiae*—in terms of the Aristotelian theory of the subordination of sciences. In this language, a science is said to be subordinate to another superior science, when it is organised into a coherent and systematic structure with the aid of first principles which belong not within it, but which it borrows from outside, from the 'superior' science. The kind of model in terms of which Aquinas is thinking here is that of, say, geometrical optics in its relation to geometry or the theory of sound in its relation to arithmetic. In each case the subordinate science, optics or acoustics, is concerned with sensible phenomena whose order and coherence is exhibited with the aid of mathematical treatment. We may, of course, question the appropriateness of this way of speaking of mathematics in relation to the fields where it finds application; but the important thing for us at present is to understand why this model should have commended itself to St. Thomas as a way of mapping the logic of theological thinking.

The lower science, on this model, achieves the kind of intelligibility, in virtue of its subordination to the higher, which is appropriate to the higher science: mere sensible phenomena come to be understood with the aid of a mathematical calculus and thereby knowledge of them becomes applied mathematics. Theology—*sacra doctrina*—Aquinas says, is a science in so far as it borrows its premises or first principles from a superior 'science', in this case from the knowledge of God which God has of Himself and which is shared, in some measure, by those who see Him face to face.[2] Revelation he regards as glimpses

[1] Cf. *Summa theologiae*, 2a 2ae, q. 1, art. 4.

[2] Cf. 1a, q. 1, art. 4.

given by God into His own mind, Himself and the world as seen in His mind. This revelation is given by God in manifold ways, through the prophets and fathers of the Old Testament and above all in Christ; its written record is the Bible. We need not enter here into the precise status of the Bible, which does, of course, differ substantially from the status it has in Barth's account. It will suffice for our present purpose to say that in St. Thomas's view, in her creeds, the Church confesses, in summary form, what she believes to be the saving, crucial truths of the biblical revelation, and it is their articles he has in mind when he speaks of the premises of theological thinking—or more precisely, in his own words, of 'sacred teaching'.[1]

This 'sacred teaching' is what God has chosen to teach men in His revelation. It comprises the scriptural revelation as well as what we should nowadays call 'theology', precisely in so far as it is continuous with God's teaching. God Himself has taken the first step in communicating the premises of our theological thinking. His revelation is imparted through the medium of human language in the Bible; since revelation has once grasped human language and human thinking in the Bible, it has provided for the possibility of an unlimited extension of this grasp in a way we have already observed when we spoke of Barth's notion of 'proclamation'. Thus, St. Thomas argues in defence of the use of non-biblical words in theological language by remarking that 'If we were not allowed to say of God except what the Sacred Scriptures say about Him, word for word, it would follow that one could never speak of God at all in any language other than the originals in which the Old and New Testaments were first given. But the need to dispute with heretics has compelled us to find new terms in which to express the old faith.'[2] Faith, in this theological tradition, is the total subordination of man's mind to God's. It is the response to the revealed Word of God recorded in the Bible, an intellectual obedience organised around the crucial points fixed by the Church's credal confessions. St. Thomas uses the model of the subordination of sciences to illuminate the way in which our need to 'understand' the revelation accepted as given is met. It is the theologian's task—his special task in the believing community, but also the task of each believer in his own measure—

[1] Cf. 2a 2ae, q. 1, art. 9 and ad 1m.

[2] Cf. 1a, q. 29, art. 3, ad 1m.

to grasp the revelation without violating its mystery, by bringing what is relevant in his human thinking and human language into relation with the human language and human nature assumed by God, on His own free initiative, in His revelation. The two sides of theological thinking, the attempt to seize the meaning of the given revelation intellectually and the concern to exploit it in thought, to allow it to penetrate into as much of human thinking as is relevant to it, are inseparable. The 'sacred teaching' is thus the whole which comprises the divine revelation and the human work of appropriation and penetration which we should call 'theology'. Faith, addressed by God in human language and compelled to speak in human language, inevitably produces a 'science' which in its turn nourishes faith, the complete intellectual subjection of man to God: 'that in this fashion', as St. Thomas writes, 'the sacred teaching might become so to speak an impression of God's own knowledge.'[1]

St. Thomas's account of theological thinking is concerned primarily to answer the question how it is possible for human thinking to be homogeneous with divine revelation, its object in the sphere of theological discipline. His very phrase 'sacred teaching' is designed to embrace both the divine initiative and its continuation in the process of human appropriation. Writing at the culmination of a new quest for understanding the traditional faith with the aid of new conceptual equipment, to embody it in new intellectual form and display it in new linguistic scaffolding, his first concern was to vindicate the possibility of this enterprise without prejudice to the content of the faith handed down. That such activity required continuous self-criticism went without saying: *scientia* is by its nature reflective, self-critical and self-corrective. In fastening attention on this function of theological thinking, by distinguishing it under the heading 'dogmatics' from the wider constructive work of 'proclamation', Barth has changed the emphasis: the critical and purifying task of theology certainly needs greater stress now than in an age in which systematic theology was just emerging from biblical study, and the *quaestiones* raised by reading the sacred texts began to achieve independence and to become slowly grouped into *summae*. Barth's influence in 'extricating the Christian faith from the idolatries of our day'

[1] 1a, q. 1, art. 3, ad 2m.

(as Reinhold Niebuhr put it, in the course of the controversy between him and Barth after the Amsterdam Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1948) has done a great deal to help bring about a renewal of faith in many quarters. In his 'dogmatics', he summons us to confront the Church's proclamation with its sole final criterion, the Word of God. But taken together with its wider, creative background, that of proclamation, is this more restricted activity of self-criticism not something very much like the *sacra doctrina* as defined by St. Thomas? Whatever the divergent emphases—and we can readily supply reasons for their divergence—in substance, proclamation and dogmatics together seem coextensive with *sacra doctrina*. That each seems only partly to coincide in meaning with 'theology' raises little more than semantic issues.

DIDACTIC KERYGMA IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS

by The Rev. JOHN J. VINCENT

'Kerygma' is probably the most popular catch-word of contemporary Anglo-Saxon biblical theology. It purports to sum up what the NT has to say in a single word; it is taken over gratefully by systematicians and preachers as the long-awaited 'conclusion' of the NT critics; it is a point from which other elements can be judged and pronounced more or less Christian.

The kerygma means the post-resurrection, apostolic, Church message about the events of Jesus Christ, in whom God had acted. A prime source of this message is Acts, but the word κήρυγμα is not found there, though the verb from it occurs frequently. The word κήρυγμα occurs once in the Synoptics. The first three Gospels are, indeed, frequently left out of consideration with reference to the kerygma, and less than justice is thereby done to the Synoptic accounts of Jesus' message, and the Synoptic tradition itself as part of the Early Church's continuing witness. It is obviously true that the Synoptics as historical records cannot give the insights of the resurrection faith; but it should not be taken for granted that in the mind of our Lord and also in the mind of the later Church what is there written does not 'breathe the resurrection', as Bengel put it. Indeed, a moment's thought should make us ready to find there too a good deal on kerygma, if only because it was not the first intention of the writers to describe it. That the idea of kerygma is not confined to the occurrences of the term κήρυγμα is, in any case, the claim of *some* biblical scholars whom John Wick Bowman gathers together under the heading 'Prophetic Realists'.[1]

[1] See his article, 'From Schweitzer to Bultmann', *Theology Today*, July 1954, pp. 160-78, his book *Prophetic Realism and the Gospel*, Philadelphia 1955, and the new journal which he edits, *Prophetic Realism*. Bowman traces the 'thoroughgoing eschatology' of 'apocalyptic pessimism', and then the 'thoroughgoing scepticism' or 'humanistic optimism' of the more this-worldly 'liberals'. The alternative to 'conversing with God at long range' and 'the monologue of reason' is to be found in 'Prophetic Realism—the dialogue of revelation'. The key words are *evangelion*,

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It is hardly possible to give any consideration of didache and kerygma in the NT without paying attention to the work of C. H. Dodd. It may, therefore, be convenient to summarise the conclusions of Dodd, the more so as the present study tends to modify them at several decisive points.

The NT draws 'a clear distinction between preaching and teaching'.[1] Teaching (*διδαχή*) is in a large majority of cases ethical instruction, though occasionally it is apologetic and (in John) the exposition of theological doctrine. Preaching (*κήρυγμα*, from *κῆρυξ*, a town crier, herald, auctioneer) is the public proclamation of Christianity to the non-Christian world. *Κηρύσσω* frequently takes *εὐαγγέλιον* for its object; and the verb *εὐαγγελίζω* is its virtual equivalent, 'to preach the gospel'. As to the *content* of kerygma, Dodd finds the key in the Pauline letters, where the pattern of preaching is found: (1) the prophecies are fulfilled, the new age inaugurated in the coming of Christ, (2) who was born of the seed of David, died according to the scriptures to deliver us from the present age, was buried, rose on the third day according to the scriptures, is exalted at the right hand of God as Son of God and Lord of quick and dead; (3) Christ will come again as judge and saviour of men.[2] This same pattern is found in Acts, save that there (1) Jesus is not called 'Son of God' but rather 'Servant', (2) Jesus does not die for our sins, (3) the exalted Christ does not intercede for us (as in Paul).[3] The Gospels are invoked as further examples of 'a valuation of the life of Jesus in eschatological terms'.[4] Mark is to be re-

kerygma, Heilsgeschichte. Most of the NT scholars engaged in theological writing in Britain and America are included in the 'school', if they use these primary concepts, together with Oscar Cullmann and (with more reservation) Ethelbert Stauffer and Rudolf Bultmann. Bowman's view is an over-simplification. It is symptomatic of the anxiety to 'call a halt' in NT theology. It is a sure sign, too, that some new insights are needed. The kerygmatic preoccupation is shared, of course, by the so-called 'crisis' theologians. For Bultmann (and John Knox), NT theology begins only with the Church's kerygma—the message of Jesus is neither theologically significant nor historically reliable. The retreat into the Church's kerygma is thus for many a convenient way of disposing of the theological difficulties of the Synoptics. Again for systematic or philosophical theologians, the kerygma provides a detachable, essential element which can then be used without further reference to the NT. This is often the case with 'existentialist' theologians and with Paul Tillich, for example. 'Consistent kerygmatism' is a peculiarly Protestant malady, and may owe as much to a diminished Lutheran Doctrine of the Word as to the supposed contemporary need for a de-historicised message.

[1] *The Apostolic Preaching and its Development*, London, re-set 1944, p. 7.
[2] ibid., p. 17 etc.
[3] ibid., p. 25f.
[4] For the following, see esp. op. cit., pp. 46-56.

garded as 'an expanded form of the middle, or historical, section' (our section (2) above), though the context is that of fulfilment, the nearness of the kingdom, especially after Peter's confession when the Cross becomes the decisive moment of its manifestation. Mark is the model for the other Gospel-writers, though Matthew and Luke depart from 'the original perspective and emphasis on the kerygma', putting less emphasis proportionately upon the passion, death, and resurrection, but giving prominence to the kerygmatic element 'born of the seed of David'. The nativity stories, which contradict the genealogies, are non-kerygmatic, especially since kerygma was essentially public proclamation (K. L. Schmidt). Matthew emphasises the theme of 'fulfilment' by his use of OT prophecies, but is also characterised by (1) 'a new law given by the messianic king'; 'it is not so much a gospel of "realised eschatology" as a new and higher code of ethics', due to the indefinite postponement of the second advent and judgment, and the Church's adjustment to meet this. 'Matthew is, in fact, no longer in the pure sense a "Gospel".' Didache predominates over kerygma; (2) a marked development of 'futurist eschatology'; the first coming was to give the law by which Messiah's people were to live until his second coming. Luke emphasises the kerygmatic phrase 'going about doing good, for God was with him' found especially in some of the summaries in Acts, and shows increased interest in Jesus as a human wonder-worker, as the friend and lover of men, especially those who were without the Law, as the ideal for human conduct. In John there is a return to the kerygmatic tradition running through Mark, though the eschatological framework has been transformed.

Apart from the criticism of over-systematisation, the thesis of Dodd has gained general acceptance. Once one agrees that the Pauline message is, indeed, typical of the earliest Christianity, there is little reason to complain at the somewhat unsympathetic treatment meted out to the Gospels. I believe that there are reasons for doubting that the early κήρυγμα was as widely acknowledged or as universally influential as Dodd asserts, especially with reference to the probable situation of 'Discipleship' in the earliest Church. At the moment, however, we must confine ourselves specifically to the Synoptic authori-

ties. Krister Stendahl has offered some pertinent criticisms at this point. He begins by referring to a book of Gustaf Wingren,[1] in which the author tries to prove that 1 Peter contains κήρυγμα. Stendahl replies[2] that the letters do not contain κήρυγμα, but rather build upon it in terms of exposition, warning, exhortation. Stendahl observes that Wingren is using κήρυγμα to describe: (1) the character of preaching as functional, formal activity (*Formalbegriff*), (2) the content of preaching as (usually) the story of Jesus (*Inhaltsbegriff*). Now, Dodd confines the term κήρυγμα to *Inhaltsbegriff*, and interprets this as meaning the summary of certain facts of *Heilsgeschichte*. But Stendahl observes that regular preaching (1) can be 'kerygmatic', but does not necessarily have 'kerygma' as its content (2). The content of 'kerygma' can be (*a*) a summary of *Heilsgeschichte* events, or (*b*) what Stendahl prefers to call '*kerygmatisch*', which may be concrete exhortation or teaching. Κηρύσσειν is not necessarily tied to κήρυγμα as its content, just as παρακαλεῖν is not necessarily tied to παράκλησις as its content, or even διδάσκειν to διδαχή as its content. A good example is in Rom. 2.21:

> ὁ οὖν διδάσκων ἕτερον, σεαυτὸν οὐ διδάσκεις;
> ὁ κηρύσσων μὴ κλέπτειν, κλέπτεις;

Here it is quite evident that ὁ διδάσκων and ὁ κηρύσσων are not sharply to be distinguished, the more so since the 'content' of the preacher's preaching (κήρυγμα) is good, solid ethical διδαχή! So also Acts 2.40 and 2 Cor. 5.20, where παρακαλεῖν is used.

The relevance of Stendahl's argument to our own is evident. We may say aside, however, that his suggestion is relevant also to contemporary biblical theology. Concern with the purity of kerygma as a faithful recital of salvation facts may be the greatest irrelevance (*unkerygmatisches Kerygma* as Stendahl would call it), while much NT and Church proclamation directed to a particular problem or couched in non-*heilsgeschichtlicher* terminology may in fact in the given situation be faithful kerygmatic preaching (*kerygmatisches Nicht-Kerygma*). The current complaint that the revival in biblical theology tends to find little *Anknüpfungspunkt* in man, and leads to little practical result in his behaviour, may, indeed, not be without founda-

[1] *Predikan*, Lund, 1949.

[2] 'Kerygma and Kerygmatisch, von zweideuten Ausdrücken den Predigt der Urkirche—und unserer'. *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, December 1952, pp. 715-20.

tion.[1] If this is the case, it may well be due to the unnatural separation of preaching and teaching.

Neither Dodd nor Stendahl were giving primary consideration to the Synoptic Gospels. On this subject, we may quote the words of Gerhard Friedrich on 'Teaching and Preaching in the Synoptics'[2]:

In the NT, especially in the Synoptics, *κηρύσσειν* and *διδάσκειν* often stand side by side: Matt. 4.23, 9.35, 11.1, Acts 28.31 (cf. Rom. 2.21). The teaching usually is given in the Synagogue, the preaching in the open air, in each place. (It is never said of John the Baptist that he taught.) The hearers of the preaching are different from those of the teaching.[3] *Διδασκαλία* is the exposition of scripture on the Sabbath for the pious in the Synagogue, to improve their knowledge. The *κήρυγμα* is the proclamation, made in the cities and villages, on the streets and in the houses. It is directed to all, to sinners and publicans, and makes contact with those who stand 'afar' (Luke 18.13), and who would not go to the gathering of the pious. The call includes them also.

Now the NT also speaks of *κηρύσσειν* in the Synagogue. Jesus did not merely give a theoretical scripture-exposition when He spoke in the Synagogue: He did not read the scripture as the Rabbis, in that He said 'This you must do', but His teaching became preaching when He cried, 'The voice of God says to you today, This day is this scripture fulfilled' (Luke 4.21). His exposition was proclamation, and His teaching of the coming of the kingdom became the challenge asking for a decision for or against it. Therefore His preaching was so wholly different from the Scribes in the Synagogue services: *ἦν γὰρ διδάσκων αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων καὶ οὐχ ὡς οἱ γραμματεῖς αὐτῶν* (Matt. 7.29).

An interesting footnote on the same page carries our inquiry a stage further:

In the sending out of the disciples, Mark 3.14f has: *κηρύσσειν καὶ... ἐκβάλλειν τὰ δαιμόνια.* At their return, Mark 6.30 says: *ἀπήγγειλαν αὐτῷ πάντα ὅσα ἐποίησαν καὶ ὅσα ἐδίδαξαν.* Here it becomes unquestionable that *κηρύσσειν* and *διδάσκειν* can be employed as synonyms.

We may take it, then, that the Synoptics do not differentiate so strictly between *κηρύσσω* and *διδάσκω*, as regards *the activity of proclaiming*. This was *κηρύσσω* in Stendahl's category (1),

[1] Cf. A. N. Wilder's comments in *Otherworldliness and the NT*, New York 1954, London 1956, and his essay 'Kerygma, Eschatology and Social Ethics', in *The Background of the NT and its Eschatology; Studies in honour of C. H. Dodd*, London, 1956. Stendahl's own work in *The School of Matthew* tends to emphasise the importance of teaching as over against kerygmatic preoccupation.

[2] *Th. Wb. zum NT.*, vol. III, p. 713.

[3] This distinction of audience cannot, I think, rigidly be maintained. But cf. T. W. Manson, *The Teaching of Jesus*, Cambridge 1931, where the content varies for Pharisees, people, and disciples. See below.

Formalbegriff. *Κηρύσσω* as the activity of proclaiming, preaching, cannot be sharply distinguished from *διδάσκω* as the activity of teaching. Friedrich's distinction above between preaching within the context of 'open-air' mission, and teaching within the Synagogue would, I think, only have occurred to him by looking at the matter through Matthaean eyes. This will become clearer as we turn now to consider *κήρυγμα* as the *content* (*Inhaltsbegriff*) of the action of *κηρύσσειν*, especially to see whether Stendahl's category of '*kerygmatisch*' finds any basis within the Gospels.

The word *κήρυγμα* itself only appears twice in the whole of the Gospels, in a single parallel sentence spoken by our Lord concerning Jonah: *ἄνδρες Νινευῖται ἀναστήσονται ἐν τῇ κρίσει μετὰ τῆς γενεᾶς ταύτης, καὶ κατακρινοῦσιν αὐτήν· ὅτι μετενόησαν εἰς τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰωνᾶ, καὶ ἰδού, πλεῖον Ἰωνᾶ ὧδε* (Matt. 12.41 = Luke 11.32). Elsewhere in the NT, the word is used only six times, all by Paul. It occurs four times in the LXX translating קוֹל and קְרִיאָה.[1] It is the word for 'what is announced by a *κῆρυξ*'. The verb *κηρύσσω* is 'to be a herald, to proclaim'. Stendahl's '*Formalbegriff*' (sense 1) meaning the *κήρυγμα* does not, of course, refer to the actual deed of sounding the proclamation, which would be *κήρυξις*, a word not used in the NT. The verb *κηρύσσω*, however, does mean 'the making of the noise', and does not have any necessary reference to the matter proclaimed (LXX for קָרָא).[2]

[1] קוֹל means 'to call, make a noise' at 2 Chron. 30.5, and in the latter sense is found in Aramaic. קְרִיאָה, 'proclamation', occurs uniquely (as in the Synoptics) in connexion with Jonah. Jon. 3.2 tells of Jonah's instructions to go to Nineveh and 'proclaim to it the proclamation' (וְקְרָא אֵלֶיהָ אֶת־הַקְּרִיאָה; LXX *καὶ κήρυξον ἐν αὐτῇ κατὰ τὸ κήρυγμα*). The *κῆρυξ* played a prominent role in Greek thought and life (cf. Gerhard Friedrich, *Th. Wb. zum NT.*, vol. III, pp. 682-94). *Κῆρυξ* occurs in the LXX at Gen. 41.43, Ecclus. 20.15, Dan. 3.4, 4 Macc. 6.4. It has been thought that כָּרוֹז in Dan. 3.4 was a transliteration of *κῆρυξ*, but it seems likely that it is derived from the Hebrew and Aramaic verb כרז (וְכָרוֹזָא קָרֵא, 'and the herald shouted'; LXX *καὶ ὁ κῆρυξ ἐβόα*, TH *καὶ ὁ κῆρυξ ἐκήρυξε*). The infrequency of *κῆρυξ* in the NT may arise from concern with that which is preached, as the Word of God, rather than with the human activity of the person preaching it.

[2] Hence *κηρύσσω* and קרא are not found in the LXX and OT with the religious content usually denoted by *κηρύσσω* in the NT. A much more biblical word is *εὐαγγελίζω*, which is regularly used in the LXX to translate בשר, 'to preach a joyful message'. Especially in Deutero-Isaiah, that which is proclaimed is 'a great victory of Jahveh, his enthronisation, his kingship, the breaking-in of the

With reference to what, then, is *κηρύσσω* used in the Synoptics? Dodd is certainly right when he asserts that Mark fits best into his kerygmatic scheme. It is Mark's normal practice to speak of 'preaching the Gospel (of God)', though he uses the word eight other times, and Matthew uses it four times for 'preaching the Gospel (of the kingdom)':

	Matt.	Mark	Luke	Acts	Paul
κηρύσσω τὸ εὐαγγέλιον	4	4	0	0	3
κηρύσσω εἰς . . .	0	2	1	0	1
κηρύσσω ἵνα . . .	0	1	0	0	1
κηρύσσω Χριστὸν, Ἰησοῦν	0	0	0	3	6
Other uses	7	5	8	5	7

The 'other uses' in the Synoptics are Mark 1.38 (content not stated), 1.39 (*εἰς*, content not stated), 1.45 (healed leper preaches 'much', *πολλὰ*), 3.14 (twelve appointed to be with Him, to be sent out to preach, and to have authority over demons; content not stated), 5.20 (the Gerasene demoniac preaches how much Jesus had done for him), 6.12 (the mission two by two, to preach that men should repent, *ἵνα*), 7.36 (the deaf mute, the more he was charged to keep silence, the more he preached), 16.20 (they went forth and preached everywhere). Now, in some of these cases, Mark undoubtedly has in mind *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, but the variety of uses here should make us pause before generalising too widely even on the basis of Mark. In at least two cases, the 'content' of the preaching was a healed person's testimony to Jesus as a miraculous healer. The phrase *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ* is not without its problems. *Τοῦ Θεοῦ* could be objective ('about God'), or subjective ('from God') genitive. The phrase is Pauline, and looks dangerously like a *cliché* of the early tradition. It hardly takes our search for *content* very much further. Only in Mark 1.15 are we given any indication of this:

New Time' (Friedrich, ibid., vol. II, p. 706), and this meaning continued in Palestinian Judaism. The usage is sometimes remarkably akin to that of the NT, with *δικαιοσύνη*, *σωτηρία* and *εἰρήνη* as subjects of the preaching. In the NT, Luke seems to use *εὐαγγελίζω* as a synonym for *κηρύσσω* (cf. Luke 4.43f with Mark 1.38; cf. Luke's phrase *κηρύσσων καὶ εὐαγγελιζόμενος* at 8.1, and *διδάσκω* and *εὐαγγελίζω* together at 20.1); and what is said below concerning the content of *κηρύσσω* would apply equally to *εὐαγγελίζω*. The noun *εὐαγγέλιον*, however, is not used in the LXX in a religious sense, translating בְּשׂוֹרָה (or בְּשֹׂרָה) six times, two with the sense 'reward for good tidings'. The noun is frequently used in Classical Greek and in the Caesar cult.

ἦλθεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν κηρύσσων τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ λέγων ὅτι Πεπλήρωται ὁ καιρός, καὶ ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ. μετανοεῖτε, καὶ πιστεύετε ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ.[1]

Our conclusion must still be that the actual contexts of the term κηρύσσω do not carry forward our search for content very far.

Luke talks of preaching 'the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins' by John the Baptist (3.3), 'release to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind' (4.18), 'the acceptable year of the Lord' (4.19; cf. Isa. 61.1-2), 'how much God has done for you' (to the cured demoniac, 8.39), 'whatever you hear in secret' (shall be preached on the housetops, 12.3), and 'in his name, repentance and forgiveness of sins' (to all the nations, beginning at Jerusalem, 24.47). The uses in Matthew's Gospel are in connexion with the words 'repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand', which are spoken by John the Baptist (3.2), Jesus (4.17), and the twelve (10.7, repentance is implied in the following verses). In two other ways Matthew adds to our evidence. In 4.23, 9.35 and 11.1 the words κηρύσσω and διδάσκω are synonymous (as Friedrich observed, see above). In 24.14 the unique phrase τοῦτο τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς βασιλείας occurs. The content here is plainly the whole of the eschatological situation described in chapter 24. The immediate context is 'he who endures to the end shall be saved' (24.13). The content of the κήρυγμα is at once eschatological and ecclesiastical, and the *point* of the matter is the need for radical μετάνοια. The content of κήρυγμα in the Gospels, then, (1) is not generally the kind of summary of *Heilsgeschichte* that we might have expected, (2) refers almost as often to repentance and forgiveness, not always in the context of a 'therefore' after a *heilsgeschichtliche* statement, (3) can also be a testimony to a miracle (see later). For any detailed content of κήρυγμα it seems that we must look elsewhere.

II

The words διδάσκαλος, διδάσκω, διδασκαλία and διδαχή are in more general use in the Synoptic Gospels than the cognates of κήρυγμα. The title ὁ διδάσκαλος is given as a rendering of the

[1] See Vincent Taylor, *Mark*, London 1952, pp. 166-7, for critical notes on this passage.

Hebrew רַבִּי, רַבּוֹן, also transliterated as *'Ραββεί*, *'Ραββουνεί*; it is the normal term used in addressing Jesus. Mark employs it so ten times (the other two occasions are: once of Jesus, and once by Jesus of Himself (14.14)), Luke twelve times (three other uses, plus one in which Jesus speaks of 'the disciple is not above his teacher' (6.40)), and Matthew only six times (plus once used of Jesus, and four times by Jesus of Himself, especially 'one is your teacher and all ye are *ἀδελφοί*' (23.8)). The word *διδασκαλία* is only used twice in the Synoptics, in parallel quotations from Isaiah 29.13. Mark uses *διδαχή* with Jesus as the teacher five times, Luke once, and Matthew twice (plus once by Jesus of the Pharisees' teaching). The verb *διδάσκω* is used ninety-five times in the NT, two-thirds of these in the Gospels and Acts 1-5. In the words of K. H. Rengstorf[1] commenting on these last figures, 'it is already clearly seen where the centre of gravity of NT *διδάσκειν* lies—in the circle of Jesus and the earliest church, and not in the Gentile Christian churches of Asia Minor or the Greek church.'

Now, what of the *content* of Synoptic *διδάσκω*? Taking alone the Gospel of Mark (since this is popularly thought to be the 'most kerygmatic' and the 'least didactic'), we find that the eighteen uses may be divided up as follows: fifteen of Jesus' work, one of His reference to Himself, one referring to His disciples (by Jesus), and one referring to false teaching. The specific content of the teaching in the case of Jesus is: 'the teaching with authority' which causes the demon to cry out, owning Him 'Holy One of God' (1.21), the teaching 'beside the lake' (cf. Friedrich!) leading to the call of Levi (2.13), more teaching 'beside the lake', in a boat, by means of the parable of the sower (4.1 and 2), no content mentioned at the synagogue in 'his own country' (6.2 and 6), the address to the 'great crowd, as sheep without a shepherd', teaching them 'many things' (6.34), 'that the Son of Man must suffer many things . . .' to the disciples after Peter's confession (8.31), the same (9.31), sayings on divorce in answer to questions (10.1), in the temple 'my house shall be called a house of prayer' (a noisy occasion for *διδάσκω* as we have usually understood it!) (11.17), 'how can the scribes say Christ is the son of David?'

[1] *Th. Wb. zum NT.*, vol. II, p. 141. The teaching is merely a radicalisation of Scribal and teaching tradition, pp. 141-5.

(12.35). Mark's uses of διδάσκω are thus as general as his uses of κηρύσσω, except that they are placed in direct relation to the questions, answers, parables, miracles and incidents which marked the progress of Jesus' ministry. There seems ground for suggesting not merely (as Friedrich rightly does) that κηρύσσω and διδάσκω are synonymous terms, but also that the word διδάσκω more directly puts us into touch with the whole Synoptic story, and therefore gives us a better indication of the *content* of the κήρυγμα. This means that the parables are material for us, as are the 'sayings'. It means also that, since κηρύσσω and διδάσκω are synonymous terms, we may turn to διδάσκω (in this wider sense) for the content of κήρυγμα which we failed to find earlier. Thus the *content* of the claim 'the kingdom of God is at hand' (κήρυγμα) is the parables; the *content* of the appeal for μετάνοια is the Sermon on the Mount; the *content* of 'release to the captives' is the miracles; just as the *content* of the healed persons' kerygmatic testimony was the story of 'how great things He had done for them' (Mark 1.45, 5.20). It has been the failure of the modern 'kerygmatic' biblical theology that when it came to the Synoptics it felt obliged to give a Pauline 'body' to the bare bones of the Synoptic kerygmatic proclamations. But this is quite unnecessary, as the (very few) kerygmatic proclamations must be seen in the light of the Synoptic tradition. It is for this reason that the only κήρυγμα of which we are entitled to speak on the basis of the Synoptics is 'a didactic kerygma'.

Thus the term Διδάσκαλος could never be an adequate title for Jesus.[1] His verbal activity always pointed beyond itself. Jesus taught ὡς ἐξουσίαν ἔχων (Mark 1.22) because of His own 'consciousness' of the significance of what He was inaugurating, to which witness was already being borne in His deeds of mercy. In Mark 1, διδάσκω (v. 21) and κηρύσσω (v. 39) are both accompanied by 'the casting out of devils' (vv. 26, 39), to which the people exclaim, 'What is this? A new διδαχὴ κατ' ἐξουσίαν. He commands even the unclean spirits, and they obey Him' (v. 27; cf. v. 45). The demons recognise the power of His word (v. 24; cf. Acts 16.17). 'Only say the word, and my servant is

[1] But on the significance of the term as applied to Jesus, see the attractive and provocative article of Erich Fascher, 'Jesus der Lehrer, ein Beitrag zur Frage dem "Quellort der Kirchenidee"', *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, June 1954, pp. 325-42.

healed' (Luke 7.7) is the Centurian's request. It is in this kind of setting that the didactic kerygma as content of the spoken word must be set, rather than either κηρύσσω or διδάσκω as *Formalbegriff*. 'My word shall not return unto Me רֵיקָם, without success or booty' (Isa. 55.11), not least when 'the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us' (John 1.14). Neither κηρύσσω nor διδάσκω adequately describe what really happened.

It should be noted that the same juxtaposition of preaching-and-teaching and healing also occurs in the Acts. May it not be that the reason for conversion was the *evidence* of the apostolic κήρυγμα (in Jesus' resurrection, in the disciples' observable transformation, in the healing miracles, the 'tongues', the economic witness) rather than a detached recital of claims about Jesus? Certainly, the disciples would have been well prepared by example if not power in the earthly days of their Lord so to expect the Spirit and grace of God to manifest themselves. The disciple had tried to live so, because he knew no kerygma until he had surrendered himself to the demands which Jesus' word and person made upon him. He knew no gospel but that which had demanded his all from him—the *law-full* gospel of Jesus.[1] (Εὐαγγελίζω is not actually used by Mark at all; it is Luke's phrase: he uses it ten times to Matthew's one.) This is 'presenting the good news'. It is presenting Jesus who *is* the good news. And the whole of the διδαχή of Jesus is the description of the event, the demands, the circumstances, and the implications of the good news—that is, *of Himself*. He is the one described in the beatitudes; He is the judge, the master, the shepherd, the householder, the messenger; He is the Physician, the Good Samaritan, and the Lord. The sermon, the parables, and the sayings are the only kerygma of which the Synoptics know. They are not 'mere' teachings: they are didactic kerygma, and the disciple is one who not merely responds to 'good news' (saying 'Lord, Lord'), but throws in his lot with the one who first gave up all, and takes up his cross with the one who first bears it for all. He is the one who 'hears the word of the Lord and does it'. And everything that Jesus began 'both to do and to teach' is his meat and his drink, now that he is (as

[1] So 'The Evangelism of Jesus', *Journal of Bible and Religion*, October 1955, pp. 266-71, which perhaps over-stresses the self-sacrificial aspect as personal discipline rather than Christological incorporation.

Paul would say) in the Body of Christ. It would have been the greatest deceit to have preached anything else but what in fact life 'in the Body' is like. And Jesus was no deceiver when he 'preached the gospel'. The disciple as evangelist is no deceiver either. He knows the truth of the saying, 'The μαθητής shall be as his κύριος.'

The content of didactic kerygma is, then, the whole person and mission of Jesus as presented to and imposed upon the crowds, and as surrendered to by those who become disciples, who then themselves pass it on. It is the Way of the Cross; for the marks of the Cross are the means of identifying the Resurrection Lord and the Disciple Church. The radical διδαχή is the κήρυγμα of God. And the Synoptic Gospels, far from being insignificant as far as 'the real business' of the Church is concerned, hold fast to the tradition that the Church's *raison d'être* is to remain faithful to the Way of the Lord. The activity of Jesus delineates Church activity. The confusion and interrelatedness of preaching, teaching, healing and witness in the Synoptics—so that the verbs often occur together, rather like the 'summaries' in Acts, with little attention to chronological history—points to the unity of these in the Person and Work of Jesus. It also suggests that there existed churches in the second half of the first century for whom the resurrection meant ever and again a recall to the life described there. The subtle distinctions between preaching and teaching, justification and sanctification, gospel and law, faith and works, were hardly so relevant when Jesus and His Way were the object of concern. What Jesus said—the didactic kerygma—was decisive. It 'presented Him in all His offices'. The διδαχή was the gracious κήρυγμα of God. The κήρυγμα was that the διδαχή described God.

THE CONFESSION 'JESUS IS GOD' IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

by The Rev. A. W. WAINWRIGHT

In a chapter of his book *Glaube und Verstehen*, recently translated into English under the title *Essays Philosophical and Theological*, Professor Rudolf Bultmann has discussed, by no means favourably, the Christological Confession of the World Council of Churches. The words of the Confession are: 'The World Council of Churches is composed of Churches which acknowledge Jesus Christ as God and Saviour.' Bultmann directs his attention chiefly to the confession that Jesus is God.[1] In the New Testament he finds only one verse in which Jesus is undoubtedly called God. That is John 20.28, in which Thomas addresses Jesus as 'My Lord and my God!' In contrast with this single example, there is in Bultmann's opinion a great amount of evidence that the writers of the New Testament believed that Jesus was subordinate to His Father.

Bultmann also criticises the statement 'Jesus is God' for its ambiguity. He comes to the conclusion that the statement is correct in the sense that Christ is 'the event of God's acting'.[2] But he argues that it is false 'in every sense in which God is understood as an entity which can be objectivised'.[3]

In the following pages the ambiguity of the formula will not be discussed. Attention will be confined to the question whether the statement 'Jesus Christ is God' is in accordance with the teaching of the New Testament. Those passages will be examined in which it can be argued that Jesus is given the title θεός. Bultmann thinks that there is only one sure instance of the ascription of this title to Jesus (John 20.28), but several other passages require discussion. An attempt will be made to prove that the confession 'Jesus Christ is God' is in accordance with the teaching of the New Testament. If the confession is ambiguous, it possesses an ambiguity which the Church of the first century, like the World Council of Churches in the twentieth century, was prepared to tolerate.

[1] p. 273. [2] p. 276. [3] p. 287.

Before the passages are examined separately, it will not be unrewarding to consider the various types of criticism which have been practised upon them. If these passages were interpreted according to the natural linguistic usage, many of them would certainly refer to Jesus as God. But critics have not been influenced only by linguistic probability. Other arguments have been brought forward and allowed to outweigh the linguistic evidence. An assessment is required of the relative importance of the different types of evidence which have been used.

One type of argument may be described as theological. A New Testament passage is interpreted so as to conform to the orthodoxy of the creeds. If an interpretation does not conform, it is rejected. This type of argument is not often used by modern scholars, but may creep in by the back door. Indeed there is a trace of it in Hort's comments on Titus 2.13: *προσδεχόμενοι τὴν μακαρίαν ἐλπίδα καὶ ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. According to one interpretation this verse refers to 'the appearing of the glory of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ'. Hort writes: 'It to say the least suggests "division" of "substance", a *separate* Deity, the Deity of Tritheism, not the equally perfect Deity of a Person of the One Godhead. This is very unlike St. Paul and the NT.'[1]

Hort brings forward other arguments, and the main point of the paragraph quoted may be the inconsistency of the interpretation with the usual teaching of the New Testament. But Hort gives unusual weight to the inconsistency of the interpretation with the Athanasian Creed. This factor ought not to influence the intepretation of the verse.

Another commoner type of argument may be described as psychological. This type of argument, unlike the former, is valid for the interpretation of a New Testament passage. It has been used with great frequency. Scholars who argue in this way claim that it is improbable or even impossible that a writer could identify Jesus with God because such an identification is inconsistent with the rest of his thought.

An example of this kind of reasoning is found in Anderson Scott's *Christianity according to St. Paul*. According to Anderson Scott Jewish monotheism was so deeply ingrained in the mind of St. Paul that he could not have identified Jesus with God.

[1] *The Epistle of James*, Additional Note, p. 103.

'What we do seem to see is the Apostle being pressed by his experience and urged by his convictions up to the verge of acknowledging that Christ is God, but finally precluded from making such acknowledgment by his hereditary monotheism'.[1] On these grounds Anderson Scott refuses to accept the view that Rom. 9.5 includes an identification of Christ with God.

In his commentary on the same verse in the Epistle to the Romans, Kirk rejects the identification for a similar reason: 'So understood it is a curiously crude statement of a great truth, and singularly unlike St. Paul's general manner of dealing with such profound questions. It is difficult to imagine that if he were content to speak so frankly here he should not have done so elsewhere in his epistles, where countless opportunities for such a course presented themselves.'[2]

Arguments of this kind occur not infrequently, especially in books about St. Paul.[3] The claim is made that, since St. Paul was a man of a particular character, brought up in a particular environment, he could not have made the statement that Christ was God. Or, if he had made the statement, he would have been constrained by his own nature to repeat it.

Although these arguments may rightly help to tilt the scales of judgment, they are in themselves of light weight. We are not in a position to say with an air of finality what was psychologically impossible for St. Paul. We are certainly not in a position to say that he was incapable of inconsistencies. The surviving works of St. Paul are small in bulk. If one or two thoughts, which they contain, do not seem to harmonise with the rest, we ought not to imagine that we can only resolve the apparent discord by finding a different interpretation of the Greek. Perhaps we are not fully attuned to St. Paul's mode of thought, which we have limited opportunities for studying, because of the small quantity of his writing which has been preserved. Beliefs which are mentioned only briefly in the surviving epistles may have been expressed at greater length in works which have perished. Some thoughts, which had great prominence in his private teaching and his devotional life, may have been deliberately veiled in the epistles. It is quite possible, for example, that St. Paul believed that Christ was

[1] *Christianity According to St. Paul*, p. 274.
[2] *Romans*, pp. 103-4.
[3] Cf. Baur, *Paulus*, p. 624; Dodd, *Romans*, p. 152.

God, and communicated this belief privately to his followers, but was reluctant to include it in his letters because he had not yet reconciled it in thought with his Jewish monotheism. Other men have held beliefs, which they could not explain rationally.

Far too much weight has been given to this kind of argument in New Testament criticism. The obvious linguistic interpretation of several important passages of scripture has been neglected in the interests of psychological probability. In a number of passages scattered through the New Testament, the construction of the Greek sentences favours the view that Christ is called God. But many critics have chosen a less natural translation of the Greek because they believe it was psychologically impossible for the writer to have said that Christ was God. The correct procedure, however, is to choose the most natural interpretation of the Greek. When two interpretations are more or less equally acceptable on linguistic grounds, it is legitimate to allow considerations of psychological probability to influence a judgment. But if the natural interpretation of the Greek seems to involve the author in an inconsistency, it should none the less be accepted. The inconsistency must be admitted. Indeed it is psychologically probable that a writer will be guilty of inconsistencies.

Although linguistic arguments ought to be our chief guide in establishing the meaning of the language of the New Testament, psychological arguments have a part to play. They can explain the development of an author's thought. They can account for his inconsistencies. They can suggest why he was silent about some doctrines and eloquent about others. But their chief function begins when the meaning of the Greek has been established. Linguistic arguments should be used to determine the meaning of the language; psychological arguments to explain the development and shape of the thought. For this second task arguments based on the historical background of the times will also be valuable. These will explain why a writer was prompted to think in a certain way and to use certain words as a vehicle for his thought. But they will not be used to support an unnatural translation of the Greek.

The passages of the New Testament, in which it is possible that Jesus was openly described as God (*θεός*), will now be reviewed. In the first group those examples will be discussed

which present no textual problems. In the second group the examples in which the text is uncertain will be examined.

I

First Group: passages in which the Greek text is certain

A. *The Pauline Epistles*

1. Rom. 9.5. . . . ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ σάρκα, ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸς εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, ἀμήν.

The Revised Version translates: 'of whom is Christ as concerning the flesh, who is over all, God blessed for ever. Amen.'

According to this translation Christ is called God. Other translations have been suggested in which Christ is not called God. If a full stop is placed after σάρκα (flesh), the last part of the verse may be translated as a separate sentence. There are three possible versions:

i. He who is God over all be blessed for ever.
ii. He who is God over all is blessed for ever.
iii. He who is over all is God blessed for ever.

None of these versions suggests that Christ is God.

If a comma is placed after σάρκα (flesh), and a full stop after ἐπὶ πάντων (over all), the translation will be: '. . . of whom is Christ as concerning the flesh, who is over all. God be (or 'is') blessed for ever.' This translation, like the three above, makes no connexion between God and Christ.

The Revised Version assumes a different punctuation. If a comma is placed after σάρκα (flesh), and no further punctuation is inserted until the full stop after ἐπὶ πάντων (over all), Christ must be called God. This interpretation is accepted by a great majority of the Fathers. But the punctuation of the oldest uncial manuscripts offers slight evidence in favour of the other interpretation. Codex Sinaiticus has no punctuation, and the punctuation of Codex Alexandrinus is uncertain. Codex Vaticanus has a colon, probably inserted by a later hand, after σάρκα, and a space at the end of the verse. Codex Ephraemi has a stop after σάρκα. Since there would be no punctuation in the earliest papyrus copies of the scriptures, we could not attach great importance to the punctuation of these uncials, even if

it were clear. Because of its ambiguity, no weight can be attached to it.[1]

Attempts have been made, with little success, to emend the text. If ὢν ὁ were substituted for ὁ ὤν, the verse could be translated: 'whose is Christ according to the flesh, whose is God who is over all, blessed for ever.' There is no manuscript evidence in support of this emendation.

The grammar of the verse favours the view that Christ is called God.

i. If the verse ended with a doxology to God the Father, we should expect εὐλογητός to come at the beginning of the sentence. That is nearly always the position of the doxology in biblical Greek. The order would be changed only for some special reason. There is, however, no need to stress the word θεός, as no contrast is drawn between God and Christ. In any case the order of words would not place any appreciable stress on θεός if the doxology were a separate sentence. If however the doxology is addressed to Christ, εὐλογητός cannot be placed at the beginning of the clause, but naturally comes later.[2]

Moreover doxologies in the writings of St. Paul usually refer to someone who has been mentioned beforehand. The name of God does not occur in Rom. 9 until the end of verse 5. Christ is mentioned several times. If Rom. 9.5 follows the general tendency of Pauline doxologies, it is ascribed to someone who is named in the preceding sentences. The only possible antecedent is Christ.[3]

ii. The words ὁ ὤν also present a problem. If the doxology is a separate sentence, the word ὤν is superfluous. It would be sufficient to say ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων θεός, 'God over all'. Or alternatively if ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων ὢν θεός were read, it would mean, 'He who is over all is God.' The position of ὁ ὤν suggests that it is attached to an antecedent. But there are examples of similar relatival uses of the article and participle which do not refer to an antecedent.[4] On the other hand, as Sanday and Headlam

[1] Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, pp. 233-4 contains a full discussion of the punctuation.

[2] 2 Cor. 11.31 . . . ὁ ὢν εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας . . . is an example of εὐλογητός in a similar position. For a discussion of the position of εὐλογητός see Lagrange, *Epître aux Romains*, p. 227, Sanday and Headlam, op. cit., p. 236, and Lietzmann, *Römerbrief*, p. 90.

[3] Other examples of doxologies which refer to antecedents are Rom. 1.25, Gal. 1.5. See also Langrange, op. cit, p. 227.

[4] John 3.31, Rom. 8.5, 8.

remark, 'In this case, as there is a noun immediately preceding to which the words would naturally refer, as there is no sign of a change of subject, and as there is no finite verb in the sentence following, an ordinary reader would consider that the words ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός refer to what precedes unless they suggest so great an antithesis to his mind that he could not refer them to Christ.'[1]

iii. The words τὸ κατὰ σάρκα seem to expect an antithesis. Although the most probable antithesis would be τὸ κατὰ πνεῦμα, there are instances in which θεός is contrasted with σάρξ.[2] But the phrase τὸ κατὰ σάρκα does not require an antithesis. And, as Baur has shown, it can be argued that the phrase was introduced, not to make a contrast with θεός, but to avoid making a concession to the Judaising Christians. Christ belonged to the Jews, but only as far as the flesh was concerned.[3] Nevertheless the passage would read more naturally if there were some kind of antithesis.

The grammatical evidence favours the view that Christ was called God. St. Paul would not be likely to vary his idiom, unconsciously, unless he were saying something startling. But those who wish to give an unusual interpretation of the language, do not claim that St. Paul has said anything startling. The other arguments which have been adduced are psychological, and are out of place at this stage of the discussion.

When the meaning of the Greek has been determined, the words can be used as material for understanding the complexities of the mind of St. Paul. The description of Christ as God is unusual. Possibly this is the only occasion on which St. Paul writes in this strain, although 2 Thess. 1.12 and Gal. 2.20 are doubtful examples of the same mode of address. Because of its uniqueness the passage requires explanation. There is need to show that St. Paul could conceivably have written these words. It is not necessary to show that his action in writing these words is fully in accord with our presuppositions about his thought, his style, or his character. But if this interpretation of the passage is to be maintained, an attempt must be made to demonstrate that a situation could have arisen in

[1] Op. cit., pp. 235-6.

[2] Luke 3.6, 1 Cor. 1.29, Col. 3.22, Philem. 16, 2 Chron. 32.8, Ps. 55 (56). 5, Jer. 5, Dan. 2.11. See Sanday and Headlam, p. 235.

[3] F. C. Baur, *Paulus*, p. 624.

which St. Paul included a doxology to Christ as God in one of his epistles.

Sanday and Headlam argue that the words 'who is God over all' etc. fit into the progress of thought in Rom. 9: 'St. Paul is enumerating the privileges of Israel, and as the highest and last privilege he reminds his readers that it was from this Jewish stock after all that Christ in His human nature had come, and then in order to emphasise this he dwells on the exalted character of Him who came according to the flesh as the Jewish Messiah.'[1]

This explanation does not account for St. Paul's reluctance to call Christ God in other parts of his writings. Sanday and Headlam have shown how Rom. 9.5 can fit its context. They have not shown how it fits in with the rest of the apostle's thought. If St. Paul wished to introduce this clear proclamation of the divinity of Christ into his epistles, why did he not do so more often? Why did he not expand and explain the idea, instead of thrusting it forward abruptly and passing immediately to another theme? In the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans nothing else is said about the Person of Christ, nothing about His relationship to the Father, nothing about His Lordship, nothing about His work in creation. While St. Paul may have described Christ as God in other writings which have not been preserved, the assumption that there were unknown epistles does not account for the abruptness with which St. Paul leaves this remarkable statement of the divinity of Christ undeveloped and unexplained.

The clue to the passage is to be found in the emotions of the apostle. When he reached the point of saying that 'Christ according to the flesh' belonged to the Jews, he might have proceeded to make a statement about 'Christ according to the Spirit'. Instead of following the expected train of thought, he burst into an ascription of glory to Christ. He allowed himself to write down what he would have been prepared to say in the intensity of worship, but was in the habit of restraining himself from writing. He acknowledged that Christ was *θεός* and *εὐλογητός*. His deep feelings, when he contemplated the rejection of Christ by the Jewish people, led him to give Him the full honours of Deity. The clause at the end of Rom. 9.5 is not

[1] op. cit., p. 236.

part of the sequence of thought in the paragraph. It is an interjection—an outburst of praise, which the apostle allowed to remain in the epistle, perhaps because, as he surveyed what he had written, he realised that he had been writing under divine inspiration.

2. 2 *Thess.* 1.12. . . . *κατὰ τὴν χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.*

There are two possible translations.

i. . . . according to the grace of our God and Lord Jesus Christ.
ii. . . . according to the grace of our God and the Lord Jesus Christ.

The Revised Version chooses the second translation, which has been preferred by the great majority of translators and commentators. The chief reason in its favour is that the phrase *Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* was so commonly used in St. Paul's epistles that it would be quite normal to introduce it, even in this context, without the definite article. Indeed *Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* seems to have been one of the earliest Christian creeds.[1] This is the strongest linguistic argument in favour of the second translation.

Two other factors are supposed to support this point of view. The position of the word *ἡμῶν* which is attached to *Θεοῦ* seems to imply that *Θεοῦ* and *Κυρίου* do not refer to the same person.[2] This is not an overwhelming argument as in 2 Pet. 3.18 (*τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ Σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*), the words *Κυρίου* and *Σωτῆρος* both refer to Jesus Christ in spite of the presence of *ἡμῶν* after *Κυρίου*.

Frame says that the phrase *ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν* rather than *Θεὸς Πατὴρ ἡμῶν* is characteristic of the Thessalonian Epistles.[3] This would explain why St. Paul linked two titles, one of which had the article and the other of which lacked it. But the phrase *Θεὸς ἡμῶν* without the article is also found in the Thessalonian Epistles. The simple *ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν* occurs in 1 Thess. 2.2, 3.9, 2 Thess. 1.11, and 1.12. *ὁ Θεὸς καὶ Πατὴρ ἡμῶν* occurs in 1 Thess. 1.3, 3.11, 3.13, and *ὁ Θεὸς ὁ Πατὴρ ἡμῶν* in 2 Thess. 2.16. In 2 Thess. 1.1 there is the phrase *ἐκ θεῷ Πατρὶ ἡμῶν*. The examples

[1] Cullmann, *Earliest Christian Confessions*, p. 41.
[2] This point is emphasised by Stauffer in T.W.z.NT. III, art. p. 106, n. 265.
[3] *Thessalonians*, p. 242.

which have the article easily outnumber this solitary reference. But throughout the Epistles *Θεός* and *ὁ Θεός* are used interchangeably. It is, however, possible that St. Paul had not yet coined the phrase *Θεὸς Πατὴρ ἡμῶν* which with minor variations occurs so frequently in his epistles, and that he wrote this more misleading formula in 2 Thess. 1.12. But there is no doubt that the first translation of 2 Thess. 1.12 in which Jesus Christ is called God, is the more natural. Nevertheless, because of the frequency of the phrase *ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν* in the Thessalonian Epistle and, above all, because *Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* was a credal formula, the second translation is to be preferred.

B. *The Pastoral Epistles*

Titus 2.13. . . . *προσδεχόμενοι τὴν μακαρίαν ἐλπίδα καὶ ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.*

The following translations are possible:

i. . . . looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ. (Authorised Version).
ii. . . . looking for the blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ. (Revised Version).
iii. . . . looking for the blessed hope and appearing of the glory of our great God and Saviour, which glory is Jesus Christ.

The first translation is unsatisfactory. *τῆς δόξης* is probably not adjectival. 'The appearing of the glory' is better than 'the glorious appearing'. The crucial question, however, is the meaning of *τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ Σωτῆρος ἡμῶν.* Should it be assumed that *Θεοῦ* and *Σωτῆρος* both refer to Jesus Christ? The Authorised Version believes that only *Σωτῆρος* refers to Christ. The difficulty of the Authorised Version's translation is that the Greek seems to favour a closer link between the words *Θεοῦ* and *Σωτῆρος*. If *ἡμῶν* followed *Θεοῦ*, it would be easier to separate the titles. The position of *ἡμῶν* links them together, requiring the translation 'our great God and Saviour'.

The absence of the article cannot be explained by supposing that the author used a credal formula. There is no evidence that *Σωτὴρ Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* or *Σωτὴρ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* had acquired the status of a credal formula like *Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*. If the author had wished to make it clear that there was a

difference between two persons, the great God and our Saviour, he would have introduced a second article.[1]

For these two reasons, the position of *ἡμῶν* and the fact that *Σωτὴρ Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* was not a formula of the same popularity as *Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*, this phrase cannot be interpreted in the same manner as 2 Thess. 1.12.

Hort favours the third translation. He argues that *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* is best taken in apposition to *τῆς δόξης*. But the title *Σωτήρ* has already been applied to Christ in Titus 1.4. The order of words favours the view that *Σωτήρ* applies to Christ and it would not be unexpected in this epistle. While Hort has brought forward much evidence that Jesus was regarded as the Shekinah or Glory of God—though there is only slight evidence that He was openly given this title—his translation involves an awkward interpretation of the order of the Greek.[2]

The best translation is the second, which is given in the Revised Version. As Christ is not called God in any other part of the Pastoral Epistles, how is the presence of this passage in the epistle to be explained? First, a unique statement in such a slender collection as the Pastoral Epistles ought not to cause any surprise. Secondly, both God and Christ are called Saviour independently in the epistles. A writer who could apply the same title to both Father and Son would be able to give the title 'God' to Christ. Thirdly, the phrase *μέγας Θεός* not only occurs in the Septuagint[3] but also seems to have been widely current in the Hellenistic world.[4] It is possible that *μέγας Θεὸς καὶ Σωτήρ*, as Dibelius suggests, was a formula which was applied to God in the Judaism of the Diaspora, and was transferred to Christ by the Christians.[5] And fourthly, if the epistle was written in the reign of Trajan, as Harrison has convincingly claimed,[6] it belongs to the same period as the letters of Ignatius, in which Christ is frequently called God.

[1] See Parry, *Pastoral Epistles*, p. 81. Parry also gives as a reason for rejecting this view the absence of any other reference to a double appearance. But this reason is not linguistic and should not influence the argument at this stage.

[2] *Epistle of James*, p. 103. He also says that St. Paul and the NT would not be likely to commit what he believes to be a travesty of true theology. This argument is not relevant.

[3] E.g. Deut. 10. 19, Ps. 85. 10, Isa. 26.4, Jer. 39. 19, Dan. 2.45.

[4] See Grundmann in T.W.z.NT., IV, art. *μέγας*, p. 546, and Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East*, p. 269, n.3.

[5] *Pastoralbriefe*, p. 92.

[6] *The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles.*

C. *The Second Epistle of Peter*

2 Pet. 1.1. . . . ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ Σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

The reference to God has been omitted by some of the versions and by the uncial P. But the integrity of the text has not been seriously questioned.

There are two possible translations of the phrase:

i. . . . in the righteousness of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ.
ii. . . . in the righteousness of our God and the Saviour Jesus Christ.

The shape of this phrase is like that of 2 Thess. 1.12: κατὰ τὴν χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. But it cannot be discussed in the same way. In 2 Thess. the presence of ἡμῶν after Θεοῦ was regarded as evidence, not strong but of some weight, that Θεοῦ and Κυρίου did not refer to the same person. In 2 Pet. 1.1, although ἡμῶν is in exactly the same position, it is unlikely to have had the same influence on the meaning of the phrase. At the end of the opening paragraph of the epistle (1.11), comes a similar phrase, τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ Σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, in which ἡμῶν is in the same position and the two nouns Κυρίου and Σωτῆρος obviously refer to the same person.[1] Therefore it is unlikely that ἡμῶν in 1.1 implies that Θεοῦ and Σωτῆρος describe different persons.

Moreover, as we have seen in the discussion of Titus 2.13, the absence of an article in front of Σωτῆρος cannot be accounted for by supposing that Σωτὴρ Ἰησοῦς Χριστός was a credal formula.

The clear meaning of the text is 'our God and Saviour Jesus Christ'. The occurrence of this description of Christ in an epistle which almost certainly belongs to the second century needs no explanation.

D. *The Epistle of James*

Jas. 1.1. Ἰάκωβος Θεοῦ καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος . . .

The opening words may be translated either 'James, a servant of God and the Lord Jesus Christ' or 'James, a servant of the God and Lord Jesus Christ'.

[1] According to several authorities 2 Pet. 2.20 is a parallel to 1.11, but this reading is probably due to assimilation.

As there is no definite article in front of Θεοῦ, the first translation is quite natural. Indeed either translation could be defended from a linguistic point of view. The issue must be decided in this case by other arguments. Since the author says little about Christ in this epistle, and does not elsewhere identify Christ with God, there is no reason to suppose that he calls Christ God in the opening greeting. It is possible that Christ is described as the divine glory in Jas. 2.1, but this is not equivalent to claiming that He is God. The first translation of Jas. 1.1 is to be preferred.

E. *The Epistle to the Hebrews*

Heb. 1.8. πρὸς δὲ τὸν υἱόν,
ὁ θρόνος σου ὁ Θεὸς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος.

This is a quotation from the Septuagint version of Ps. 45.6. There are two possible translations:

i. . . . but of the Son he saith,
Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever. (Revised Version).

ii. . . . but of the Son he saith,
God is thy throne for ever and ever or
Thy throne is God for ever and ever. (Westcott's suggestions).

The meaning and the text of the Hebrew has been disputed, but since the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews was quoting the Septuagint, these problems are not relevant to the interpretation of this passage.

The words ὁ Θεός could be nominative or vocative, as the nominative of θεός usually does duty for the vocative. The translation which Westcott prefers does not express the most natural sense of the Greek. The phrase εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος is in an awkward position, if ὁ Θεὸς is not vocative. ὁ θρόνος σου εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος ὁ Θεός would be more suited to Westcott's translation.

Peake thinks that the most serious objection to the first translation is that the use of Θεός and the definite article with reference to Christ is without parallel in the New Testament.[1] There is, however, a good parallel in John 20.28, where Thomas addresses Jesus as ὁ Θεός μου. This is an example of the nominative used as a vocative.

[1] *Hebrews*, p. 87.

Westcott suggests that a description of Christ as God would obscure the thought of the passage.[1] The intention of the writer is to stress the eternal nature of the dominion of Christ in contrast to the mutability of the angels. Perhaps a reference to the divinity of Christ would distract a reader from the main issue. In fact the thought is not obscured. The implication that Christ is God only strengthens the emphasis on His eternal rule and increases the contrast with the angels.

How does the idea that the Son is God fit into the scheme of the writer's thought? The idea receives no further development. There are indications that the Son is worshipped (1.6, and possibly 13.21). But although Christ is described as Son, High Priest, and the pre-existent Agent of creation, no sustained attempt is made to give an account of the Deity of Christ. Why, then does the author make this isolated confession in Heb. 1.8?

A reasonable explanation is that Ps. 45.6 was applied to Christ in the worship of the Christian Church. The quotation is introduced as if it were familiar to the readers. They would be most likely to gain familiarity with it by hearing it quoted in sermons, or by singing it themselves as a hymn. The writer presupposes that Christ is regarded as a legitimate object of worship. His readers would not be unduly surprised to find Christ addressed as God. Perhaps it was unusual to express the belief in writing. But because they uttered these words in their worship, there was no great surprise when they saw them in the letter. The writer did not amplify the statement, because it was not his intention to discuss the difficult problem of the Deity of Christ. His point in this verse is the superiority of Christ to the angels. The Deity of Christ, which is relevant but not necessary to the argument, is only mentioned in passing.

F. *The Gospel according to St. Matthew*

Matt. 1.23. . . . *καὶ καλέσουσιν τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Ἐμμανουήλ, ὅ ἐστιν μεθερμηνευόμενον Μεθ' ἡμῶν ὁ Θεός*

The translation is: And they shall call his name Immanuel; which is, being interpreted, God with us.

An alternative translation of the last part of the quotation is 'God is with us'.

[1] *Hebrews*, p. 26.

The Greek is a literal translation of the Hebrew *immanu 'el* of Isa. 7.14. The order of words in the Greek suggests that *μεθ' ἡμῶν* is adverbial rather than adjectival. 'God with us' would be more likely to be expressed in Greek by *ὁ Θεὸς ὁ μεθ' ἡμῶν* or *ὁ μεθ' ἡμῶν Θεός*. But the Hebrew is regarded as a proper name, and cannot therefore be expected to make it clear whether *'immanu* is adverbial or adjectival. St. Matthew was more concerned to give a literal translation of the Hebrew than to free the language from ambiguity. It is impossible to be certain whether St. Matthew meant 'God is with us' or 'God with us'. Probably he was not sure himself.

The translation 'God with us' implies that Jesus is God. But the identification is not absolute but limited by the words 'with us'. The second translation 'God is with us' means no more than that God was present in Jesus. This does not imply that Jesus was God. Because of the uncertainty of the meaning this passage cannot be used as evidence that Jesus was called God.

G. *The Johannine Writings*

1. John 1.1. *Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος*

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God.

The translation 'the Word was God' implies that Jesus was regarded as God. Since *Θεός* occurs here without the article, whereas it is preceded by the article in two other places in the same verse, it has been argued that the word can be adjectival when it appears without the article. But if an adjective had been wanted, the word *θεῖος*, which occurs twice in the New Testament (Acts 17.29, 2 Pet. 1.3f), could have been used.[1]

Θεός is used with or without the article indiscriminately in the New Testament. In the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel it never has the article except in the first verse. In verses 6, 12, 13 and 18 it appears without the article. The first verse, however, presents a problem because *Θεός* without an article occurs between two examples of *Θεός* with the article. There is no reason to suppose that a deliberate contrast is intended. The

[1] Origen was the first to suggest that *Θεός* was adjectival. See *Comm. in Joan.*, II, 3.

article is absent because *Θεός* is predicative. *ὁ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος* would have meant 'God was the Word'. The Evangelist wanted *Θεός* to be stressed. Hence he placed it at the beginning of the clause. In order to show that it was predicative he had to omit the article.[1]

Moreover, if he had written *Θεός*, he would have implied that only the *Λόγος* could rightly be described as God. The clause should be translated 'the Word was God' rather than 'the Word was divine'.[2]

2. John 17.3. *αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ αἰώνιος ζωή, ἵνα γινώσκωσιν σὲ τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν καὶ ὃν ἀπέστειλας Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν.*

And this is eternal life, that they should know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, Jesus Christ.

Bousset suggests that this may be translated: And this is eternal life, that they should know thee as the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou didst send, as the only true God.[3]

To make this translation plausible the phrase *τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεόν* would have to be moved to the end of the sentence. There is no real implication in this verse that Jesus is God.

3. John 20.28. *ἀπεκρίθη Θωμᾶς καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ ὁ Κύριός μου καὶ ὁ Θεός μου.*

Thomas answered, and said to him, My Lord and my God. The words of Thomas are addressed to Christ. They are almost certainly an instance of the nominative used in a vocative sense. Theodore of Mopsuestia suggests that this is a thanksgiving which Thomas addresses to God the Father. The context favours the view that these words were spoken to Jesus.[4]

Thomas uses the two commonest names of God in the Old Testament, 'God' and 'Lord', and applies them to Christ. There is no need, like Bousset, to find an origin for this saying in the Church's desire to oppose the emperor-worship of the second half of the first century.[5] The saying is dependent on Jewish usage. Thomas honours Jesus with the titles of God.

[1] E. C. Colwell (*J. B. L.* Lii (1933), 12ff) formulates the rule that 'definite predicate nouns which precede the verb usually lack the article'. His views are discussed by C. F. D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek*, pp. 115ff.

[2] This verse expresses a paradox which runs through the Fourth Gospel. Jesus is one with the Father and yet He is subordinate to the Father. The Word is God, and yet the Word is with God. Cf. Bultmann, *Das Ev. des Johannes*, pp. 17-19.

[3] *Kyrios Christos*, 1st ed., p. 301. [4] See Hoskyns, *Fourth Gospel*, p. 548.

[5] See Bousset, *Kyrios Christos*, 1st ed., p. 301, and Bultmann, *Ev. Joh.* p. 538, also Hoskyns, ibid. The words 'dominus et deus noster', used of Domitian (Suet., *Domit.*, 13), may have heightened the significance of this passage.

But it is probable that the story was later used to oppose the demands of the emperors. Its present form may have taken shape under the influence of liturgical needs.[1]

Thomas may have actually uttered these words. But it is probable that the title *Θεός* was not given to Christ immediately after the resurrection. Lordship and not Godhead seems to have been the main confession of the Primitive Church. Nevertheless the possibility cannot be excluded that Thomas accorded full divine honours to Jesus. The evangelist may have correctly recorded the scene in which Thomas grasped the truth of Christ's divinity 'in the exaltation of his sudden deliverance from obstinate gloom to radiant faith'.[2]

The confession of Thomas has an important place in the structure of the Fourth Gospel. The Prologue to the Gospel is an account of the Incarnation of the Word of God. Not only was this Word with God in the beginning. It was also itself God. The Gospel begins, therefore, with a declaration of the divinity of Christ. Until chapter 20 there is no other open declaration of His divinity. Many things are said which imply that He is divine, but He is never called God. In the concluding narrative of chapter 20 He is called God for a second time. Since chapter 21 is probably an appendix to the original gospel, the story of Thomas may have been the last story in the first version of the gospel. The evangelist began and ended his work with a confession that Christ was God.[3]

4. 1 John 5.20. *οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἥκει, καὶ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν διάνοιαν ἵνα γινώσκομεν τον ἀληθινόν· καὶ ἐσμὲν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ, ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος.*

The Revised Version translates: And we know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we know him that is true, and we are in him that is true, *even* in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life.

There are several textual variants, all of which seem to be attempts to make the verse easier to interpret.

[1] Barrett *John*, p. 477. [2] Temple, *Readings*, p. 391.

[3] This saying presents a difficulty to those commentators who claim that *Θεός* is never applied to Christ when it has an article. They defend their position by arguing that *Θεός* cannot be anarthrous when it is vocative. Hoskyns comments (p. 549): 'It may, however, be doubted whether the Evangelist intends this nice grammatical and theological distinction.' On the other hand, as in 1.1, the evangelist does not imply God and Christ are wholly identical. See Barrett, op. cit., p. 477.

If οὗτος refers to 'Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ, then Jesus is called God. Bousset accepts this view and thinks that the author or the final redactor is alluding to John 17.3.[1] Bousset's view is supported by the descriptions of Jesus as 'the Life' which occur in the Johannine writings (John 11.25; 14.6). On the other hand, Dodd believes that the writer is summing up all that he has been saying about God in the epistle. οὗτος refers not to the words which immediately precede it but to the teaching about God throughout the epistle.[2] There is, however, a more natural interpretation. οὗτος refers to ὁ ἀληθινός of the previous sentence. ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ is not in apposition to ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ, but limits the whole of the ἵνα clause. 'Being in His Son Jesus Christ' is the the condition upon which we are able to know and to be in the true one, who is God. In this verse, therefore, Jesus is not called God.

II

Second Group: passages in which the text is uncertain

1. Gal. 2.20. ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί, ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ.

And that life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith, the faith which is in the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself up for me.

Several authorities, including the Chester-Beatty Papyrus, Codex Vaticanus, Codex Claromontanus,[3] and most of the Old Latin Versions, support the reading τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ instead of τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. There are two possible translations of this variant reading:

i. . . . the faith which is in God and Christ who loved me etc.

ii. . . . the faith which is in the God and Christ who loved me etc.

The second translation says that Christ is God. Since, however, Χριστός without the article was used frequently as a proper name, the first translation is to be preferred, and the variant reading must be rejected as an attempt to give a more comprehensive definition of the object of faith. In any case the expression τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ is without parallel in St. Paul,

[1] *Kyrios Christos*, 1st ed., pp. 301-2. [2] *The Johannine Epistles*, p. 140.
[3] One corrector of D follows the other reading.

but that in itself would not be sufficient reason for rejecting the reading. It is, however, more likely that the reading *τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ* was substituted for *τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ* than that the latter was substituted for the former. Hence, in spite of the strong textual support for the variant reading, it must be rejected.

2. 1 Tim. 3.16. *ὃς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί,*
ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι

He who was manifested in the flesh, justified in the Spirit . . .

Some authorities read *Θεός* instead of *ὅς*. But *Θεός* is almost certainly a later reading. The manuscript support is not strong.[1]

3. John 1.18. *μονογενὴς Θεὸς ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πατρός, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο.*

The only-begotten God, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has declared him.

This reading *(ὁ) μονογενὴς Θεός* is supported by the weightier authorities (x, B, C*, L, e, W*, Θ, Irenaeus, Clement, Origen). *(ὁ) μονογενὴς Υἱός* is found in the 'Received Text'. Its earliest support is Western. It is also found in the Old Syriac. *μονογενής* alone occurs in some codices of the Vulgate and in the Diatessaron.

Lagrange and Bousset favour *μονογενής* and argue that *Θεός* and *Υἱός* are two different examples of a later amplification.[2] Barrett claims that *Υἱός* 'seems to be imperatively demanded by the following clause, and is conformity with Johannine usage'.[3] Westcott and Hort accept the reading *μονογενὴς Θεός*.[4] They argue that the substitution of the words *μονογενὴς Υἱός* for the unique *μονογενὴς Θεός* would be obvious, and that the converse substitution 'is inexplicable by any ordinary motive likely to affect transcribers'.

The reading *μονογενὴς Θεός* is the most probable. Burney's claim that the original Aramaic may have meant 'only-begotten of God' is unconvincing, as it is unlikely that a translator could have made such a mistake.[5]

In the first of his *Two Dissertations* Hort has justified the occurrence of this unusual title in the Prologue of the Fourth

[1] See Wescott and Hort, NT Vol. II, pp. 132-4.
[2] Lagrange, *St. Jean*, ad. loc. Bousset, *Kyrios Christos*, 1st ed. p. 302.
[3] *St. John*, p. 141. [4] NT Vol. II, p. 74.
[5] See M. Black, *Aramaic Approach to the Gospels and Acts*, 2nd ed., p. 10.

Gospel. He argues that there is a careful progress in the thought of the Prologue. The introduction of the phrase *μονογενὴς Υἱός* would have been abrupt, since the title *Υἱός* had not been previously mentioned. But *μονογενής* has been mentioned (v. 14) and also *Θεός* (v. 1). The words *μονογενὴς Θεός* give the Prologue a roundness of form. 'Verse 1 declares the Word to have been "in the beginning" *Θεός*; verse 14 states that the Word, when He became flesh, was beheld to have a glory as of a *μονογενής*; verse 18 shews how His union of both attributes enabled Him to bridge the chasm which kept the Godhead beyond the knowledge of men.'[1]

4. Acts 20.28. . . . *ποιμαίνειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἣν περιεποιήσατο διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου.*

. . . to feed the church of God, which he purchased through his own blood (or 'the blood of his own').

There is good Western support for *Κυρίου* instead of *Θεοῦ*. But *Θεοῦ* has very strong manuscript support including Vaticanus and Sinaiticus. The reading *Κυρίου καὶ Θεοῦ* is obviously conflate. There are several other readings, *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, *κυρίου Ἰησοῦ*, and *Χριστοῦ*, which are poorly supported and do not alter the main issue at stake.[2]

In favour of *Κυρίου* it has been argued that the expression 'church of the Lord' is unusual and therefore has a strong claim to be authentic. 'Church of God' is the usual expression. But although 'church of the Lord' is not found elsewhere in the New Testament it is not an unnatural expression. The substitution of *Θεοῦ* for *Κυρίου* makes the thought of the whole clause extremely unusual. Although it is conceivable that *Θεοῦ* was substituted in the interests of Patripassianism, it is far more likely that the converse process took place, in order to guard the text against the suspicion of heresy. Moreover the manuscript evidence favours *Θεοῦ*.

Hort has suggested that the original reading might have been *τοῦ ἰδίου Υἱοῦ*. *ΥΙΟΥ* may have dropped out after *ΤΟΥΙΔΙΟΥ*.[3] J. H. Moulton thinks that *ὁ ἴδιος* may have been a title for Christ, although he does not bring convincing evidence in favour of his theory.[4] But the position of the adjective is un-

[1] *Two Dissertations*, p. 15.

[2] For a full account of the textual evidence see Ropes, *Beginnings of Christianity*, Vol. III, pp. 197-9. Cf. Westcott and Hort, Vol. II, pp. 98-100 (Note by Hort).

[3] Westcott and Hort, II, pp. 99-100.

[4] *Beginnings*, Vol. III, p. 196.

expected. What Ropes calls the 'Antiochian' text supports the reading τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος which is a stylistic improvement, setting the adjective in the usual position.[1] The text is best explained by a theory such as Hort's or Moulton's. Therefore this passage cannot be adduced as convincing evidence that Jesus was called God in New Testament times.

In this examination of the New Testament evidence it has been argued that there are seven passages in which Jesus is called Θεός. They are Rom. 9.5, Titus 2.13, 2 Pet. 1.1, Heb. 1.8, John 1.1, 1.18 and 20.28. Only the last is more or less universally accepted as a genuine instance. The interpretation of the other passages is seriously disputed. The linguistic arguments, however, although they are by no means one-sided, support the view that Jesus is called God. If attention is paid to the linguistic arguments, the instances of this kind of description of Christ are numerous enough to ease the perplexity of those critics who are unable to accept an example when it appears to be unique in the New Testament. They will not want to dismiss an example, which has six companions, as easily as one which stands alone.

It is not possible to discuss in this article the varied ways in which divine honours were accorded to Christ but in the New Testament the use of the word Θεός to describe Christ is not surprising. He is regularly designated as Κύριος, the Septuagint translation of 'Yahweh'. The divine functions of creation, judgment, and salvation are ascribed to Him. Quotations, which in their Old Testament setting were applied to Yahweh, are used in the New Testament about Christ.

At the beginning of the second century there is a variety of extra-canonical evidence that Jesus was called God. In the *Didache* 10.6 the words Ὡσαννὰ τῷ Θεῷ Δαβίδ (Hosanna to the God of David) refer to Christ. Pliny writes in one of his letters (*Ep.* X. 96.7) that the Christians used to 'sing a hymn to Christ as God' (*carmen Christo quasi deo dicere*). Ignatius frequently calls Him God.[2] This form of address, this manner of description, did not suddenly spring into being at the beginning of the second century. That there should be previous examples of the

[1] *Prolegomena*, pp. 90ff.
[2] E.g. *Eph.* i. 1, xv. 3, xviii. 2, xix. 3, *Sm.* i. 1, x. 1, *Tr.* vii. 1.

usage is not surprising. Their scarcity, not their existence, is a cause of surprise. It is only to be expected that Jesus was called God before the time of Pliny and Ignatius. Both these writers assume that this mode of speech is perfectly natural. It might have been expected that the predicate Θεός would have been used of Jesus far more often in the pages of the New Testament. For that would account for its unquestioning acceptance by Ignatius.

An attempt will be made to explain why these references occur in the New Testament, and why they are so few in number. There is one important characteristic which some of them, perhaps all of them, have in common. They have a liturgical background. Rom. 9.5 is a short ascription of praise to Christ. Its vocabulary is typical of a doxology (εὐλογητός, εἰς αἰῶνας, ἐπὶ πάντων). The suggestion was made that St. Paul wrote these words under the influence of deep emotion. They are an expression of his innermost feelings rather than an integral part of the argument. He may have written words which he was accustomed to use in his private prayers. Or he may have quoted a doxology which was used in public worship.

Heb. 1.8 is a quotation from a psalm. The author assumes that the words are well known to his readers, and that they will readily accept the reference to Christ. The psalm, or at any rate part of it, must have been used in the liturgy of the church to which the epistle was addressed. In their worship they sang: 'Thy throne, O God, is for ever.' The belief that Christ is God is not the keystone of the Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews. The author is chiefly concerned to expound the conception of the High Priesthood of Christ and His unique Sonship. The allusion to the Divinity of Christ in 1.8 does not form an integral part of the theology of the epistle. It supplies valuable evidence, however, about the liturgical background of early Christianity. Although the writer does not include the full Divinity of Christ within the scheme of thought which he presents in the epistle, his use of this quotation from Ps. 45 shows that he himself, and the Church to which he was writing, were prepared to acknowledge in their worship that Jesus was God.

In the Epistles to the Romans and to the Hebrews the acknowledgment of Christ's Deity is not integral to the thought

but provides a clue to the liturgical background. On the other hand the references to Jesus as God, which are found in the Fourth Gospel, are essential to the writer's thought. The prologue begins with the statement that the Word was God, and ends with the description of the Incarnate Word as 'only-begotten God'. The earliest edition of the Gospel ended with the story of Thomas's confession that Jesus was His Lord and His God. The evangelist implies that the Christian believer is able to discern that the risen Christ is God. The presence of these passages at the beginning and the end of the Gospel proves that they are not merely passing allusions which have been introduced haphazardly. Their position in the Gospel is deliberately planned.

Not only are these passages important for an understanding of the theology of the Fourth Gospel. At least one of them (John 20.28) seems to have been used liturgically.[1] The structure of the pericope in which the confession 'My Lord and my God!' is included (John 20.19-29) suggests that the passage may have had a liturgical origin. C. K. Barrett claims that there is considerable evidence for this view: 'The disciples assemble on the Lord's Day. The blessing is given: *Εἰρήνη ὑμῖν*. The Holy Spirit descends upon the worshippers and the word of absolution (cf. v. 23) is pronounced. Christ Himself is present (this may suggest the Eucharist and the spoken Word of God) bearing the marks of His passion; He is confessed as Lord and God.'[2] Barrett's arguments can be supported by the evidence that *Κύριος καὶ Θεός* was a formula which was used both in the Greek Old Testament and in pagan literature and inscriptions. Since the formula was so well known, it could easily have been taken over into Christian worship.[3]

The references to Christ as God, which occur in Titus and 2 Peter, may also have had their origin in liturgy. It is quite likely that at a time when Ignatius would frequently describe Christ as *Θεός*, these forms of invocation and confession were in common use in some of the churches.[4]

The evidence which has been collected favours the view that

[1] The prologue too, it has been argued, was couched in poetic form. But it must have been revised before inclusion in the Gospel. The parts of the prologue which describe Christ as God are theological rather than liturgical.

[2] *The Gospel according to St. John*, p. 477.

[3] Cf. Ps. 34. 23. Suet., p. 538. n. 8.

[4] Cf. Dibelius, *Pastoralbriefe*, p. 92.

Jesus Christ was called God in the worship of the Church in New Testament times. He may not have been addressed in these terms in every church of Christendom, but He was accorded this honour at least in churches with which St. Paul, and the authors of the Fourth Gospel, Hebrews, the Pastoral Epistles, and 2 Peter, were connected. The writers of the New Testament seem to have been reluctant to commit to writing the confession that Jesus is God. The reluctance of St. Paul and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews may have been caused by their inability to give an account of the relationship of this belief to the Jewish monotheism to which they continued to subscribe. Their faith outstripped their reason, and they were able to give joyful utterance to a belief which they felt incapable of expounding. But each of these writers, on one occasion, allowed himself to give expression to this deep-seated belief, and to include in the text of an epistle language which he used more frequently in private and public worship.

The author of the Fourth Gospel interwove this belief into his thought. The Word, which was incarnate in Jesus Christ, was God. After the resurrection the disciple of Jesus was able to perceive this divinity as he looked at the risen Lord. St. John too was in contact with a liturgical tradition in which Jesus was hailed as Lord and God. Perhaps, by placing the confession of Thomas at the very end of the Gospel, he was suggesting that it was only in the moment of worship that men were able to comprehend that Jesus was God. Only when, like Thomas, they bowed in reverence and faith before His risen majesty, could they know who He was.

The language of St. Paul, the Fourth Gospel and the Epistle to the Hebrews, does not suggest that Jesus Christ was wholly identical with God. He is only called ὁ Θεός when the nominative is used in a vocative sense. And when this happens the article has not the usual definitive significance. On the other hand, in the Pastorals and the Second Epistle of Peter, the definite article is used with Θεός to describe Christ. This is not a sign of incipient monarchianism. The writers did not realise the complexity of the problem. In their language, like their contemporary Ignatius, they failed to exercise the subtle restraint which was shown by their predecessors.

B. S. Easton claims that Hellenistic Christians could speak

of Jesus Christ as 'our great God' without derogation to the supreme Godhead of the Father.[1] This is certainly true of the Hellenistic Christians amongst whom Ignatius and the writer of the Pastorals moved. It would not have been true of the Church which St. Paul knew. By the end of the first century a change had taken place. The claims of strict Jewish monotheism did not figure so largely in the thought of Christians. They acknowledged the monotheism, and never questioned it. But it was not engrained in them so deeply as in St. Paul, whose thought and language was always fenced by this most cherished dogma of Judaism. They were able to use expressions which could have been used by Monarchians or Polytheists, although they themselves would have had no dealings with either.

Bultmann criticises the confession, 'Jesus is God', because of its ambiguity. He claims that it is impossible to know whether the confession is in accordance with the New Testament or not, until it has been more precisely defined.[2] It has been shown, however, that Jesus is called God in the New Testament. The formulae 'Jesus is God' and 'Christ is God' do not actually occur. But formulae with the same implications are found in several different types of writing. If St. Paul said 'Christ . . . who is God over all', and the author of Hebrews said, 'Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever', the statement 'Jesus Christ is God' is in accordance with the New Testament.

The word 'God' with a capital 'G' is often said to be different in meaning from 'god' with a small 'g'. Since there were only capital letters in the original New Testament Greek, there was no such distinction in the first century. Can it then be argued that the confession 'Jesus Christ is God' is not more ambiguous but less ambiguous than similar confessions in the New Testament? This criticism, somewhat different from Bultmann's, cannot stand. For 'god' in English is generally applied to a being who is not believed to be a god at all. 'God' describes the one true God. But 'God' has been used for so long against a background of Trinitarian thought, that it cannot be accounted misleading to say 'Jesus Christ is God' when it is also understood that the Father is God as well. The absence of the article in Rom. 9.5, John 1.1, and John 1.18 is in accordance with the

[1] *The Pastoral Epistles*, p. 95. [2] *Essays*, p. 273.

use of the word 'God' in the confession 'Jesus Christ is God.' St. Paul and St. John believed in one God. But they did not claim that Jesus Christ was identical with the whole of what was meant by God. The World Council Confession agrees with St. Paul and St. John in refraining from making such an identification. The formula is not 'Jesus Christ is the only God', but 'Jesus Christ is God'. The ambiguity of the World Council's formula is more or less the same ambiguity as that which is found in the writings of St. Paul and St. John.

BOOK REVIEWS

Religion and the Christian Faith. By HENDRIK KRAEMER. Lutterworth Press. 45s.

THIS new book of Professor Kraemer's is a clearer statement of his 'biblical realism' and his theological approach to other religions than was his earlier book, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World*, which stimulated so much controversy and fruitful disagreement at Tambaram, 1938. Kraemer is again challenging, penetrating and provocative and one meets here the biblical theologian, the scientist in religions, the missionary and 'missiologist' who brings his convictions, wide learning and practical experience to bear on the fascinating theme of the relation of the Christian faith to other religions. The subject of this book is 'Religion, Religions and the Christian Faith', though the title has been contracted to 'Religion and the Christian Faith'. According to Kraemer, 'There is no such thing as Religion in the singular, but there is something which exists universally; namely religious consciousness. It embodies and expresses itself in concrete forms of religion, as we see in the empirical religions in the past and in the present; or as a specific quality found in certain individuals, in their way of apprehending life and the world, but which is not crystallised into a definite pattern of religion as a social phenomenon' (p. 78). This religious consciousness is part of man's God-given make up. But man's nature is paradoxical. He seeks God and at the same time he rebels against Him. He knows God and yet perverts this knowledge. The result is that man's religions are paradoxical too. They show at the same time man's God-given relation to God and a perversion of this relationship. Christianity as a historical religion is not free from the same perversions. Contrasted with the 'natural' religious consciousness and the expression of that in religion is the Christian faith, or better the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 'Revelation, of which Christ as a living Person is the final embodiment, is *toto modo* different from Religion. Religion speaks about what man thinks of God, Revelation speaks of what God thinks of man' (p. 144). God the living and true God, is at work in man's nature and in other religions, but it is only in Jesus Christ that it is possible to say where and how. Here Kraemer takes back the assertion in his earlier book that, though God can be said to be at work in other religions, it is not feasible to say where. Now he points to the religious consciousness of man as the place of a dialectic encounter with God which yields a

negative or rather 'a distortedly positive' answer. So to the question —one of Kraemer's main ones—Are the religions responses to Divine activity or not? his answer is YES and NO. And he gives this answer on the basis of a biblical anthropology, and a study of what the Bible says regarding the great human fact of religion in the light of the revelation in Jesus Christ.

One of the most valuable contributions of Kraemer's book is that he makes clear what is involved in a biblical theological approach to this problem of religions and the Christian faith. As a result of his earlier book, he was criticised as being narrow, dogmatic and unsympathetic to the truth in other religions, but with great cogency he now shows the impossibility of the Christian theologian having any 'standing place' whence he may judge Jesus Christ. He must stand within the realm of Christian revelation. Critics of his Tambaram position 'did not see that without any reflection or valid philosophical argument they took for granted that the revelation in Christ is subsumed under the general Idea of Religion, and that this general Idea is the standing place. Their demand was philosophically naïve and theologically inadmissible' (p. 145). Kraemer goes on to say that to take a stand within the realm of Christian revelation does not prevent the Christian theologian being quite scientific. If the philosophers of religion, the scientists in religions (i.e. the experts in the comparative study of religion), contest the right of the biblical theologian to give a scientific interpretation of religion and religions because of the latter's 'bias' of faith and his basic assumptions, Kraemer reveals the *Voraussetzungen*—the axiomatically accepted presuppositions, decisions of faith, value judgments etc., which go along with factual knowledge in the comparative studies of the 'scientists of religion'. Understanding a religion is always an existential activity. 'The real beginning and end of all understanding of religion is theological; that is to say, it starts and ends with taking sides in the great question: What do you think of God and man? and, I would add: Which God do you choose?' (p. 52). The purely intellectual *Verstehen* of a religion is one of the fictions of our time. 'Every philosophical approach rests ultimately on an attitude and a decision as to what to think about man and his attitude in relation to the Beyond, which cannot be cogently and universally demonstrated' (p. 60). Kraemer works out this critique by reference to Rudolf Otto, C. P. Tiele, the great Dutch historian of religions, Max Müller, Joachim Wach, and a great variety of philosophers of religion, including—at greater length—those of Radhakrishnan (pp. 99-136) as representing modernist Hindu philosophy of the Sankarist school, and of Tillich (pp. 418-50) as representing the attempt—and failure—to synthe-

sise a wholehearted ontological philosophy with a wholehearted biblical theology.

In all this it seems to this reviewer at least that Kraemer succeeds in his attempt to vindicate 'the scientific and philosophic legitimacy of a Theology of Religion and Religions', which is one of his main endeavours (p. 32).

The central part of Kraemer's book is Part IV, i.e. chapters 13-18, pp. 239-317, where he deals with 'The Bible and the Problem of Religion and Religions'. He admits that his failure to deal with this in his earlier book, 'The Christian Message', was one of the reasons for confusion and misunderstanding of his position. His basic assumption for his 'scientific inquiry into religion and religions' is that Jesus Christ is the centre of history and therefore the religious history of man before and after Him can only be rightly understood in Him. In this part of his book Kraemer attempts to set down what the Bible has to say about the problem of religion and religions: (*a*) directly in certain passages (Rom. 1.19-32; 2.1-16; 3.29, 30; Acts 14.15-17; 16.22-37); (*b*) indirectly in certain passages (e.g. the Creation and Fall, the Covenant with Noah, the story of the Tower of Babel, the thoughts about God in the Wisdom Literature and in the Logos concept in the New Testament); and (*c*) in various other central concepts necessary to grasp the biblical understanding of religion and the nature of the human religious consciousness, e.g. 'people' or 'community', 'Gentiles', 'heart', 'flesh and spirit'.

This study leads Kraemer to conclude that man is 'in an inescapably dialectical condition: related to God—separated from Him; sought by God and haunted by Him—rebelling against Him and yet groping towards Him. This dialectical condition is the constitutive element of man's religious conciousness' (p. 252). 'Man is still in the image of God and at the same time has lost it entirely' (p. 251). We must speak at one and the same time about man's 'grandeur' and of his *misère* (p. 251), as Calvin saw more clearly than any other reformer.

This leads Kraemer to the conclusion that 'the whole world of religion and religions, lies within the compass of God's concern. God is not absent from them. At the same time, this world of religion and religions lives, on the same ground, in a condition of responsibility and obligation towards God, whether this is subjectively recognised or not. It is their objective existential situation, and it makes religion and religions conscious or unconscious responses to God, wrong, partly right, sometimes really right. . . . The world of religion and religions belongs to the realm of the "old man", the unredeemed man, not yet re-created into the Image of God in whose likeness man was originally created, and therefore,

with all its marvellous achievements and Satanic deviations, under divine judgment, dimly or unwittingly awaiting its redemption' (p. 257).

In his exegesis of the vital New Testament passages, Kraemer criticises Dodd and Moffat at certain points and calls in question Barth's exegesis of Romans 1 and 2 and Acts 14. Here says Kraemer the dialectical theologian has become one-sided and interpreted all religion as idolatry and *Unglaube* and *Werkheiligheit*. Later in dealing with the terms general and special revelation (which he would like to see discontinued, though he was no great hopes of this happening!), Kraemer says of Barth (p. 359): 'If Barth says—and he does—that the Bible knows no other mode of revelation than Christ, he has the Bible against him. If he says that all modes of revelation find their source, their meaning and criterion in Jesus Christ, and that the revelation of God's righteousness in Christ is the final revelation in the light of which Jesus Christ is the Truth, the only Truth, without whom no man comes to the Father—then he is quite right.'

Kraemer's exegesis and interpretation of the biblical concepts is powerfully homogeneous and convincing, and the whole position from which one views the religions in the light of God's truth—mercy and judgment in Jesus Christ—is one which leaves room for no proud superiority or boasting on the part of the Christian, for Christianity as a historical religion also comes under judgment and stands in need of mercy. It too can reveal, and has revealed, 'marvellous achievements and Satanic deviations'.

If one is to venture any criticisms of this work of such a renowned expert as Dr Kraemer—and this reviewer hesitates to do so as one who has often sat at Kraemer's feet and marvelled at the scholarship, biblical understanding and practical experience of this lay apostle—they would be as follows. (1) He delays in coming to grips with the main part of his study, though in his delays he is building up the case for his theological position as 'scientific' and giving a historical account of theological attempts to deal with the problem of religion and religions—in Justin Martyr (author of the *Logos spermatikos* doctrine which has been so unbiblically used in the history of Christian theology in this matter of the Christian revelation and its relation to other religions), Clement, Origen, Tertullian, Augustine, Aquinas, the Reformers and so on right up to Tambaram and the post-Tambaram discussions. (2) This historical part (Part III) is very interesting and suggestive indeed, but is in danger of being sketchy and would demand more than the hundred pages Kraemer gives. (3) Following Kraemer's biblical insights, we might have expected more in the way of concrete application to the living religions of today. Indeed Kraemer admits (p. 321) that this would

have been the 'only proper thing to do now', but claims this would need a new book. We can hope that this is a promise Kraemer will redeem.

But this must not detract from appreciation of the penetrating and stimulating character of Kraemer's thinking, and his vigorous theological handling of his subject. He admits that some of his friends found the book rather heavy going when they read it in manuscript, but his response is characteristic: 'If Christians intend to do their duty in the present encounter of Church and World in all its sectors, they must rejoice in the unavoidable, arduous heavy-goingness of the battle' (p. 8).

Indeed Kraemer has his sights on the battle in Asia and Africa today and on the comparatively weak Christian forces in the Younger Churches facing the old and today resurgent non-Christian religions. In fact he believes that 'the Christian Church is, as never before since A.D. 312, challenged by the existence and vitality of the non-Christian religions. . . . This means the modest beginning of a new era of contact and spiritual contest' (p. 27).

In relation to the real autonomy of the 'Younger Churches' (especially as regards their real indigenous freedom to think and not slavishly to follow the pattern of Western Christian thought), the problem of syncretism (pp. 387f), and the necessity of 'adaptation', Kraemer has many wise things to say that are very relevant to missionary thinking; as for example: 'The reason why the danger-signal is raised so often in regard to the matter of adaptation is that we are, to a very great extent unconsciously, still thinking of indigenous Churches in terms of Western spiritual colonies' (p. 410).

It is this setting of Kraemer's study of religion and religions in the light of biblical revelation that removes it entirely from the class of academic exercises in the comparative study of religions and gives it its existential *pied à terre.* J. R. FLEMING

He That Cometh. By S. MOWINCKEL. Translated by G. W. ANDERSON. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Pp. xvi + 528. 45s.

THIS long awaited and important work, first published in Norwegian in 1951 under the title *Han som kommer*, is a landmark in the study of the Messianic problem, and the translator deserves the highest praise for his industry and meticulous care in the exacting task of making it available in English. Besides innumerable footnotes below the text, many of them of the greatest importance, there are eighteen pages of additional notes, the bibliography extends to tweny-six pages, and the very full indexes are a model of what indexes should be.

Mowinckel surveys in great detail the origin and development o

the idea of the Messiah and examines its relationship to the conceptions of the Servant of the Lord and the Son of Man, although unfortunately there is no discussion of the Messianic beliefs of the Qumran sect apart from a reference to the Damascus Fragments on p. 289. It is inevitably difficult in a book of this size always to keep the progress of the argument clearly before the reader and to avoid a certain amount of repetition; but it says much for the skill of the author that time and again he emerges from a maze of detail and picks up again the main thread of the argument with a recapitulation of the particular aspect of the theme under discussion.

There are two main parts: 'The Future King in Early Jewish Eschatology', and 'The Messiah in Later Judaism'. In the first brief chapter he affirms it as a principle that the words 'Messiah' and 'Messianic' in later Judaism are strictly eschatological terms, and should not be applied, as by Bentzen, Engnell, and Riesenfeld, to oriental royal ideology. He then endeavours to show, as against Gressmann and Sellin, that the divine features of the king in the royal psalms are due not to the existence of ancient Messianic beliefs, but to oriental ideas about kingship. All the Old Testament genuinely Messianic prophecies belong to the post-monarchical period, and Isa. 7.10-14 and 9.1-6, the only certainly pre-exilic passages, are not 'Messianic' at all, but refer to the kingship. The later concept of the eschatological Messiah (a term which in this sense does not appear in the Old Testament) originated in the Israelite conception of the king and in the expectation of a future king as a this-worldly political figure. The Messiah, moreover, to a certain degree always retained this political character.

At the beginning of the long third chapter, 'The Ideal of Kingship in Ancient Israel', Mowinckel distinguishes between two problems: the origin of the actual expectation of a Messiah, and the source of the content of the Messianic figure, and goes on to discuss the latter as a preparation for consideration of the former. This he does by examining the king-ideology of the ancient east and the relationship to it of the Israelite ideal of kingship. He is critical of the tendency among some exponents (Hooke, Engnell, Widengren) of the 'ritual pattern' school of thought to force uniformity upon the various oriental religions and the extant texts so as to produce an artificial picture of 'a ritual pattern which is found everywhere, though it existed nowhere' (p. 27). In fact, as Frankfort has shown, considerable differences exist, for example, between the Egyptian and Mesopotamian conceptions of kingship. In Egypt the king is a real god, but in Babylonia, while he is endowed with 'divine' powers and attributes as an intermediary between god and people, he is not a god like Pharaoh. Much less is the king identical with the god in the

cultic drama to such an extent that it is permissible to speak of the suffering and dying king. The form of this complex of ideas which is most relevant to Israel is, of course, the Canaanite. Here the Ugaritic texts are the most valuable source, but although the central conception is that of the dying and rising fertility god, it is quite uncertain how far the king was identical with him. Israel, while adopting kingship after the Canaanite model, also retained the ideals of the nomadic period, with the result that Israelite royal ideology is a distinctive fusion of the old chieftainship and Canaanite kingship. This explains the ethical transformation and sublimation of features of the cult derived from Canaanite practice as reflected especially in the psalms. The New Year festival was completely transformed. There is no renewal of the god himself, and 'what the king obtains in the cultic festival is not primarily new life and strength, but the renewal and confirmation of the covenant' (p. 82). The king in Israel is a 'divine' figure, as elsewhere in the east, but 'there is no evidence that in Israel the king was regarded as Yahweh, much less the dying Yahweh, or that there was any representation in the festival ritual of the cult of the suffering and death of the king' (p. 87). The conclusion is that the source of the content of the Messiah is the ideal of kingship and the blessings which are expected to follow when it is fulfilled, as described in a royal psalm like Ps. 72.

In the next three chapters Mowinckel turns to the other question, the origin of the Messianic hope. The ideal of kingship was never fully realised and so always contained a future element: one day the ideal king would surely come. While the monarchy lasted this ideal was crystallised in the cult, and especially in the festival of anointing and the annual New Year festival when hopes were centred on the king himself. These hopes cannot rightly be called 'Messianic', which is an eschatological term, but they led the way to Messianic expectation. ' "Messiah" is the ideal king entirely transferred to the future' (p. 123). Mowinckel's view is thus diametrically opposed to the religio-historical theory of an ancient pre-Israelite Messianic concept set within an ancient widespread oriental eschatology. The king was not regarded as a Messiah; the idea of the Messiah developed out of the royal ideology.

Mowinckel next sketches the origin and content of Jewish eschatology. This developed out of the hope of national restoration after national destruction, especially as expressed by Deutero-Isaiah in terms of Yahweh's enthronement festival in which he reigns supreme after his conquest once more of the powers of chaos. It must, however, be remarked that there are those who do not accept the cultic explanation of the thought of Yahweh's kingship, and

derive it rather from the teaching of the prophets themselves. The kingdom of God, the rule of Yahweh both over His own people and over the whole world of men and nature, but with Israel under the Davidic king as the centre, is the core of the future hope. The content of Jewish eschatology is determined by that of the future hope which gave it birth. The transition to eschatology proper is discernible in later prophecy (the Trito-Isaianic circle), which increasingly employs transcendent, supra-historical conceptions of the method of restoration and the arrival of the day of Yahweh.

In chapter six Mowinckel turns to the place of the king in the future hope. The Messianic faith proper could only arise after the downfall of the monarchy and the end of the cult which saw in each successive king a possible realisation of the Davidic ideal of kingship. The ideal king in the Old Testament is always an entirely human figure, though in the development of national and political expectations into true eschatology there is a corresponding increase in his mythical features. At the same time, the future king or Messiah was never so exalted as to become a rival of Yahweh. That the Messiah is in no way essential is clear from the minor role he sometimes plays in Old Testament pictures of the future and his absence from some later Jewish writings. This takes place when the main emphasis is shifted from the national and political to the religious aspect of the future hope, and all is centred on the kingship of Yahweh Himself. The chapter ends with a denial that the mythical features of the Messiah in the Old Testament, which he attributes to the royal ideology, come from the idea of the eschatological *Urmensch* redeemer.

A chapter of seventy pages is next devoted to 'The Servant of the Lord' in Deutero-Isaiah. Mowinckel is inclined to think that the Servant conception is based on an actual historical figure, a prophet from the same circle as the author of the Songs who lived some time after Deutero-Isaiah. He is in no sense a royal or Messianic figure, though some royal traits have been transferred to him. He felt his mission to be to convert Israel to Yahweh both by his preaching and by his bodily sufferings which his disciples after his death came to interpret as vicarious and redemptive. The Servant replaces the ideal king, or rather, he 'will be what the Messiah in the earlier period was never thought of as being, namely, a true mediator of salvation' (p. 244). The two conceptions remained distinct until Jesus combined them in the thought of Himself as the Servant-Messiah.

Part II begins with a brief but brilliant sketch of later Jewish eschatology. This is characterised by the dualistic conception of the two ages, of Persian origin. The other-worldly and transcendental

element in eschatology receives more and more emphasis. Yet there remains a tension between the older and more Jewish outlook and later ideas, 'between those elements which were political, national, and this-worldly, and those transcendental and universal elements which belonged to the world beyond' (p. 267), a tension which is never fully resolved, though both apocalyptic and rabbinic orthodoxy attempt a reconciliation between them.

Correspondingly there are, broadly speaking, two Messianic types, the national Messiah, the subject of chapter nine, and the Son of Man, and these are fused in the same way as the different types of eschatological outlook to which they belong, usually with one of the figures dominating the picture and influenced by the other. In this Mowinckel follows Bousset, and he is surely right in his protest against attempts by Bonsirven and Riesenfeld to conflate the two conceptions. He is particularly emphatic in refuting the idea that the transcendental features of the Son of Man are, like those of the Messiah, derived from the royal ideology, for it is absolutely fundamental to his thesis that the Son of Man has quite a different origin from the Jewish Messiah and is not connected with the king. Neither will he have anything to do with statements by Jeremias and others that Judaism anticipated Christianity in holding beliefs in a suffering and dying Messiah. He argues convincingly, in the reviewer's opinion, that this cannot be so, and outlines the correct methodology to be applied to the question (p. 327).

In the last and longest chapter of over a hundred pages on 'The Son of Man', perhaps the most important in the whole book, the author shows himself master of one of the most baffling but fascinating and, indeed, vital problems in biblical history and theology. This does not mean that all his solutions of the many subsidiary problems involved will necessarily win assent. Detailed discussion of them cannot be given here; all that can be attempted is a brief summary of Mowinckel's main argument.

He begins by saying that the Aramaic *bar nasha*, 'the son of man', was an expression for 'the man', known but not common to everyday speech in the time of Jesus, in which it was used with a certain emphasis. In order to discover what the term meant to Jesus it is necessary to find out what meaning it had in His day which led Him to adopt it in preference to other titles, especially that of Messiah. Mowinckel does not find the origin of the Son of Man conception in Daniel 7, which gives a corporate interpretation of an individual figure which about 200 B.C. was regarded as 'a heavenly being in human form ("one like a man"), who, at the turn of the age, the dawn of the eschatological era, would appear, and would receive from God delegated power and authority over all kingdoms and

peoples' (p. 352). This figure, derived from oriental conceptions of the primordial man or *anthropos*, had in Judaism become entirely eschatological. It may be remarked that one consequence of this view would be that the term Son of Man on the lips of Jesus, being dependent not on Daniel 7 directly, but on the individual figure which that passage interprets in a corporate sense, had not a corporate but an individual reference. 'Jesus came to be, not the Messiah, but the Son of Man' (p. 445). He was also conscious of being the suffering Servant of the Lord. He was thus the first to combine two conceptions which in origin were not Messianic at all, and in doing so He created an entirely new conception of Messiahship. By interpreting the Messiah in terms of the Son of Man, and adopting the latter as His self-designation in preference to all others, 'He also hallowed those features in it which were of non-Jewish origin, and in fact attested that He was a saviour for both Jews and Gentiles, the fulfilment of the hope of all mankind' (p. 446). It is no part of the author's purpose to undertake the task of further re-examination of the New Testament use of the term; but his rich and stimulating study of its earlier history provides the prolegomena to that task.

A. J. B. Higgins

The New Testament Background: Selected Documents. By C. K. Barrett. S.P.C.K., London, 1956. 21s.

Most writers, it has been said, are children of their time. Our appreciation, sometimes indeed our very understanding, of their work is conditioned by our knowledge of the period in which they lived, the circumstances under which they wrote, the problems with which they had to contend. It may indeed be possible to read them with some understanding in isolation; a good translation may open their treasures even to those who have not the gift of tongues. But time and again a knowledge of the background sheds a flood of light upon the meaning, and not least where the documents with which we are concerned derive from a period far removed from our own.

The New Testament has sometimes suffered through being treated as a purely sacred literature. On the one hand its Greek has been disparaged by those for whom the Greeks possessed no literature after Demosthenes and Aristotle, on the other there have been those who have sought interpretation on the basis of the English version alone, as if it were a document of English literature. Yet it was said, as long ago as the prologue to Sirach, that 'things originally spoken in Hebrew have not the same force in them, when they are translated into another tongue'. The same is true of things originally spoken, or written, in Greek.

It has been one of the real achievements of critical scholarship

since the days of Wettstein to restore the New Testament to its proper setting in the life of the first century of our era, to utilise for its understanding the resources which have become available in the papyri and in inscriptions, alike for the study of the language itself and for the interpretation of the documents written in that language. Inevitably there have been those who have set too great store by this new knowledge, and have sought to interpret the New Testament entirely by the light of the new material, to the neglect of the heritage of the Old Testament and of Judaism, but that is a necessary stage in the advancement of our knowledge. Unfortunately there has hitherto been no single book in English which could supply a comprehensive selection of material for the convenience of the student. As Dr Barrett says, 'There are not a few books which describe the history and thought of the world in which the Church was born, but none (so far as I know) which offers the reader a selection of those original documents which alone can make this past world live.' This need he has set himself to meet. One wonders that no one ever thought of it before.

One reason for the lack of such a book is quite obviously the immensity of the task. Dr Barrett has chosen over two hundred extracts from a wide range of writings, papyri, inscriptions, the philosophers, Rabbinic literature, Philo, Josephus, the *Corpus Hermeticum*, the mysteries, the Septuagint, apocalyptic, not to speak of those from the historians and the men of affairs: yet he modestly acknowledges that many gaps remain, and must remain. The book must suffer, like all anthologies, from the criticism of those who miss what they would themselves have included; if some suggestions are hereafter offered, it is not in any carping spirit but with due appreciation of what the editor has given us, and in the hope of contributing to its improvement.

Dr Barrett tells us that he considered, but rejected, the method adopted by Fiebig in the book which prompted this undertaking, namely to select and illustrate New Testament topics. He has sought instead to present a survey of the ancient world which will supplement rather than reduplicate the material available in the commentaries. There is no bibliography, but those who wish to seek further will find in the acknowledgments (pp. xv-xvi) and in the account of the sources (pp. xix-xxiv) ample references for more extended reading. Here it may be noted that while Dr Barrett's book was in the press Sir Ernest Barker published an excellent selection of material from Diogenes Laertes on the Stoics (see *Alexander to Constantine*, pp. 19ff).

The book opens with a series of thumb-nail portraits of the emperors from Augustus to Domitian, including extracts from the

Res Gestae of Augustus himself, from Horace's *Carmen Saeculare*, and also Virgil's *Messianic Eclogue*. The imperial cult is referred to only incidentally, which some may count a defect, while Pliny's correspondence with Trajan regarding Christianity is already available in Bettenson's *Documents of the Christian Church*. The section on the papyri begins with Pliny's description of the preparation and use of papyrus, and includes a long extract from the Paris 'magical papyrus'. Here perhaps room might have been found for one of the invitations to the table of the Lord Sarapis, despite their date.

The inscriptions include the Gallio inscription from Delphi and the inscription from the wall of the Temple in Jerusalem. On p. 52 reference might have been made to Deissmann's association of the formula of receipt ('He has received the price') with the saying of Jesus 'They have received their reward'. One or two of the *soter* inscriptions studied long ago by Wendland might have been added, if only to show that Philo (p. 138) is merely using conventional terms in speaking of 'our saviour and benefactor Augustus'. Then follows a selection from the philosophers, from Heraclitus to Marcus Aurelius, with some passages from Epictetus and Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* presenting the itinerant philosophic missionary. A surprising omission here is the cosmogony of Plato's *Timaeus*, the more so in view of the reference on p. 65: 'Platonism now (with Posidonius) began strongly to influence Stoicism. The *Timaeus* in particular came to be looked on almost as Holy Writ.' And one reader at least would have liked to see some more of Lucretius.

The Graeco-Roman section ends with some extracts from the Hermetic literature, or more correctly from the *Poimandres*, which do convey a real sense of the character of this literature, and selections from various writers about the Mystery cults. Here the 'sordid story' of Decius Mundus recorded by Josephus stands in striking contrast to Apuleius' account of his initiation. One is tempted here to ask for Catullus' account of the myth of Attis, or for some of the comments of Juvenal. The whole section could indeed have been quite enormously expanded by the addition of extracts from Cicero about the rapacity of colonial governors (both in his speeches and in his letters), from those parts of his correspondence which reflect the turmoil which preceded the end of the Republic, or again from the satirists and the poets. On the Greek side, there are the philosophic criticisms of the Olympian religion from Xenophanes down. But alas! we cannot have it all.

The Jewish section is rather longer, but this includes some sixteen pages of Philo and eighteen of Josephus. Moreover a considerable part of it is devoted to the literature of Rabbinic Judaism (as Dr Barrett remarks in his introduction, the student reading theology

'has probably not read the *Hermetica*, and he has certainly not read the Talmud'). To provide a comprehensive selection from Philo alone in sixteen pages is itself no mean undertaking. The section on the Septuagint provides extracts showing the Jewish tradition about its origin, and a number of passages presenting 'certain aspects of LXX thought and writing, not represented or only slightly represented in the canonical Old Testament'. The final section of the book proper deals with Apocalyptic, but an appendix adds some extracts from the Zadokite Fragments and the Manual of Discipline. As Dr Barrett says, the questions raised by these documents are still *sub judice*, and he therefore makes no attempt to discuss them.

Even such a bald summary may serve to indicate the wealth of material here supplied, although no review can do real justice to the immense amount of work which Dr Barrett has undertaken. One error has been noted: on p. 106 Antiochus returned in the one hundred and forty-third year; on pp. 127, 155 and 195 the letter 'l' has dropped out in the references to the line of the text in the notes. On p. 113 Alexander Balas is referred to without explanation. These are however minor blemishes.

The test of such a book must be its capacity to convey a sense of atmosphere, to make the period come alive, and here different readers may have different reactions. One wonders if Dr Barrett has truly brought out the sense of the *lachrimae rerum*, of what Professor Gilbert Murray called 'the failure of nerve', and Paul summed up so brilliantly in Ephesians 2.11-12. The *Passer* of Catullus might have helped, with its reference to that dark abode from which no man returns, or Virgil's First Eclogue, treated as a social document. Again, one might have looked for some of the passages collected by Reinach illustrating the attitude of Greek and Roman authors toward the Jews, since Reinach's book is in French and not available in every library. The list is endless, and only serves to show how much Dr Barrett deserves our thanks. The real value of this book may prove to lie not so much in what it actually contains but in the impulse which it will give the reader to prosecute his studies. In an age when knowledge of the Classics is the privilege of the few, and even the student of theology may have but little Greek and less Latin, such a book as this is invaluable as a means of opening the door upon the ancient world. 'The world of the first century (or thereabouts) is worth studying for its own sake, and when studied for its own sake it becomes even more valuable as the setting in which the Christian faith appeared' (p. xvii). Any who begin with this volume will be richly rewarded.

R. McL. Wilson

The Problem of History in Mark. By James M. Robinson. S.C.M. Press (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 21). Pp. 85. 8s.

There must be something in the name Robinson which predisposes its bearers to biblical scholarship. The latest scion of this distinguished theological clan is James M. Robinson, Assistant Professor of Biblical Theology at the Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Georgia, who has written a small but most important monograph on the Problem of History in Mark.

Mr Robinson begins with a compact survey of recent Marcan studies with special reference to Mark's conception of history, and rightly remarks that it is only when we have defined Mark's understanding of history that 'a centre of interpretation can be located which does justice both to Mark's history of Jesus and to Mark's religious experience. Until this understanding of history is clarified, Marcan interpretation must fluctuate between the dissolution of the Marcan history of Jesus into Mark's religious experience, and the petrifaction of the Marcan *Kerygma* into objective historiography' (p. 15).

The rest of the book is devoted to the thesis that this centre of interpretation is to be found in Mark's conception that the Baptism/Temptation of Jesus inaugurated a cosmic war bewteen the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Satan which continued throughout the ministry of Jesus and has still to be waged in the life of the Church today. Dr Robinson sees all the Marcan historical material as coming within this eschatological perspective. Exorcisms (the Son of God against the demoniacs) and conflict stories (Jesus battling with his opponents) and even debates with the disciples (in which they play the role of *advocati diaboli*) all reflect at a lower level the primary cosmic clash in history between the power of the Spirit and the power of Satan.

'For Mark, history is not ultimately ambiguous or relativistic; rather it has two clear-cut and irreconcilable alternatives in it . . . life or death, communion or segregation. . . . It is Jesus' function to enter this struggle on behalf of the true destiny of mankind and with his heavenly power to carry through to the victory, and to the life and communion it brings' (p. 42). In His death Jesus experiences 'the ultimate of historical involvement and of diabolic antagonism. In the resurrection the force of evil is conclusively broken, and the power of God's reign is established in history' (p. 53). 'By defining the Church's existence as a combination of eschatological blessing and persecution, Mark is distinguishing it on the one hand from the non-eschatological history preceding Jesus and on the other hand from the non-historicity of the new aeon. Mark's understanding of the Church is rooted in a new understanding of history as the inter-

play of blessedness and suffering. This new understanding of history is rooted in the event in history through which a new situation in history is inaugurated' (p. 56).

These quotations will serve to show the trend of Dr Robinson's argument and the stimulating quality of his thought. While in general terms it would be agreed by all students of Mark that the antithesis of the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Satan plays a dominent role, its place as the *Leitmotiv* of the Gospel, influencing both Mark's presentation of Jesus and his conception of the role of the Church in the world, has not yet been so fully and suggestively developed as in this monograph. It is undoubtedly a notable contribution to Marcan studies and a new interpretation with which we shall have to reckon. WILLIAM NEIL

New Testament Faith for Today. By AMOS N. WILDER. S.C.M. Press, 1957. Pp. 181. 15s.

THE subject dealt with is in fact Bultmann's issue of demythologising: Wilder attempts to give a more traditional solution. He admits that the Bible's picture of the world and of God's dealings with men occasions a great deal of confusion and bewilderment today, but he thinks that it has far from broken down (p. 162). He also allows that much religious symbol and many biblical symbols are rightly suspect. But he holds that faith cannot do without symbol: wherever there is a great rising up of faith, as at the time of the Incarnation, symbol is not only inevitable but essential. His plea then is for more than an understanding of the thought-world into which the New Testament came, though it is that—'our difficulty with Paul's language is that we have lost a sense of the living context in which he wrote' (p. 136). We today must try to recapture that faith of the New Testament actors and writers, and, seeing how, through the symbols of their day, they tried to express how God in Christ had spoken to the needs of the times, try for our part to convey the same faith.

Professor Wilder's contention is that the Bible's picture is still capable of being made meaningful for today. And few, in this country at any rate, would be ready to go the whole way with Bultmann. But the present reviewer would have welcomed a little more actual illustration from *New Testament Faith for Today*, showing *how* the reinterpretation is to be gone about. Wilder rules out neo-orthodoxy, individual salvation, and the old liberalism that discarded symbol. We must grasp the New Testament faith. (And the insistence on that is one of the excellences of the book.) But the question still remains for many: how is it to be communicated today? Will the writer follow up his admirable exposition of the New

Testament faith, and how Paul and John sought to communicate it, with a book addressed more directly to today?

D. M. G. Stalker

A Year with the Bible. By John Marsh. S.C.M. Press, 1957. Pp. 191. 15s.

After an introduction which stresses the unity of the Bible as the account of man's salvation, daily readings are given, with comments, which appear to have two ends in view. The first is to let the Bible speak to man in his condition today, the second is to make the understanding of the Bible itself easier and the connexion between the several parts of it clearer. This has meant that the author follows fairly closely the traditional method of working more or less straight through the books in their order from Genesis to Revelation. It also means that there is a fair amount of Old Testament history. That is in part good: there is quite appalling and widespread ignorance of the main sweep of the biblical events. But are nine readings from Judges and two from Second Isaiah a proper balance —especially when we notice that one of the Isaiah readings attempts to deal with all the Servant Songs? The treatment of Second Isaiah also raises the question of the readers whom the author has in view. The critical approach to the Bible is pre-supposed. But critical questions are hardly ever raised. It may be that they should be raised as little as possible in a book of this kind. But in some cases they surely ought to have been touched upon, at least: e.g., the name Deutero-Isaiah is introduced without explanation. Will every non-specialist, apparently the presumed reader, understand that without more ado? This is perhaps the chief weakness in a book which will appeal to many—it assumes more knowledge in some points than those who use it are likely to possess.

D. M. G. Stalker

Early Israel in Recent History Writing. By John Bright. S.C.M. Press (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 19), 1956. 9s. 6d.

The author is McCormick Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Interpretation at Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Virginia, and he is a former pupil of Professor Albright. The volume is virtually a study and criticism of the writings of Albrecht Alt and his distinguished former pupil, Martin Noth. In between the summary and the evaluation of the work of these two scholars, there is a summary and criticism of the work of Yehezkel Kaufmann, an Israeli scholar whose work is less well known than it deserves because he has written almost wholly in Hebrew. Klausmann is a severe critic of the work of the two Germans, but, whilst Bright

agrees that his criticism is fresh, original and fruitful in suggestion to the highest degree, he is of the opinion that an effective answer is not provided. Bright and Klausmann agree that Alt and Noth have seriously overplayed the aetiological factor in their estimate of the value of ancient traditions. On the other hand, Kaufmann has almost entirely neglected the archaeological evidence, an attitude which no pupil of Albright's is ever likely to allow. The Israeli scholar, also, is so concerned to save the antiquity of the early traditions that he defends the unity of the canonical books, and virtually moves back the dates of the composition of, for example, Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges and Kings, close to the date of the events they describe.

The criticism of Alt and Noth concerns their use of form-criticism. The direct heirs of Wellhausen may have made literary criticism carry a heavier load than it can bear, but this is what Alt and Noth have done with form-criticism. This shows itself in the excessive regard paid to the aetiological element in the old traditions. Bright maintains, following Albright, that in general the aetiological factor is secondary, and he supplies fascinating illustrations from American history in support. Traditions follow people rather than cling to places. But Bright chiefly attacks Noth's claim that the history of Israel can begin only with the formation of the Twelve-Clan League, which did not take shape till after the Settlement. He denies that the tribes received their names after the Settlement, and insists that the ancient traditions which make, for instance, Issachar and Zebulon full brothers, must have a pre-Palestinian basis. If ever we are to have a history of Israel dealing with the period before the rise of the monarchy, this must be based on a balanced evaluation of *all* the evidence of every type. This will mean that the broad outlines of biblical history and essence of the Sinai tradition are firmly rooted in history. Professor Bright's work is itself a well-balanced piece of scholarship, careful, clear and erudite. The style is superb, and the modern American analogies make the book thoroughly fascinating. The story of how the legend grew that George Washington threw a silver dollar across the Rappahannock River is alone worth the money. NORMAN H. SNAITH

The Faith and Modern Error. By HARRY BLAMIRES. S.P.C.K., 1956. Pp. x + 145. 15s. net.

MR BLAMIRES is a Senior Lecturer in English in a Church of England Training College for men. 'The Faith' is therefore the Faith of the Church and the Creeds, taken as sufficiently so defined. 'Modern Error', in this Essay on the Christian Message in the Twentieth Century, is seen as the denial or diminution of the supernatural,

which is the constitutive element in the Church and its message. Unawareness of the finite limitations of human existence, repudiation of or deliberate closing of the eyes to the infinite dimensions of reality, is the keynote of the contemporary situation. Most serious of all, in Mr Blamires' opinion, is that the Church too has been infected by this mood, that she too often presents a diluted Gospel, making suicidal concessions to scientific naturalism, pressing its claims to be heard in terms of secular humanism and humanitarianism. In vivid and lucid prose he presents his indictment of world and Church in terms which we shall have only too often to allow to be sadly true. Nothing which this reviewer may hereafter say should be taken to contradict his opinion that this is a good book, which we should all be the better for having read. This note will concentrate on one aspect of Mr Blamires' criticism, his attack on theological modernism and the theological epistemology in terms of which this is conducted. In so doing we shall have to ignore the many-sided riches in the rest of the book, his disquisitions on literature and aesthetics, his rewarding disentanglement of specific Christian ethics from 'materialistic criteria and naturalistic affiliations', and much else. This concentration seems to be justified by the role cast by Mr Blamires for modernism in the Church as the real villain in the piece, in the Church's refusal to 'let religion be religion'. And his attack is argued, in the third chapter of his book, 'The Language of Religious Thought', with a particularity which invites corresponding attention.

'The spectacle in the educational world at the present is often both ludicrous and tragic. It is the spectacle of Christian teachers apologetically minimising that doctrinal content of supernatural Christianity for which the souls and intellects of their pupils are urgently clamouring . . . laboriously tussling over the chronology and authenticity of different gospel narratives before pupils who long to know only what the Christian Message is, what the Church has to teach . . . inoculating their charges against the danger of incurring a potent dose of Christianity. Unless we realise that modernism is absolutely and utterly out of date, that it caters pathetically for a historical phase that finally disappeared with the coming of the Second World War, we shall fail to rise to a most exciting opportunity.' Now there may be a lesson to be learned here in the tactics of evangelism in the contemporary situation. One may well believe that the evidence suggests that 'the young of today are looking for complete systems. Hence the appeal of Marxism and Jehovah's Witnesses.' It may even be that 'the temper of the young intellect today is healthier than that of pre-war generations': although to others than Mr Blamires the appeal of Marxism and

Jehovah's Witnesses may suggest that the lust for complete systems is not always 'a freer recognition of the scope of the rational'. The 'rationality' which he has in view is the deductive interconnexion of a scheme of supernatural dogma which must be accepted as a whole by an act of faith. The interconnectedness of the dogmatic scheme is such that the Fall of the Angels is equally certain with the Fall of Man, the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection. 'The doctrine of the Trinity is not less certain than the facts of the Crucifixion. The promise of the Kingdom of Heaven is not less certain than the fact of Christ's birth in Bethlehem.' Hence 'the picking and choosing of liberal protestantism means nothing except to those brought up to it. The one thing we can most safely and certainly say of modernism is that it is no longer modern.'

Now, unless we can commit ourselves to the position that whatsoever is most recent is therefore most true, that youth is always in the right, Mr Blamires' wholesale repudiation of modernism and liberal protestantism obviously stands in need of further argument. It may be a vain endeavour, as he represents the scepticism of the Victorians and Edwardians as doing, to 'try to adjust the claims of science and religion at a point midway between the Resurrection and the Incarnation'. But it is not a useless endeavour to try to adjust the claims of science and religion in general. There is no guarantee that this problem, left out of sight by modern youth in the act of faith which commits them to Christianity, will not turn up to trouble them later on. And it is idle to imagine, either that the problem has been left behind as superfluous, or that it is solved by the doctrine of analogy in St. Thomas Aquinas as defining the applicability of human language (and therefore human thought) to treat of transcendent reality and supernatural truth. The long-term strategy, therefore, if not the tactics of contemporary situation, may well assure us that modernism and liberal protestantism were not just vain endeavours. Both movements were concerned with the problems which the scientific spirit and historical criticism presented to the Faith. Is it enough merely to tell science to bow before the claim of the supernatural and lay its hand upon its mouth? Is it true that relations of the Christian Faith to its historical origins and records is either a matter of indifference, or have been happily settled? There is next to nothing in Mr Blamires' book on this latter point—merely the appearance of an unconcern which comes near to contempt. His roll of the heroes of contemporary 'theological thinking' does not include the name of Rudolf Bultmann; and there is nothing about demythologising or existentialism beyond mention of the names of Sartre, Buber, Marcel, Kierkegaard.

But Mr Blamires has his own doctrine or account of the relation of the supernatural in the Christian Message to revelation in history; and it is here that this reviewer has most difficulty in following (perhaps, in understanding?) him. '*Christ was the Son of God.* . . . The statement is rooted in a historical event recorded like other historical events, with more than the average amount of evidence to support it. . . . Men saw and heard that Christ was the Son of God, and heard Him whom they supremely trusted declare that God is Love.' Compared with the statement *Prevention is better than cure* the statement *Christ is the Son of God* is 'linked to the world of sense experience by a more fool-proof "scientific" connexion' than the other. 'For historical records exist, and there is a scientific way of establishing the authenticity of such records'; whereas *Prevention is better than cure* 'is not a statement of the scientific order. It is doubtful whether any apparent instance of prevention could be reliably proved to be such.' Now in what sense did 'men see and hear that Christ was the Son of God'? Obviously this is a historical statement in the sense that from what they saw and heard some men believed that Christ (Jesus?) was the Son of God. Peter, James, John and Paul so believed (leave the question about Paul's 'knowledge of Jesus after the flesh' out of sight for the moment) or there would have been no Bible, no Church. But did they all mean the same thing by such confession? Was the metaphysical Sonship of God, the Incarnation of the Second Person in the Trinity, present to Peter as it was to Paul or 'John'? Did Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi go beyond acknowledgment of the Prophet of Nazareth as the expected Jewish Messiah? Here we enter the realm of historical criticism of the records. How does Mr Blamires deal with Rudolf Bultmann's doubts whether Jesus ever 'claimed' Messiahship in His lifetime? By a species of High Church fundamentalism which decides the historical and exegetical 'facts' of the records by what Church and Tradition say they were or must have been? 'Men saw and heard that Christ was the Son of God.' The name of Soren Kierkegaard stands high with Mr Blamires as a leader of the kind of 'theological thinking' he desiderates as truly modern. Yet no one insisted more than Kierkegaard that a man could and can be acquainted with all the historically attainable facts about Jesus and yet not pierce the Incognito of the Incarnate Son of God. And all that Kierkegaard says about the 'leap' of faith suggests that what he meant was not that one makes a moral or pragmatic choice between alternatives on which the historical evidence is inconclusive; but that here one passes into another realm of discourse altogether, where conviction relates to matters that have appeared in history, but where the convictions are them-

selves matters that history could never compel acknowledgment of, for which history *qua* history has no place, which are sheer paradox in terms of anything else we know.

Mr Blamires says in another place: 'No amount of argument about the proofs of the Resurrection narrative can transmute this piece of historical research into theological utterance. The true theological vision, whilst maintaining the historical foundations of the revelation, lifts it at the same time out of history. The theological vision is the supra-temporal vision which adds to the historical facts of Christ's Crucifixion and Resurrection the supernatural facts of Redemption and Atonement. . . . It is supernatural vision which transmutes history into theology.' The question here, of course, is *how* is this transformation effected? For it is transformation, transmutation, not simple 'addition'. 'Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven.' Here is no confession which the 'historical facts' compel, not even the 'more than average amount of evidence' of these facts. Neither can reason exerting itself in faith *make* the facts supernatural; although reason might decide to treat certain historical facts as determinative for thought and conduct, i.e. accord them a value as clues to the ultimate realities. But this last would be to open the door to the existentialist interpretation of faith; and that would not find any support in Mr Blamires.

In his discussion of the implications of the vision of the creative artist, Mr Blamires speaks of 'new significances . . . created at the conscious level by the illumination of a rare insight: the *givenness* of this insight is itself proof of man's link with the supernatural'. Here we have the acknowledgment of a realm of the supernatural different from the technical supernatural of dogmatic Christian belief. In the same context he can admit that 'value, in fact, represents the impingement of the supernatural upon the natural order'. If these positions are given full weight it seems to the reviewer that a more tenable theory of the relation of the historical to the supernatural might be arrived at, even in the sphere of Christian doctrine. Mr Blamires would probably reply that the specific Christian supernatural must not be diluted to the dimensions of that supernatural background of infinitude which is present to artistic (as indeed to philosophic) insight and to all serious reflection on man's situation as creaturely existence. We are aware of one contemporary construction of religious belief, which insists on retaining the Christian label, and indeed speaks of Christ as the Centre of History; but which begins by explicitly repudiating the whole conception of the supernatural in the sense for which this is central in Mr Blamires' defence of the Faith. On whatever side truth may

lie, it will hardly be helped by denigration of movements which, whatever their errors, were motivated by a desire to know the historical facts of Christian origins. JAMES BROWN

Where Judaism Differs. By RABBI ABBA HILLEL SILVER. Macmillan, New York, 1956. Pp. 305. 31s. 6d.

THIS work has to be considered under three headings: (i) an apologetic of Judaism, which we can commend most heartily; (ii) a polemic against Heathenism, which we think is often unfair; (iii) a qualified approval of some Christian doctrine which the author accepts because, he argues, it is after all Jewish.

Of the apologetic aspect of the book we can but say that it is a very able and reasoned presentation of the *Liberal Jewish* case. We will not quarrel with the Rabbi for using the term 'Jewish', to cover the whole history of the nation, though scholars generally reserve that term for the post-exilic period.

We must direct the author's attention to a serious misstatement on p. 41, 'One does not find a single instance of the rejection of the mythologic concept of Deity in the religions of the ancient world'. What about Xenophanes *c.* the sixth century B.C.?

On p. 40 the author implies that no other nomadic people save the Jews became monotheists. What about the Arabs? Chap. X, 'That men need not to be Saved', the author begins by discussing the 'soul', and claims that Judaism does not believe that the soul needs to be saved in one form or another. Judaism did not have the soul concept; that came from the Indo-European group. Judaism thought in terms of '*nephesh*', which was the whole being, body, heart and spirit. Its cardinal doctrines centred on: (i) the Call of and Covenant with Abraham; (ii) the redemption from Egypt; (iii) the Covenant of Sinai. The author should examine these carefully when he criticises the miracles of the New Testament.

The author accepts the Babylonian, Egyptian and Assyrian myth as part of the heritage of Judaism, but rightly claims that these were passed through the crucible of Jewish monotheism. He charges St. Paul with clinging to a myth which somehow escaped the Jewish crucible, viz. the doctrine of the fall. In the Genesis passage, the plain point is not the fall, but the absolute freedom given to men and its results. This involves God in the problem of the existence of sin, and in a sense calls for a solution. St. Paul presents the solution in the Cross.

The author claims that soteriology and the resurrection of Jesus are after-thoughts developed by the Church, as an explanation of the death of Jesus, but he has failed to study Mark 10.45. It was Jesus who taught the meaning of His death, and, though there are

passages in which He also taught His resurrection, it could hardly be made a dogma till it took place.

In Chap. XIV, while claiming that non-resistance is an Indo-European doctrine and not original with Jesus, he asserts that the West came by the doctrine through the teaching of Jesus (The Sermon on the Mount), and goes on to explain why Jesus taught this doctrine. 'Jesus expected the imminent establishment of the Kingdom of God, and that evil would cease automatically with the Millennium.' We have no quarrel with the author's militant Judaism or militant Zionism; yet we do claim that Jesus taught this for the guidance of His Church on His own initiative.

On p. 86 the author quotes a psssage from *The Beginnings of Christianity*, Vol. I, by Professors Foakes Jackson and Kirsop Lake, with the intention of showing that Jesus had nothing original to teach. He takes up the three points set out by the authors, and tries to show that what is claimed there to be original to Jesus, is in fact old Jewish doctrine. The authors of *The Beginnings of Christianity* are great and respected scholars, who only deal with the special emphasis of Jesus regarding these matters. It is the New Testament that is the text-book of Christianity.

In its apologia for Judaism the contribution is very well set out, and, if the author had kept to that subject, one would have classed it with such contributions as were made by Israel Abrahams, Claud Montefiore, and S. Schechter, and might appeal to him to produce an apologetic of Judaism. Many students would be very grateful for such a work. His present work excelling in the apologia of Judaism, is often quite unfair to the Heathen, and very shallow when dealing with Christian doctrine and Christ's teaching.

N. Levison

Modern Science and Christian Beliefs. By Arthur F. Smethurst. Nisbet. 21s.

In the first Eddington Memorial Lecture, Canon C. E. Raven maintained that, 'The attempt to interpret man's religion and man's science in terms not only mutually intelligible but also mutually interdependent, remains the great cultural task of our time, if we are to see any stable order.' Unfortunately during the last hundred years, so significant in the development of the modern scientific outlook, there have been very few scientists with a theological or philosophical training and one can obtain very little information from those engaged in scientific investigations about the implications and deeper significance of their work and its relation to other convictions and beliefs which capture and stir the spirit of man. On the other hand very few theologians have been

trained in the method of science and some by their obscurantist attempt to ignore what is the most important achievement of man since the Renaissance and the Reformation, have created a barrier of suspicion and mistrust, thus failing to give the scientists the spiritual guidance and help they need. As Baron von Hügel delighted to repeat, 'God is the God of Nature as of Grace. He provides the meal as well as the yeast.' To be 'fellow-labourers' with Him, we need to understand something of both and until we do, many of the great problems which confront us today will yield no solution.

Canon Smethurst's book is a notable contribution to this need; an impressive illustration of the words of Sir William Bragg, which he quotes in conclusion. 'Some people say that religion and science are opposed; so they are but only in the same sense as that in which my thumb and forefinger are opposed—and between the two one can grasp everything.' The author is singularly fitted for his task, for he is not only an Honours B.Sc. in Chemistry, a Ph.D. of London University for research in geology and geo-chemistry, a Fellow of the Geological Society, the Chemical Society and the Mineralogical Society but also an honours graduate in theology at Oxford. Although he has specialised in chemistry and geology, he appears to be equally at home in physics, biology and astronomy and conducts a survey of the field which is characterised by a comprehension and clarity, not easily found anywhere else.

The purpose of his book, which is twofold, is clearly set forth in the Introduction, namely, 'first to attempt to show that, so far from there being ground for any distrust or hostility on the part of Christianity towards science, there is so close a connexion between them that there ought to be mutual trust, understanding and co-operation, between scientists and Christian theologians; and secondly, to face and discuss frankly the very real problems and difficulties which arise, for Christian faith, in various fields of science, biological as well as physical or astronomical, and, for scientists, in some aspects of Christian teaching.'

The book is divided into three parts. In the first, there is an illuminating investigation of the presuppositions of modern science, an account of its pioneers and their Christian faith, of the attributes of a good research student and their relation to Christian virtues, of the objects of scientific research and the use of scientific discoveries and an indication of the limitations of the scientific method. In the second part, problems arising out of the relation of individual sciences, physics, astronomy and biology, to Christian doctrine are considered and there is a helpful discussion of the nature of human character with reference to biochemical, physiological, psychological and para-psychological factors. In the third part the author turns

to problems arising out of certain aspects of the Christian faith and deals in a balanced and constructive way with the miracles and the creeds. In conclusion there are four valuable appendices in which with outstanding clarity and concision, he critically reviews the modern philosophical standpoints which have arisen from the scientific attitude, logical positivism, dialectical materialism and existentialism and considers the problem of communicating the Christian 'Gospel' in a scientific age, with special reference to the attempts of Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Heim to solve it.

There is an adequate index and copious references throughout, which range from Adler to Adrian, from Ray to Ryle, from Bacon to Bohr, from Hume to Heisenberg, from Rutherford to Rhine, from Lamarck to Lysenko.

It would be too much to claim that this book brings us in sight of a new synthesis between science and religion and Canon Smethurst does not set out to attempt for the twentieth century what St. Thomas did in the thirteenth. Indeed the field is so vast and complex that it is doubtful whether such an achievement is now possible for one man. It would involve an investigation of the symbolism of science and religion, which few are capable of attempting and still fewer of understanding. But for the many, theologians or Christian apologists, Canon Smethurst provides a comprehensive, accurate, balanced and constructive survey which can be read with great interest, profit and enlightenment. DAVID F. S. DICK

Die Zeit der Kirche. By HEINRICH SCHLIER. Verlag Herder, Freiburg. Pp. 314.

THE author of this book, who is Professor in the University of Bonn, has recently been received into the Roman Church. The work consists of twenty exegetical studies of NT passages and themes, being a selection from articles nearly all already published, over some twenty years, before the change in his allegiance. They are intended to justify on NT authority the views he holds on the Church and the World (human and supernatural powers), the two main subjects of these studies.

The method of exegesis here represented is itself of considerable interest. There is little discussion of diverse interpretations, in the manner of the Commentaries; nor, generally, is there a mere pooling of texts in support of a doctrine. Rather the work is characterised by direct exegetical handling of a passage in its context (as in the striking study of Jesus and Pilate in the Fourth Gospel), or, more extensively, of the theme of a NT book (as of the Church in Ephesians or the Understanding of History in Revelation). It is in line with this exegetical approach that the author does not usually state the

application of his interpretations to the ecclesiastical and political situation of the present time, but his application lies near the surface and becomes explicit in the concluding *Nachwort* of the book.

The direct exegesis of NT passages, verse by verse, following the writer's thought, is a method to be commended, but in these articles the exegesis is so closely argued and so elaborately developed that there is plenty of room for the author's presuppositions and special interests to displace the emphasis or even obscure the meaning of the original writing. Many readers at any rate will disagree with numerous interpretations which point to Roman rather than Reformed doctrine; it is evident from these earlier works that the author's recent 'conversion' to Romanism has not been sudden. For instance, he comes near to making Paul a protagonist of the doctrine of Justification by Works, on the ground of such passages as Rom. 2. He regards the *Kerygma* of Paul (in contrast to the *Sophia* of 1 Cor. 1) as essentially the transmission of the original Apostles' witness to the Death and Resurrection of Christ. He sees in the self-willed gnosticism, enthusiasm and divisiveness of the Corinthian Christians analogies with the weaknesses of modern Protestantism. Basing himself upon the Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles (and there at the points where their authenticity is most open to doubt) he concludes that from the beginning the Church had a ministry holding authority in virtue of office and not merely of personal superiority, in orderly succession to the Apostles, and entrusted with their teaching.

In view of present discussions, many readers will find special interest in the author's examination of the NT teaching on the Sacraments, and particularly on Baptism. One of the chapters is a reply to Karl Barth's *Die Kirchliche Lehre von der Taufe* (1943) with its rather ambiguous position in regard to infant Baptism. The author, however, goes much farther than a defence on this particular point. On the ground of Rom. 6 and other passages, he regards the NT evidence on Baptism in a thoroughly realistic way. Baptism in the NT is 'causative'; it is indeed a 'sign', a significant act, but it effects as a *signum instrumentale* that which it signifies, *ex opere operato*. Baptism is the means of objective incorporation into the Body of Christ, into His Death and into the new life of His Resurrection. It is necessary for salvation; that is full justification for the Baptism of infants. Faith (as our author understands it) is a condition of Baptism, a sort of preparation for it, invariably a mark of the new life for those who are old enough to apprehend what is believed; but it does not of itself effect what Baptism effects.

All this, we must again note, is presented as exegesis of the NT. And if we question its presuppositions and disagree with some of its

conclusions, we shall also recognise the insight of many passages of the book and respect the earnestness, the conviction and the eloquence with which all of it is offered to us. ALLAN BARR

Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften. By FRIEDRICH BRUNSTÄD. C. Bertelsmann Verlag, Gütersloh, 1951. Pp. 258. DM. 15.85.

THIS book is a hymn of praise to the teaching of the Lutheran Confessions. The lectures were given by Professor Brunstäd on these Confessions as summed up in the *liber concordiae* of 1580, and were edited after his death (1944) by Karl Janssen. Those unfamiliar with the theology of the Lutheran Church will find an easy introduction through Brunstäd's work. Those, however, who know Luther's own theology will receive through this book an insight into the way in which Luther's theology and the subsequent confessional documents can today be made into a scholastic system which answers all theological questions. We remain strictly within the currents of sixteenth-century thought and learn with astonishment that we in the Church today have nothing more to do than to expound and to repeat this confession of the sixteenth century. On p. 1 we read that the confessions are the norm of preaching, doctrine, life and church-order. 'The church exists because this confession exists.' Yet Luther is quoted without hesitation on p. 19 as saying: 'One cannot make an article of faith of the work or word of the holy fathers. It is God's Word and no other, not even an angel, that should establish articles of faith.'

Friedrich Brundstäd is extremely interested in *una doctrina*. He understands the unity of the Church as unity of doctrine. Therefore he tries to understand the collection of the Lutheran confessions as a united and harmonious doctrinal witness. Thus his book deals not with the confessional documents separately but with the great dogmatic questions—Scripture, Christology, Anthropology, Justification, Church and Predestination. All the documents have the same teaching. Brunstäd's book is thus not a historical investigation but a Lutheran Dogmatics.

But how can he harmonise into a unity the various confessions, the theology of Luther, of Melanchthon and of his disciples? How can he criticise Loofs, the historian of dogma, for 'theological insufficiency' (p. 13) because he works out inner contradictions in the confessions? The answer is: Brunstäd is well known as a student of Hegel and has worked on the philosophy of German Idealism. From this source he has learnt the distinction between *Lehrintention* and *Lehrgestalt*. The confessions differ no doubt in *Lehrgestalt* but they are a unity in *Lehrintention*. This is the author's theory throughout his whole work. The *Lehrintention* is the testimony to the truth

of the Gospel as it revealed itself anew to the understanding of Luther, 'the man of God' (p. 247).

By this method Brunstäd is able to save Melanchthon from any suspicion of synergism and deism, to explain the changes in Luther's theology between 1525 and 1528, to understand the *Confessio Augustana invariata* and the *Variata* as theologically identical. Brunstäd works exclusively with the theological positions of the sixteenth century but thinks them out in the forms of nineteenth-century logic. No question is left open and no problem unsolved; theology is deprived of all tension and dialectic. The ultimate authority which the confessions have for Brunstäd becomes apparent when he fails even to mention modern literature and research. Only Loofs, Holl, Seeberg and Theodosius Harnack are mentioned, and these only marginally, either as confirmation of his own opinions or as victims of the sharpest criticism. There is no doubt, however, that Brundstäd has done great service to the protestant theologians of our generation with this clearly written book. Here at last we hear a clear avowal of Lutheran sacramental doctrine and a kind of explanation of it ('the means of grace, in and through themselves, effect salvation'! p. 229); and with it a statement of a Lutheran position on the episcopal office, on the question of Church government, on the problem of Church and State and finally on the question of election and predestination. These last are seen in close connexion with sacramental doctrine and especially with the thesis of the *manducatio impiorum*. 'The means of grace contain the Holy Ghost, they make holy', p. 119. 'Praise be to Luther's doctrine of the means of grace, which is the steady anchor of salvation from this confusion', p. 234. But his biting and contemptuous criticism of Calvin and Zwingli can be read only with pain and astonishment. Calvin 'tells fairy tales and gives false expositions with a godless lack of understanding and a devilish blasphemy against God', p. 229. He is a *Gesetzlehrer* and metaphysician who holds a false Christology (pp. 79, 80, 83, 165-8, 170). For Calvin, Christ 'died only for the elect' (p. 232). He teaches what Luther declared to be *Türkenglaube*. The Synod of Dort in 1618 'drove out the devil with Beelzebub's help' and so on. *Zwingli ist ein Schwärmer und treibt Geisterei.* Such passages unfortunately destroy the scientific character of the book for they show that the author is passing judgment on opinions which he does not know well enough. So the reader doubts whether he can rely on the author's competence at other points.

Professor Brunstäd's book, for all its clarity and lucidity, serves not the unity of the Church of Christ and her theology but the fragmentation of the Church and the misinformation of students.

D. Ritschl

The Sacrament of Reconciliation. By Thomas M. Donn. The Leslie Press. 5s.

The minister of Duthil, Inverness-shire, has given us a well-documented little book on the Lord's Supper. There is wide reading behind these forthright pages. At points the argument tends to turn back upon itself, but this is probably justified for the sake of emphasis upon the central thesis of the book. The choice of the title not only stresses what the author believes to be the essence of the New Testament sacrament, but also sets in relief by contrast the division and discord occasioned, as he is sure it is by radical departure from New Testament thought and practice.

There is no doubt where Mr Donn stands. He is a stout Protestant and deplores any attempt to apologise for the Reformation. All theories of sacerdotalism and sacramentarianism are unscriptural, as much so as the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation. 'We cannot endure the language of Chrysostom, such as "we bury our teeth in His flesh; our tongues are red with His most precious blood." ' The use of the 'altar' rather than the 'table', elaborate ritual, fasting before Communion, the practice of early morning celebration, the extension of the original institution to include the Resurrection and the Second Coming—all these, with all concessions to Anglo-Catholic teaching, and all unilateral demands designed to secure general intercommunion, are rigorously condemned.

The main substance of the book is a devout exposition of the original rite. No Church makes the sacrament necessary for Salvation, but it is a true means of grace to the worthy partaker; so its benefits are indeed 'sealed' to believers. In the Passover, the primary thought is thank-offering, not sin-offering (which it is in the Day of Atonement); and this is recapitulated in the Lord's Supper. For this and other reasons, the liturgical language of the Prayer Books of the Reformed Church stand in need of revision—and there is no doubt in what direction. The term 'sacrifice', in the sense of expiation or propitiation, has to be utterly avoided. The Lord's Supper proclaims but does not re-enact. It stands for a finished work, and the sacrifice is not repeated. As a High Priest after the order of Melchisedek, Christ has no successor. The conception of the Lamb of God is to be interpreted in a Messianic, not a sacrificial, sense. To understand the Lord's Supper, we ought to regard the figure of the Suffering Servant, not the old Testament sacrificial system, as its true background. Christ is the Mediator of a new Covenant of Grace, at the cost of His death. By His completely voluntary sacrifice, He has made possible forgiveness and reconciliation. The subjective view of the atonement is not enough, but it is not so easily perverted as the objective view. At

the Table of the Lord, there is also of necessity a forward look—'till He come'; there will be no sacraments in Heaven; it is only here that we need them.

Such is the outline of a book which ought to help many a minister and Church member, and especially in discussions that will be before the Church for a long time to come. It is to be hoped, however, that the gulf between Catholic and Evangelical is not so unbridgeable as this writer implies. The present reviewer, who used to think differently, now believes that the more we turn our thoughts towards the fulness of the Church that is to be, and the more we regard this disruptive subject in terms of all that we mean by 'the manifold grace of God', hitherto irreconcilable views may approach each other with a positive, mutual welcome.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Plato and the Christians. By ADAM FOX. S.C.M. Press, 21s.

IN this attractively produced book the Archdeacon of Westminster has 'collected the passages (in Plato) which seem to bear in one way or another on Christian theology and morals, and let them speak for themselves'. The result is an unusually interesting anthology of significant passages from the dialogues and letters, newly translated by Archdeacon Fox, who has also provided short introductions, Bible references, occasional notes on matters of substance, an appendix on the proof of the existence of the soul (*Laws* X, 884-99D), and three useful indexes. The anthology consist of over 140 passages, grouped under four main headings ('God and Creation', 'Man and his Destiny', 'The Foundations of Morality', 'Religion and the Church'), together with twenty-four short 'aphorisms' (one ascribed to Plato by Plutarch, the rest extracted from the Oxford text). These extracts help to show how much there is in the doctrines of Christianity which is common to all serious thought upon matters of faith and morals; but it ought perhaps to be remembered that another Plato anthology could be compiled which would very severely shock most professing Christians. The translations seem very faithful and read smoothly; but I doubt if it is fair to use A.V. or R.V. renderings of words like *μονογενής* in translating Plato, or to introduce anachronisms like 'psychoanalysis' and 'Fascism' (pp. 155-6, 169) into one's discussions.

J. A. DAVIDSON

Myself and My Creed. Ed. E. H. HAYES and F. S. POPHAM. Religious Education Press, 7s. 6d.
[Lessons for Seniors on Sections of the Agreed Syllabuses which deal with the Apostles' Creed].

SCRIPTURE teachers have long been greatly indebted to the Religious

Education Press for its valuable series of guides and lesson notes for use with Agreed Syllabuses of Religious Instruction. This book of forty-three lessons on the Apostles' Creed is to be especially welcomed in that there is now available an authoritative guide to the later and more advanced sections of the agreed syllabuses, sections held by many to be too ambitiously theological for teacher and pupil alike. Each lesson is systematically set forth under the following headings: Keynote or theme, method, point of contact (i.e. recapitulatory links with previous lessons), the narrative itself, and questions for class discussion and activities. In addition, there is a plentiful use of illustrative which seeks to show the relevance of the material taught to men's lives here and now, whilst introductions and background notes are designed to give the teacher some knowledge of recent theological thought. Without any doubt, the book will be of immense value to the teacher and could with advantage, in virtue of its interesting style and manner, be placed in the hands of pupils themselves in the middle and upper forms of secondary schools for private reading and project work.

It may be hoped that a pioneer work of this kind, which introduces the pupil to the living Church and its faith, will stimulate a heightened awareness of the profound difficulties inherent in the teaching of religion in schools. There are guides in abundance on the techniques of story-telling, illustration, film-strips and so on, but little enough to help the teacher to interpret for himself, and thus for his class, the meaning of such basic doctrines as say, the Holy Spirit and the Atonement. This book may itself be considered in parts confused and confusing in its own treatment of some of these themes, but if so, teachers and clergy may well be profitably driven to ask themselves what they ought to teach the young, if their teaching is to be spiritually inspiring and not formal, doctrinaire, and unmeaning.

Two further points: the notes for teachers would benefit by reference to appropriate books. For example, what meaning, without supplementation, will the note on pp. 165-6 on the historical Jesus and the Kerygma convey to the teacher who lacks an adequate background of theological knowledge? Secondly, it may be suggested that examples of the power of Christ in the world today might with profit be sought in some aspects of movements, on the surface, avowedly secular, rather than to persist in the belief that when the outward form of a Church is, there necessarily is the Spirit of Christ. This suggestion is prompted by the unduly complacent attitude towards the Russian Church. 'The hopes of the architects of the revolution have not been fulfilled.' Is there not a fruitful contrast for our pupils to be found in a comparison between

the Russian Church and its history, both before and after the Revolution, and the record of the German Churches in the face of Nazi totalitarianism? Generally speaking, one feels that the tone of the book errs in this respect. The pupil is likely to be given the impression that all is on the whole well, that the Churches are going from strength to strength. One misses the notes of crisis and urgency that are so frequently expressed in both theological and secular literature today and which need to find expression in the classroom too if our pupils are to recognise for themselves the relevance of their Scripture teaching. A. E. Elms

A Safe Stronghold. By Edgar P. Dickie. Religious Education Press, 7s. 6d.

An outline of Christian Apologetics for the use of upper forms in grammar schools has long been urgently needed. There exists quite a body of literature—Arnold Lunn's contribution to the volume *Public School Religion*, Blamires' *Repair the Ruins*, and Sandford's *How Heathen is Britain* are good examples—which brings home to us warningly the harm done to the cause of Christianity by the failure to bring to the schools some acquaintanceship with the work of the many distinguished Christian scholars and theologians of our time. Spencer Leeson used to speak of the quite considerable time-lag which exists in this field: he believed that the climate of opinion in theology and biblical studies and their relationship with the scientific world-view was still that of the latter part of the nineteenth century. If one bears in mind that the senior and most influential teachers in our grammar schools completed their university education in the 1920's and 30's, one need not be surprised that many of their pupils leave school absurdly ignorant of the principles of the Christian faith. Even worse are the misrepresentations of which they are often unwittingly the victims. How to combat and correct this ignorance has become an urgent problem today—particularly if some of our novelists are to be trusted in their reports, and indifference and apathy are becoming quite noticeable characteristics of some among the younger generation.

This book, No. 7 in the Pathfinder Series, is an outstanding contribution to the cause of religious education in schools. It is doubtful whether there exists any work of a comparable nature written for young people by a distinguished university teacher and theologian.

The work is divided into three parts, Part I concerning itself with the meaning and scope of Christian Apologetics, Part II outlining some powerful modern challenges to Christianity, and Part III—the All-Inclusive Answer—providing a brilliantly succinct outline of Christian belief.

The practical teacher will welcome not only the clearness with which difficult questions are discussed—questions which fifth and sixth form boys and girls should raise if the teaching is proving effective—but also the power of fertile illustration which the author so tellingly employs. For example, in the opening paragraph of a discussion on miracles and their alleged impossibility, Professor Dickie calls to mind Wingate's order to his Chindits: 'No jungle will be reported as impenetrable until it has been penetrated.' This is the kind of introduction which commands the attention and it does not stand alone; the book contains anecdotes and citations of great value to the teacher who would enliven his teaching. However, with all these advantages of presentation to teacher and pupil it is doubtful if the book could be used in the middle school. To sixth formers the book would be most valuable and a place for it could well be found in the training college. For all teachers, whatever their special subject or whatever the age-range they teach,—since, as with English so with religion, every teacher of necessity teaches it—the book is one to be read and studied. It deserves the widest possible circulation. A. E. Elms.

The Kirk of the Canongate. By Ronald Selby Wright. Oliver and Boyd. Pp. 56. 8s. 6d.

This beautifully produced and admirably documented book will be of interest far beyond the bounds of the Canongate parish for Dr Selby Wright was bound to cover much of the history of Scotland in showing the significance of the Kirk of the Canongate since the days of David I. It has been rightly said that no one can write unbiassed history of Scotland for the issues that divide are still live, and Dr Selby Wright avowedly acknowledges his bias (for example with regard to his attitude to Montrose and Argyll on pp. 44 and 45). Argyll perhaps could not look anyone in the eyes because he had a disfiguring cast in his own, and it has to be borne in mind that Argyll's own bearing in 1661 was no less noble than that of Montrose in 1650.

Such a work must be selective to a degree and the selection will depend on the writer's point of view. Calderwood would not have approved the omission of mention of that series of events by which James VI re-established episcopacy in 1610 and then forced the Five Articles on Scotland, nor would Wodrow have approved the lack of reference to the sad events after the Restoration. The Kirk Session Minute extracts and the footnotes help to right the balance, and in any case many readers will rejoice in the 'romantic' view of Scottish history which has the imprimatur of Sir Walter Scott.

The later chapters dealing with the period since 1688 are thor-

oughly satisfying and Dr Selby Wright's modest record of his own achievements, in the church and parish which he loves, has a rightful place in this record of church work and change through the centuries.

There are excellent photographs and the book is a mine of information about a part of Scotland which has felt every pressure of historical event. The continuity and catholicity of the Church of Scotland are truly underlined and this should help in the ecumenical movement. Would that such attractive publications could be produced for other parish kirks in Scotland; for set in the past are the roots of all that is best in our life today. A. Ian Dunlop

Muhammad in Medina. By W. Montgomery Watt. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Pp. 399. 42s.

In *Muhammad in Medina* Dr Watt continues his account and interpretation of Muhammad's life and work from the Hijrah until his death shortly after his conquest of and re-entry into Mecca. After dealing with the course of events in detail in the first three chapters, Dr Watt examines in Chaps. IV to IX Muhammad's work in relation to the various surrounding factors in the situation—the presence of the Jews, the Arab tribal system, the internal politics of Medina—and how he transformed the existing situation to produce the new political, social and religious system of Islam. The final chapter deals with Muhammad's personality and character, and the book is furnished at its end with a number of appendixes dealing with special problems, or gathering information and evidence on certain matters into summary form which makes them very handy for reference or special study.

Dr Watt not only looks at this period of Muhammad's life as an important episode in the political history of a great nation, but deals with the sociological and economic factors involved in each situation, while at the same time leaving the religious aspects more in the background. He thus seeks to bring the reader as close as possible to the personality of Muhammad himself, denuded of the aura which has been thrown round him on the one hand by Muslim veneration and on the other by anti-Muslim bigotry. For example, Muhammad's treatment of Beni Qurayẓa, the last of the three Jewish tribes of Medina, is shown to be not simply a piece of uncompounded cruelty on the part of Muhammad, but 'the most tactful way out' of a difficult situation in which social and economic, as well as religious and political factors were involved.

While the general reader will find the arguments so detailed as to prevent his getting a clear view of the history of the period, students of Islamics, and especially those interested in the evange-

lisation of Muslims, will find here much which will help to dispel from the mind false prejudices against Muhammad, and therefore against the system he founded and his present day disciples—a very necessary condition of the Christian approach to the Muslim.

One has the feeling that Dr Watt is almost too partial towards Muhammad in his last chapter, and many will doubtless find much to criticise in his definition of sincerity in regard to Muhammad's belief in his own revelations. 'To say that Muhammad was sincere does not imply acceptance of the Qur'an as a genuine revelation from God, a man may without contradiction hold that Muhammad truly believed that he was receiving revelations from God, but that he was mistaken in this belief. Further, once this point is grasped, it should be clear that, even if true, the alleged fact that the revelations fitted in with Muhammad's desires and pandered to his selfish pleasure would not prove him insincere; it would merely show him to be capable of self-deception' (p. 325). Dr Watt gives us the impression implicitly by his references to the Qur'an in other parts of the book, that it was a kind of *deus ex machina* in aid of policies which Muhammad had previously worked out, and he is not far from stating so explicitly in Excursus A, where he says: '. . . the Qur'an is a first-hand witness, especially to the contemporary feelings of the Muslim community about various events.' Indeed, if Muhammad's inspiration is not to be taken for granted this is the only conclusion we can draw. No reference is made in his discussion to the contradictions found in the Qur'an of previous revelations, i.e. the Old and New Testaments, contradictions of which he must have had enough notice to put him on his inquiry, even on the assumption that he was illiterate. Further, account has to be taken of the false aspect of sincerity which may be developed by the human personality after it has deliberately turned from the truth. For the Christian these are elements which must be considered in a right evaluation of Muhammad as a Prophet.

On the other side, we must remember that Dr Watt is not aiming at reaching a final conclusion on the matter, but is trying to help the reader to a conclusion by approaching the subject objectively, in a purely secular way divested of all religious predilections of any kind. In this Dr Watt has achieved a remarkable degree of success.

J. M. Ritchie

Islam and Christian Theology, Part II, Vol. 1. By J. Windrow Sweetman. Lutterworth Press, 1955 Pp. 309. 31s. 6d.

Those who have passed through the normal secondary classical education of the inter-war period find that the eastern Mediterranean fades out of sight about the year A.D. 312 and is shrouded in a

mist which becomes a thick fog in the period of the Middle Ages, and only clears in the modern period when in our study of European History we find the Turkish Empire brought to our notice as 'The sick man of Europe'.

As regards the political, social and commerical aspects of history this fog has been cleared away for the general student by such books as Hitti's History of the Arabs and History of Syria: and what Hitti has done in respect of those fields, Professor Sweetman has accomplished in the field of religion and theology in his *Islam and Christian Theology*. This appears particularly in the Volume under review, Part II, Vol. I, which deals with the period from the tenth to the fourteenth century A.D. But whereas Hitti and other Arab writers have perhaps, through being influenced by the rising spirit of modern Arab Nationalism, overstressed the Muslim contribution to modern European learning, Professor Sweetman has been careful to point out the other side of the matter. For example, he points out that such early scholars as Bede prove that there was in Christendom itself a stream of learning from classical times which had flowed on independently of any Islamic agency. He also shows (p. 41) that the translations of classical authors which were received by the West through the medium of Arabic were often later forsaken for translations direct from the Greek, because the former, having reached Latin via Arabic, or Arabic and Syriac, tended to be full of inaccuracies. He gives other instances also.

The specialist student will find particularly interesting and helpful the last chapter entitled 'Polemical Climax', which occupies over half the volume and gives summaries, with commentaries, of four of the greatest polemical works of the period under discussion, two Christian and two Muslim. The authors are Ricoldo of Montecroce and Nicholas of Cusa for the Christians, and Ibn Hazm and Al-Ghazzali for the Muslims. This bird's-eye view, at several centuries' distance in time, makes very obvious how far these learned men were at fault in their understanding of the other side's point of view, and also how they were ready in their arguments to rest rather on the incidental than on the essential in their faiths. But Professor Sweetman does not return over the centuries merely that we may keep our eyes on the past. The same errors can be seen today in the missionary contact of Christians with Muslims, and he wishes us to learn, by going back to the place where Christendom first erred, how such errors may be avoided.

For these errors lead to a much more fundamental error, which Professor Sweetman touches on at the end of his section on the work of Al-Ghazzali. He says, 'Apparently Al-Ghazzali was looked upon as an intellect to convince, rather than as a soul in quest, of peace

and salvation, as indeed he was.' He doubts whether Al-Ghazzali had ever been instructed in the doctrine of God's Grace. Now the Christian Doctrine of God's Grace is based on a view of the nature of God derived from the historical events of the death and resurrection of our Lord, whereas polemics by their very nature tend to turn from these essentials, and to become a kind of jockeying for position by seizure on the least thing which seems to offer the arguer advantage. Professor Sweetman, speaking as a convinced Christian, is surely right when he suggests that the biggest mistake on the part of these ancient scholars was to allow themselves to be drawn into polemics at all, since it tended to obscure the Gospel rather than to present it plainly. A soul seeking salvation and peace needs not polemics but the facts of the Gospel presented in love, and there are thousands in the Muslim world today seeking, as was Al-Ghazzali.

Let us seek the right way to present Christ's claims to the Muslims, not that Christendom may win an intellectual victory, but that Christendom and Islam may find all the barriers which divide them broken down in Christ.

J. M. Ritchie

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BIBLICAL AUTHORITY AND THE CONTINENTAL REFORMATION

by The Rev. B. A. GERRISH

That the distinctively 'Protestant' understanding of biblical authority can be grasped only by seeing it against its medieval background, may appear to be a truism. But the affirmation is necessary, if for no other reason, at least because the relationship of Protestantism to Catholicism has too often been interpreted as one of simple opposition in every respect. In part, however, the Reformers' understanding of biblical authority arises directly out of scholasticism, not by conscious opposition, but by unquestioning acceptance. The *differentia* of Protestantism cannot be defined simply by appeal to the so-called 'formal' and 'material' principles, unless the twin principles be themselves carefully defined. There was nothing new in the mere fact that the Reformers resorted to the Bible for verification of their theological convictions, nor even in their affirmation of the necessity of grace for salvation. The medieval Church had a rigorous doctrine of biblical inspiration, and it found grace as indispensable for justification as did the Reformers themselves.

I

No doubt the earliest disciples took their view of inspiration and authority from Judaism. To begin with, their Scriptures were the Jewish Scriptures, and they themselves were all Jews. But it was natural enough that the Jewish doctrine of 'verbal inspiration' should persist even after the Church had become predominantly Gentile. The authority of Scripture is made to rest upon a theory of inspiration: the words of Scripture are binding because, in the last analysis, they are the Words of God.[1] The inspired writers are no more than the Spirit's *calamus*,[2] and

[1] The Scriptures were spoken by the Holy Ghost (Clement, *Cohortatio*, ix; Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.*, II, xxviii.2), written by the Spirit of God (Origen, *De Princ.*, praef. viii). The real author of Scripture is: '*qui scribenda dictavit*' (Gregory, *Moralia*, praef. i.2). So also St. Thomas: '*Auctor sacrae scripturae est Deus*' (*Sum. Theol.* I, Q. i, a. 10).

[2] Gregory, op. cit. Cf. the illustration of the 'prophet' as a musical instrument

the finished product is a sacred text inerrant in all its parts.[1]

This emphatic biblicism of the early Church, which passed into the main stream of medieval thought, was, however, virtually cancelled by the growth of allegorisation. According to Origen,[2] the Scriptures admit of a threefold interpretation: for as a man has a body, a soul, and a spirit, so Scripture has a bodily (or literal) sense, a psychical (or moral) sense, and a spiritual (or symbolic) sense. And it is the last which is regarded as the 'highest'. To be sure, the practice of allegorical exegesis never went unchallenged: the school of Alexandria was opposed by the school of Antioch, and both had their successors in the Middle Ages. St. Thomas himself expressed strong reservations on the use of allegory.[3] Nevertheless, the practice of fanciful 'spiritual' interpretation was a severe limitation upon the medieval Church's avowed principles of biblical authority and inspiration. A sufficiently astute theologian could, without much difficulty, find any of the Church's dogmas 'hidden' or 'symbolised' in the most unlikely corners of both the Old and the New Testaments.

A second limiting factor which also tended to modify the effectiveness of the biblical norm was the growing power of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The only way to check heresy was by appeal to an authority apart from Scripture, for (notoriously) the heretic makes use of the Scripture no less than the orthodox. The Bible remains the *professed* authority, but in fact there is a second authority which judges it. Augustine repeatedly declares that his supreme norm and standard is the Scriptures; yet it is 'the Church' which decides what is and what is not Scripture, and it is 'the Church' which guarantees their authority and interprets their meaning. Thomas attributes a certain 'necessity' to arguments from the Scripture which, in theory, raises them above all merely 'probable' arguments from secondary authorities[4]; yet, in practice, his premises are drawn impartially from Scripture, from the Fathers, and from the philosophers. In Duns Scotus the 'either-or' is stated explicitly:

(Athenagoras, *Legatio*, ix; Justin, *Cohortatio*, viii; also Montanus ap. Epiphanius, *Panarium*, I, xlviii.4).

[1] Cf. Augustine, *Epist.*, I, lxxxii.3. Apparent error must be explained in one of three ways: either the MS is faulty, or the translator is mistaken, or the reader has failed to understand.

[2] *De Princ.*, IV, i.8ff. [3] Op. cit. [4] Ibid., a.8.

'Nothing is to be held as of the substance of the Faith except that which can be expressly derived from Scripture *or which is expressly declared by the Church. . . .*'[1] Equally unambiguous are the two pronouncements of the Council of Trent: (1) that the Church's 'traditions' are to be received *pari pietatis affectu* as the Scripture, (2) that the Scriptures themselves must be understood only according to the sense *quem tenuit et tenet sancta mater Ecclesia.* The question: Who shall speak for the Holy Mother? was not finally determined until less than a century ago, when, by the promulgation of the *Pastor Aeternus*, the Vatican Council made it clear that the authority of the Roman Church is virtually the *sola auctoritas summi pontificis.*

The attitude of the Nominalists towards biblical authority is of particular importance for understanding Luther's own attitude, since Erfurt, where Luther learned his theology, was (with Vienna) the foremost stronghold of Occamism. And it is highly significant that the advocates of the *via moderna* stressed the authority of Scripture even more forcefully than their predecessors. Occam, indeed, plays off the Bible against the Pope. Yet fundamentally he is a 'Catholic', and his appeal is not from the Church, but only from the Pope. Hence, in the preface to his *Compendium Errorum Papae*, Occam writes as an obedient child of the Roman Church: 'I submit myself and my words to the correction of the Catholic Church.'[2] Whilst, therefore, he can affirm both the 'sufficiency' and the inerrancy of the Bible,[3] Occam is still content to accept the admittedly un-biblical dogma of transubstantiation simply on the Church's authority. The truth is that any idea of an actual *discrepancy* between the teaching of the Bible and the beliefs of the 'Catholic Church' is far from the thoughts of any of the Nominalists.

We can now turn to Luther and Calvin. What was new about their use of the biblical norm? Where did they depart from the principles and practice of the Schoolmen? The subject will be

[1] Quoted from Reinhold Seeberg's *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (E.T., Grand Rapids, 1954), vol. II, p. 149. The italics are mine.

[2] '*Si quid autem scripsero in praesenti opusculo quod scripturae vel doctrinae sanctorum seu sacrosanctae ecclesiae assertioni repugnet et adversetur, correctioni praefatae ecclesiae catholicae . . . me et dicta mea subiicio et expono.*'

[3] '*Christianus de necessitate salutis non tenetur ad credendum nec credere quod nec in Biblia continetur nec ex solis contentis in Biblia potest consequentia necessaria et manifesta inferri*' (Dialogus, 411). '*Qui dicit aliquam partem novi vel veteris testamenti aliquod falsum asserere aut non esse recipiendum a Catholicis est haereticus et pertinax reputandus*' (ibid., 449).

divided into three closely related problems, designated the 'authority of Scripture', the 'character of Scripture' and the 'interpretation of Scripture'. The second two are treated as subordinate to the first—and, indeed, are only discussed insofar as they throw light upon it. The first and third speak for themselves. By 'character' I intend to suggest the basic question: What does the Bible *consist* of? Two answers are of special importance for the problem of authority. The one maintains that the Bible consists of 'sacred oracles', the other that it consists of 'testimony to God's revelation'. The expression 'content of Scripture' could perhaps be employed equally well.

II

As early as the *Marginal Notes* on the Sentences of Lombard, Luther shows the utmost respect for biblical authority, in one place dismissing the opinion of 'several distinguished doctors' precisely on the grounds that 'they have not the Scripture on their side'.[1] But this does not mean that he was already a 'Protestant' in 1509, since, as we have seen, there is nothing in this curt dismissal which could not equally well have been written by Occam, D'Ailli, or Biel. And we must say the same of similar assertions which are to be found in the *Lectures on the Psalms* (1513-15). It is not Moses, but God Himself who speaks. God speaks through the prophets: the prophet only desires to be the Spirit's *organum*. This is the way in which Luther likes to speak of the men to whom and through whom God revealed Himself: and he clearly thinks of the Scriptures as a faithful record in writing of what God said—what was actually heard from His very mouth. Indeed, in the Gospel we virtually hear Christ speaking.[2]

By the time he came to lecture on Romans (1515-16), Luther had come to conceive his mission as a protest against 'philo-

[1] '*Ego autem, licet multi inclyti doctores sic sentiant, tamen quia non habent pro se scripturam, sed solum humanas rationes, et ego in ista opinione habeo scripturam, quod anima sit imago Dei, ideo dico cum Apostolo "Si angelus de coelo", i.e. doctor in ecclesia, "aliud docuerit, anathema sit"*' (W.A. 9.46.16).

[2] '*Deus ipse, ipse inquam per se deus; non iam Moses aut Helias, sed deus locutus est, id est loquetur in Sanctuario suo*' (W.A. 3.347.11). '*Alii prophetae sese locutos esse fatentur, hic autem non se, sed per se locutum esse spiritum singulari modo pronunciat*' (W.A. 3.15.6). '*Propheta vult quod lingua sua sit organum spiritus sancti*' (W.A. 3.262.30). '*Evangelium audiendum est, quasi dominum praesentem, quasi Christum loquentem audiamus: quod enim pretiosum sonabat de ore Domini, et propter nos scriptum est et nobis servatum et propter nos recitatur et propter pastores recitabitur et donec seculum finiatur*' (W.A. 4.535.1).

sophy' in the name of 'Scripture': 'I believe that I owe it as a service to the Lord that I should cry against philosophy and turn men to Scripture.'[1] In May of 1517 he wrote to a friend that Aristotle was on the way out, that the Bible and Augustine (or 'some other doctor of real standing') would alone find an ear in his university.[2] Yet for all this, in September of the same year he could conclude his ninety-seven theses *Against the Scholastics* with a model expression of pious submission towards the Church.[3]

The turning-point seems to have been occasioned by the Leipzig debate of 1519, in which Eck revealed (to Luther himself as much as to anyone else) the true logic of the Reformer's protest. That Luther still reverenced the Roman Church and the Papacy on the very eve of the debate, appears from a letter written on 5th March 1519: 'It was never my intention to secede from the Apostolic Roman See; indeed, I am satisfied that it should be called, or even should be, the lord of all.'[4] The one thing he was concerned for was 'the pure Gospel'. Looking back (in 1522) he says:

> I would have been glad to have popery . . . except that I would have the Scriptures pure and clean and certain; I did not yet know that it was *opposed* to the Scriptures, but thought only that it was *without* the Scriptures, like other secular governments established by men.[5]

But in the course of the Leipzig debate (held in the month of July) Luther was finally driven to assert the principle *scriptura sola* —the Bible *alone* in all matters of faith. The immediate occasion for Luther's outburst was the charge of 'Bohemianism':

> As for the article of Hus that 'it is not necessary for salvation to believe the Roman Church superior to all others', I do not care whether this comes from Wyclif or from Hus. I know that innumerable Greeks have been saved though they never heard this article. It is not in the power of the Roman

[1] '*Ego quidem credo me debere Domino hoc obsequium latrandi contra philosophiam et suadendi ad sacram scripturam*' (W.A. 56.371.17).

[2] W.A.Br. 1.99.8.

[3] '*In his nihil dicere volumus nec dixisse nos credimus, quod non sit catholicae ecclesiae et ecclesiasticis doctoribus consentaneum*' (W.A. 1.228.34).

[4] '*Nunquam fuit in animo ut ab apostolica sede Romana voluerim desciscere. Denique sum contentus ut omnium vocetur, aut etiam sit, dominus*' (W.A.Br. 1.356.7).

[5] W.A. 10^2.232. Quoted from M. Reu, *Luther and the Scriptures* (Columbus, Ohio, 1944), p. 22. Reu's discussion is perhaps the best available in English on the problem of authority in the writings of Luther. Particularly valuable are the profuse citations of Luther's own words, and I have drawn freely upon them. But Reu's critical judgments I have not always found so acceptable.

pontiff or of the Inquisition to construct new articles of faith. No believing Christian can be coerced beyond holy Writ. By divine law we are forbidden to believe anything which is not established by divine Scripture or manifest revelation.[1]

Luther summed up his position the next year (1520) in the oft-quoted words of the *Babylonish Captivity*: '*Quod sine scripturis asseritur aut revelatione probata, opinari licet, credi non est necesse.*'[2] And the final, culminating affirmation must be reckoned to be Luther's famous reply at the Diet of Worms (18th April 1521) when asked to 'retract':

> Since then Your Majesty and your lordships desire a simple reply, I will answer without horns and without teeth. Unless I am convicted by Scripture and plain reason—I do not accept the authority of popes and councils, for they have contradicted each other—my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I cannot and I will not recant anything, for to go against conscience is neither right nor safe. (?Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise.) God help me. Amen.[3]

The distinctive element in this affirmation is really what it *denies* rather than what it *affirms*. What marks Luther off from the Scholastics (and even more so from the Nominalists) is not that he asserts the authority of the Bible, but that he denies the authority of Church and Pope. There is an implicit *sola* in his declaration before the Diet of Worms, and it is this which makes his stand revolutionary.

We now turn to the second problem, the content and character of the Scriptures. This does not mean leaving the question of authority behind, for the problem is precisely to see how authority is related to content. Does Luther establish the authority of Scripture upon a theory of inspiration, or does he regard Scripture as authoritative because (in Barthian terminology) it is a *real witness* to revelation? The answer is, I think, that whereas the Schoolmen took the first alternative, Luther oscillates between the two.

On the one hand, Luther repeatedly declares that the *content* of Scripture is Christ,[4] and from this fact he seems to derive the *authority* of Scripture. Christ is the *punctus mathematicus sacrae*

[1] Trans. by R. H. Bainton, *Here I Stand* (New York, 1950), p. 116.
[2] W.A. 6.508.19.
[3] Trans. by Bainton, op. cit., 185.
[4] In this he was largely anticipated by John Wyclif. See *The Reformers and Holy Scripture* by C. S. Carter (London, 1928), p. 37. Cf. J. T. McNeill's remarks on Rupert of Deutz in *The Interpreter's Bible* vol. I (New York, 1952), p. 119.

scripturae.[1] All Scripture turns about Him as its true centre. This holds for the Old Testament no less than for the New: 'Here you will find the swaddling-clothes and the mangers in which Christ lies. Simple and little are the swaddling-clothes, but dear is the treasure, Christ, that lies in them.'[2] It is this 'christo-centric principle' which explains, in part, Luther's high regard for St. Paul. '*Paulus semper in ore habet Christum, non potest eum oblivisci.*' '*Nihil aliud sonat quam Christum.*'[3] Indeed, this same principle affords him what is virtually a 'test of canonicity':

> All the genuine sacred books agree in this that all of them preach Christ and deal with Him. That is the true test by which to judge all books, when we see whether they deal with Christ or not, since all the Scriptures show us Christ, and St. Paul will know nothing but Christ. What does not teach Christ is not apostolic even though St. Peter or Paul taught it; again, what preaches Christ would be apostolic even though Judas, Annas, Pilate, and Herod did it.[4]

This enables him to formulate an inner canon—a canon *within* the canon. 'John's Gospel and St. Paul's Epistles, especially that to the Romans, and St. Peter's First Epistle are the true kernel and marrow of all the books.'[5] And it also enables him to dismiss James as an 'epistle of straw', of which he can exclaim: 'One of these days I'll use James to light the fire!'[6] The condemnation is simply that 'the writer names Christ several times but he teaches nothing about Him'. For it is not the mere *mention* of Christ that Luther applauds (though this is sometimes what he appears to be saying), but *preaching* Christ—that is, presenting Him as Saviour from sin. And this is why Luther values John's Gospel more highly than the Synoptics.[7]

On the other hand—equally clearly—Luther repeatedly appeals to Scripture as authoritative on the grounds that it is the 'Word of God', verbally inspired by the activity of the Holy Spirit. That is to say, he takes the former of our two alternatives.

[1] W.A.Tr. 2.439 (2383).

[2] *Introduction to the OT.* Luther's 'prefaces' are conveniently collected and translated in vol. VI of the 'Philadelphia Edition' of his works (Muhlenberg Press, 1943), pp. 363ff. For the *Int. to the OT* see pp. 367-82.

[3] W.A. 40[1].600.13; 82.31.

[4] *Pref. to James and Jude* (Phila. Edn., 477-9).

[5] *Pref. to the NT* (Phila. Edn., 439-44). The sentence only appears in the edn. of 1522.

[6] '*Eyn rechte stroern Epistel*' (ibid.). '*Ich werde ein mal mit dem Jekel den offen heizen*' (W.A.Tr. 5.382, 5854).

[7] The *Preface to the NT.*

'The Bible is God's Word written—presented in letters, as Christ is the eternal Word presented in human nature.'[1] 'We refer all Scripture to the Holy Spirit.' The Spirit 'speaks through' (*durch*) the human agent. Hence we may say that, in effect, 'Holy Scripture has been spoken by the Holy Spirit.'[2] 'Not only the words (*vocabula*), but also the expression (*phrasis*) is divine which the Holy Spirit and the Scripture employ.'[3] Of Peter and Paul Luther writes that God would have us reverence, not their apostolate, but 'the Christ who speaks in them and the very Word of God which proceeds from their mouth.'[4] Perhaps the most remarkable testimony to Luther's strict view of verbal inspiration arises out of the sacramentarian controversy and the interpretation of the words: '*Hoc est corpus meum.*' Luther maintains that 'these words were spoken by the mouth of God'. He is at pains to insist that *every word in the sentence is divine*: therefore, the *est* is inescapable.[5] 'We must not wickedly trifle with God's words . . . as those do who sacrilegiously try to twist the word *est* into meaning "it signifies". . . .' Indeed, he seems himself to have desired to 'twist' the words of Institution in precisely this way:

> I would have regarded it as a great service if Dr Carlstadt or anyone else could have shown me that there was nothing but bread and wine in the Sacrament. . . . But I am captive, I cannot escape, the text is too powerful and will not permit its meaning to be altered by arguments.[6]

There is no reason to doubt Luther's honesty in this piece of autobiography, and it certainly is a remarkable testimony to his attitude concerning biblical authority.

There are, then, so it appears, two distinct answers in Luther to the question: Wherein lies the authority of Scripture? He replies, on the one hand, that Scripture is authoritative because it bears witness to Christ; and, on the other hand, that Scripture is authoritative because it is the verbally-inspired 'Word of God'. Of course, there is not necessarily any contradiction between these two points of view. But the distinction is important, if only because the former viewpoint has seemed to many to pro-

[1] W.A. 48.31.4.
[2] W.A. 54.35.2, 48.19, 48.22.
[3] W.A. 40^3.254.23.
[4] '*In Petro et Paulo non vult nos admirari vel adorare apostolatum, sed Christum in eis loquentem et ipsum verbum Dei quod de ore ipsorum egreditur.*' *Comm. Gal.* (edn. of 1535): W.A. 40^1.173.21.
[5] W.A. 26.448.18.
[6] W.A. 15.394.12 (trans. by Reu, op. cit., p. 50).

vide a way of combining authority with 'criticism'. The attempt has accordingly been made to show that Luther himself was something of a 'higher critic'.

An impressive list of instances is brought forward by Seeberg[1] which is alleged to demonstrate that: 'Luther employed "criticism" in the widest variety of forms. Almost all the criteria employed at the present day were applied by him in his own way.' (1) The text of the prophets has often fallen into confusion. (2) The prophets were often in error. (3) The Books of Kings are more trustworthy than Chronicles. (4) By whom Genesis was composed, is a matter of indifference. (5) It would be better if the Book of Esther were not in the canon. (6) The composition of Ecclesiastes by Solomon is doubtful. (7) The Synoptic Gospels are not of uniform value. (8) The Epistle of Jude is derived from the second Epistle of Peter. (9) The Epistle to the Hebrews errs in denying a second repentance. (10) James wrote a 'right strawy epistle'. (11) The Apocalypse is not to be regarded as an apostolic book.

The list of 'critical judgments' is certainly very striking, and it could, no doubt, be extended. But one ought to ask what exactly it proves. In particular, is this kind of criticism necessarily inconsistent with a belief in verbal inerrancy? Of the examples given by Seeberg[2] one (the first) relates to textual or 'lower' criticism; three (nos. 4, 6 and 8) relate to authorship; and four (nos. 5, 9, 10 and 11) to canonicity. Only three (nos. 2, 3 and 7) appear to relate to errors in the original text of canonical writings, and there are some Luther-scholars (M. Reu, for example) who find it possible to maintain that even these three are inconclusive. If Luther admits that the prophets erred, he does not admit that there are errors in the prophecies which have been transmitted to us in the canonical Scriptures. If the Books of Kings are more trustworthy than Chronicles, that is not because the Chronicles contain errors, but because the Books of the Kings include richer detail. If there are apparent discrepancies in the narratives of the Four Gospels, this is not because the Evangelists made errors of chronology, but because they never intended to present a strictly chronological narrative at all. Obviously, such 'explanations' as these cannot be proved either true or false. The most one can say is that they are

[1] Op. cit., 300-1.

[2] Op. cit., esp. ch. V.

possible.[1] Certainly, Luther is extremely reluctant to admit error in Scripture, and on the whole I think that Reu has understood him correctly.[2] It seems, in fact, that Luther never really questioned the medieval theory of inspiration, although he did provide a way of escape from it.

We turn now to the third problem, the interpretation of Scripture. The subject can be dismissed far more briefly, since I am only concerned with interpretation insofar as it bears upon the problem of authority; more specifically, I am concerned to show that Luther's exegetical principles saved him from the pitfalls of allegorism and, consequently, from the temptation to annul the 'formal principle' by fanciful 'eisegesis' of his own convictions. Generally speaking, Luther remained true to the letter of Scripture, whilst never forgetting that the Bible is a 'Book of faith'.

His exegetical principles can be summed up under five major heads. (1) First, the literal meaning is to be preferred to the allegorical when we are seeking to establish points of doctrine. To the principle *scriptura sola* he adds the further principle *sola historica sententia*. Allegories may be used *afterwards*—as 'ornaments', not as proofs. Even then we must observe the *analogia fidei*: 'that is, accommodate them to Christ, the Church, faith, and the ministry of the Word.'[3] (2) Second, Luther insists that

[1] At two points Reu is surely right in arguing that Luther has been misunderstood. (1) Luther did not say in his preface to the *Annotations of Wenceslaus Link* that the writings of the prophets, as contained in the OT, included 'hay, straw, wood' as well as 'silver and gold'. He was referring, not to Scripture at all, but to 'annotations' which he *presumes* the prophets to have made in reading Moses. (2) Luther does not accuse Paul of using an invalid allegory in Gal. 4.25 (W.A. 40^1.652ff). What he says is that allegory does not serve for *proof* (here or anywhere else), but only for *illustration* of what has already been proved. See Reu, op. cit., 68ff.

[2] Sometimes Reu shows himself to be far more of a 'fundamentalist' than Luther found it necessary to be. On Matt. 27.9 Luther says: 'What does it matter if he does not give the name exactly?' Reu jumps on the 'if' as proof that even here Luther was not persuaded that he was faced with an error. Again, in Stephen's speech (Acts 7) Luther admits discrepancies with 'Moses'; but, Reu assures us, this is not to admit a fault in the sacred text, since the Holy Spirit is accurately recording Stephen's errors. Whether Luther himself would have approved such artifice, may be at least doubted. He does, however, occasionally deny that the Scriptures could contradict one another (e.g. W.A. 40^1.420.27), though he devotes far less labour to explaining 'Bible difficulties' than Calvin did.

[3] '*Videbam allegorias esse inanes speculationes . . . sola enim historica sententia est quae vere et solide docet. Postquam haec tractata et recte cognita est, tunc licet etiam allegoriis ceu ornamento et floribus quibusdam uti, quibus illustretur historia seu pingatur*' (W.A. 42.173.31; on Gen. 3). '*Sicubi autem Allegoriis vultis uti, hoc facite, ut sequamini analogiam fidei, hoc est, ut accommodetis eas ad Christum, Ecclesiam, fidem, ministerium verbi*' (W.A. 42.377.20: Gen. 9).

the understanding of Scripture is fundamentally simple. Partly, this was asserted in opposition to the Roman Church's claim that only the Pope could interpret Scripture—a view against which Luther argues in the *Address to the German Nobility*.[1] According to Luther 'the Holy Ghost is the most simple writer and speaker in heaven and earth; therefore His words have only one sense, the most simple one, which we call the literal sense'.[2] This does not mean that Luther neglects what we would term 'scholarship': on the contrary, he speaks with the utmost respect for the literary sciences of humanism as 'Baptist forerunners'.[3] (3) Third, Luther believes that many difficulties can be cleared up—and many errors evaded—by interpreting each passage in the light of the biblical message as a whole. The Scripture is *sui ipsius interpres*.[4] (4) Fourth, however, his method is not purely 'rationalistic': the Scriptures must always be understood in faith. We must 'feel' the words of Scripture 'in the heart'. Again, 'Experience is necessary for the understanding of the Word. It is not merely to be repeated or known, but to be lived and felt.'[5] (5) Fifth—and this is really only another way of saying the same thing—we must listen to the voice of the same Spirit who wrote the Scriptures.[6] It is in the light of affirmations such as these that we must understand Luther's characteristic dicta that 'it is better to leave reason at home' and submit to Scripture[7]; or that 'even the humble miller's maid, nay, a child of nine if it has faith' can understand the Bible.[8]

To sum up, it seems clear that Luther affirmed the authority of Scripture as emphatically as any of the medieval Schoolmen. What is far more significant, he insisted on the principle of *scriptura sola* and, moreover, refused to be led away by the temptation to indulge in fancy 'spiritual' (so-called) exegesis. This means that what was for his predecessors only the theoretical authority, became for him the authority in actual effect. 'It is the emphasis on the *sole* rather than the *supplementary* character of the ultimate Scriptural norm that distinguishes the Reformers from their predecessors.' These words of Paul Lehmann cor-

[1] Phila. Edn. II, 73ff.
[2] W.A. 7.650.21 (trans. by Reu).
[3] W.A.Br. 3.50.
[4] W.A. 7.97.23.
[5] See James Mackinnon, *Luther and the Reformation* vol. IV (London, 1930), p. 293
[6] '*Scripturas non nisi eo spiritu intelligendas esse, quo scriptae sunt, qui spiritus nusquam praesentius et vivacius quam in ipsis sacris suis, quas scripsit, literis inveniri potest*' (W.A. 7.97.1).
[7] Cf. Carter, op. cit., p. 29.
[8] Ibid., 66.

rectly underscore the central issue (though I doubt if 'supplementary' is quite a fair term for characterising the views of the medieval Schoolmen).[1] The other side of the problem is stated by Brunner:

> The struggle of the Reformers for the sole supremacy of Scripture as the doctrinal authority was only significant in the fact that at the same time they followed the line of the literal historical and philological exposition of the Scriptures.[2]

But insofar as Luther's own thinking on the problem of authority followed unquestioningly lines already laid down in the Middle Ages (and even earlier), he bequeathed a serious problem for later Protestantism—namely, how to reconcile a rigid theory of verbal inspiration with the claims of 'biblical criticism'. But in addition to the problem Luther also bequeathed at least a partial solution. The problem and its solution will both be reserved for consideration in the concluding section. First we must endeavour to see how far Luther's view of biblical authority was perpetuated by John Calvin.

III

Calvin's own viewpoint is carefully put together in the first book of the *Institutes*. In theory, his view of Scripture is that it constitutes a supplementary aid to what God has already made known of Himself through man's innate *sensus divinitatis* (iii.1) and through the works of Creation and Providence (ch. v). Hence he can liken the Scriptures to a pair of spectacles (vi.1), as though their function were merely to clarify our perception of what is already given. But in practice—and this means: in view of mankind's wilful suppression of the truth—the Scripture is the *only* guide, providing what otherwise would not be given at all:

> If true religion is to beam upon us, our principle must be, that it is necessary to begin with heavenly teaching, and that it is impossible for any man to obtain even the minutest portion of right and sound doctrine without being a disciple of Scripture (*nec quenquam posse vel minimum gustum rectae sanaeque doctrinae percipere, nisi qui Scripturae fuerit discipulus*: vi.2).[3]

[1] Paul L. Lehmann, 'The Reformers' Use of the Bible', *Theology Today*, vol. III (1946-7), p. 333.

[2] Emil Brunner, *The Christian Doctrine of God: Dogmatics*, vol. I (E.T., Philadelphia, 1950), p. 108.

[3] Citations from the *Institutes* are generally given in the English translation by

Man's *sensus divinitatis* serves only to render him inexcusable, since he deliberately 'suffocates' it (iv.1). Calvin denies that the knowledge of God which is inborn in man can ever be totally extinguished: it can be distorted (in the form of superstition and idolatry) or suppressed (by denial of God's providence, though not of His existence), but never annihilated.[1] Calvin is caught, in fact, between two necessities: on the one hand, the 'light of nature' must be bright enough to render man's ignorance culpable; and, on the other hand, it must not be so bright as to render unnecessary the revelation in the Scriptures. The problem is solved by his understanding of human sinfulness: there is no defect in the revelation, but it is nullified by man's perverseness. Therefore, although Calvin apparently has two sources of knowing God, only one is of immediate normative significance. This is the position he has reached by the conclusion of chapter vi. In chapter x he rounds off the argument by a comparison between the content of the revelation in 'God's works' and the revelation in Scripture. Chapters vii-ix are a parenthesis on the authority of Scripture,[2] and it is with these that we have to do—primarily, but not of course exclusively. As before, we will proceed according to the three major problems of authority, inspiration (or 'character'), and interpretation.

The 'formal principle', which in Luther was expressed by the characteristic formula *scriptura sola*, appears in Calvin as a fully-articulated doctrine of 'sufficiency'. The sufficiency of Scripture is repeatedly affirmed, both in its negative, and in its positive, form: (1) we are not to look outside of Scripture for guidance on faith and morals, since (2) Scripture contains everything that we may require. Calvin insists on the 'impiety' both of holding beliefs which *cannot* be demonstrated from Scripture and of failing to hold fast anything which *can*. The principle of sufficiency applies to faith, to morals, to rites, and even to matters which fall outside any of these three categories. (*a*) The sufficiency of Scripture in matters of belief is nowhere more

Henry Beveridge (2 vols., London, 1949). Beveridge usually keeps close to the original Latin of the 1559 edn., but occasionally I have thought it advisable to add the Latin, in part or whole, as a footnote or parenthesis.

[1] The words of the title to chap. iv are carefully chosen: the innate knowledge of God is either 'suffocated' (*suffocari*) or 'corrupted' (*corrumpi*).

[2] '*Antequam longius progrediar, quaedam* inserere *operaepretium est de Scripturae authoritate. . . .*'

strictly adhered to than in Calvin's exposition of predestination and election: Calvin believes in the 'double decree' (*praedestinatio gemina*) only because he finds it forced upon him by the Word of God. He accordingly addresses some severe remarks to 'two classes of men': the 'curious', who *want to know more* than God has been pleased to reveal; and the 'reticent', who are *willing to keep silent* about what God has revealed (III.xxi.1, 3). To the first class he says:

> Let it, therefore, be our first principle that to desire any other knowledge of predestination than that which is expounded by the Word of God, is no less infatuated than to walk where there is no path, or to seek light in darkness . . . (sec. 2).

And to the second:

> Scripture is the school of the Holy Spirit, in which as nothing useful and necessary to be known has been omitted, so nothing is taught but what it is of importance to know (sec. 3).

And to both:

> I wish it to be received as a general rule, that the secret things of God are not to be scrutinised, and that those which He has revealed are not to be overlooked, lest we may, on the one hand, be chargeable with curiosity, and, on the other, with ingratitude (sec. 4).

Similar statements are to be found in the discussion on Providence, where the difficulties involved are, of course, very much the same. Indeed, perhaps nowhere has the binding authority of Scripture been more unequivocally laid down than in the concluding remarks to chapter xviii of book I: 'Our true wisdom is to embrace with meek docility, and without reservation, whatever the Holy Scriptures have delivered.'[1]

Similar affirmations (*b*) could be found in relation to matters of morals and conduct, in which matters the Church of Rome had presumed to add to the explicit requirements of God's Word. In his discussion of the Moral Law (II.viii) Calvin roundly condemns the 'irreligious affectation of religion' (*irreligiosa religionis affectatio*) which dares to usurp the place of God's Law and to substitute an 'endless host of human inventions' (sec. 5). Calvin takes his stand by Moses' warning: 'What thing soever I command you, observe to do it; thou shalt

[1] '*Nam sapere nostrum nihil aliud esse debet quam mansueta docilitate amplecti, et quidem sine exceptione, quicquid in sacris Scripturis traditum est.*' *Exceptione* could be rendered 'exception' and taken with the phrase '*quicquid . . . est*': i.e. 'everything without any exception . . .'.

not add thereto, nor diminish from it' (Deut. 12.32). He goes on:

> The best cure for this vice would be a constant and deeply-seated conviction that the Law was given from heaven to teach us a perfect righteousness; that the only righteousness so taught is that which the divine will expressly enjoins; and that it is, therefore, vain to attempt, by new forms of worship, to gain the favour of God, whose true worship consists in obedience alone (*cuius legitimus cultus sola constat obedientia*: ibid.).

In other words, Calvin's principle is: *quod non iubet, vetat*—what God has not expressly enjoined, He means to prohibit. 'Everything relating to a perfect rule of life the Lord has so comprehended in his law, that he has left nothing for men to add to the summary there given' (IV.x.7).

Calvin's attitude towards 'rites' (*c*) may be illustrated from his comments on the Mass.

> Nothing is safer than to banish all the boldness of human sense, and adhere solely to what Scripture delivers. And certainly, if we reflect that it is the Supper of the Lord and not of men, why do we allow ourselves to be turned aside one nail's-breadth from Scripture by any authority of man or length of prescription? (IV.xviii.12).

Again, of the 'chrism' in episcopal Confirmation he remarks, with characteristic sarcasm: 'And I thought that everything pertaining to Christianity was prescribed and contained in Scripture!'[1]

Surprisingly, however, Calvin's principle of biblical sufficiency does not seem to be limited to 'everything pertaining to Christianity' (*d*). When he warns against speculation into the immortality of animals or the 'silent years' of Jesus' life,[2] we are obviously 'on the border-line'—for these matters really have nothing to do *directly* with our salvation. But this is precisely the reason why Calvin will not consider them. There are certainly several passages in the *Institutes* where Calvin seems to be saying that Scripture contains, not merely all that can be known concerning our salvation, but all that is worth knowing. This, however, does not mean that he considered the Bible an exhaustive treatise on all conceivable subjects: it rather implies a severe limitation on what is considered 'worth knowing'. We may say, quite simply, that what is worth knowing is, in Calvin's

[1] '*Atqui putabam, quaecunque ad Christianismum pertinent, omnia Scripturis perscripta ac comprehensa esse*' (IV.xix.9).

[2] *Comm.* on Rom. 8.21 and Acts 1.21-22, respectively.

view, precisely whatever concerns our salvation. Indeed, he can speak, not merely of what it is *profitable*, but even of what it is *legitimate*, to know. We must not try to go beyond 'the lawful boundary of wisdom': 'Almost all men are infected with this disease of desiring to obtain useless knowledge.' One thing alone is sufficient—the 'knowledge of the love of Christ'.[1]

The important feature of Calvin's doctrine of authority is, then, his insistence on the Bible's absolute sufficiency as the Christian's guide to belief and conduct. And the doctrine is certainly maintained with extraordinary consistency throughout the *Institutes*, as Calvin proceeds in his endeavour to provide a systematic 'summary of religion in all its parts'. Calvin condescends at times to point out certain parallels between Christian truth and the opinions of the philosophers; but these parallels never really attain to the status of *proofs*, and Calvin is obviously uneasy in his use of them. 'For pious readers a simple reference is sufficient': in these words Calvin sums up his uncompromising standpoint.[2] Nor is he able to understand how anyone could 'bring himself to doubt' what the Scriptures clearly teach.[3] He deplores the arrogance—the blasphemy even —of those who, confronted with the plain meaning of Scripture, can still say: 'Mihi secus videtur!'—'*I* think otherwise!' (I.xviii.3).

On what grounds did Calvin base his confidence in the authority of Scripture? This brings us to our second problem once again—the 'character' and 'content' of the Bible. Here also—and perhaps more obviously—Calvin shows a certain 'hardening' of Luther's viewpoint. He certainly does not forget the 'Christocentrism' of the German Reformer. He can maintain equally strongly that the unity of Scripture is to be sought in its revelation of Christ. And he has his own distinctive way

[1] Quoted by Mitchell Hunter, *The Teaching of Calvin* (2nd edn., London, 1950), p. 82. But Hunter adds that Calvin 'did not burn his classics, nor did he cease to peruse them'. Cf. A. Dakin: 'There are passages in the *Institutes* which taken out of their context might almost seem to suggest that the Reformer was willing to confine men to Scripture entirely, as though nothing profitable could be found in any other place. But a consideration of his own educational system at Geneva alone is enough to refute such an idea . . .' (*Calvinism* (London, 1940), p. 191).

[2] *Admonitio* does not mean 'reference' in the sense of a 'proof-text', of course, but Calvin certainly intends to contrast the tortuous discussions of the philosophers with the 'simple' teaching *of Scripture*. I.xv.2.

[3] '*Adeo certis clarisque Scripturae testimoniis asseritur, ut mirum sit potuisse de ea quempiam dubitare*' (I.xvi.4).

of expressing this unity by relating it to his 'federal' Christology. For Calvin there is really only *one* 'Covenant' in the Scriptures, though it is set forth under different 'dispensations', and the 'Mediator' of this one Covenant is Christ. To be sure, he speaks of the 'New' Covenant as against the 'Old', but he will acknowledge no *essential* difference—save in the 'mode of administration' (II.xi.1). Both the Old and the New Testaments set forth Christ (II.x.4), and in this lies their unity of 'substance' (II.xi.1). The patriarchs were saved by faith in Christ; the Law 'prefigures' Christ; the prophets foretell Christ; and so on (see esp. II.x-xi and IV.viii). The Incarnation is but the 'full unfolding' of the Christ who was already revealed, albeit partially, in the Old Testament (IV.viii.7).[1]

But, granting all this, we are still bound to admit that Calvin's thinking is not so conspicuously Christ-centred as Luther's. To state the same thing another way, we may say (as Edward Dowey says repeatedly[2]) that Calvin did not adequately relate his doctrine of faith with his doctrine of authority. For whilst his view of *faith* is strongly Christocentric, he continues to work with the medieval conception of the Bible as an external and formal *authority*. For him there could be no 'inner canon' within the Bible, nor could he ever have referred to any biblical book as Luther referred to the Epistle of James. Some books seem to have given him difficulty—the Apocalypse and the Song of Songs, for example, on neither of which did he write commentaries. He is supposed to have said that the significance of the Apocalypse totally eluded him; yet this did not prevent him from citing it on occasion. And if he never dared to write a commentary on the Song of Songs, he judged Castellio unfit to be a minister on the grounds (*inter alia*) that he considered it merely a 'love-poem'.[3]

For Calvin, in fact, the whole Bible is the 'Word of God'. The expressions 'Scripture says' and 'The Holy Spirit says' are used synonymously (*passim*). In the Scripture God 'opens His own sacred mouth' (I.vi.1). We are sure that the Scriptures came to us 'from the very mouth of God' (*ab ipsissimo Dei ore ad nos fluxisse*: I.vii.5). Hence Calvin can introduce his exposition

[1] '*Verum ubi demum in carne manifestata est Dei Sapientia, quicquid humana mente de Patre caelesti comprehendi potest et cogitari debet, pleno ore nobis edisseruit.*'

[2] *The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology* (New York, 1952), pp. 87ff and 160ff.

[3] See Warfield, *Calvin and Calvinism* (New York, 1931), p. 51.

of the Decalogue with the invitation: 'Let us now hear God speaking in His own words' (*Nunc Deum ipsum audiamus loquentem suis verbis*: II.viii.12). As we would expect from these high affirmations, Calvin tends to minimise the part played by the human agents in the production of the Scriptures: they are 'amanuenses' (IV.viii.9), 'organs of the Spirit' (*Comm.* on 2 Tim. 3.16), 'ministers' (*hominum ministerio*: I.vii.5). The writers did not speak *ex suo sensu*, nor *humano impulsu*, nor *sponte sua*, nor *suo arbitrio* (see on 2 Tim. 3.16 and 2 Pet. 1.21). The real 'author' of Scripture is God Himself (*authorem eius esse Deum*: I.vii.4). The writings of the apostles are to be regarded as the oracles of God (*pro Dei oraculis habenda sunt*: IV.viii.9). The Scripture comes from God alone and has no human 'admixture' in it (*ab eo solo manavit nec quicquid humani habet admixtum*: on 2 Tim. 3.16). In a word, Scripture is produced by the dictation of the Holy Spirit (*dictante Spiritu sancto*: IV.viii.6). And this has the all-important corollary that the Scriptures are thought of primarily as a 'depository of doctrine' (*caelestis doctrinae consignatio*: I.vi.3).

Perhaps even more important is the corollary that Calvin is obliged by his view of inspiration to think of the Scriptures as inerrant, and he exercises much ingenuity in reconciling alleged contradictions and explaining apparent errors. Sometimes he finds himself in difficulties; but always, when hard-pressed, he has two defensive ditches to fall back upon, and there he entrenches himself impregnably. First, he makes use of his principle of 'accommodation', generally to explain away problems of a moral nature—for example, the attribution of human emotions to Deity.

> What then is meant by the term repentance? The very same that is meant by the other forms of expression by which God is described to us humanly. Because our weakness cannot reach His height, any description which we receive of Him must be lowered to our capacity in order to be intelligible. And the mode of lowering is to represent Him not as He really is (*non qualis in se est*), but as we conceive of Him. . . . We ought to consider the mode of speech accommodated to our sense (*a sensu sumptam*).[1]

And the other method of explanation, which he uses against apparent errors of historical fact, is to attribute the error to a

[1] '*Nempe quod aliae omnes loquendi formulae quae Deum humanitus nobis describunt. Quia enim ad eius altitudinem non pertingit nostra infirmitas, quae nobis traditur eius descriptio, ad captum nostrum submittenda est . . .*' (I.xvii.13).

copyist, hence enabling himself to hold to the inerrancy of a hypothetical 'original document'.[1] In this way Calvin places within the province of 'lower' criticism many problems which we would expect the 'higher' critic to solve.

The authority of the Bible then, according to Calvin, rests upon its character as the verbally-inspired 'Word of God', dictated by the Holy Spirit.[2] But we can never be fully and personally persuaded of its authority until convinced by the 'secret testimony of the Spirit' (*ab arcano testimonio Spiritus*: I.vii.4). That is to say, the authority of Scripture, although it is really something *intrinsic*, is only *recognised* for what it is when the Holy Spirit illuminates the mind. Calvin can even say that Scripture is 'self-authenticating' (*esse autopiston*), that it 'bears upon the face of it as clear evidence of its truth as white and black do of their colour, sweet and bitter of their taste' (I.vii.5, 2). Nevertheless, Scripture only becomes self-authenticating *for this or for that man* through the testimony of the Spirit. 'For as God alone can properly bear witness to His own words, so these words will not obtain full credit in the hearts of men, until they are sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit' (I.vii.4).

It is extremely important to make clear exactly what it is that the Holy Spirit testifies to. It cannot (I think) be maintained that Calvin holds 'Word' and 'Spirit' together in a kind of dynamic relationship—as though authority were vested, not in the Scriptures *per se*, but rather in the Spirit 'speaking through the Scriptures'. This would, no doubt, be very congenial to our modern ways of thinking. But Calvin seems to be thinking along different lines.[3] He is concerned to parry the Roman Church's claim that the authority of Scripture depends upon the testimony of the Church (I.vii.1-3). He retorts, in effect:

[1] See Warfield, op. cit., 65.

[2] It ought perhaps to be added that the term *dictare* scarcely supplies Calvin with a fully-articulated 'theory of inspiration'. Neither Luther nor Calvin devote much space to the 'mechanics' of inspiration: they are far more interested in the *results*. The real problem of the Reformers' teaching on this theme lies in their apparent assumption of an inerrant text: it is less just to accuse them of holding to a mechanical view of inspiration. Several scholars have maintained that Calvin did not intend 'dictation' to be understood literally at all. This may be true: in any case, Warfield is surely right in saying that 'what Calvin has in mind is, not to insist that the mode of inspiration was dictation, but that the result of inspiration is as if it were by dictation, viz., the production of a pure word of God free from all human admixtures' (op. cit., 63).

[3] The Word-Spirit correlation takes on a different appearance in the argument against the 'fanatics' in ch. ix, and to this we must return.

No, it depends upon the testimony of God Himself—that is, of the Holy Spirit. In other words, he is concerned with establishing the authority of the Bible *as a whole*,[1] and it is no accident that the question of 'canonicity' is to the fore in section 3. It is also significant that Calvin mentions *probationes*—the 'secondary aids to our weakness'—in this context (I.vii.4 and I.viii *pass.*). There is in a sense a certain parallel between them and the testimony of the Spirit: they have the same purpose or function, though they differ in the effectiveness with which they attain that purpose. In neither case are we dealing with another source of revelation, nor even with coadjutants to the one source; they are not the light, but bear witness to the light. Warfield is again, I believe, essentially right in describing the function of the Spirit as a 'subjective operation on the heart enabling sinful man to receive the revelation': it is a kind of 'repairing operation', that is, something strictly prior to the reception of the revelation.[2]

On the third problem, the interpretation of Scripture, it is not necessary to add to what has been said in connexion with Luther, for Calvin's own exegetical principles are essentially the same. Indeed, we may say that the Reformers were fundamentally at one in all three divisions of our topic. By their common emphasis on the *sole* authority of Scripture and the *sole* regulative status of its literal interpretation they fought for the removal of the two limiting factors imposed by the medieval Church upon the supremacy of the biblical norm. In their understanding of the 'content' of Scripture the Reformers, so far from opposing the medieval Church, accepted its viewpiont unquestioningly: Scripture contains revealed doctrine, the infallible oracles of God. But—and this is the really important contribution—that the Bible contains revealed doctrine was not the *only* answer which the Reformers gave to the problem of

[1] Cf. Dowey: 'If we should dare the Barthian expression that the Bible "becomes" the word of God in faith, we must confess that it becomes it for Calvin by book-size units' (op. cit., 120, n. 355).

[2] Op. cit., 31-32. Cf.: 'It is no revelation in the strict sense' (ibid.). Also: the question concerns 'the accrediting of Scripture' (71). On the other hand, Warfield's estimate of the *probationes* is surely wrong. He not only exalts the *indicia*, as he likes to call them, to a status which Calvin would not accord to them: he even tries to argue that Spirit and *indicia* work together as though inseparable. The real problem in Calvin's own position is to see why he bothers to mention the *probationes* at all, for he says: '*Neque demonstrationi et rationibus subiici eam* (i.e. Scripture) *fas esse*' (I.vii.5).

content: both of them could affirm on occasion that the Scriptures contain *nothing but Christ.* And if there is no necessary contradiction between the two answers, neither is there any necessary connexion: they do not stand or fall together.

IV

The importance of these considerations could hardly be overemphasised. For one possible answer to the problems raised by biblical criticism is to recover Luther's 'Christocentric' understanding of Scriptural authority and to discard the remains of medievalism which still cling to his thinking. Christ is, for Luther, the 'Lord of the Scriptures' (as of all things else): if Scripture must 'reign as Queen', yet Christ is King even over the Scripture.[1] If necessary, Christ and Scripture can be set over against each other. 'Scripture is to be understood, not against, but for Christ: either it must be referred to Him, or else it must not be held to be true Scripture. . . . If my opponents have urged Scripture against Christ, we urge Christ against Scripture.' 'You urge the slave, that is, Scripture—and that only in parts. . . . I urge the Lord, who is King of Scripture.'[2] Such utterances as these show that Luther was—at least in principle—emancipated from the medieval understanding of the Bible's content. For him Scripture is authoritative *only insofar as it bears witness to Christ.* For this reason Emil Brunner is correct in saying that 'Luther was the first to represent a biblical faith which could be combined with biblical criticism'.[3]

We are, then, confronted with the strange historical circumstance that the immediate successors of the Reformers developed the worse side of their twofold answer to the question of the Bible's character and content. It is clear that an ambiguity is already present in Luther and Calvin—indeed, that Calvin has

[1] '*Haec Regina debet dominari, huic omnes obedire et subiacere debent*' (W.A. 40[1].120.20). '*Dominum qui rex est Scripturae*' (see below).

[2] '*Scriptura est, non contra, sed pro Christo intelligenda, ideo vel ad eum referenda, vel pro vera Scriptura non habenda. . . . Si adversarii Scripturam urserint contra Christum, urgemus Christum contra Scripturam*' (W.A. 39[1].47.3, 19). '*Tu urges servum, hoc est, Scripturam, et eam non totam. . . . Ego urgeo dominum, qui rex est Scripturae*' (W.A. 40[1].420: only in the 1538 edn.).

[3] Op. cit., 111. Cf. Brunner's remarks in *Revelation and Reason* (E.T., Philadelphia, 1946), p. 276: 'If we hold firmly to the Reformation principle of the Scriptures—*Christus dominus et rex scripturae*—then, in principle, the problem of Bible faith and Bible criticism is solved. The Bible is the human, and therefore not the infallible, witness to the divine revelation in the Old Covenant and in the history of the incarnate Son of God.'

begun to stress the medieval element at the expense of the distinctively 'Lutheran' insight. The medieval—or, as Brunner terms it, the 'reactionary'[1]—element was from Calvin onwards more and more in the ascendancy. 'So that what has unhappily occurred is that the ways in which the Reformers were children of their time have triumphed over the ways in which they were pioneers in the use of the Bible.'[2] These words of Paul Lehmann sum up the post-Reformation developments only too well. In Lehmann's own terms, the Reformers' 'interpretation' (that is, their consciously-stated analysis of the Bible's content) was overcome by their 'apperception' (that is, by 'all those ways in which in their use of the Bible the Reformers were children of their time'). It has required all the impact of modern scientific, literary, and historical criticism to drive Protestantism back to its own best insights.

It is only putting the same thing another way to say[3] that the Reformers 'drew a distinction between the Word of God and the Scripture which contains or presents that Word'. To be sure, Luther does, on occasion, speak of Scripture as God's 'Word'. But he also speaks of *Christ* as the Word and, perhaps most characteristically of all, *the Gospel concerning Christ*.[4] What he did not, apparently, perceive is that this distinction between the 'Word in the Scripture' and the 'words of the Scripture' could have delivered the Reformation from the encumbrance of an inerrant Bible. It might have spared the Church from its futile quarrel with the Copernican astronomers[5] and Calvin from exercising a misplaced ingenuity in 'explaining' biblical difficulties.[6]

It should not be imagined that all problems are automatically solved by a consistently Christocentric interpretation of biblical authority. On the contrary, new problems are created. Both Luther and Calvin found statements concerning Christ in the most improbable corners of the Old Testament. Neither of

[1] *Rev. and Reason*, 275. [2] Op. cit., 342.

[3] T. M. Lindsay, *History of the Reformation* vol. I (New York), p. 461.

[4] E.g. in the *Treatise on Christian Liberty* (Phila. edn. II), p. 315. Cf. 1 Pet. 1.25; Acts 4.31, 6.2, etc.: the NT uses ῥῆμα and λόγος in roughly this sense.

[5] Cf. Luther: '*Ego credo sacrae Scripturae, nam Josua iussit solem stare, non terram*' (W.A.Tr. 4.4638).

[6] Calvin finds himself obliged to maintain, for example, that David's hatred of his enemies is a 'pattern set before us by the Holy Spirit'; and that the speeches of Job's friends contain 'sound doctrine'.

them had any real historical sense, and this deficiency is partly occasioned by their Christocentric interpretation of the Scriptures. Moreover, if they rejected allegory, they nevertheless loved 'typology'—and this was a particular weakness of Calvin. Yet, when all this is said, we can still agree with Brunner that Luther's Christocentrism does, *in principle*, solve the biggest problems of biblical criticism.

Calvin, too, has a positive contribution to make to the problem of biblical authority through his correlation of 'Word' and 'Spirit'. We have seen that in the main Calvin uses the *testimonium Spiritus* only to buttress the authority of the external written Word. But there is in the *Institutes* at least the possibility of another understanding. This is especially clear in his defence against the 'spiritualists' (in chap. ix of book one). Here Calvin's biblicism seems to be considerably modified by the introduction of the Spirit as a second factor in the final authority. For he does not deny the 'leading of the Spirit', but simply insists that the Spirit is always bound to Scripture as the medium of His revelation. Hence the 'Supreme Judge' in matters of doctrine would appear to be (in the words of the *Westminster Confession*) 'no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture'. Calvin says plainly: 'As they'—that is, the children of God—'feel that without the Spirit of God they are utterly devoid of the light of truth, so they are not ignorant that the word is the instrument by which the illumination of the Spirit is dispensed.'[1] Word and Spirit are, in fact, united *inviolabili nexu* (I.ix.1). Therefore, the ultimate authority must be *Scripture-plus-Spirit*. But—and this is the crucial point—Calvin never really makes much use of this valuable correlation, and there is no need to modify the conclusions which were reached above: for all practical purposes Calvin's final court of appeal is the letter of Scripture, and the function of the Spirit is to attest the Scriptures *en bloc*. It was no accident that later Reformed theology made little of the Word-Spirit correlation. The best summing-up of the problem known to me comes from Dakin:

> Calvin's own example naturally overshadowed his theory. In all his work the Bible is simply the external authority so conceived and used. . . .

[1] '*Qui ut omni veritatis luce, sine Dei Spiritu, orbatos se vident, ita non ignorant verbum esse organum quo Spiritus sui illuminationem fidelibus Dominus dispensat*' (I.ix.3).

Not that the idea of the witness of the Spirit ever dropped out of Calvinism or was ever totally ignored . . . but it came to be so conceived as to be a subordinate factor, at best reinforcing and establishing in the heart the authority of the external revelation.[1]

In conclusion, then, it seems to me that, quite apart from the debt which we owe to the Reformers for their clearing away of the two obstacles imposed upon biblical authority by medieval Catholicism, we also owe them the further debt of gratitude for providing a way of weathering the storm of modern biblical criticism. Indeed, in all three departments of our topic they laid the foundations for a genuinely 'modern' understanding of the Bible. They insisted that the ultimate *authority* was the Gospel concerning Christ, which the Scriptures enshrined; that the Bible therefore has the *character* of a 'real wintess', pointing to something beyond itself; and that the true *interpretation* of Scripture was a matter for faith and the 'testimony of the Holy Spirit'. What is given and objective—the *revelatum*—is Christ: all other 'authorities' are subordinate and instrumental, being in the nature of 'witnesses'. But before the *revelatum* can become *revelatio* the Spirit must transform the written word and the historic event into the personal self-disclosure of God in the concrete contemporary moment to this or that concrete individual person. For just as the function of the Scripture is to testify of Christ (John 5.39), so the function of the Spirit is to exalt Christ by taking hold upon what concerns him and proclaiming it to his people (John 16.14).

[1] Op. cit., 203.

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND DEMYTHOLOGISING

by The Rev. Dr ALLAN D. GALLOWAY

The following is intended as a contribution to the current demythologising controversy. I hope it will either bring some clarification or else add profitably to the prevailing confusion.

I write as a man of faith to men of faith. That is to say, I am not here concerned with whether the Christian faith is true or how much of it 'we can accept'. That is a question which must be discussed in quite another way and in quite another context. I shall assume that we accept it in the same way as Carlyle accepted the universe, only more so, for Christ is Lord of the Universe. I am concerned rather with the way in which the symbols in which we express our belief behave.

Religious symbols live a curiously independent life of their own. Some rise to prominence and then fade away. Others remain permanent. But there is very little that we can do either by act of will or intellection to hasten their rise or retard their fading or keep them in permanence. We cannot make them. We simply find them or they are given to us—which is perhaps what one should expect in a revealed religion. We do not possess them as one possesses an idea. Our minds are possessed by them.

As my clinical example, I shall refer mostly to the symbol of the Kingdom of God.

There is no need to find an offence in the word 'symbol' here. All language is symbolic. When we say specifically that religious language is symbolic, all that this really means is that it is related to its object in a different way from empirical language (which has become the norm). It is therefore symbolic in a different sense. This does not mean that its object is any less real or that its truth is in any way suspect.

The Kingdom of God is the most suitable example because it has been represented at different times in such a variety of symbols. The roots of this doctrine lie in the deep act of faith

whereby the Jewish people believed that God would one day actively manifest Himself in holiness and power in the world. But while this is the permanent core of faith which gives continuity to the doctrine, the symbols in which it is expressed have gone on changing from age to age. Among such symbols one thinks of 'the day of the Lord', conceived as the day when God would show Himself in battle; the land flowing with milk and honey; the land of corn and wine; Immanuel; Messiah; the desert blossoming as the rose; the overthrow of Israel's political overlords; the new heaven and the new earth; and so on. The variety of these symbols does not imply an equal vacillation in the faith of Israel. They are all expressions of the one basic act of faith—that God would actively manifest Himself in holiness and in power.

From this we can infer our first principle in the logic of religious symbols. It is:

(1) *The concrete symbols in which an act of faith is expressed may vary considerably without necessarily implying any corresponding alteration in the underlying act of faith itself.*

A further consideration of the same evidence in relation to the development of the Israelite nation suggests a second principle, namely:

(2) *The specific symbol in which the basic act of faith is expressed at any given time tends to be determined by a salient feature of the life and culture then prevailing.* The desert period gives rise to the symbol of the land flowing with milk and honey—the food of the desert. In the agricultural period, this symbol became corn and wine. In the days of the occupation of Palestine, when the salient problems were military, it was the day when God would appear in battle. Amid the moral and fiscal complexities of more developed nationhood, judgment and the establishment of moral and political justice became the prominent prophetic symbols. In the days of a too human monarchy which had not lived up to all that was expected of it, a vague, messianic symbol begins to take shape. In the days of captivity, it was the restoration of the nation. In the days of alien occupation, it was political liberation. In the days of transition from parochial consciousness to a consciousness of involvement in world affairs, there arose the apocalyptic symbol of the new heaven and the new earth.

These were the points at which the experience of the people became most vivid—the points, if you like, at which their experience forced an awareness of their existential situation upon them. It was therefore these experiences which became capable of bearing the weight of symbolism which is required for the expression of an act of faith.

These two principles seem to me to have a bearing on the demythologising controversy. They do not solve anything, but they help to set it in its proper perspective. In so far as the problem of what is today called demythologising is that arising from the degeneration of certain religious symbols and their replacement by others, it is no new problem. We have given it a name and have become self-conscious about it. But the process itself is as old as religion. It does not constitute any special spiritual crisis peculiar to our age. We can take comfort from the fact that the prognosis for such disorders of religious symbolism is extremely good in that the final outcome is generally enriching.

The same process could be traced in detail in the Christian era. 'Demythologising' of Christianity was already well under way when Origen tried to express its essential content in terms of Stoic philosophy. This coincided with the time when the arresting element in men's experience was the shock of becoming acquainted with the new and terrifying Ptolemaic picture of the universe. Stoic philosophy provided the language in which they dealt with the existential problems which this new world-view created for them.

Again, when men were living through the dissolution of a mighty empire and the birth pangs of another, Augustine raised the symbol of the eternal city of God to the paramount position.

It is typical of the spirit of Europe that her symbols are intellectual rather than pictorial. But they still bear the same relationship to the vivid and typical elements in the experience of that age. For example, the enlightenment produced its crop of ethico-rational symbols within the Church, such as Kant's realm of ends or Hegel's self-realisation of Reason. When the romantic movement turned attention inwards, the Kingdom of God was represented as an inward condition of the hearts of men (Schleiermacher). In the period of the first world war, brotherhood and peace became the

symbols. In the disilusioned years following the second, a neurotic sensitivity to the problems and anxieties of our existential situation is beginning to determine the formation of new symbols (Bultmann).

It is typical of our own generation that we should see ourselves as living through a rather special, difficult and critical period. It is at once comforting and humiliating to discover that perhaps this is not so. The outcome of what we have been saying would seem to be that the decay and replacement of religious symbols is a normal phenomenon. From this standpoint the current fashion for demythologising scarcely merits the degree of excitement which it has aroused.

But now we come to a third principle of religious symbolism in which the whole question appears in a much more serious aspect.

(3) *A sharp distinction must be drawn between the derivative symbols in which an act of faith is expressed and the archetypal symbol to which an act of faith traces its origin.* (Though I use the term archetypal symbol, I do not intend any direct association with Jung's theory of archetypes.)

The symbols whose behaviour we have so far discussed are all derivative in that they are used only as expressions of a faith that is already there. They do not constitute its ground. They are the thoughts in which men try to picture their faith to themselves and to see its concrete meaning for their own particular lives. If we turn to the example from which we began, this distinction becomes quite plain.

(*a*) All the Jewish symbols for the kingdom of God stand in a dependent relation to an archetypal symbol which is the source and origin of the act of faith—in this case, the twin symbol of the Exodus and the giving of the law on Mt. Sinai.

(*b*) These symbols are believed in as empirical events, though their meaning far transcends their empirical significance. The derivative symbols are merely pictured or excogitated.

(*c*) Archetypal symbols retain their symbolic power long after the cultural circumstances in which they arose have ceased to exist. Derivative symbols tend to be replaced with every new cultural development.

In the case of the Christian Church, the archetypal symbol is

those events described in the *kerygma* of the early church—particularly the death and resurrection of our Lord.

Having established the distinction, we can now formulate some of the principles governing the life of archtypal symbols (though in their case it would be truer to speak of the circumstances which they govern).

(4) *Archetypal symbols are a constitutive element in the society which believes in them.* (Cf. A. N. Whitehead, *Symbolism* (C.U.P., 1928), pp. 71ff.)

(*a*) They provide the basis of communion within a society without which it would be a mere aggregate of individuals. This is shown forth in the Passover and the Eucharist, both of which contain an essential reference to the event which is the archetypal symbol.

(*b*) They provide the basis of that common point of view—a 'common universe of discourse'—without which the society could not remain a cultural unity.

(*c*) They provide the basis of a common sense of value and a common sense of destiny without which there could be no moral cohesion within the society.

This principle carries with it the corollary that when an archetypal symbol loses its symbolic power, the society based on it disintegrates.

(5) *The historical reality of the event which constitutes the archetypal symbol is believed in not because of the sufficiency of the empirical evidence, but because of its symbolic power.* The empirical evidence is never sufficient to warrant the unqualified affirmations of faith. Even if it were sufficient, the meaning which faith finds in the event could never be inferred. It stands out among other happenings as a divine event. It is believed in as the action of God. No amount of empirical evidence could warrant such a conclusion.

The argument from empirical evidence to faith is the creation of a misguided kind of apologetics. In religion, the movement of thought is always from the certainty that God has acted to the certainty that the empirical event in which His action was manifest really took place.

The history of any event of great symbolic power tends to become shrouded in legend. The legends begin as the response of men to the symbolic power of the event itself. Since its

meaning so greatly transcends its empirical significance, the bald description of the event itself does not express its meaning satisfactorily. But it soon becomes difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the legend from the bare history. It is certainly impossible to distinguish them with a certainty which matches the certainty of faith.

Thus, the certainty of faith is always the certainty that some such event—an event which bears this meaning—actually did occur. Faith has a good deal of tolerance to doubts as to whether the divine event occurred in this way or that. That such tolerance has always existed can be demonstrated from the widely and obviously divergent accounts of the same event which have been permitted to exist within both the Old and the New Testaments. It is further significant that the more important the event for faith, the wider the divergence tends to be.

Where the limits of this tolerance lie, and whether it has any limits, are central questions in the demythologising controversy at the moment. I am not proposing to answer these questions here, but only to find out what kind of question they are, and what kind of evidence will be relevant to their solution.

For the man of faith, the factor which ultimately determines the extent of this tolerance to historical doubt is never the empirical evidence. The ultimate test by which any statement, purporting to be a statement of what actually happened, is judged is never: 'Is this historically probable?', but always: 'Could such an event bear the full meaning which I experience as member of the believing community?' This is what I mean in saying that the historical reality of the event which constitutes the archetypal symbol is believed in not because of the sufficiency of the empirical evidence, but because of its symbolic power.

I am not here raising the question whether it is rational or fitting that our assent to the basic propositions of faith should be so determined. I am merely observing the fact.

In what I have said so far, much has been made of the term 'symbolic power'. We cannot entirely avoid the difficult question of what is meant by these words. To answer this fully would mean raising the whole question of the epistemology of revealed knowledge—which is clearly far beyond

the scope of this article. For present purposes, the following will be adequate as a working definition:

(6) *An archetypal symbol has symbolic power in so far as it dominates the world-view of a community. In so far as it comes to be assessed in the light of an already accepted world-view, it has lost symbolic power.*

This again is a matter of observation rather than theory. The world-view which is adopted at any given time is determined not only by the totality of evidence available, but also by the standpoint from which the evidence is viewed. It is this standpoint which is determined by the basic act of faith and the event-symbol on which that faith is based. The world-view may change as new evidence comes to light. But so long as the archetypal symbol retains its symbolic power, each new picture of the world is always viewed from the same standpoint. Thus there can never be any question of assessing an archetypal symbol in the light of a more modern world-view. The mere fact that a man makes such an assessment—even though this be done with affirmative intention—means that, for him, the symbol has lost its authoritative power. It has been replaced by some other factor which determines the standpoint from which all such assessments are made.

These considerations are purely phenomenological. That is to say, they are not concerned with the truth of the religious symbols we have been discussing, but simply with the manner in which they are experienced. Phenomenology can never be a substitute for theology, but it can be a useful tool in the clarification of theological problems. In the light of these six 'principles' governing the behaviour of religious symbols, the following conclusions about the demythologising controversy are suggested.

(1) We must distinguish three quite distinct activities which tend at present to be subsumed under the one blanket-term—Demythologising. There is first of all the interpretative replacement of derivative symbols by new ones which are more relevant and meaningful in our contemporary cultural circumstances. This is a healthy spiritual activity which has been going on since religion began. From this point of view demythologising is no new activity, and the name is a rather presumptuous one. Every age calls the discarded symbols of a previous age 'myth' and regards its own as simple truth. It is

at least conceivable that a future age will speak of the existentialist mythology of the twentieth century.

(2) Secondly there is the task of interpreting the archetypal symbols. On the face of it, it looks as though this is only the extension of the same process to a deeper level. Bultmann moves from his treatment of derivative, pictured symbols of the now outmoded culture of New Testament times to his treatment of the basic event-symbols of the *kerygma* as though he were still dealing with essentially the same problem. The only difference of which he appears to be conscious is that more serious issues are at stake.

If the foregoing phenomenological analysis is correct, however, the problem of the interpretation of archetypal symbols is of a different order altogether. It is of a different order because archetypal symbols stand in a completely different relationship to culture. It is in the nature of derivative symbols to change with changing cultures. They are a product of the intercourse of secular culture with religion. But it is the nature of archetypal symbols to determine the standpoint from which all new knowledge and every new cultural development is assessed. The mere fact of reversing this relationship and assessing these archtypal symbols from the standpoint of contemporary culture is equivalent to their rejection. The fact that the assessment results in the conclusion that we can still 'accept' these symbols as expressing some truth is irrelevant. They have lost their symbolic power to dominate our cultural standpoint, and all the indications of history go to show that the community based on symbols which suffer this fate (in this case the Christian Church) is in process of disintegration.

(3) There is a genuinely theological work of criticising and interpreting archetypal symbols. The demand to clarify our thought and language about them is continuous. What does the event-symbol described in the *kerygma* really mean? Which elements in the story are the essential bearers of that meaning? Are we permitting an obsessive concern with non-essential elements to obscure the deepest meaning of God's action in Jesus Christ? These are the questions which the Church asks about the basic event-symbols when it is taking itself and them seriously. How these questions can best be answered is a matter of controversy. But there is one thing certain. The fact

that I am a modern man who knows a little science and switches on electric light and listens to a radio and shares in the culture of my day has nothing whatsoever to do with the issue.

There are thus three distinct kinds of question that we can ask about religious symbols. It is clear that we shall become bogged down in all kinds of difficulties and misunderstandings and led into all kinds of error if we allow them to become confused. The trouble with the whole demythologising controversy is that it has done just that.

Of the three types of question indicated, the first and third are genuinely theological. The second, when it is clearly distinguished and made to stand by itself, does not belong within the framework of the theology of revealed religion at all.

But the first and third types of question and the work of answering them are merely the normal preoccupation of theology. They do not merit any special name—least of all a provocative name like 'demythologising'. It would be more edifying as well as more biblical if we forgot the '-ism' and said simply that we are today realising anew that to understand the Scriptures with profit we must understand them according to the spirit and not according to the letter—to know salvation in Jesus Christ we must know him after the spirit and not after the flesh. To this realisation Bultmann has made an immense contribution. It is a pity that it is his red herrings that have provoked most theological interest.

THE REPORT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN ANGLICAN AND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES

I

Reviewed *by* The Rev. Professor NORMAN SYKES

'Shall two walk together except they be agreed?' may well have been a widespread question asked on both sides of the Border when the appointment of a joint Committee of Representatives, nominated respectively by the Archbishop of Canterbury and by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, to consider means of establishing closer relations between the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches was announced. The Report entitled 'Relations between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches' offers a provisional answer to this question, by affording evidence of a surprising degree of mutual rapprochement and by setting forth the bases for further action. Perhaps this measure of agreement is more surprising than ought to have been the case; for the history of the two national, established Churches of England and Scotland indicates how near they have been to each other in polity in the past; and how fortuitous were the circumstances which drove them apart. 'This is the ideal which springs to light in the last months of 1558,' wrote F. W. Maitland of the relationship of the two nations at the accession of Elizabeth I, 'deliverance from the toils of foreign potentates; amity between two sister nations; union in a pure religion.' A Scottish contemporary, William Maitland indeed wrote to William Cecil in England, that 'earnest embracing of religion will join us straitly together'. It was a consummation then devoutly to be wished; and no less still to be desired in the reign of Elizabeth II after the lapse of four centuries.

Much water, however, has flowed in both Thames and Tweed during this period; and it may be questioned how much even earnest churchmen in each country know of the history and present conditions of their opposite numbers. Admiration not unmixed with envy is often expressed by high-churchmen

south of the Border for the freedom from state control guaranteed by the Church of Scotland Act of 1921; but it may be doubted whether the sentiment goes much farther or deeper; and it may still be the case that episcopacy in the eyes of Scottish churchmen is associated with the mis-called and ill-fated 'Liturgy of Laud' of 1637. With the approaching quatercentenaries of the English and Scottish ecclesiastical settlements, however, it is pertinent, as the Report affirms, that both Churches 'should renounce the method of selecting and measuring such faults and errors in the past history of the Churches now conferring as might be judged to be responsible for our present divisions'.

Instead the Report fixes its attention on the future. One of the first and most emphatic of its characteristics is the repeated appeal to 'the greater fulness of the Church that is to be' (p. 7). This note is struck throughout the document. In the contemporary world-situation, no less at home than abroad, when Christianity is challenged by powerful forces of Antichrist, 'the overcoming of disunity and *the fuller manifesting of the Church's wholeness* are . . . necessities of the Church's real existence and proper vitality'. The starting-point of the Report is the agreement that 'the "Churches" in their separatedness cannot exhibit the wholeness and fulness of the Church's true being' (p. 2); and its objective is the provision of an answer to the question: 'are there conceivable modifications and mutual adaptations of the two Church systems whereby they may be reconciled in such *a plenitude of faith and order* as will conserve the fulness of their traditions?' (p. 7). The detailed and practical recommendations which follow must be studied and envisaged as means towards a 'fuller participation in the true wholeness of the one Church of Christ', and as a mutual approach towards 'the plenitude of order and practice in the enriched Church of the future' (p. 13). Anglicans will find welcome echoes here of a concept of the 'plenitude' of the Church, traditional and familiar in their own apologetic; and in the light of this will examine with sympathetic consideration the suggested modifications of their own polity. They will be reinforced in this attitude by the theological considerations adduced in the Report to demonstrate that unity is not merely a practical expedient required by the turbulent times in which we live, but is firmly grounded in the biblical testimony to the

nature of the Church, which is the Body of Christ. It is in this context that the character of the Ministry of the Church in general, and of the exercise of *episcope* in particular, is succinctly set forth; and once again the warning must be given that the practical proposals should be studied in the light of these prior theological conclusions. Only when the function of *episcope* in the Church has been examined and accepted, can the issues concerning episcopacy and presbyterianism be fruitfully considered. The section of the Report headed 'Theological Considerations' must therefore be studied carefully.

It is, however, both natural and inevitable that attention will be concentrated on the practical suggestions for approximation of the Anglican and Presbyterian systems of church polity to each other. 'On both sides there has been a desire to examine afresh the idea of *episcope* or pastoral government and the mode of its exercise within the Church. From the Anglican side it was clear that full intercommunion and unity could not be realised apart from episcopacy. From the Presbyterian side it was clear that full intercommunion and unity required a movement of mutual adaptation, including full recognition of the corporate nature of the ministry and of the exercise of *episcope* in the parish ministry of Word and Sacrament' (p. 11). Accordingly 'on the Presbyterian side, there was a willingness to consider the functions of a Bishop, as they are recognised by the Anglican Communion, so long as the office was duly integrated with the Presbytery and the whole Church. The concept of a presiding "Bishop-in-Presbytery", exercising functions in relation to ordination and pastoral oversight as a Father-in-God to ministers and congregations, with authority given to him by consecration at the hands of Bishops as well as with the authority of the collective Presbytery, appeared to be a possible modification of the Presbyterian polity. The Anglican representatives moreover were anxious to emphasise that the Bishop's office is rightly exercised only within the context of the corporate life of the whole Church, a principle which has been too often obscured in practice. . . . In short, over against the possibility of the acceptance of the "historic episcopate" by the Presbyterian Churches, there was set the possibility of the acceptance of a greater measure of "corporate episcopacy" by the Anglican Churches' (p. 12).

In approaching the detailed proposals for such changes in polity as would be consonant with these principles, it may not be impertinent for an English churchman to remind Scottish readers that twice during their history, from 1610 to 1640 and again between the Restoration and the Revolution, the Church of Scotland possessed episcopacy duly modified by presbyterianism. It is useful to look further at this experiment, for the interval of more than two centuries and a half since the final abolition of episcopacy in the Church of Scotland enables the political associations which compromised its ecclesiastical character to be disregarded. The recurrence of the formula 'the bishop with the consent of the brethren of synod' indicates the constitutional principle of its synodical legislation. The General Assembly at Glasgow in 1610 agreed that 'the Bishops shall be Moderators in every Diocesan Synod', that 'no sentence of excommunication or absolution therefrom be pronounced . . . without the knowledge and approbation of the Bishop of the Diocese', that in institutions and depositions of Ministers the Bishop is to act with the Ministers of the several bounds; and that the Bishops 'shall be subject in all things concerning their life, conversation, office and benefice to the censures of the General Assembly'. Furthermore after the Restoration Bishop Leighton attempted to realise his ideal of 'episcopacy attempered unto presbytery', as being 'not contrary either to the rule of Scripture or the example of the primitive Church, but most agreeable to both'. His proposals were that the Church should be governed by bishops and clergy together in synods, in which the bishops were to act only as presidents and to be determined by the majority of their presbyters, both in matters of jurisdiction and of ordination; that bishops should not claim a negative vote upon the decisions of their presbyters; that they should ordain ministers to parishes only with the concurrence of the presbytery and the approbation of the people; and that Provincial Synods should meet triennially at least, with power to receive complaints against and to censure the bishops.

It may be expected, however, that an English churchman should concentrate his attention on those changes which the Report recommends in his own Church. Equally with the Church of Scotland, the Church of England is committed by

the principles and circumstances of its Reformation to recognition of the rights of the laity in all spheres of church government. No reader of the controversial literature of the sixteenth century can escape the iterated taunts of Roman Catholic polemists that the Elizabethan settlement was a parliamentary religion; and in that period 'parliamentary' was equivalent to 'lay'. Nor do the facts of the case belie the charge. In February 1559 the Convocation of Canterbury, under the presidency of Bishop Bonner of London, passed a series of resolutions denying the competence of the laity to intervene in matters concerning the faith, liturgy and government of the Church. The retort courteous was offered by the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity, carried despite the negative votes of all the bishops present in the House of Lords. In England the rights of the laity were expressed by the Royal Supremacy on the one hand and by the legislative action of the Crown in Parliament on the other; and with the constitutional evolution of the next two centuries, the power of parliament in ecclesiastical affairs steadily increased. Moreover the exclusively clerical personnel of the two Provincial Convocations of Canterbury and York tended further to devolve upon parliament the assertion and protection of the rights of the laity. At the parochial level indeed the traditional office of churchwarden associated the laity with the minister in the exercise of ecclesiastical discipline; but this functioned chiefly by way of formal presentment of offenders against the ecclesiastical and moral codes to the hierarchy of Courts Christian, from that of the archdeacon through that of the bishop to those of the archbishop. In regard especially to reception of the Holy Communion, ecclesiastical discipline was directed rather to ensure reception by all persons of proper age, than to reject those unfit for such participation; and in the ecclesiastical courts the infliction of, and absolution from, excommunication was too general a process to command confidence.

Thus the Church of England would benefit considerably from some of the changes recommended in the Report. The present century indeed has seen a steady if modest extension of the rights of the laity; and the Parochial Church Councils might well form a proper subject for the devolution of the powers associated with the Presbyterian lay eldership. Nor

would most Anglicans deny that their Diocesan Conference would be improved by approximation to a Diocesan Synod. It is possible even that a reform of the Diaconate might afford wider opportunities of service for some of the laity, without relinquishing their professional vocation. It should be observed furthermore that many of the reforms suggested in the Report are to be found already in one or other of the Provinces of the Anglican Communion, thanks to their development apart from the conditions imposed by the particular form of establishment in the Church of England. For example, the recommendation that 'steps would be taken to include or associate with the Convocation of each Province a House of Laity', is by no means so revolutionary as might seem from a consideration only of the history of the Church in England. Various Provinces of the Anglican Communion enjoy this already; and in none of these has the cumbrous duplication of an exclusively clerical Convocation with a Church Assembly, embodying the entire personnel of the Convocations plus a House of Laity, been essayed. It is a matter of common knowledge that a Commission on Synodical Government is in session at present, to which has been committed the task of considering appropriate means of associating the laity more adequately and fully with the clergy in all spheres of church government; and whilst it would be improper to attempt to forecast its recommendations, it is pertinent to emphasise that the changes suggested by the Report are in fact customary in various Provinces of the Anglican Communion. From any incorporation of a House of Laity with the two Provincial Convocations in England there would follow also and naturally a reconsideration of the 'relationship between the Convocations and the Church Assembly viewed as a National Synod'. This reform further would meet the desire of the Presbyterian members of the Conference to 'be sure that the laity and the presbyterate were fully linked with the Bishop in the doctrinal and spiritual decisions of the Church'. This association is already provided for in the case of the presbyterate by the right of final negative possessed by the Lower Houses of Convocation on all resolutions of the Upper Houses of Bishops; and this right would doubtless be extended to the House of Laity, if incorporated in the Convocations. There would seem to be nothing in these

recommendations therefore which is contrary to Anglican principle as interpreted by the practice of many Provinces of the Anglican Communion.

Perhaps the suggestion for the division of large bishoprics 'into units capable of being adequately pastored by a single Bishop' may cause greater practical difficulties. On the one hand many English churchmen would agree that the present practice of affording relief to the Diocesan Bishop by the provision of Suffragan-Bishops is in some respects both anomalous and inconvenient. For example, some suffragan-bishops are members of the Lower Houses of Convocation (though by definition the latter consist of 'the inferior clergy', that is, those not of episcopal rank); whilst a recent decision has led to their not being invited to the 1958 Lambeth Conference on the ground that they do not bear witness to the faith and tradition of a particular diocese. On the other hand, in considering what at first sight may seem a convenient practical expedient for accommodating diocesan episcopacy to the presbyterian concept of *episcope*, care should be taken not to overlook the wider responsibilities of the episcopal office in relation to the whole Church. Particularly in respect of the guardianship of faith and doctrine, the multiplication of little bishoprics would not necessarily ensure stability or soundness. Nor is this contention a survival of prelatical notions. The experience of the General Councils of the undivided Church (and, it may be added, that of the Vatican Council of the Roman Church in 1870) suggests rather that the prestige and influence of great sees is more valuable and stabilising than the suffrages of a large number of bishops of relatively small and insignificant dioceses. But this is a matter of practical arrangement rather than of principle. Probably much heart-burning may be caused also in Anglican circles by the desire of the Presbyterian members of the Conference that the Episcopalians should 'lay greater stress on the parochial incumbent's prophetic office of preaching the Word', with the consequent suggestion of 'a change of emphasis in the present system of ministerial training'. No one with experience of service on commissions to consider the training of the ministry, would lightheartedly embark on the practical implementation of this recommendation!

These, however, it must be repeated, are matters of practical

expediency. So far as points of principle are concerned, if regard be had to the constitutional evolution of the various Provinces of the Anglican Communion, there would seem to be no objection to the recommendations of the Report from the standpoint of English churchmen. If their brethren of the Church of Scotland were willing to accept the 'historic episcopate' in the form suggested of a presiding 'Bishop-in-Presbytery', there should be no difficulty in principle in the Anglican acceptance of 'corporate episcopacy' as sketched in the Report. But, as a matter of immediate urgency, it is greatly to be desired that the process of mutual understanding should be furthered by the translating into action of the recommendations of the Conferences of 1932-4 and 1949-51, concerning interchange of preachers and admission to Holy Communion in certain circumstances. Such action would do much to prepare the way for a sympathetic mutual consideration of the long-range programme, for the setting forth of which members of both Churches are deeply indebted to the authors of the Report, and the realisation of which would fulfil the ardent hope of William Maitland that 'earnest embracing of religion will join us straitly together'.

2

Reviewed *by* The Rev. Fr. EDWARD SYMONDS

By the time that this article appears the contents of the report will be well known. If they are largely repeated here, it will be by way of comment and appreciation.

It is laid down at the beginning that Unity is an essential mark of the Church, and that it is obscured by visible disunity, which manifests itself both in faith and order. It is, however, to the second of these that the report is devoted.

Within the corporate priesthood of the Church (it is not said that every believer is a priest) there is a specific ministry instituted by Christ in His appointment of the Twelve and continued by the ministerial succession implemented by the laying on of hands. This forms one element in the Unity of the Church through time. Differences arise, however, as to the mode of this succession. The Presbyterians claim to exercise a corporate Episcopate through the Presbytery or collective group of Presbyters in each district, with the power of ordaining their successors, and exercising authority in worship, doctrine and discipline.

According to the Anglican view, the Bishop has a distinctive office of a distinctively apostolic character[1] being the proper minister of ordination, the chief minister of the Word and Sacraments, with authority in matters of doctrine, though this authority is invested in the collective Episcopate and exercised in connexion with the Church as a whole. He possesses succession in his see and succession of consecration within the continuity of the body of the whole Church.

These differences do not, however, constitute a fatal obstacle to reunion. For the Presbyterian members were prepared to consider the conception of a 'Bishop-in-Presbytery', exercising the functions of ordination and pastoral oversight with authority

[1] This phrase does not occur in the Report but it is implied in the Anglican order for the Consecration of Bishops in the collect, 'Who (Jesus Christ) . . . poured down his gifts abundantly upon men, making some Apostles, some Prophets, etc.' The Report itself states 'Apostolic mission and authority continue to be exercised through the *episcope*, which the Anglicans claim to be the especial function of the Bishop.'

given to him by consecration at the hands of Bishops, as well as with the authority of the collective Presbytery. (No doubt they had in mind the two references to the ordination of Timothy in 1 Tim. 4.14, 'neglect not the gift which is in thee, which was given thee through prophecy with the laying on of hands of the presbytery', and 2 Tim. 1.6, 'the gift of God which is in thee through the laying-on of my hands'.)

The statement of the Lausanne Conference of 1927 was quoted as relevant, namely that Episcopal, Presbyterian and Congregational systems should be combined in a reunited Church, and 'that the acceptance of any special form of ordination for the future should not be interpreted to imply the acceptance of any one particular theory of the origin, character or function of any office in the Church, or involve the acceptance of any adverse judgment on the validity of (existing) orders, or as disowning or discrediting a past or present ministry which has been used and blessed by the Spirit of God'.

This statement though not definitely endorsed, but only accepted as relevant by the authors of the report, seems still to allow the Anglican, or at least Anglo-Catholic, view that episcopal ordination is essential for the security of orders, while not forcing the acceptance of such a view on Presbyterians or Congregationalists. It may be noted here that the Roman Catholic Church, though demanding the reordination of Anglican clergy, does not explicitly require one who has received Anglican orders to disown his first ministry. On the other hand it must be frankly stated that Anglicans in common with other traditional Catholics, whether Roman or Orthodox, cannot regard episcopal and non-episcopal ministries as equal,[1] however much the latter may have been blessed by God, as evidenced by their effectiveness. Nor can Anglicans, in view of the position they assign to a Bishop, accept the doctrine of the parity of ministries.

The Report, however, wisely points out that 'the appropriate changes in each Church are not to be regarded as accommodations in alternative forms of Church government but as the

[1] The view largely held by Anglicans that the Episcopate is essential seems recognised by the Anglican members on p. 14. 'Accordingly on the Anglican side, full intercommunion would be impossible without raising the question of episcopacy as a thing deemed requisite for its fulfilment between the churches.'

spiritual and doctrinal requirements in order and practice to which the Churches must give heed, if they are to move forward into fuller participation in the true wholeness of the one Church of Christ' (p. 13).

These changes in polity, which seemed to the whole Conference to be appropriate, are next specified. On the Presbyterian side, Bishops are to be chosen by each Presbytery and consecrated by prayer with the laying-on of hands by Bishops from one or more of the Episcopal Churches and by the Presbytery acting through appointed representatives. Each Bishop would therefore be in the line of apostolic succession both from the Anglican and the Presbyterian point of view. His special functions as the principal minister in ordination and as exercising pastoral oversight over his fellow ministers are both recognised. Confirmation is left in the hands of the parochial minister, but it is added 'the rite might come to be shared by the Bishop and parish minister acting together'.

The Presbytery would still retain its full and essential place in the life and government of the Church. Similarly the General Assembly would retain its present authority. Bishops would be members of it without constituting an upper house, but it is added, 'decisions on doctrinal and constitutional matters might well have to require their consent'.

The Episcopalian members, however, stressed the need of safeguarding the collective voice of the Bishops in matters of doctrine, and hoped that the episcopal administration of confirmation might be in the end generally used (as indeed is happening in S. India). Many Anglicans would feel that a serious departure from the old Catholic order of the Church would be made if the Bishops did not constitute a House of their own, although their legislative power could rightly be exercised in conjunction with a Lower House of Presbyters, as is found in the Church of England.

The appropriate changes demanded in the Episcopalian Churches are chiefly concerned with the appointment of laymen to an office akin to that of the Presbyterian Elders. It is not suggested that they should necessarily bear that name. Taken in connexion with the Appendix on the Eldership in Scotland, it would seem that this requirement would be met by changes in the English Parochial Church Councils, which

would make the laymen not merely helpers in financial and external matters but give to at least some of them a pastoral responsibility exercised in visiting the sick and the outsiders, and so really assisting the spiritual work of the parish priest. Such a change would meet a warm welcome from the English parochial clergy.

It was also suggested that lay people should be given an appropriate share in the government of the Church at all levels, parochial, diocesan, provincial and national. This could be done by assimilating the existing Diocesan Conference to a Diocesan Synod. The former would be no longer a mere debating society; its decisions would have legislative force, as they have in most Churches of the Anglican Communion outside England itself. This would mean that the decisions of the Church would be made by the whole Church, the Body of Christ in its entirety.

Provided that the Bishops and Clergy were still regarded as the Teaching Authority, specially endowed by their ordination for that purpose (as ministers of the Word), there could be no real objection in principle to the above proposal, since in the last resort it is the whole Church and not merely the Bishops to whom the Holy Spirit of Truth is promised. There could be no objection therefore to the proposal of the Conference that a House of Laity should be associated with the Convocation of each Province, as is found in S. Africa and elsewhere.

The Presbyterian members of the Conference also stated that they would like to be sure that the Church in England should be able to reform its liturgy and to have its Bishops appointed on the recommendation of the Church, including lay representatives. They also desired that the Episcopalians should lay greater stress on the prophetic office of preaching the Word, and lastly that large dioceses should be divided into smaller units, giving the Bishop a greater opportunity of exercising his pastoral office.

Anglicans should be immensely grateful for this report. If accepted, Episcopacy will be no longer an offence to the one side, nor Elders to the other. But prejudices rooted in centuries of history are hard to overcome. Consequently the members of the Conference wish to make haste slowly. The first step, namely the recommendation of the Report for study, has

already been taken by the governing bodies of both churches. This study may take years, before the next step is taken, namely that of a united solemn resolve to seek reconciliation and unity. During that period we may hope for the continued operation of the various factors which have, humanly speaking, made this united report possible, for example the growing volume of prayer for unity, growth of knowledge and respect for the traditions of other Churches, visits of representatives and teachers to meetings of governing bodies and to theological colleges, smaller conferences etc. Bishops will no longer be distrusted, if not hated, as lording it over the Lord's heritage, or still worse as officials of a Church regarded as a department of State. They would no longer be regarded as little popes laying down the law each by himself, and expecting absolute obedience to their own ideas, but as bishops consulting their own clergy, their fellow Bishops and the age-long traditions of the Church of God. Freed from appointment by the Crown, they will primarily uphold the Crown rights of Christ the King.

Anglicans on their side would admire and incorporate into their own system in appropriate ways the strengthening of parochial life secured in Scotland by the lay-Elders, and welcome the demand for more effective preaching.

Doctrinal agreement is hardly touched on in the Report. Yet the things believed in common as stated in the Joint Committee of 1934 are printed as the first Appendix and obviously taken for granted. This includes not only the Scriptures, but the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper as divinely instituted as effectual signs and seals of the saving grace of God, the Ministry as the gift of the Lord Jesus Christ to the Church, and as the ministry of the Church Universal. Further it is stated that the Church is grounded in the Will of God, as a fellowship rooted in Christ and sustained by His Spirit, and that the inward unity of believers in Christ ought to be made visible in a common Church life and fellowship. Anglicans would wish for all this and more, e.g. the explicit recognition of the General Councils of the Undivided Church, and the authoritative interpretation of the Scriptures by the Ancient Fathers. They would desire something corresponding to the doctrine of the Sacraments as set forth in the Church Catechism, and many would desire a

clearer doctrine of the Priesthood exercised by both Bishop and Presbyter in accordance with the traditional mind of the Universal Church. They would defend the validity of their orders on the doctrine of the Anglican Ordinal as set forth in the Preface to the Anglican Ordinal, and as expounded by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in their reply to Pope Leo XIII.[1]

Anglicans might indeed insist on some such requirements in order that the traditional Catholic contribution should be fully represented in the reunited Church. But this is clearly a long-term policy, and the Report envisages something short of this before full intercommunion is reached. The intermediate stage[2] would give time and opportunity for each side to consider and appreciate the peculiar riches of the other.

[1] Mr T. H. L. Parker in a review in *S.J.T.* 10/1 p. 111 condemns Anglo-Catholics as forced to make the Edwardine ordinal as ambiguous as possible, so that it shall be valid in form. If so, they are only following the plain defence of Anglican orders as set forth in the Archbishops' reply.

[2] One of the difficulties of this intermediate stage is that the present Church of Scotland, and the Episcopal Church in Scotland would exist side by side. A parallel to this may be found in the Uniate churches in their relation to the Roman Catholic churches using the Latin rite. But in this latter case there exists the unifying bond of obedience to the Pope.

3

Reviewed *by* The Rev. Professor J. L. M. HAIRE

This report comes, I believe, as a surprise, indeed as a shock, to many members of both communions. For Presbyterians this shock was partly the fact that there would be Bishops in Presbyterian Churches, if the Report were accepted. But perhaps the greatest force of the shock was the realisation that these conversations might be leading to vast practical changes.

We all experienced that emotion brilliantly described by Professor C. H. Dodd when in reunion conversations one party suddenly turns back, if real change seems imminent. This is a preservatory emotion and a natural first reaction. If persisted in, it may also become a refusal to face the truth. Each of us will have to decide which it was in our case in face of this report.

An Initial reason for Confidence

The Report, however, evokes a second and less alarming surprise. While quite a few of the representatives of both communions have been prominently associated with the ecumenical movement, several of these and some other members of the Committee also are well known for their loyalty to their own tradition. If such men signed the report, then its provisions merit serious consideration.

A second doubt is also partly allayed. In this age of conversation and common action among all the non-Roman churches, was it wise in Britain to enter on conversations between two Churches only? One learned at once that it had not been conversations simply between the two establishments, but between Anglican and Presbyterian Churches. The participants believed that, if the division which exists between them could be resolved, it would be a large step towards the reunion of all the churches who have traditionally accepted either the equality of ministers or the preservation of episcopacy. We can hardly doubt, however, that there are elements in the fulness of the Church which others of the denominations in Britain will have to contribute.

The Master's Word

The most impressive and challenging sections are those which make clear that the restored unity of the Church is no optional matter. 'Our Lord's will for His Church is full unity.' 'Unity is not a contingent feature of the Church's life, but is of the essence of it. One God, one People of God; One Christ, one Body of Christ; One Holy Spirit, one fellowship of the Spirit—such is the incontrovertible logic of New Testament Teaching' (p. 12). 'The Church cannot adequately fulfil its ministry of reconciliation in the world, so long as it manifestly fails to heal its own divisions' (p. 13). Unity, the Report maintains, is not merely desirable, it is imperative, if the Church is to claim to be God's people, witnessing to God's power to break down barriers of error and prejudice. This is the basic assumption of the ecumenical movement, arising out of new insight into the teaching of the Bible on the unity of God's people and also the oneness in Christ experienced together by men from different traditions. This may be as great a gift to our time as the missionary impulse of the nineteenth century. But if we accept it, this must not lead us, on any specific occasion, to avoid the questioner who says to us: Are you achieving a unity in the fulness of truth or a compromise of truth with error for the sake of outward unity? And this Report too has to be subjected to this question.

Episcope in the life of the whole Church

Churches which really desire to share their richness and equally to receive gifts through other Churches, must speak in frankness and love and must no less listen with humility and patience. It is quite clear that this has been done in these conversations, especially in the additional comments which the Anglican and Presbyterian members make on pages 26 and 27. Here also it is admitted that real divisions still persist, even if the depth of the tensions may be a little understated in parts of the Report.

On the Presbyterian side there is real concern that the whole people of God should take their part in the life of the Church, according to the gifts given them. There is a constant insistence that the ministry is a ministry of and to the whole Church and not a separate ruling caste parallel to the Church.

'All ministry in the Church is to be exercised within the corporate priesthood of the whole Church' (p. 18). Members are no mere recipients. Therefore the representatives of the whole people are to have their places in the oversight (the *episcope*), exercised in the Church in the name of Christ. It is natural that there should be some Anglican hesitancy on this point. If Presbyterians fear the prelacy of Bishops, Anglicans fear the rule of powerful laymen within the Church (the monarchy exempted!), as they believe they see it at times in the Free Churches. But a very strong case is presented for recognising the place of the laity in the life and government of the Church.

The fear of episcopacy

If the difficulty for Anglicans is to have minds open to the claims of an office like the eldership within the government of the Church, the difficulty for Presbyterians is to listen with minds unprejudiced and alert to what is said about the importance of episcopacy. Yet many Presbyterians today would acknowledge the importance of the facts that there have been Bishops in the Church since the second century and (what is more) that in the New Testament there are both episcopal and presbyterian elements. St. Paul exercised considerable oversight over the whole church at Corinth, as later did men like Timothy elsewhere. Yet Presbyterians would maintain that the New Testament knows of a freedom to oppose even an apostle and a liberty to prophesy greater than that often permitted under episcopal government. This the association of other responsible members of the people of God along with the Bishops and Presbyters may help to restore. Indeed one wonders if the Report itself is not being a little too rigid in its description of apostolic men, when it limits them to the twelve and St. Paul (p. 19).

The Report certainly removes the grounds of fear of prelacy by preserving in Churches of the Presbyterian tradition the rights of Presbytery, Synod and General Assembly. They remain the supreme governing bodies of the Church. The Bishops-in-Presbytery will be chairmen and spokesmen of the Courts of the Church rather than their masters. One tension, however, remains. There is the Anglican claim to a unique place for the Bishops on matters of Faith and Order. This has

been a role associated with the Bishop since the second century—to be the *defensor fidei*. But at the Reformation the Presbyterian Churches set 'doctors' alongside the pastors to be the Church's teachers, yet left the final decisions on Faith and Order to the Courts of the whole Church, with strong safeguards against sudden change. The one tradition thus preserves the position of the Bishops as principal ministers of the Word and the guardians of the truth of the whole Church. The other equally preserves the place of the representatives of the whole people of God in such vital decisions. Are there not here two insights which need to be combined more explicitly than in the report?

The appointment of the first Bishops-in-Presbytery

It is clear that the point given most publicity and opening up most controversy has been the proposal for the appointment of the first Bishops-in-Presbytery in the Presbyterian Churches. Here both Bishops of an Episcopal Church and representatives of the Presbytery are to take part. This seems to imply that the *episcope*, already possessed by the Presbytery, cannot be conferred by it *simpliciter* on its permanent president. Some further authority that is possessed only by Bishops must be conferred. Is this indeed what is implied?

Let us set aside the matter of ecclesiastical pride—for here Anglicans too have to admit that they must accept something akin to the eldership, that the Church may attain a greater fulness. There still remains in many Presbyterian minds a feeling that this proposal is a concession to those High-Church Anglicans who hold a theory of apostolic succession by which episcopal character is indelibly stamped on a man apart from his place within the life of the Church. The Presbyterian problem is to see if some truth is being preserved by the participation of the Bishops. Is the authority which the apostles had, and which the second-century Bishops came to exercise (however transmitted) better set forth and realised today through its transmission through the Bishops? The Presbyterians need to be convinced of this.

At the same time, if Presbyterian Churches have in fact better preserved the biblical sense of the whole people of God taking part in the oversight through the Elder's office, is there

not equally a need for representatives of the Presbyterian Churches to take part with the Anglican Presbyters in the first setting up of the Anglican eldership?

Liberty and Order

The Report bids each Church neither override its own conscience nor force the conscience of the other Churches. This raises the question of how much liberty of interpretation is compatible with unity. What are the *adiaphora*? They are clearly wider than the older Calvinism would have allowed. This Anglicanism can teach. There is on the other hand a comprehensiveness which embraces too easily truth and error alike—and against this Presbyterian (and Lutheran) theology has stood firm. There are probably two extremes—the left wing of the Presbyterian and the right wing of the Anglican Churches, to which it may not be possible to give in, simply to avoid offence, and this both communions must face, if they are to take some real action. One of the great virtues of the report is that it does not aim at that uniformity of religion which ruled the minds of so many Anglicans and Presbyterians in the seventeenth century. Each Church is to retain its own traditions. Presbyterian Bishop and Anglican Elder are not necessarily to be dressed in gaiters or a frock coat. But if the two communions reach the point where they can covenant together to advance along this path, then it is hoped they can then meet together in the Holy Communion at the Lord's Table.

There will be few who study this report with care and without prejudice, who will not pray that the Lord of the Church may lead the Churches through it, with all the alterations that may follow, to the place where they can worship together singing:

> Behold how good a thing it is
> when brothers dwell in unity!

HOLY SPIRIT AND TRADITION[1]

by The Rev. Dr GÖSTA HÖK

There are many idealists who have no conviction of sin. They are not immoral; indeed they are quite aware of the difference between good and evil, and in certain cases they are anxious to do what is good in their own lives, and in national and community life. They are conscious also of faults both in themselves and in their surroundings, and certainly do not think that everything is perfect. They lack, however, conviction of sin. They interpret the faults which they see as imperfections which are to be explained by the fact that the ideal or the good can be only partly achieved because of circumstances. They have no sense of guilt. Rather than speak of human sin, they speak of human frailty and of the recalcitrance which exists in human nature and which prevents more than the partial realisation of the ideal.

At this point we see an important distinction between Christianity and idealism. The Christian proclamation, 'Repent ye, and believe the Gospel', is addressed to sinners, and will never be understood except when there is conviction of sin. Man must know the judgment and the wrath of God before he can repent and believe in forgiveness for the sake of Jesus Christ. Idealism, on the other hand, both theoretical and practical, is quite possible without any conviction of sin. For idealism it is quite sufficient to accept the ideal and to recognise the gulf between the ideal and the reality. The man who recognises this gulf is driven to realise the ideal in public and in private so far as circumstances allow. Some idealists would understand the failure to realise the ideal as sin, but this is not necessarily the interpretation of all idealists, who would rather hold that the failure is to be explained by unavoidable circumstances, in which case no one could be held responsible.

It is an accepted fact that Christianity was brought by its missionaries to peoples who were directly or indirectly in-

[1] Translated by the Rev. Ross Mackenzie, B.D., St. Andrew's Church, Clermiston, Edinburgh.

fluenced by idealism. Plato and Aristotle had a profound influence on the thought-forms even of those who accepted different philosophies or had none at all. It was to these that the Christian mission and theology had to proclaim Christ, but this was possible only by accommodating the Christian message to the conceptions of the old idealist philosophy. This accommodation was inescapable but dangerous. Idealism was often an ally of Christianity, but often, too, its enemy, by corrupting the Christian preaching about sin and grace in Christ. For the Christian *kerygma* sin was offence against God, but for the preaching about sin which had been affected by idealism, sin became essentially failure to achieve the ideal.

Two thousand years is a long time, but the situation has not greatly altered, for we still have to wrestle with the problem which was created by the preaching of Christianity in an idealist environment. Roman Catholic and Protestant theology have alike failed to deal adequately with the problem. Idealist philosophy tends to corrupt the proper understanding of the Christian message both in Roman Catholicism and in Protestantism. Ferdinand Christian Baur held that Christian doctrine required to be delivered from natural religion and Jewish survivals. Without any understanding at all of the essential nature of the Christian faith, Baur yet understood the theological task which is to make the Christian Gospel comprehensible and communicable without allowing it to be corrupted by alien influences. This is still our task today. And among the dangers which at all costs must be avoided is the corruption of the sense of sin by an idealist world-view.

I should like to be more precise about two other respects in which the Christian message is perverted, first, in dealing with the Holy Spirit, and, second, in discussing tradition.

Ancient philosophy distinguished between spirit and matter. The main thought of idealism was that matter was formed and permeated by spirit, by ἰδεαί. Spirit and matter together constitute the world. In so far as the present world was good, it was a product of spirit. Evil is that which is not a product of spirit. Christian faith, on the other hand, speaks of God's Holy Spirit who continues the work of Christ and teaches men about God.

The objection for the Christian faith is the combination and

confusion of what idealism calls spirit with what the Bible has to teach about the Holy Spirit. This is not the occasion to discuss when or how this confusion originated, but the confusion is certainly to be found in Augustine, for he thinks of spirit both as emanating from God and forming the world, but he also thinks of spirit as the Holy Spirit, as is evident from his commentary on the Psalms. The Roman Catholic Church adopted his synthesis and bequeathed it to posterity. The confusion consists in thinking about spirit in a Platonic way, and in identifying it with the Holy Spirit of God.

This confusion was most serious in the theology of the nineteenth century. Under the influence of Schleiermacher and Hegel the history of the Church was described as a work of the spirit. According to Hegel the essence and origin of everything is a super-individual world-spirit. History reflects a logical process of development in this spirit, developing from thesis to antithesis to synthesis. We could describe Hegel's thought as being a kind of Platonism in which there is a continual development of spirit and ideas. The idealism of ancient philosophy was static, whereas Hegel's idealism is dynamic and dramatic, i.e. moving from thesis to antithesis. Despite this movement, however, Hegel's philosophy was idealist in the earlier sense of the word. The spirit is the source and origin of all life and goodness. It is the creative principle within the present world. In this way history may be described as a work of the spirit.

Hegel was not a Christian, but his monism has influenced the theology of the nineteenth century, in which the history of the Church was regarded as a work of the Holy Spirit, and the work of the Holy Spirit within the Church was interpreted in idealist terms as the formative principle in the historical development of the Church, a development which, however extended or curtailed, could only be good. Hegel's monism was determinative for that particular view of the Church, but it makes the Church uncritical of its own historical development and present condition. According to this monistic view nothing in the development of the Church can be sinful or wrong. As we saw earlier, idealism is tenable without recognition of sin, both for individuals and for the Church, but if the work of the Holy Spirit is described in a idealist way, the Church will fail to

appreciate that its present condition may necessarily be to some extent attributable to sin. Hegelianism has in this way corrupted both Roman Catholic and Protestant thinking about the Church.

If we are going to criticise effectively this particular view of the Church, it will be important for us to have a correct understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit, for only in this way can the distinction between idealism and Christian thought be maintained. It is clear that the Bible speaks of the Holy Spirit as teaching us about God and Christ, and an important part of this teaching is that the Spirit tells us that we are sinners and what our sins are. To put it differently, the Holy Spirit arouses in us conviction of sin. In the Gospel of St. John this is expressed in the words, 'He will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment' (John 16.8). The Holy Spirit also bears witness to Christ (John 15.27), but the condition of understanding the salvation of Christ is true conviction of sin. If the work of the Spirit is defined as formative in an idealist sense, conviction of sin is easily lost. In consequence, the life of the individual as well as the life of the Church will both alike be interpreted as a monistic development which has no real place for sin. The Church will then quite uncritically accept historical development as a work of the Spirit, and therefore good in itself.

If we turn now to study the concept of tradition, we shall see quite clearly that the theological interpretation of tradition at the beginning of the nineteenth century is closely connected with the contemporary interpretation of the work of the Spirit. Professor Einar Skydsgaard has an acute analysis of this problem in an article on 'Scripture and Tradition' in the *Scottish Journal of Theology*.[1] In this article Skydsgaard shows how different interpretations of the meaning of tradition have come into conflict. In Irenaeus, for instance, tradition is the same as the teaching of the Apostles which is contained in the Scriptures. The Council of Trent, again, has a different interpretation of what is meant by tradition, and according to the Council, tradition and Scripture do not have the same content. Scripture has only part of the Apostolic teaching, and must be completed by tradition, which contains a different part of that

[1] *Scottish Journal of Theology*, vol. ix, pp. 337ff.

teaching, as primitive as the other, the difference being that Scripture has been written down, whereas tradition has been conveyed orally from generation to generation. It is of primary importance for this way of thinking that both tradition and scripture alike contain the teaching of the Apostles, and that no new conceptions due to the development of doctrine are introduced. This way of thinking prevailed until the nineteenth century both in Roman Catholic and Protestant theology, but after this period tradition came to be interpreted as developing in the history of the Church after the period of the Apostles through the inspiration and guidance of the Holy Spirit. In other words, tradition does not principally contain that which is inherited from Christ and the Apostles, but rather that which has been developed at a later period in the Church under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Skydsgaard shows that this interpretation of tradition, which was new to nineteenth-century thought, is also to be found in Roman Catholicism, e.g. in Newman and Möhler, and also, it may be added, in Protestantism, particularly when the Church is regarded as a continuation or extension of the Incarnation, as it has been, for instance, by certain High Church theologians both on the Continent and in Great Britain.

In the article which we have been discussing, Skydsgaard gives no explanation of the remarkable change in the concept of tradition at that time, and yet it is quite clear that it is related to the new conception of history, the new belief in progress, and Romanticism. Both Schleiermacher and Hegel, of course, have in their own ways contributed to the success of the new way of thinking. This means essentially a victory for idealism, but not for the old, static idealism which was taught by Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, but rather for the new, dynamic idealism which regarded the world as a product of a spirit which itself is in the process of development. The Holy Spirit was conceived of as the author of history, and especially of the history of the Church in which tradition, interpreted as a work of the Holy Spirit, is developed and transformed.

It is not our present purpose to reject the tradition of the Church. On the contrary, it is very helpful to use it constructively, for instance in regard to biblical interpretation and preaching. Our congregations should be hearing the *Church's*

proclamation, and the *Church's* interpretation of the Bible, and not any private interpretation. Nor is it our purpose in any way to deny that the Holy Spirit continues its work in the Church, and deepens our knowledge of Christ's Gospel. According to Oscar Cullmann the Gospel of St. John was written to show that in leaving the world Christ has not abandoned the World. Revelation continues through the Spirit of truth, and the Spirit will teach Christ's disciples what they were not ready to learn from Jesus Himself.

We must, however, be careful that this continued revelation is not accepted uncritically. The Spirit of Christ is at work in the Church, but so also are other spirits, and therefore we must try them, retaining the good, and rejecting the rest (1 John 4.1).

The criterion by which we must judge what is right and what is wrong must be the apostolic proclamation of Christ which is given to us in the Bible. In an essay on 'Scripture and Tradition', published in the *Scottish Journal of Theology*,[1] Oscar Cullmann makes the distinction between 'apostolic tradition' and 'ecclesiastical tradition', the difference being that the Apostles had direct contact with Christ while the Bishops of the Church had only indirect contact. The apostolic tradition has been preserved in Holy Scripture. The ecclesiastical tradition, on the other hand, is transmitted in the continuing Church. Cullmann evaluates both forms of tradition, and holds that ecclesiastical tradition must be criticised in order to distinguish between the Spirit of Christ and other spirits and the criterion of this criticism is the apostolic tradition. Since the Apostles had direct contact with Christ, their tradition was bound to be superior to ecclesiastical tradition.

Skydsgaard, too, believes that we should test the ecclesiastical tradition in the light of the Gospel of Christ which was proclaimed by the Apostles, and which is witnessed to by the Bible. He shows that the word 'tradition' has the double meaning, first, of 'that which is transmitted', and second, 'the transmission itself'. That which is transmitted is the inheritance from the Apostles. In this sense it is the Church's responsibility to transmit what it has received. If, however, the whole emphasis is laid on the fact of transmission, we become uncritical of what is transmitted. The emphasis must, therefore,

[1] *Scottish Journal of Theology*, vol. vi, pp. 113ff.

be put on the fact that it is the right content which is transmitted, viz. the Gospel of Christ which is found in the Bible.

Cullmann and Skydsgaard show us in several ways how necessary it is to have a critical attitude towards ecclesiastical tradition. The tradition of the Church is a work of the Spirit, but it is not wholly pure. All that is called tradition is not necessarily of God. It is only with the help of the Bible that tradition can be purified.

We now come to the heart of the problem. Idealism, i.e. dynamic idealism, has influenced the nineteenth-century view of the Church and its tradition. By tradition we mean all that the Church has accepted and handed on. It does not require to have come from the Apostles, but may have developed later and be interpreted then as a work of the Spirit. It would not be just to say that everything is accepted without criticism. The Church itself must judge between what is to be accepted and what rejected, and after it has formed this judgment, what has been accepted must be regarded as holy and as having been given by God. In practice this means that the Pope or the episcopate or other responsible authority has the final decision. The question is, however, what is their criterion for accepting what is right and rejecting the wrong? There is obviously no inner light or voice to tell what is right. Any reliance on inner enlightenment would prove that, so far from handing down the true, apostolic faith, they were in fact Enthusiasts. It was precisely on this account that Luther accused the Pope himself of being the worst of the Enthusiasts. The episcopate falls under the same condemnation if it fails in the same respects. The problem is precisely this: What *is* the nature of authority? Does the authority of the bishops rest on the fact that they remain faithful to the Ministry of the Word, or on their possession of some enlightenment which is given through their ordination by laying on of hands and prayer? Apostolic succession is no effective safeguard against Enthusiasm. We must find other criteria by which to judge what is right.

Protestant theologians like Cullmann and Skydsgaard, as we have already seen, look for this criterion in the Bible. Conformity to the apostolic teaching must be decisive. Tradition is of God, but it should not be accepted unless it harmonises with the biblical witness.

Against this, however, there may be raised serious objections. The Bible has no full or clear instructions concerning Church life, e.g. worship or polity, and for this reason cannot be used as a pattern or *paradeigma*. We must therefore ask whether the criticism suggested by Cullmann and Skydsgaard will have any real effect on the life of the Church, for one feels that their criticism is too abstract. It is surely inescapable that where the Bible is silent about the ordering of worship or Church government we must use tradition in some way. But where are we to find a criterion by which to judge and evaluate this tradition?

Can we, for instance, look to the Bible for instructions about the necessity of having bishops in the modern sense, or for introducing elders as a new office within the Church? Do we find anything in the Bible which ought to convince the Church of England or the Church of Scotland to seek full organic union by a mutual adaptation of their systems of government—in the case of the Church of England by accepting the office of eldership, and in the case of the Church of Scotland by introducing bishops-in-presbytery who are in the apostolic succession? In point of fact we have too limited a knowledge of the apostolic period from the Bible to be able to come to any such decision.

In other words it is insufficient to argue that criticism is necessary if we have no criterion by which to evaluate tradition.

In actual fact, there were two critical principles which emerged during the period of the Reformation in reference to tradition and the formation of the worship and organisation of the reformed Churches. Both were derived from the Bible. One was the use of the Bible as a rule of faith and life; the other was love for one's neighbour. Calvin mainly employed the former principle, seeking patterns in the Bible for Church organisation and worship. The result was a form of Church life entirely different from the Roman Catholic system which had been handed down by tradition. Modern exegesis would not equate Calvin's reformed system with any early Church order. Calvin knew too little about the forms of the early Church. This is true too of ourselves.

In regard to doctrine, Luther and the Lutheran Churches used the same critical principle as Calvin, and went back to the biblical witness. In regard to worship and organisation there

was no attempt made to re-establish things as they were in the time of the Apostles and immediately afterwards; they chose a different course. The guiding principle which they followed was that of love towards one's neighbour, i.e. a principle which had been taken from the teaching of the Bible. In the practical outworking of this principle little, in fact, was altered either in worship or in organisation. Changes were made only as the right preaching of the Gospel demanded them. In this way a great deal of tradition was preserved in Lutheran Churches out of love for the weaker brother who might be upset by sudden changes in the traditional structure. True love for one's brother is one of the fruits of the Spirit. If there is no love, the Spirit itself is absent. But where love towards one's neighbour becomes the guiding principle, the Spirit is present. This certainly was true in the apostolic period, and it is no less valid for today. Any change in worship or in organisation must therefore have love for men as its motive, i.e. they must be of benefit and assistance to men in their religious life.

With Cullmann and Skydsgaard we should maintain that tradition cannot be uncritically accepted; there must be some biblical principle by which it should be checked. We cannot accept theological Hegelianism which identifies that which has been given in history with the work of the Spirit. To use the Bible simply as a rule will be insufficient—it leads too easily to arbitrary reconstructions which cannot be proved to be correct. We must use another principle given by the Holy Spirit and deduced from the Bible, i.e. love to men and concern for them. Worship and organisation must serve to edify and help men, and should be judged by whether or not they are in fact edifying and helping men. If they are failing to do so, the essential Christian principle is absent.

I should like to conclude what I have been saying with a lighter, but none the less penetrating, illustration from Luther and Calvin. Both spoke about the passage in St. John about the marriage in Cana of Galilee, and both were concerned to explain why Jesus and the Virgin Mary remained at a wedding at which the guests had drunk so much, and had not rather gone home. Luther's answer was that Jesus and Mary remained out of love for the bride and the bridegroom, being unwilling to hurt them. Love was of greater importance than

sobriety. Calvin's conclusion was different, and he suggested that Jesus and Mary had remained for the sake of order, for the drunk guests would surely behave better if Jesus and Mary were present.

There is a certain similarity between the way in which Luther explained this passage and his approach to the problem created by the Church's tradition. Our guiding principle in the ordering of worship and the organisation of the Church must be love and all that is of practical benefit to men. It is of more importance to be concerned with men's real need than to conserve what has been historically preserved in the Church but may not be able to be proved as having originated in the apostolic period.

PRIESTHOOD IN THE NEW TESTAMENT[1]

by The Rev. Canon W. M. F. SCOTT

Theological discussions are not infrequently stultified because terms used in them are interpreted in different senses by the parties involved. This paper is offered as an attempt to clarify one such ambiguous term, that of priesthood, by an examination of the relevant New Testament passages. We must obviously begin with the priesthood of our Lord and much of our discussion of this point will centre upon the Epistle to the Hebrews, the only NT book which calls our Lord a priest. Here a preliminary warning is necessary against the danger of assuming that when you know what a thing means in the Old Testament you also know its meaning in the New Testament. It is quite true, of course, that you cannot know the latter without discovering the former, but that does not mean it is the same as the latter. Moberly has expressed the point well.[2]

> As to the bearing of the Old Testament upon the true meaning of sacrifice and priesthood, I would urge that it is limited. The Old Testament itself is only really understood retrospectively. Of course all that is in the Old Testament is relevant. The New Testament will interpret it all. But the Old Testament is not determinative of the meaning of the New. What things mean in the New Testament, is their true meaning. It is only from *that* that you can go back and find out how all the Old Testament had been (however blindly) leading up to the different elements of the fulness of the truth.

To take a common example of the neglect of this—the remarks of the writer to the Hebrews about sacrifice are commonly interpreted on the implicit or even explicit[3] assumption that the key is to be found in Lev. 17.11: 'It is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life', i.e. the life inherent in it, a reasonable but not the only possible interpretation of the original.[4] But this assumption ignores the simple fact that

[1] A paper first read in 1954 at the Evangelical Fellowship for Theological Literature.

[2] *Priesthood and Sacrifice*, ed. W. Sanday, p. 74.

[3] S. C. Gayford, *Sacrifice and Priesthood*, pp. 3, 108f.

[4] For other interpretations see Lods, *Prophets and the Rise of Judaism*, pp. 293-6.

the author was not familiar with the Massoretic text of Leviticus on which our versions are based. Nearly all the quotations in Hebrews are from the LXX, eight of them following the LXX where it differs from the Massoretic, none following the Massoretic text where it differs from the LXX. From this Westcott, followed by most other scholars, concludes: 'The writer regarded the Greek version as authoritative; and . . . nowhere shows any immediate knowledge of the Hebrew text.'[1] Moffat is even stronger.[2] Turning therefore to the LXX, we find that Lev. 17.11 reads *τὸ γὰρ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἀντὶ ψυχῆς ἐξιλάσεται*. 'The blood shall make atonement instead of the life.' This puts the matter in a very different light and makes sacrifice not a matter of life released but of a life forfeit.

Another warning may be added against the common assumption that the writer used a systematic and consistent typology so that when he mentions a type it can be taken as certain that a doubtful interpretation of the OT type can be applied to the antitype, and extended beyond the application made in Hebrews. To take an example, one frequently finds remarks about our Lord's priesthood which appear to rest upon the following argument. On the day of atonement the High Priest offered the blood of the sin offering in the holy of holies (a possible but by no means certain interpretation of Lev. 16.14: 'He shall take the blood of the bullock and sprinkle it with his finger upon the mercy seat'). The writer to the Hebrews compares our Lord with the High Priest on the day of atonement. Therefore it is concluded our Lord must be offering His blood in the heavenly sanctuary. But quite apart from the questions whether Lev. 16.14 meant this in the original and whether it was so understood by the writer to the Hebrews (and as we have seen these are two separate questions), we have to bear in mind that[3] 'these (Old Testament) analogies are marshalled (by the writer to the Hebrews) with a light hand; exact correspondence and consistency was not his aim'. He employs his Old Testament figures not as types worked out in detail, but as a series of kaleidoscopic images, making, like a parable, but one point at a time. 'Thus the day of atonement

[1] *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (1889 edition), p. 479.
[2] *I.C.C. The Epistle to the Hebrews*, p. xvi.
[3] Nairne, *Epistle of Priesthood*, p. 357f.

(9.6-8) gives place to Jeremiah's New Covenant (15-17); that leads back to the Sinaitic Covenant and its sacrifices (18-22); and in the next chapter a passage is contrived to the Day of Atonement again.' This quotation may make it look as if these images are introduced in orderly succession. But a closer examination reveals how Hebrews sometimes superimposes images one upon another. The passage already dealt with combines the idea of sprinkling for cleansing with that of sprinkling for the establishment of a covenant without any notice of a change from one meaning to the other. He 'sprinkled both the book itself, and all the people, saying, This is the blood of the covenant which God commanded to you-ward. Moreover the tabernacle and all the vessels of the ministry he sprinkled in like manner with the blood.'[1] Hebrews handles the Old Testament not primarily as one who decodes a cipher, but as an artist who selects and combines various images.

Turning to Hebrews' exposition of our subject the first question to consider is when the author teaches that our Lord's priesthood began. He seems to put forward two, if not more, different, though not ultimately contradictory, views. On the one hand Christ's priesthood is eternal, from eternity to eternity so that 'Melchizedek priest of God most high was made like unto the Son of God'.[2] On the other hand he speaks of Him as becoming a priest[3] when He actually performed His priestly offices. In interpreting Hebrews we may find some help from a common LXX phrase,[4] τελειοῦν τὰς χεῖρας, to fill the hands, i.e. to instal in the priestly office. Occasionally the verb[5] τελειοῦν is used, and the noun τελείωσις even more frequently.[6] It is difficult to escape the conclusion that Hebrews often uses the word with very much the same force and that it means consecrate, instal as a priest.[7]

[1] Heb. 9.19-21. [2] Heb. 7.3.

[3] Heb. 2.17: 'that he be (γένηται) a merciful and faithful High Priest'.

[4] Ex. 29.9, 29, 33, 35, etc.

[5] Num. 21.10.

[6] Ex. 29.22, 26, 27, 31, 34; Lev. 7.27, 8.21, 25, 27, 28, 31; 2 Macc. 2.9. Philo, according to Westcott, also used the noun absolutely. In the LXX the noun is never found with the addition of τῶν χειρῶν.

[7] An application of this to the rubric in the B.C.P. about the delivery of the elements in the Holy Communion is found in *Fulfilling the Ministry*, by S. K. Knight, p. 58, note 2:

'The rubrical direction "into their hands" has a special significance, which has been recently emphasised by the R.V.; for the Hebrew phrase for consecrating a

Our Lord's perfection, or consecration as a priest, so Hebrews stresses, was achieved through suffering.[1] It was on the Cross, in fact, that our Lord became a priest. His inaugural sacrifice was not that of a ram[2] but of himself. 'This he did once for all when he offered up Himself . . . perfected for evermore.'[3] In one passage[4] our author seems to say that our priesthood began at His ascension when 'he obtained a ministry more excellent than they (the priests who minister on earth) by how much also he is the mediator of a better covenant'. But this is not the predominant view of the Epistle. To explain it, it is not necessary to adopt Westcott's view of our Lord's double priesthood, one Levitical and sacrificial and the other a priesthood of blessing after the order of Melchizedek.[5] The differences depend on which aspect of our Lord's priesthood the writer was thinking of at the moment.

Where and when did our Lord offer His sacrifice for sin? This is of course a controversial question, but as far as I can see, Hebrews teaches that our Lord's offering for sin was completed on the Cross. 'Every priest indeed standeth day by day ministering and offering often times the same sacrifices, the which can never take away sins, but he when he had offered one sacrifice for sins for ever sat down on the right hand of God.'[6] Our Lord's session evidently means that, unlike the Levitical priests still standing at the altar, his sacrifice for sins had been offered and was complete. Hebrews goes on to point out that the New Covenant has secured remission of sins, and adds, 'Now where remission of these is there is no more offering for sin.'[7] This is one of the most constant themes of the writer from his opening verses, whatever imagery he uses.[8] But this interpretation is usually passed over in favour of the theory of the heavenly sacrifice or offering.

priest is to "fill the hands", that is to say, the holy things which no layman might touch were solemnly given to him. And so with us, all baptised and confirmed members of the Church are priests, for all have "their hands filled".'

[1] Heb. 2.10: 'perfect through suffering'; 5.8-9: 'learned obedience by the things which he suffered; and having been made perfect he became unto all them that obey him the author of eternal salvation; named of God a High Priest', etc.

[2] Cf. the frequent use in the LXX of the phrase, *κριὸς τελειωσέως*.

[3] Heb. 7.27-28.

[4] Heb. 8.6.

[5] Westcott, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (1889), p. 227.

[6] Heb. 10.11-12.

[7] Heb. 10.18.

[8] 1.3, 7.27, 8.1, 9.12, 25-28.

In discussing this theory we need to notice an ambiguity in these words. Sacrifice or offering can mean the act of sacrifice and also the thing offered. No Christian can deny that there is an offering in heaven in the latter sense; that there is One who can say, 'I am he that liveth and was dead and behold I am alive for evermore',[1] that in the midst of the throne of God there stands a lamb *ὡς ἐσφαγμένον*.[2] But because we have to use the same words for the act of offering, it is all too easy to make the transition to the idea that the act of offering continues in heaven. This view has become even more plausible in the last century because of the theory that Old Testament sacrifice did not consist in the forfeit of a life through sin but in the offering of a perfect life. The death was only 'an indispensable preliminary'[3] to the offering of the blood, i.e. the life. It is therefore concluded that while Hebrews taught that our Lord died once for all on the Cross, He has now entered the heavenly sanctuary in order to offer His blood for us continually to the Father.[4]

But Hebrews seems to identify offering not with life but with death. 'Nor yet that he should offer himself often . . . else must he often have suffered.[5] 'Who needeth not daily, like those high priests, to offer up sacrifices, first for his own sins, and then for the sins of the people: for this he did once for all, when he offered up himself.'[6] 'Our Lord entered in once for all into the holy place having obtained eternal redemption.'[7] It has been suggested that the English 'having obtained' will not hold water, as the Greek *εὑράμενος* may be a case of a coincidental or identical aorist: 'He entered in, obtaining.' In this case, His entry is His obtaining. But it should be noticed that even if this is correct, the sentence cannot have the meaning, 'He entered in in order to obtain', i.e. by His continual

[1] Rev. 1.17-18.

[2] Rev. 5.6. But notice that he is no longer lying inert as a victim, and also the use of the perfect. It is because he has been slain that he can act as he does and unroll the book of destiny.

[3] Moberly, *Ministerial Priesthood*, p. 246.

[4] It is here that Lev. 17.11 is often brought in, e.g. a correspondent writes 'It is scarcely possible that he (the writer to the Hebrews) should be unfamiliar with the rationale of sacrifice in Lev. 17.11,' which he quotes from the R.V., underlining the words 'by reason of the life' and concluding, 'it seems therefore that the blood is a living thing'. But as we have seen our author is familiar with the LXX not the M.T.

[5] Heb. 9.25. [6] Heb. 7.27. [7] Heb. 9.12.

offering.[1] But while grammatically a translation different from that of the A.V. and R.V. may be possible, the writer himself makes it clear that his sense is as the R.V. construes it. For he tells us that this eternal redemption was obtained by means of death when he writes in v. 15, 'a death having taken place for the redemption of the sins that were under the first covenant'. It was the death that secured the redemption. Our Lord's sacrifice had been offered and accepted on the Cross. That this was the teaching of the writer is borne out by his final benediction, 'The God of peace who brought again from the dead the great shepherd of the sheep in the blood of the everlasting covenant. . . .'[2] He was raised in the efficacy of the sacrifice of the Cross.

Appeal, however, is sometimes made to Heb. 8.3 which in the R.V. runs, 'Every high priest is appointed to offer both gifts and sacrifices: wherefore it is necessary that this high priest also have somewhat to offer.' Here it is said that the continuance of our Lord's offering is plainly implied. If so, the writer must be contradicting himself in successive sentences. For he draws a contrast between the repeated offerings of the Levitical priests and the completed offering of our Lord symbolised by His session. 'Who needeth not daily, like those high priests, to offer up sacrifices, first for his own sins, and then for the sins of the people: for this he did once for all, when he offered up himself. . . . Now in the things which we are saying the chief point is this: we have such a high priest, who sat down on the right hand of the throne of the Majesty on high, a minister of the sanctuary and of the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, not man. For every high priest . . .'[3] Moreover the crucial phrase is so compressed that it defies exact translation—*ὅθεν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τι καὶ τοῦτον ὃ προσενέγκῃ*. It will be noticed that there is no equivalent in the Greek for 'it is'. It would be equally possible to translate 'it was necessary'. This is not a Protestant evasion. It was current long before the Reformation controversies about priesthood. The Syriac ver-

[1] Moulton, *Grammar of New Testament Greek*, vol. 1, p. 132, concludes that there is 'no evidence for an aorist participle of subsequent action'. Cf. C. F. D. Moule, *An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek*, p. 120.

[2] Heb. 13.20. The *ἐν* is clearly instrumental as often in the New Testament (e.g. *ἱλαστήριον . . . ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι*, Rom. 3.25; *Δικαιωθέντες νῦν ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ*, Rom. 5.9, etc.); it means 'by means of', 'in virtue of'.

[3] Heb. 7.27-8.3.

sion, Athanasius, Chrysostom, and Aquinas among others interpreted it thus.[1] This must, however, be left an open question. It would be just as precarious to build anything on the one alternative as on the other.

What is more conclusive is the use of the aorist προσενέγκῃ, which might perhaps be paraphrased, 'to make an act of offering', a significant change of tense from εἰς τὸ προσφέρειν earlier in the same verse, as significant as the change in 7.27, only four verses previously, from ἀναφέρειν of the continual offerings of the Levitical priests to the aorist ἀνενέγκας of the one offering of our Lord. N. Dimock[2] echoed the spirit of this passage when he wrote of our Lord's present exercise of his priesthood, 'All is the work of a sacrificing priest, not less the present and continuous work of a Priest for ever because the work of a priest whose sacrificing work is done.'

Our Lord's priesthood is by no means exhausted by his offering for sin, but covers the whole range of τὰ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, things to do with God,[3] and includes His intercession. Some scholars assume the equation, intercession equals pleading equals offering. But this syllogism seems to me to suffer from the fallacy of an undistributed middle. But whatever the logical basis of this equation, it ignores the twofold contrast that Hebrews draws (9.23-28) between the priesthood of our Lord and the Levitical priesthood. Not only does the writer contrast the repeated acts of offering of the Levitical priesthood with our Lord's completed act of offering for sin, but he also contrasts the unending intercession of our Lord with that of the Levitical priests which was interrupted by death. 'And they indeed have been made priests many in number because that by death they are hindered from continuing, but he because he abideth for ever hath his priesthood unchangeable.[4] Wherefore he is able to save to the uttermost them that draw near unto God through him; seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them.'[5]

[1] The evidence is given by Dimock, *Our one High Priest on High* (2nd edition), pp. 11-12.

[2] Op. cit., p. 85f.

[3] Nairne's translation, 'the Godward side', gives an unfortunate limitation of the meaning of the phrase. The preposition πρός was losing its idea of motion towards and is often translated in the A.V. 'with', e.g. Heb. 4.13, 10.16. See C. F. D. Moule, *Idiom Book of New Testament Greek*, pp. 52-53.

[4] ἀπαράβατος seems to mean here 'of such a kind that another cannot, or is not needed to, step in'.

[5] Heb. 7.24-25.

To illustrate the writer's view of the relation of the present priestly work of our Lord to 'his one sacrifice once offered' we may think of a bridge built at tremendous cost. Our Lord has built the bridge between man and God at the cost of His death. He is the *ἀρχηγός*,[1] the pioneer who has blazed the trail at the cost of His life, the *πρόδρομος*.[2] In our illustration it is the bridge which remains, not the maker. Here our analogy shows its first weakness. For our Lord not only builds the bridge, but is the bridge, the new and living way as well as the maker of the way. Also, while a bridge joins two places, Christ joins God and man in a covenant sealed in sacrifice. The offering is completed, but the offerer, who has achieved complete fellowship with the Father, remains to bring us into the same relationship with the Father. The point is emphasised by a contrast.[3] Christ entered into the heavenly sanctuary to appear openly before the face of the Father. For He is in full and intimate communion with Him because His sacrifice is complete. In this He is contrasted with the high priest whose fellowship with God was only partial and therefore had to be hid on his annual visits to the sanctuary behind a cloud of incense 'that he die not'.[4] Our Lord in contrast does not need anything to hide Him from the Father with whom He is in complete fellowship. Moreover, He is there 'for us' as the Head of a new humanity.

But it is possible to view our Lord's present work for us too passively, especially if we take the idea of the heavenly session seriously. It is true that He is the way we must tread, that He is in communion to our advantage. But statements of this kind do not exhaust the truth. Even if we give due weight to the vital symbol of our Lord's heavenly session we have to remember that 'some of the hardest work in life is done by the monarch seated in his cabinet, and the statesman at his desk; and the seated Christ rests not day nor night from the unremitting energies of heaven.'[5] As our writer says, He makes intercession for us.[6] There is no reason to suppose that the writer imagined our Lord as uttering petitions on our behalf. The word *ἐντυγχάνειν* means primarily to meet with, and so to meet with

[1] 2.10, 12.2.
[2] 6.20.
[3] 9.24-25.
[4] Lev. 16.13.
[5] Swete, *The Ascended Christ*, p. 14.
[6] Heb. 7.25.

a person for a special object. Then it has the wider significance of undertaking a person's affairs, intervening in his favour. Moreover in its context in Hebrews the word is applied to our Lord as the climax of an argument in which humanity and divinity are both seen to come together in our Lord, so that in His person He is 'the surety of a better covenant'[1] between God and man.[2] This fits the author's insistence that our Lord's priesthood is not of the order of Aaron but of Melchizedek which he emphasises, especially in connexion with our Lord's heavenly ministry. For blessing is the only action of Melchizedek that Hebrews notices,[3] that is, 'communicating the fruits of a sacrifice already made'. 'He only can bless who is in fellowship with God and speaks as his representative.'[4] 1 John 2.1-2 also bears on our Lord's intercession without mentioning the word. The key word in the passage παράκλητος had been transliterated into Hebrew, and is probably to be understood in the light of a rabbinic dictum, 'He who performs one precept has gotten to himself one paraclete, and he who commits one transgression has gotten to himself one accuser.'[5] The Christian knows that such a paraclete is unreliable. 'If any man sin we have a Paraclete with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous.' We rely on our Lord and His atonement. Therefore the second half of this passage is parallel with the first: 'He is the propitiation for our sins.' He does not say, 'He makes propitiation.' The propitiation or expiation has been made, but its results abide in the person of Him who made it, who is ever active to bring us to the Father with whom He is fully and perfectly united. Perhaps the most adequate summary of our Lord's intercession is to be found in two passages in W. Milligan's *Ascension of our Lord*, who says that our Lord's 'very presence in his humanity is enough to secure the hearing and answering of his prayers'.[6] Moreover he stresses that our Lord's intercession must not be limited to spoken prayers. It includes 'every act by which the

[1] Heb. 7.22.

[2] There is a parallel in St. Paul's representation of the intercession of the Holy Spirit (Rom. 8.26-27) who is one with us and prompts our inarticulate desires and also one with God who knows the mind of the Spirit. It is interesting that the intercession of the Son is mentioned only a few verses later (Rom. 8.34).

[3] Heb. 7.1-10.

[4] Westcott, op. cit., p. 201.

[5] A. E. Brooke, *The Johannine Epistles*, ad. loc.

[6] W. Milligan, *The Ascension of our Lord* (1898 ed.), p. 150.

soul, in dependence on the Father, in the Father's name, and with the perfect concurrence of the Father takes his own with him into the Father's presence, in order that whatever he himself enjoys in the communication of his Father's love may become theirs also'.[1]

Though the title of this paper confines our attention to the New Testament, we should take a look at the wider background. For the way in which we fit the Bible into the background of general ideas can be decisive for our understanding of the Bible itself. It is axiomatic that, God being love, the relations between the Persons of the Trinity are those of mutual self-giving. But does not self-giving mean offering, and offering mean sacrifice? Are we not therefore back at the doctrine of an eternal sacrifice in heaven?

It is certainly true that the Incarnation and Atonement proceed from the eternal character of God throughout. In the language of Hebrews our Lord's sacrifice was offered 'through eternal Spirit'.[2] As Moffatt comments,[3] 'It was because Jesus was what he was by nature that his sacrifice has such final value; its atoning significance lay in his vital connexion with the realm of absolute realities; it embodied all that his divine personality meant for men in relation to God.' But this surely does not mean that Calvary was nothing more than a mirror of the eternal character of God. We come here to the difficult question of the relation of time and eternity. Without going too far into the deep waters of speculation we can say that time is the creation of God and therefore has a certain reality. Our sins were committed in time and the atonement for them was made in time. While it proceeds from the mutual self-giving of the Persons of the Trinity, it is more than this. For this is an eternal fact which would always have been so even if man had never sinned. If, as I am convinced, the main stream of the New Testament teaches that the atonement includes at its heart the bearing by our Lord of the judgment of man's sin, the equation self-giving equals offering equals sacrifice does not seem so compelling. Rather eternal self-giving face to face in time with sin deals with it by sacrifice which makes the way open to God. Anything which suggests that the sacrifice for

[1] Op. cit., p. 152. [2] Heb. 9.14.
[3] *I.C.C.* ad loc.

sin, needs to be continued, undermines the boldness and full assurance of faith with which the Christian man draws near and enters into the holy place.

But the sin offering, which is the category under which I have been mainly considering our Lord's work of sacrifice, is of course not the only kind of sacrifice. And there are several passages in the New Testament which suggest that, while our Lord's atoning work is done, the sin offering is completed, He is nevertheless now offering something, namely His people and their gifts and prayers. I refer to such passages as 'Christ also suffered for sins once the just for the unjust ἵνα ἡμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ Θεῷ',[1] 'that he might offer us to God', as the Vulgate translates the passage. Or, 'You hath he reconciled in the body of his flesh through death to *present* you *holy* and *without blemish* and irreprovable'.[2] Or again, 'The angel (apparently our Lord) added incense unto the prayers of the saints upon the golden altar, and the smoke of the incense with the prayers of the saints went up before God out of the angel's hands.'[3]

Even clearer is a phrase from our Lord's high-priestly prayer when He says, 'For their sakes I sanctify myself (i.e. offer myself in sacrifice) that they themselves also may be sanctified (offered in sacrifice) in truth.'[4] In view of such passages has not Lightfoot some ground for saying, 'Christ is a priest for ever, still offering sacrifice to God but no more himself, but his people's sacrifice! And that offering is twofold, viz. the offering of the persons of his people to God as an acceptable living sacrifice, and offering their services as an acceptable spiritual sacrifice to God.'[5] This surely is the meaning of the traditional phrase 'through Jesus Christ' which is rooted in the New Testament, which not only speaks of prayer through Jesus Christ, but also of offering up sacrifice through Him.[6] Waterland put the matter very clearly: 'He is not the matter or subject of our sacrifices but he is the medium of them: we offer not him but we offer what we do offer by him,'[7] and

[1] 1 Peter 3.18.
[2] Col. 1.21-22. The sacrificial terms are in italics.
[3] Rev. 8.3.
[4] John 17.19. See also Hoskyns and Davey, *The Fourth Gospel* (1942 ed.), pp. 595-9.
[5] Cit. Tomlinson, *The Catholic Doctrine of Eucharistic Sacrifice*, p. 39.
[6] Heb. 13.15; 1 Peter 2.5.
[7] *Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist* (1880 ed.), p. 338.

Bishop Christopher Wordsworth even more tersely, 'He has everything to offer except himself.'[1]

'Everything to offer except himself'. St. Paul would have endorsed that 'everything' even to include the material creation. For he has a magnificent picture of all things coming from God through Christ and all things being reconciled to Him again through Christ. 'For in him were all things created . . . all things have been created through him and unto him, and he is before all things and in him all things consist.'[2] He continues: it was the Father's good pleasure 'through him to reconcile all things unto himself',[3] an idea which he elaborates in Ephesians where he says that 'it is his good pleasure to sum up (to re-integrate) all things in Christ, the things in the heavens and the things upon the earth'.[4] The priesthood of our Lord is therefore cosmic in its sweep, and at its centre stands the one sacrifice for sins, for ever complete and final and therefore the basis of all the rest of His priestly work.

The priesthood of the Church is rather less stressed in the New Testament and is of course derivative. The Church is called 'a holy priesthood',[5] 'a royal priesthood',[6] and its members 'kings and priests',[7] presumably because they have been given a share in Christ's priesthood, just as He is the 'only begotten Son' and we are all sons of God, through faith in Him. Our sonship is derived from His, so is our priesthood. The New Testament is rather less explicit on what this priesthood involves but we may consider His priesthood for clues on the meaning of ours.

There is first the priestly work of intercession. The writer to the Hebrews leads up to our Lord's intercession in 7.25 by stressing first that our Lord is one with God by nature and secondly that He became one with man in all the experiences of human life even its temptations, crying, and tears. He holds God and man together in His person. That is the heart of His intercession. We can seek to do this by grace, becoming one with God through Christ by faith and more deeply one with our fellow men through the Spirit by imaginative love.

In contrast to the extreme rarity of the word intercession as

[1] Cit. Tomlinson, op. cit., p. 39.
[2] Col. 1.16-17. [3] Col. 1.20. [4] Eph. 1.10.
[5] 1 Pet. 2.5. [6] 1 Pet. 2.9. [7] Rev. 1.6, 5.10.

applied to the Christian, sacrificial terms are used to describe nearly all the activities of the Christian life—faith,[1] almsgiving,[2] the converting of the Gentiles,[3] martyrdom,[4] good works of one kind and another,[5] and of course the consecration of the Christian's whole life to God.[6] In this connexion it has to be remembered that not only are Christians priests but also the Church is a priesthood, and so its self-offering will be more than the sum of the self-offerings of its members. Life is redeemed in Christ from independence and isolation into the fellowship of the body of Christ. So it is not surprising that St. Paul's appeal 'to present your bodies a living sacrifice' leads straight on to his reminder that 'we who are many are one body in Christ'.[7]

But of course it is not enough for us who belong to Christ to offer ourselves individually and corporately to Him. So St. Paul speaks of himself as ἱερουργοῦντα, 'exercising a priestly ministry of the Gospel of God that the offering up of the Gentiles might be acceptable'[8]—an interesting verse because it suggests that St. Paul may have realised that the work of a priest was to declare the Torah before it was to offer sacrifice. Similarly in 1 Peter the functions of the royal or holy priesthood are to 'offer up spiritual sacrifices and to shew forth the excellences of him who called you out of darkness into his marvellous light'[9] —again sacrifice and Torah go together.

Putting these ideas together we may say that the New Testament gives us a picture of Christ our great High Priest offering His people to the Father. We are given a share in this priestly work first in the submission of our own wills, secondly in the proclamation of the Gospel that will lead others to offer themselves to our Lord, thirdly in the offering of our praises, 'through him then let us offer up a sacrifice of praise continually, that is the fruit of lips which make confession to his name'.[10] Fourthly we are given a share in the cosmic priesthood of Christ; the Christian is the priest of creation. This surely is

[1] Phil. 2.17: 'the sacrifice and service of your faith.'
[2] Phil. 4.18: 'an odour of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well pleasing to God.'
[3] Rom. 15.16.
[4] 2 Tim. 4.6: 'I am already being offered.'
[5] Heb. 13.16: 'To do good and to communicate forget not: for with such sacrifices God is well pleased.'
[6] Rom. 12.1: 'present your bodies a living sacrifice.'
[7] Rom. 12.5. [8] Rom. 15.16. [9] 1 Pet. 2.9. [10] Heb. 13.15.

what is being stated in another idiom in the epistle to the Romans: 'The earnest expectation of the creation waiteth for the revealing of the sons of God.'[1] Why? 'In hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.'

There is another passage which also seems to make this point, viz. Eph. 4.7-13 of which the crucial sentences are 'to each one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ . . . who ascended up far above the heavens that he might fill all things'. What does πληροῦν mean in this connexion? The clue seems to be in Rom. 13 where the word means 'fulfil'. 'He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law.'[2] 'Love is the fulfilling of the law.'[3] It is also synonymous with ἀνακεφαλαιοῦν: 'If there is any other commandment it is summed up in this.'[4] In Eph. 1.10 St. Paul has told us that it is God's good pleasure to sum up all things in Christ. Later[5] he tells us that the Church is the fulfilment of Him who is fulfilling all things in all (or perhaps 'being fulfilled' as the majority of scholars hold, though I am not altogether convinced). In ch. 4 Paul takes up the theme. To each member of the Church grace is given adequate for his share in the bringing of all things to their true fulfilment, in fact for his share in the cosmic priesthood of the ascended Christ.

Redemption is to overflow from the Christian man to the material creation. Certainly our people should be helped to see their use of the material creation as a divinely ordained priesthood. It may be said that these are only two isolated passages in the New Testament. This must be admitted, but this opinion expressed is consonant with the whole biblical revelation from Gen. 1 via Isa. 6.3 to John 1.14, and on into the New Testament. The material world is God's creation and is to be redeemed in Christ through His Church.

What is the relation of all this to the ministry? Is there a priesthood within the Royal priesthood, a *sacerdotium in sacerdotio*? The conclusion of a modern scholar echoing Lightfoot and many others that 'there is no trace of any such thing in the New Testament' (as sacrificial priesthood)[6] is hard to gainsay.

[1] Rom. 8.19. [2] Rom. 13.8. [3] Rom. 13.10.
[4] Rom. 13.9. [5] Eph. 1.23.
[6] Phythian-Adams, *The Way of Atonement*, p. 74.

Those who think otherwise cannot derive any encouragement from a second reading of Ehrhardt's recent book *The Apostolic Succession*, however much their hearts may have been warmed by a cursory first glance. He maintains that 'the form of the court of St. James at Jerusalem reflected that of the Jewish High Priest'.[1] But it is clear that whatever the later Church may have thought about it, the earliest Christians, insofar as they thought of St. James as like the High Priest, thought of this resemblance as being *qua* chairman of the Sanhedrin not *qua* priest in the strict sense. Of course this is not an original point with Ehrhardt[2] though his detailed outworking has some points fresh to me. There can of course be no doubt that Christian institutions derived from Jewish institutions and Jewish offices from the appropriate examples in the Pentateuch. What matters is not how a man was appointed to office, but what the office meant. E.g. Ehrhardt points out the parallels[3] between the separation of Barnabas and Saul in Acts 13 and the separation of the Levites in Num. 8.14, and that in each case the word 'separate' was used and the whole company laid on hands. But in one case the office was a sacerdotal office that involved residence in the midst of the community, in the other a prophetic task that involved departure hundreds of miles from the community. In spite of similar methods of appointment, two offices more different could hardly be imagined.

Turning therefore to the descriptions of the different offices of the Christian ministry there is a significant absence of priestly terms. Consider for example the Epistle of priesthood itself in which almost the whole Christian life is described in terms of the Old Testament cult. But it is far otherwise with the three references to the ministry in that epistle. In each case they are called *οἱ ἡγουμένοι ὑμῶν*. In the first case their work is described in the words 'who have spoken unto you the word of God'.[4] In the second the readers were told to obey them 'for they watch for your souls as they that must give account'.[5]

In the third case he says, 'Salute all them that have the rule over you and all the saints.' The only passage in the New

[1] Op. cit., p. 30.
[2] Cf. Headlam, *Doctrine of the Church and Reunion*, p. 72.
[3] Op. cit., p. 32. [4] Heb. 13.7. [5] Heb. 13.17.

Testament known to me that speaks of the ministry or rather a ministry in priestly terms is Rom. 15.16 when St. Paul refers to himself as a λειτουργὸν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη, ἱερουργοῦντα τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα γένηται ἡ προσφορὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν εὐπρόσδεκτος, ἡγιασμένη ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, an impressive collection of sacerdotal and sacrificial terms.[1] But it is significant that St. Paul applied these terms to the function of proclaiming the Word which could not be confined to the ranks of the ministry, 'therefore all scattered abroad . . . except the Apostles. . . . They therefore that were scattered abroad went about preaching the word.'[2] This is not to suggest that Paul's ministry was any less priestly than his words taken in their plain and natural sense imply. Moreover while he shared this priestly ministry with others, even with laymen as they would now be called, it is plain from the New Testament records that he was outstanding as a λειτουργός handling the sacred Torah of the Gospel.

This, it would seem to me, gives us the clue to the sense in which the Christian minister may rightly be said to be priestly or sacerdotal. The minister of a priestly body must himself be priestly, and should be pre-eminently priestly. He must include in himself the outstanding characteristics of the body of which he is a minister. Indeed he may well be on many occasions the executive of the Church's priesthood, though where this happens I would maintain that it is a matter of opportunity or order, not an ontological necessity. Certainly there is no New Testament evidence for the necessary restriction of the Church's priesthood to any one type of person. Where the idea of priesthood as applied to the ministry has become subject to perversion is (*a*) through a wrong conception of priesthood and the Christian offering. I have attempted to deal with these in the earlier part of this paper; (*b*) through understanding the priesthood of the ministry in an exclusive instead of representative and inclusive sense. A parallel to the latter abuse would be the idea that Sunday is to be holy in order that the rest of the week can be left free for us to do as we like. The truth is rather that we keep Sunday holy in order to make all other days holy. So within the priestly body certain people are recognised as

[1] Sacrificial terms underlined.

[2] Cf. Acts 8.1 and 4.

priestly, not to deprive the rest of their priesthood, but to promote it. Here is the test of any true ministerial priesthood. Does it derogate from the priestliness of the rest of the body, or does it emphasise it and promote it?

BOOK REVIEWS

Essays on Typology. By G. W. H. Lampe and K. J. Woollcombe. *Promise and Fulfilment: The Eschatological Message of Jesus.* By W. G. Kümmel. S.C.M. Press (Studies in Biblical Theology, Nos. 22 and 23). 7s. 6d. and 12s 6d.

With the great resurgence of typological methods of exegesis in recent years, critical discussion of its procedure is welcome as a safeguard against misunderstanding and abuse. Professor Lampe and Mr Woollcombe in their essays have made a useful contribution to an understanding of the theological presuppositions of this kind of approach to the Bible. They both insist, with the utmost clarity, that in so far as the typological method of exegesis is to rank as a legitimate approach to Scripture, it must seek to discern genuine historical correspondences between the events or persons it sees as 'types' and their 'antitypes'. Typology of this sort, embedded in the redemption-history recorded by the Bible as a whole, is radically distinguished from arbitrary allegorising on Old Testament texts with a view to making them yield edifying teaching or to foreshadow some fragment of the New Testament revelation. Allegorism strikes at the root of typology: for where typology invokes the temporal categories of anticipation and realisation, of hope, promise, prophecy and their fulfilment, allegory does away with the temporal unfolding of the redemption-history in which these are different stages, each with its place in the divine plan for the salvation of men. Allegorism seeks a set of timeless truths only thinly veiled behind the temporal forms, to be extricated from the Old Testament treated as a book of riddles and oracles.

'Historical typology', defined in this sense, as seeking genuine correspondences between Old Testament types and New Testament antitypes is forced upon the exegete: as Professor Lampe points out, it is impossible to understand, for instance, St. Stephen's speech in Acts without recognising 'the typological correspondence which it presupposes between Christ and Moses' (p. 19). In this, as in countless other cases, the typological relation to some Old Testament anticipation is what endows the New Testament narrative with a part—possibly a considerable part—of its meaning. It is, apparently, the extension of this kind of search for types beyond the correspondences clearly presented by the New Testament writers themselves that is in question. Thus, Professor Lampe asks: 'Ought we, like the Fathers, in their sermons and commentaries, to

find types and fulfilments where the New Testament writers appear, at least at first sight, to have seen none?' (p. 20). A great deal hinges on the qualification 'at least at first sight', but unfortunately neither Professor Lampe nor Mr Woollcombe discuss its implications. The great key-images drawn from the Old Testament in terms of which the writers of the New present the events they recount in order to display these in their true significance as they saw it, lie at one end of a continuous scale; at its other end lie the more recondite allusions and patterns which—as practitioners of typological exegesis claim—are found often to underlie a narrative. To discern such underlying indications of typological relations and to discriminate between these and purely arbitrary impositions of fancied correspondences requires delicate literary discipline. Neither of the authors of these essays insists with sufficient clarity that the criteria of typological, as of any other exegesis, must lie ultimately in the biblical text itself, and that its exercise is basically a matter of sensitive, responsive scholarship. Mr Woollcombe makes the distinction between typology considered as a method of writing and as a method of interpretation; but surprisingly, he fails to say that typological exegesis is legitimate where the text is an instance of typological writing. The implication that typological exegesis can legitimately extend into a field wider than that of typological writing is not dispelled anywhere else in these essays. And yet, it seems necessary to insist, if typological exegesis is to be justified in its claims, that it must find its criteria in the biblical text itself. The question as to whether an Old Testament passage bears any, and if so, what, typological sense, must ultimately be answered by reference to the meaning it has for the New Testament writers when they look back upon it as an anticipation of the fulfilment in the work of redemption wrought by Christ.

The New Testament writers, in the use they make of Old Testament types, express their interpretation of the whole history of God's dealings with men. Professor Kümmel's book—published, by a happy coincidence, together with *Essays on Typology*—is concerned with the final stage of this *Heilsgeschichte*. He is concerned with the notoriously difficult question of the interpretation of the eschatological message of Jesus. His study is very far from being typological in its approach; he is concerned simply with the sayings of Jesus, and indeed has a predilection for regarding these as 'detached'. The evangelists' patterns of imagery and their significance are irrelevant to his study. Within the limits of the exegetical method he adopts, however, he gives a clear and rigorously argued interpretation of the eschatological teaching in the New Testament. He shows, first, that Jesus regarded the advent of the Kingdom of God as lying in

the near future; that He nevertheless distinguished His return in glory from His resurrection, and indicated the lapse of an indefinite interval of time between the resurrection and the *parousia*. He goes on to show that the eschatological teaching cannot be understood as 'apocalyptic instruction' but only as 'eschatological promise'. In a final part he discusses texts in which Christ speaks of the Kingdom as already present, and rightly rejects any attempt to escape the tension between the present and the future realisations of the Kingdom.

The eschatology of the New Testament is inherent in the time-scheme of the biblical redemption-history itself. In Christ, the New Testament writers saw the fulfilment of the promises made to Abraham, sustained in waiting throughout the history of the chosen people, recalled by the prophets, to be shared by the nations in the fulness of times. Christ, in person, was the fulfilment. The last times had come, all that remained was that the salvation wrought by Him be appropriated by men and be shown forth at His return in glory and the ingathering of all the faithful from the ends of the earth. The coming of Christ is the decisive event of the economy; the nearness of the Kingdom characterises the entire time-span between the incarnation and the *parousia*. The final stage of Christ's redemptive work, to be manifested at the *eschaton*, is the unfolding of the decisive inauguration of the Kingdom at His death and resurrection. Cullmann's writings have already familiarised us with such a picture of the biblical time-scheme. Professor Kümmel's book lacks the wider sweep of such an overall conception of time in the biblical history; but his meticulously argued case supports its general validity by detailed piecemeal study of Jesus' eschatological sayings. The content of these, no less than the typology of the New Testament writers, points to the same conception of the economy of redemption; Christ is the end at the mid-point of history, the fulfilment of the promise; in Him we have entered the last days, in Him all the fulness of God fills the members of His Body. R. A. MARKUS

Harmannus Obendiek. By ROBERT STEINER

Deine Zeugnisse sind meine Rede, Twenty Sermons by HARMANNUS OBENDIEK. Edited by UDO SMIDT.

Both publications: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins, Neukirchen Kreis Moers, 1955.

PROFESSOR OBENDIEK was killed in a motor-accident on his way to South Dakota after the Conference in Evanston. I had become acquainted with him in London before his journey to the U.S.A. and I am thankful that these two books have been published after his death: a biography and a treatment of his work together with

some small essays and publications edited by Robert Steiner; and a volume of sermons from the period 1943-53 edited by Udo Smidt. There is no danger here of glorifying a churchman. This is rather a sober report about the work of the Church in a time full of decision, especially because the name of this man is inseparably connected with the ten-year history of the Confessional Church during the Hitler régime. Christians of all denominations and especially those of the Reformed Churches will greatly appreciate the little book about Dr Obendiek as well as the collection of his striking sermons.

R. Steiner and two other friends of Dr Obendiek describe his life, his service in the congregation (mainly Barmen-Gemarke), his participation in the work of the ecumenical movement and his work as a theological scholar and professor (in Wuppertal). Here we have the picture of a remarkably varied service in the Church which we seldom find among the theologians on the Continent. Dr Obendiek was always a parish minister, always a theologian who took an active part in theological work by writing and teaching, and at the same time always saw the vital connexion between his Church and the family of Reformed Churches and the entire ecumenical movement.

Obendiek's sermons which are deserving of a thorough study can be characterised in a threefold way.

1. They are real textual sermons. One feels that each sentence is at the same time an exegesis and an application to the life of the congregation. This is good reformed tradition and it is the homiletical method which was used so effectively during the time of the *Kirchenkampf*. This textual preaching is now very common on the Continent. The sermons have no special introductions but the introduction is rather in the text itself. They do not end with an emphasis upon the scholarly conclusions of the preacher but upon the message of the text.

2. Almost all his sermons are divided into three parts. This seems to be more than just a methodological principle. Often one feels that this is a trinitarian division so that the sermon concludes with an emphasis on the work of the Holy Spirit. With the sermons on shorter texts, the threefold division is more practical: (*a*) the question the text addresses to us, (*b*) the question we put to the text, (*c*) the answer of the text to us.—The language is clear and simple German, but no sentence can be overlooked; the hearer's attention is focused entirely on the message. The climax comes usually at the beginning of the third part of the sermon; then the text provides the conclusive answer.

3. We do not find any 'illustrations' in these sermons, although

so many preachers seek diligently for illustrations because they have not finished their exegesis. Obendiek does not use any stories or illustrations which could distract the hearer's attention in any way from the text, but only contemporary language and modern expressions which help to make the text meaningful to his hearers. The pernicious demand for 'practical' sermons, as if 'theological' sermons were unpractical, is refuted clearly and convincingly by Obendiek's sermons. This is the practical and vital sermon, the good textual theological sermon which the congregation receives in tension and which gives comfort and power to resist in times of tribulation.

The reading of sermons is a questionable matter. Sermons are to be heard. But here the reader quickly becomes the hearer and for myself I can only say that each time I closed the book, after having read a sermon, I have been strengthened. Thus the hearer learns to expect not the power of human speech but the power of the text on which the sermon is based. Therefore the title of the volume of sermons is fitting: 'Thy testimonies are my meditation' (Ps. 119.99). D. RITSCHL

The Box and the Puppets. By NATHANIEL MICKLEM. Geoffrey Bles. 13s 6d.

The Abyss of Truth. By NATHANIEL MICKLEM. Geoffrey Bles. 9s. 6d.

THE source of the title of the first book is a passage in *Vanity Fair*. Fortunately, the second part of the quotation is not yet true of the gifted and lovable author—'our play is played out'. This is a whimsical autobiography—'slapdash' as he calls it—pleasant to read, full of wisdom and good humour, with plenty 'amused and kindly feeling', considering that there were stormy periods of controversy in his public life.

We are told not to look in this book for a tracing of the development of his thought, nor for the setting forth of his deepest thoughts (he has done that in his poems). Dr Micklem has destroyed the documents which would be requisite for a biography; but in the most friendly way he takes us into his confidence from 1888, 'when I joined the human race' to 1953 when he retired from the Principalship of Mansfield College, Oxford. He has always been a very sensitive man, 'suffering from an enlarged conscience'. Notwithstanding his royal ancestry, he believes that 'pedigrees afford aesthetic but not practical satisfaction'. Like most students he has 'some regrets about my life as an undergraduate'. There is a wonderful devotion to his mother who lived till her son was over sixty-five.

This fascinating book is full of delightful sentences, witty sayings and quotations that flash and sparkle, and excellent stories. He

has met innumerable interesting and distinguished people—Birrell, Horton, Fairbairn, Selbie, Moffat, Russel Maltby, Vernon Bartlett, Forsyth, Glover, Streeter, Buber, Annan, C. S. Lewis, Berggrav, Niemöller, Neville Talbot, George Macleod. A Nonconformist on principle, he has much to say of its character and its present status, and his ecumenical interests are wide.

Half of the book, naturally, is given to Mansfield—'my life-sentence'. He was an innovator in several directions, and so he had his troubles, anxieties and oppositions. The controversies are not concealed, but there is neither littleness nor bitterness in disclosing them. His lectures on Thomas Aquinas, his reforms in College worship, his attitude to the Oxford Group, his theological positions which were regarded as reactionary by philosophical liberals, all combined to give him a measure of unpopularity in his own denomination. Dr Micklem had a quite unusual Christian alertness on great public questions, especially as they impinge on the Church's welfare and witness. He was deeply impressed by the work of the Iona Community. It is a very crowded scene that this gentle, modest, humorous scholar allows us to see. He played a large part in it, and withal found time to play cricket with marked agility till recent years.

Thy Abyss of Truth is Dr Micklem's latest theological book. He refers to it in the autobiography, and tells how as a student he read a paper with a Greek title on this subject—'my last essay is curiously like my first, but is concluded in more modest terms'. It deals with the character of religious truth and of revelation, and the views of the old and New Testaments are briefly expounded, followed by the views of Augustine, Erigena, Anselm, Aquinas, Bonaventura, Duns Scotus, Calvin, Mansel, Farrer and others. The many angles from which modern theologians approach the theme of revelation are stated—revelation as regulative idea, as value, as events, as discovery, as symbol, as experience, as Gospel, as ethical demand, as encounter, as ecstatic reason. With Augustine, he agrees that all true knowledge is 'a participation of the Word'. This book probably errs in attempting too much, but the bewildering variety of ideas is skilfully woven together.

GEORGE S. GUNN

The Communication of the Christian Faith. By HENDRIK KRAEMER. Lutterworth Press. 11s. 6d.

THE writer of this book has become one of the best-known figures in the World Church. It is a small book compared with his two previous volumes, *The Christian Message in a non-Christian World* and *Religion and the Christian Faith.* These works reveal a first-class mind, a thorough biblical scholar and a missionary statesman whom many

would now rank with John R. Mott. He has some penetrating and disturbing things to say about the great gulf which has to be bridged between the Church and the multitudes in the modern world, and of several points he indicates that we may expect fuller treatment of some of the issues in a subsequent book. May the expectation be speedily fulfilled.

'The problem of communication' has become almost a trite phrase in our time—it has a reference not only to religion, but in the general field of culture and science. This book contains a course of lectures given in 1955 at Knox College, Toronto. The author apologises for their compact style, and this is specially true of chapters two and three.

It is not only the *how* of communication that has to be considered, but the *what* as well. In both senses, communication is 'the lifeblood of the Church'. Kraemer, who knows so much of the state of the World Church, in its strength and weakness, who is also an expert on language and translation, sees the Church as embarked on a trek, 'by its very nature a body on pilgrimage'. Because of the breakdown in communication, the Church is impotent evangelistically. The Bible unfolds the story of 'God's risky adventure with man, from creation to consummation.' God has created man 'for dialogue with Himself'. But man in general is unaware of this or has no idea of what it means. God speaks to persons, but to persons in community, and He is always taking the initiative in restoring the broken communication. The fundamental cause of the breakdown is secularisation dating from the Renaissance. The Bible has become a sealed Book, and the effort of fundamentalism to open it is itself an unbiblical spiritual disease. Those who desire to communicate the Gospel are up against nothing less than the disintegration of fundamental assumptions about life—and this is indeed the crux of the problem.

Kraemer leads up to this position by a masterly analysis in three chapters of the biblical perspective, the history of the Church and the psychological, sociological and cultural factors in the situation. The closing chapter is excellent in what it has to say on restoring communication. The Church's greatest need is self-examination in the light of God's Word, and this at present is more urgent than plans for evangelistic campaigns. The 'indirect' way of the Church regaining a better conception of its own true nature is likely to be the most effective and lasting means for the needed restoration.

The relation of objective and subjective preaching, the difference between faithful and 'successful' preaching, the process of the hardening of the heart, the dangers of easy adaptation of the message, what 'Christianising' the world may mean, the biblical theology of

missions, the ousting of theology by scientific humanism, the relation of basic theology to other aspects of life and learning, the limitations of language, 'the overwhelmingly verbal' character of Western culture—on all these and other vital and relevant topics, Dr Kraemer has wise words to say. GEORGE S. GUNN

The Communication of the Gospel to Illiterates. By H. R. WEBER. S.C.M. Press, London, 1957 (I.M.C. Research Pamphlet No. 4). Pp. 120. 7s. 6d.

THIS study is concerned with Evangelism so far as it is the conveying of the message of the Bible in oral and pictorial forms to a growing Christian community which is predominantly illiterate. The author's four years' experience in Indonesia, as a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, gives him his practical material, some of which is described in detail with charts in the second part of the study. The first part considers 'Ways of Communication', underlining that the 'Bible is the book of the *great symbol*', or 'God's great picture-book', and, that as such, it can be presented to the illiterate who has the 'brilliant gift of seeing'. The author is of opinion that the period of 'word-culture' is past and that the medium of communication must be visual, thus following American psychologists who maintain that the average man receives eighty-five per cent of his impressions visually and only ten per cent through his ear. The author has perhaps failed to appreciate the extent to which illiterates seek to have the *ipsissima verba* of a story fixed, whatever the medium of communication, once they have the picture clear in their minds. It may be true that 'in describing a person the illiterate would not talk about his character but rather tell significant stories about him', yet, as often as not, illiterates sum up in a telling phrase or word that same character. For example, the Luwuk-Banggai among whom the author worked have effectively described the 'illiterate' as 'buta huruf', that is, 'blind with regard to letters'. Surely a summary of a story! There is a useful bibliography for those wishing to follow up the author's sources.

R. A. BARCLAY

The Gospel and the Religions, a Biblical Enquiry. By WALTER FREYTAG. S.C.M. Press, London, 1957 (I.M.C. Research Pamphlet No. 5). Pp. 47. 3s.

THE modern revivals within non-Christian religions and their close contacts with nationalist movements in Asia require a re-appraisal of the Christian message and attitude towards these faiths. This is undertaken in this English translation of *Das Rätsel der Religionen und die Biblische Antwort.* It might have been better to have kept the

title as 'The Riddle of the Religions', though the change does indicate the problem of the 'superiority' of the Gospel which other faiths resent. The author deals succinctly with Christianity as one religion among the many and raises the problem of whether ultimately all say the same thing or whether the differences are such that only one can be finally true. One quotation will reveal the quality of the author's insight. He says, 'The Parable of the prodigal son cannot be inserted into the Koran, nor can the essential pronouncements of other religions concerning themselves be taken in exchange.' The second part of the study deals with the 'Biblical Answer' and analyses the concept of 'the Gentiles' ('the heathen'), as being as significant as the concept of the 'chosen people' in the biblical record. Perhaps the author's German background makes him overemphasise the place of 'judgment' rather than stressing the sense of victorious living which is the privilege of the Christian and which is not produced from other faiths. This pamphlet would be of great value for discussion groups interested in comparative study of religions. R. A. BARCLAY

The Gift of Conversion. By ERIK ROUTLEY. Lutterworth Press. 18s 6d.

IT is a serious neglect if every preacher does not give a central place to the subject of conversion—why we need it, why we resist it, what is the heart of the experience beating beneath all its varied forms, and what are its recognisable results. This book by the Chaplain at Mansfield College, Oxford, will assist the preacher, especially on the deeper theological aspects of the question. It is essentially a study of biblical teaching, and is directed to the present anxiety in several quarters about the whole matter. The treatment of the theme is far from familiar, but it is stimulating. It is a commendation of a book that it contains matter which will not command the agreement of all readers—that indeed is one of the best reasons for reading a book.

Dr Routley begins with 'a mythology of conversion' which has to be dispelled—confused ideas, standardised types, misleading methods. Then follows a brief study of the great 'archetypes' of conversion—Paul, Augustine, Wesley—what they have in common and what differentiates them. Why not have one of the Reformers included here? The fifteen occasions of the use of the term 'convert' in the Bible are looked at—with special reference to Peter's conversion, and also a detailed examination of the story of blind Bartimaeus as a pattern of conversion, as the gift of Christ as something to be prepared for, as arising out of deep need, and leading to radical renewal.

The theological substance of the book is concentrated in the four chapters on 'Law and Grace'—in the Old Testament stories of Jacob and Esau, Abraham and Lot—in the Pauline Epistles with the great contrasts which are never absent from Paul's mind—in the Gospels, where the writer is led to examine such difficult passages as the stilling of the storm, the cursing of the fig-tree, and the loss of the Gadarene Swine—and in Hebrews, John's epistles, Peter's epistles, and even in James and the Book of Revelation—everywhere the same fundamental tension. Valuable as much of the material of these four chapters is, it may well be held that the argument is indirect and circuitous, and that he has wandered too far from his main theme. Dr Routley seems to be conscious of this in his admission of 'these digressions', and 'difficult and chancy contentions'. There is excellent material on the fruits of conversion and how far they ought to be visible to the unconverted. Conversion issues in freedom, keeps us actively in the fight, overcomes anxiety, stimulates assurance and courage, provides confidence without bigotry, and makes possible dynamic peace. The closing pages of the book deal with preaching for conversion and the true use of the Bible by evangelists.

The book is enhanced by a very full analysis of its contents, and by a remarkable appendix page setting forth the twelve main points made in the discussion. The author's specialist knowledge of hymns shines through every chapter. GEORGE S. GUNN

Das Praedestinationsproblem in der Theologie Augustin. By GOTTHARD NYGREN. Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, Goettingen, 1956. Pp. 307.

THE university of Lund has a good tradition in theological scholarship. The author of this work is minded to maintain it, in the systematic theological study he has done in setting out the problem of predestination as it derives from St. Augustine, its relation to biblical theology, especially that of St. Paul, and the bearing which the problem has upon determinism and the free will of man.

The subject, he observes, is not new. For centuries in the Church the subject of predestination has provoked passionate controversy. It led to heated discussion during the Reformation. As discussed themes, predestination, determinism, and free will find place in modern theology and philosophy. The author finds that the controversies in the varied camps lead in history to a single point, and radiate from there. This focal point is—Augustine. The author, therefore, seeks to illuminate the historic controversies by a new treatment of the original source.

He asks: how does Augustine's doctrine of predestination stand in

relation to his other theology, which is expressed, throughout early Christian tradition, by the doctrine of free human will? Is there, in the relation of predestination and free will, in Augustine's view, an inner continuity? Or how does free will find its place in his wider system of 'predestined', deterministic theology?

These questions the author seeks to answer. He allows Augustine, through his writings, to make exhaustive contribution; but he is himself ever ready with pertinent and critical question.

Examination of the early Augustine, in relations with the Manicheans, the neo-Platonists, Plotinus, Gnosticism and Cicero, is done in detail. This leads to Augustine's contact with the Scriptures and Paul. Pauline influence is exhaustively treated. Then follows the effort to present the mature thought and religious experience, including, of course, his conversion, and the form and content which his subsequent Christianity assumed.

It is beyond the compass of a brief review even to outline this careful biographical re-statement, in theological terms of Augustine's religious development and writings, or to summarise the main positions reached. The book was written to be read rather than reviewed. A few pointers can be indicated. Augustine makes man's will responsible for evil, and absolves God from 'guilt'. Relating this to God's omnipotence and God's foreknowledge: how can there be free will, when everything God foresees must happen of necessity? Augustine answers that human will existed from the first: 'Our will would be no will if it did not lie in our power' (p. 36). From this position he never departs: he neither denies God's omniscience, nor that man can will what he wills. But man has no claims as against God; sold under sin, he can do nothing. Thus Grace enters a situation where there are no merits.

A pertinent part of the book is the treatment of the two graces, one given at the original Creation of man; the other in Jesus Christ—the breathing of the Holy Spirit into His disciples. Hence the emergence of 'love', through Christ, integral to Grace, as a growing factor influencing the human will, enlivening a freedom from God, shared with the angels.

The author concludes that he cannot credit human will with more, at most, than a so-called psychological liberty, by which the act of will is experienced as free, although in the final resort, it is not so. He confesses to being puzzled that Augustine, in his latest years, could so markedly stress liberty, and cling without vacillation, to his doctrine of merits. He thinks the key may be found in what Christ's love did for him—and may do for all men—change the heart of stone into one of flesh. It is in this realm that the continuity must be sought which holds together determinism and free

will. The effort of writing has made the author want to pursue research in the wider setting of Augustine's general theology, and the fundamental philosophic-religious questions, to which it gives, and has given, rise.

He might, too, on this further journey, seek to enter more fully into the mystical experience of Augustine, which, more than his own explanations of it, has made Augustine the great exemplar of Christianity he has become to us all. RENNIE SMITH

Elijah and Elisha. By RONALD S. WALLACE. Oliver and Boyd. 16s.

IT is a rare thing for a volume of Old Testament sermons to come nowadays from the pen of a Scottish minister—too rare. This lucid and living book contains nothing that has not been preached. The late Professor A. A. Bowman of Glasgow University said more than twenty-five years ago that he had noted a want of urgency in Scottish preaching and that in most churches the Old Testament was a closed book. He believed also that the latter explained the former. It has to be acknowledged also that, since the days of John E. McFadyen and Adam C. Welch, hardly anything has been published in Scotland in the Old Testament field which might encourage the preacher. Perhaps Mr Wallace's book is a symbol of a much-needed adjustment.

When the Old Testament comes to Elijah and Elisha, the narrative expands in a remarkable way, and a very large space is devoted to them. This is all the more striking because of the fact that neither of them left any writings to be compiled in a book. The prominence in the narrative of these two figures is an excellent illustration of the very way that the Old Testament is written. It is not so much the story of a nation that it records as the story of a nation's soul.

The writer of this book sets himself to avoid 'exaggerated allegorical interpretations' of passages which are admittedly difficult, but he searches for their true meaning in the context of the Church's witness and life; and he stands fast by the essential unity of the Old and the New Testaments. As Professor Barr stresses in the Foreword, Mr Wallace's main method is analogy—different from allegory or typology—'a likeness of pattern in God's act and men's response at various times, but not an identity of content or situation'. On every page of the Bible there is biblical truth to be discovered, though not necessarily literal truth. What cannot be taken literally ought none the less to be taken seriously.

Our present world is always in the writer's mind, and so we are told what it means for us now that 'the Lord God of Israel liveth', that the barrel of meal and the cruse of oil do not fail, that there is

an eternal Either-Or at Mount Carmel, and that after an exciting triumph a prophet can crack up and need 'an extended holdiay'. Mr Wallace faces up to the enormous difficulties of the devouring of the children in 2 Kings 2, but interprets it as a reminder of the grim element of judgment. The three strange miracles in 2 Kings 4 and 6 yield such points as 'Christ and our Mistakes', 'Christ and our Inadequacies', 'Christ and our Accidents'. The latter chapter also illustrates 'The Folly of Fighting against God, of Mistrusting God, and of Overstepping God'.

Frequently with such words as 'we are reminded', Mr Wallace makes a quick transition to the New Testament. Some will cavil at this—but it is well within the method of analogy. Accordingly in every sermon Christ is preached. All the material is used honestly, and the book is not loaded with quotations, illustrations or anecdotes.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Paul's Use of the Old Testament. By E. EARLE ELLIS. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 1957. 21s.

IT has been the fashion in certain quarters in the past to lay emphasis upon the Hellenistic and other elements which have been detected in the New Testament, and thereby at times virtually to deny to the Christian Gospel any real measure of originality or independence. As Professor Ellis neatly puts it, there has been a tendency 'to convert parallels into influences and influences into sources'. It is one thing to try to restore primitive Christianity to its contemporary setting, to understand it in the context of the period in which it emerged upon the stage of history; it is quite another to reconstruct, from the slenderest of evidence, alleged 'pre-Christian' schemes and systems of thought which are then postulated as the *fons et origo* of the Christian faith. In this respect the trend of more recent years 'to seek from the OT itself the source and meaning of NT thought' is only to be welcomed, as the recovery of something which ought never to have been forgotten. It is, however, to be hoped that the pendulum will not swing too far to the opposite extreme, and produce once more the idea that the Bible is something apart, entirely without relation to the hopes and aspirations, the cares and anxieties and perplexities, of contemporary pagan society. The truth, as often, lies between: in the recognition that Christianity was cradled in Judaism but grew to full stature in the Hellenistic world. Rooted in the OT, it was nevertheless subjected to new influences in the wider world and, in the genuine line of development which begins in the NT itself, adapted itself to meet the changing conditions of its new situation, yet without losing its fundamental grasp of the essential biblical tradition. It is significant

that the ultimate solution, after a century and a half of development including the crisis of the Gnostic heresy, lay with Irenaeus in a return to a thoroughly biblical theology. Study of the background is of the first importance, but it has all too often been vitiated by the fallacy that to observe a parallel, which may be superficial or even merely verbal, is to discover the origin of a particular concept or expression. Due regard must be paid to chronology, and to the question whether or not the parallel really explains the passage to which it is adduced, and indeed whether the terms employed are used with the same significance in the two cases. As Dodd long ago observed,[1] Jewish thought and 'the higher religion of paganism' were already drawing together in the Hellenistic age, and the convergence of these two streams served to prepare the way for Christianity. There was modification, there was adaptation, there was even some absorption of ideas from the contemporary world, but in so far as Christianity remained true to its fundamental basis in biblical thought it stands apart from the characteristic syncretism of the time.

More recently Dodd has examined the thoroughly biblical substructure of Christian theology provided by the re-interpretation of the OT which was the first theological undertaking of the Church.[2] Dupont has exhaustively studied the various terms and phrases in the Pauline letters commonly associated with the concept of *gnosis*, and has underlined their Jewish background.[3] Now Professor Ellis has devoted a short but thorough study to Paul's use of the OT, seeking 'the rationale underlying the Pauline usage both in its textual manifestation and in its theological application'. At times, it must be admitted, he seems to fall victim to the temptation to make the OT almost the only source of Paul's thinking, but that is perhaps inevitable in a study of this kind. He is certainly right in his emphasis on the importance of the OT, and in urging that 'one must look to the apostolic Church and to Christ Himself to find the primary source of the apostle's understanding and use of the OT'.

Albertz[4] has complained of the tendency of some authors to take account only of their own generation and the one immediately preceding, but this complaint cannot be brought against this book. In a brief historical introduction Ellis begins with Stephanus in 1550 and surveys the various contributions to the subject down to 1953.[5] Nor are these mere card-index entries, for he knows how to quote

[1] *The Bible and the Greeks*, 248 n. 1.
[2] *According to the Scriptures*, (London, 1952).
[3] *Gnosis: La connaissance religieuse dans les Epîtres de Saint Paul*, (Paris and Louvain, 1949). But cf. also Bultmann's review, *JTS*, N.S. iii (1952), 10ff.
[4] *Die Botschaft des Neuen Testaments*, II. 2, p. 12.
[5] Further references in later footnotes bring the literature down to 1955.

an apposite remark as occasion may afford in the body of his study. There is no bibliography, but an extensive list of modern authors gives references to the pages where they are quoted; the titles of books cited are given in full at the first occurrence. Here it may be remarked that Johnson (p. 92, n. 2) should be Johnston, and Doere (p. 20, n. 10) appears to be Doeve. It must be confessed that there is rather a large number of mistakes, some of which seem due not to the printer but to the typescript. Some usages would have aroused the wrath of H. W. Fowler (culminating in a split infinitive on the last page!), while the book contains a remarkable crop of new words (antipody, polyrhizal, deuterograph, intercurrence, inscripturation—none of them in the reviewer's dictionary). 'Critique' may be a verb in American, but is (to the reviewer's knowledge) a noun in English. Again, Ellis cannot make up his mind between 'interpretive' and 'interpretative', and falls into the old traps of 'mutual' and 'transpire'. Of the errors perhaps the worst is ἔργοι (twice) in note 4 to page 93; Schoeps is twice mis-spelt (p. 95, n. 4, p. 130, n. 3).

Lest any be deterred by this selection, be it noted that it is part of a reviewer's duty to draw attention to mistakes; nor do they detract from the real quality of the book. Proof-correction is a trial at the best of times; across the Atlantic it must have added complications. The errors are unfortunate, but despite them this is a valuable contribution to New Testament study.

The main body of the book falls into four parts: Paul and his Bible, Paul and Judaism, Paul and the Apostolic Church, Pauline Exegesis. Four appendices list the citations and allusions, showing the agreements with and variations from LXX and the Hebrew and setting out the Pauline texts in full, with the LXX and also the parallel NT passages. An introductory section contains the historical survey already mentioned and some four pages on 'The Pastoral Problem' (actually 'The Problem of the Pastorals'), in which Ellis comes down against Harrison on the side of authenticity.

The opening chapter deals first with the nature of the quotations, 93 in number, from 16 books but mainly from the Pentateuch. Reminiscences occur throughout the Pauline corpus, quotations (apart from Eph. and the Pastorals) only in the four *Hauptbriefe*. This is followed by a section on 'the problem of the Septuagint', discussing the views of Kahle and Katz (see now their papers in *Studia Patristica*),[1] and then the main part of the chapter is devoted to Paul's attitude to Scripture. Here consideration is given to the introductory formulae, the use of the terms γραφή and γράμμα, the

[1] Proceedings of the Second Patristic Congress, Oxford 1955 (*TU*, 63, Berlin 1957), 328ff, 343ff.

relation of γραφή to other authorities, and finally the question of Paul's Canon.

In the second chapter Ellis explicitly recognises the place of Judaism in Paul's thought, but goes on to add a word of caution: 'From that day on the Damascus road, the home of Paul's heart and of his mind never again lay in Judaism.' The force of this warning is borne out by a study of contemporary Jewish exegesis, followed by a comparison of Pauline and Jewish literary methods and of Pauline and Jewish exegesis. This last section provides opportunity for a detailed examination of certain OT themes as interpreted on the one hand by Paul and on the other in Jewish thought. The last section of this chapter considers Paul's use of non-canonical literature, in particular Wisdom and Philo, and concludes that such affinities as may be found are due rather to the use of a common tradition than to Pauline dependence. In this Ellis is almost certainly right, but it may perhaps be felt that Philo should have had a more extended treatment in view of the points of similarity noted by Kennedy (and Windisch), to whom Ellis refers and whose conclusions he is content to accept. Here it may be noted that although Philo is given nine references in the index (to which add p. 34), there are no Philonic passages in the *index locorum* except two from the Biblical Antiquities; but Ellis can quote Philo to his purpose. It is moreover somewhat surprising to find but one reference to W. L. Knox, whose *Paul and the Church of the Gentiles* and *Hellenistic Elements* would surely have provided useful material. It may also be appropriate to mention Cullmann's article in this Journal[1] and, for typology, Daniélou's *Sacramentum Futuri*; but no man can read everything. To judge from the index of references, Ellis's main interest lies in the Rabbinic and apocryphal literature, and not on the Hellenistic side.

The third chapter inevitably raises questions about the relation of Paul to the teaching of Jesus. Ellis does not consider the possibility of 'Pauline' influence on the Synoptic tradition, but safeguards himself in a footnote (page 85, note 3) adducing various criticisms of the 'extreme position' of Bultmann by Taylor, W. Manson and A. Barr. The sections in this chapter are devoted to Pauline and NT Parallels with Christ's Teachings, Parallels with other NT writers, the 'Testimony Book' hypothesis (a very useful survey of Harris's theory and of Dodd's reconsideration thereof) and finally the λέγει κύριος quotations. The significant point about this chapter is that Ellis, by a different route, finds himself in agreement with Dodd's opinion that 'the key to OT interpretation was given by Christ Himself to His apostles' (p. 113, cf. p. 107).

[1] *SJT*, 1950, 180ff. See also Cullmann, *The Early Church*, (London, 1956), 57ff.

The final chapter is devoted to a consideration of the hermeneutical principles employed by the NT writers, and in particular by Paul. The main divisions here are Topical Emphases (e.g. Faith and Works, Jew and Gentile, etc.), Typology, New Covenant Exegesis, and *Midrash Pesher*. Inevitably the Dead Sea Scrolls come under review, although briefly and with judicious handling (pp. 141ff, cf. also pp. 43ff). The problem is to account for the fact, already noted at the outset, that Paul's quotations from the OT sometimes agree with LXX against the Hebrew, sometimes with the Hebrew against LXX; sometimes again they agree with both, sometimes they differ from both. Various explanations have been offered to account for these phenomena: the use of Targums or of other Greek translations (was LXX a uniform text in Paul's day?), the use of an Aramaic *Volksbibel*, or free quotation from memory. All these have earlier been passed under review, with some reserve in the last two cases. 'The present state of the whole textual problem cautions against any dogmatising' in regard to a selection from various readings, but on the other hand 'taken as a whole, the Pauline citations reflect in substantial measure a *pesher*-type moulding of the text which in some cases is determinative for the NT application of the passage'. Moreover, 'some of the most significant instances appear to point back to a pre-Pauline usage in the early Church'. For Ellis, 'the essential problem appears to be more one of interpretation than of a purely textual nature'.

It has been necessary above to offer certain criticisms, but it will be clear from this brief survey that this is a book of real importance. If at times Ellis seems to over-emphasise one side, that is a fault from which authors of far greater experience have by no means been exempt. We may look with confidence for further genuine contributions to scholarship from his pen. In conclusion, tribute should be paid to printer and publisher: the format of the volume is quite admirable, and for a book of this type these days the price is extremely reasonable. R. McL. Wilson

The Church in the New Testament Period. By Adolf Schlatter, translated by Paul P. Levertoff. S.P.C.K., London, 1955. Pp. 324. 21s.

The first volume of Kittel's *Wörterbuch* is dedicated to Adolf Schlatter and the foreword concludes with a recognition of the debt owed to him by New Testament scholars. Schlatter was until his death the *doyen* of New Testament scholarship on the Continent and an influence not only among scholars but among Church people through his Expositions of the New Testament. The book under review is the first of his works to appear in English translation. It is a history

of the Church from the first Easter to the decay of Jewish Christianity after the revolt under Bar-Kochba in A.D. 132. It deals with the origin and growth of the Church, its worship and order, crises and turning points in its development. The work, teaching and lives of the leading Apostles are set forth and assessed. The rise of important movements in the Church and of national Churches and the development of evangelisation are described. The final chapter sums up the significance of the Apostles' labours for the Gentile Church. There is an introductory note on Schlatter and his translator, Paul Philip Levertoff, by F. N. Davey.

For Schlatter, history and the Church are closely related, and the Church, not individual Apostles or doctrines, is the theme of the New Testament, for in the Church we see 'something outside the natural order, something emanating from God's creative activity' (p. 4). It began at the first Easter when Jesus renewed His commission to the Apostles, and His appearances 'gave the Church her outward form and inner life' (p. 4). It is important to note that the Lord appeared to a number outside the apostolic circle. This prevented the Church from being split into two sharply differentiated groups—the ministry and those who were under an obligation to obey them (p. 11). The New Testament, containing not only descriptive and didactic elements but also prophecy, shows the Christian message as 'a proclamation of what God will do' (p. 8). This eschatological direction of the will, combined with the Easter faith in the present activity of God, made the Church not simply the guardian of a deposit of faith but a forward-looking, forward-living body.

One of the great merits of the book is the way in which Schlatter does justice to the Jewish Christian Church. We are accustomed to views which assume that the Jewish Christian Church was merely a stage in the development towards the more perfect form of Gentile Christianity. Schlatter sees that the Jewish Christians had a distinctive witness to make. He speaks of the portrait of Jesus in the Gospels as 'the supreme achievement and priceless heritage of Jewish Christianity' (p. 129). At the same time, this recognition of two elements in the Church does not mean two independent Churches, each going its own way. The importance of the Apostolic Council at Jersusalem lies not simply in its recognition of St. Paul's apostolate but in its decision that the Church was to form a united body and not to fall apart into two separate groups or confessions. 'They had to decide what was the distinctive element in the Christian life and how the Church could become an all-embracing fellowship' (p. 126). It was a decision of the whole community, not an arrangement between the Apostles (p. 126). It

secured that the Law was set aside as a medium between God and man on an equal status with Jesus Christ and that the condition of entrance into the Church was by faith, which 'desired and possessed nothing but Christ and His gift' (p. 127).

On the other hand Schlatter sees in this context also the danger to the Church from gnostic interpretations of the Gospel which might corrupt the Gentile Church. Gnosticism with its pride in enlightenment, freedom and purely individual piety might prove a danger to the Church and render the Gospel of none effect, just as much as insistence on the Law. The battle with gnosticism went on through the early Church, and its course is traced by Schlatter not only from the writings of St. Paul and his circle but also in that of St. John. The essence of the Church is that it should be not a purely Gentile concern, but a Church of Jews and Gentiles. 'Paul's fellow-workers, both Jewish and Greek, oppressed by the burden of traditions from which they sprang, fumbled in their efforts to appropriate the blessings of the Gospel. He gave them firm ground on which to stand' (p. 196).

In his treatment of the Johannine literature, which he ascribes as a whole to the Apostle, Schlatter sees John's work as 'preventing the Church from losing touch with Jesus and His history and in laying bare the eternal significance of that history' (p. 300). Against gnosticism, which tended to make Christ the author of an idea, 'faith for John was grounded in the fact that in Jesus the very act of God was revealed in a human life and the grace of God in human poverty' (p. 296). He also safeguarded it against mysticism in which 'nature, history and human society tend to fade from the mystic's view . . . duty and vocation also disappear, and he lives only for his own transfiguration, illumination and immortality' (p. 304). For John, 'history is the determinative factor in man's relation to God, and by Jesus and His history man is taken out of himself and brought into fellowship with others, acquiring a vocation. The Spirit keeps alive the memory of Jesus, brings His teaching to life and makes it active in His hearers' (p. 305).

Schlatter does equal justice to other New Testament writers in the spirit of a sentence about St. Paul in which he says: 'His epistles are not literary works but part of his activity inserted like links into his chain of deeds' (p. 244). Thus in his presentation of the early Church, Schlatter shows us not isolated and conflicting tendencies but a whole movement and activity of God. Not only great teachers come alive; minor figures also, who are often mere names to us, acquire character and background through his sympathetic and penetrating scholarship.

This is an exacting book to read because of the concentration of

matter. Nothing can be skipped. It is also a great joy, from the first chapter to the last, sending the reader back to the words and contexts of the New Testament, the meaning of which he may have been taking too much for granted. Besides the broader themes and questions treated, there are word studies which reveal Schlatter's grasp of detail. Those who have not read Schlatter before will note the absence of references to other schools and scholars. There is only one general reference to modern scholars on p. 209. This means not that he neglects or undervalues the work of others, but that he assumes knowledge of it. He is something of an *abnormis sapiens*, not influenced by current opinions or fashions, but attending to the whole witness to revelation and forming his own judgment in its light and setting it down plainly.

The reviewer has often found Schlatter's style difficult to read in the original, but Professor Levertoff's translation makes lucid and attractive reading without losing any of the solid quality of the original. He has rendered a great service to students and the Church outside Germany. There are only three footnotes, one of which is in the introduction. There are two indexes, one of biblical references and the other of names and subjects. Griefswald, on p. viii introduction, should be Greifswald. JOHN C. CAMPBELL

Baptism and Church in the New Testament. By JOHANNES SCHNEIDER, tr. E. A. PAYNE. Carey Kingsgate Press, 1957. Pp. 53. 3s. 6d.

THOSE who have not read Professor Schneider's larger *Die Taufe im Neuen Testament* will be grateful to Dr Payne and the Carey Kingsgate Press for giving us this translation of a lecture delivered by Professor Schneider in 1955. The translation is in clear, lucid English and the printing and format are admirable. A useful index of Scripture passages has been added by the translator.

There are statements in this lecture, basic to any Christian doctrine of Baptism, which need to be pondered in all the Churches. 'The One who is responsible for the decisive happening (in Baptism) is God Himself' (p. 20). 'A baptism which does not convey the Spirit is no right baptism and must be completed by the receiving of the Spirit' (quoted from Bultmann, p. 25). 'Incorporation into the Body of Christ takes place through Baptism' (p. 35). There is much that is suggestive in Professor Schneider's interpretation of passages from St. Paul; we note particularly how the obligation to right conduct is so often linked by him with Baptism.

The weight of Professor Schneider's argument, however, is in his rejection of Infant Baptism in favour of Believers' Baptism. Professor Schneider deals at length with some of the weaker arguments for Infant Baptism—the analogy with Prosylete Baptism, the argu-

ment from the children being holy in 1 Cor. 7.14 (a verse variously interpreted by equally competent commentators), and, at absurd length in a short lecture, the argument about the Baptism of Christian households. These are at best considerations in support of the really strong arguments for Infant Baptism. Although it is realised that St. Paul compares Baptism with circumcision in Col. 2.11-14, there is no consideration of Infant Baptism in the light of this analogy, which is found in some of the earliest non-canonical Christian writings and expounded by Justin Martyr. While it is admitted that Infant Baptism is 'clearly attested by Irenaeus towards the end of the second century', there is no reference to the clear statement of Origen that it was handed down from apostolic times, a statement also made by the later Augustine. Professor Schneider asks rhetorically: 'Why was infant baptism still contested in the second and third centuries, if it was already known in early Christianity?' In the only clear statement of the matter (in Tertullian's *De Baptismo*) the answer is not the teaching of the New Testament or the practice of the Apostolic Church, but the danger of falling into post-baptismal sin, a danger that gave no less reason that 'the baptism of the unmarried also should be postponed'. Professor Schneider would scarcely accept this counsel, and Tertullian himself departed from it later. Little attention is paid to the three sayings of our Lord about little children, given by St. Mark in 10.16, 10.15 and 9.37. There is a quotation from R. Weber about the passage in Mark 10, with the very unworthy suggestion that in our baptismal liturgy it is 'inserted for polemical reasons'. In the other reference we are told that 'the word of Jesus in connexion with the blessing of the children has nothing to do with Baptism; it relates quite generally to still innocent children "of whom is the Kingdom of God"'. The Bible has no shallow sentimentalities about the innocence of little children, and to suppose that it is their innocence which gives them possession of the Kingdom of God is dangerously near justification by works. Until Baptist theologians take these passages as serious theological statements, even although they may have no reference to Baptism, they are not likely to have any understanding of the position of those who hold to Infant Baptism.

Professor Schneider finds as 'fundamental' in the relation of faith and Baptism a sentence occurring only in the later ending of St. Mark's Gospel, and again lays much emphasis on verses in Acts 8.26-40, which are omitted in the best manuscripts. What these presumably later additions show is something that no one has ever seriously doubted, namely that in the early Church (as indeed in almost all branches of the Church today) a profession of faith has

been the normal antecedent of Adult Baptism. Rather than demonstrating this, the author would have been more usefully employed in examining the nature of faith; there is not a word here, for example, of the Scriptural link between faith and the faithfulness of God. It is in a deeper understanding of faith that both Baptists and non-Baptists are likely to come to a truly Christian doctrine of Baptism.

The last chapter on 'Baptism and the Church' reveals the background of the earlier discussion. Professor Schneider displays a strong antipathy to anything in the way of a *Volkskirche*, anticipating somewhat uncharitably the judgment which only God can make that 'only a relatively small part of it could be regarded as the Church of Jesus Christ' (p. 48). One wonders if all Baptist pastors agree with the statement: 'If the Church took such matters seriously, she could hardly direct missions to her own members!' A churchman engaged in Church Union negotiations in North India once remarked that the real difficulty with the Baptists is not their views on Baptism but their views on the Church. Professor Schneider admits this, when he says in conclusion that 'the question of the Church has precedence over the question of Baptism' (p. 50).

WILLIAM LILLIE

The Daily Study Bible. By WILLIAM BARCLAY. *The Gospel of St. Luke. The Letters to the Corinthians. The Gospel of St. John* (vols. 1 and 2). St. Andrew Press, Edinburgh, 1956. 12s. 6d. per volume in cloth; 6s. in limp paper.

WHEN these volumes first appeared as *Daily Bible Readings* from 1953 onwards, a reader described them as 'the finest Bible-reading notes I have ever used', and they were certainly notes that held the reader's interest with their vivid illustrations and made clear in a language that all could understand the more difficult portions of Scripture. The introduction to the Letters to the Corinthians is a good example of Dr Barclay's power of expressing simply, concisely and interestingly all that is really important of what Biblical Criticism tells us of the origin and milieu of these letters. In the St. John volumes, however, the comments, which sometimes extend to six pages, seem rather long for the ordinary person to use in his daily devotions. St. Francis de Sales used to recommend his readers to 'gather a little spiritual bouquet' after their daily meditation; one sometimes feels that Dr Barclay's reader is left with too large a basket of varieties of spiritual nourishment. Occasionally it is difficult to see what the reader is intended to take from a passage; the allegorical interpretation of the healing at the pool of Bethesda forms a whole day's study, although Dr Barclay says that 'it is highly

unlikely that John wrote it as an allegory', and the reader is more likely to be puzzled and confused than to gather any spiritual bouquet here. Again although Dr Barclay comments on 2 Cor. 8 and 9 at considerable length, comment on the example of Jesus is confined to four lines on one page and six on another, but it is surely just from this example that the reader should gather a spiritual bouquet for the day's refreshment.

It looks, however, from the title of the new edition, *The Daily Study Bible* that Dr Barclay is catering for the more serious student rather than for the reader who wishes a little help in the understanding of his daily portion. We have, indeed, a very useful commentary for the Bible student who knows no Greek. One of Dr Barclay's greatest gifts is in enabling the student without Greek to do useful study of New Testament words, for example, the most competent study of the nine words that St. Paul uses for that most work-a-day Christian practice—the 'collection'. Sometimes one wishes that Dr Barclay made more of the Hebrew background of New Testament words. Of course all scholars would not agree with all Dr Barclay's interpretations, and a commentary of this kind is not the place to defend them. I find it hard to believe that St. Paul's 'principalities and powers' are of the same order as 'evil spirits that haunted empty houses', or that Mary's Child was born 'in the common courtyard' of the khan at Bethlehem, or that 'purity is prudence at its highest tension'—an explanation that itself needs interpretation.

Perhaps an even more appropriate title for this commentary would be 'The Preacher's Bible', for many of the notes are really the expositions of a preacher, homiletic rather than theological. A reviewer described one of the original volumes as 'a perfect mine of expository sermon material', and sometimes as in the cases of 1 Cor. 15.12-19 or John 1.9, the sermon is almost ready-made, complete with illustrative material. The 'sermon' on John 1.9 begins with an introduction making clear, as Dr Barclay does so lucidly, the distinction between *alethes* and *alethinos* (with an illustration from dawn on the Bay of Naples) and then the sermon proceeds under the conventional three heads: (*a*) His coming dissipated the shadows of doubt (with a quotation from 'one of the Greeks'); (*b*) His coming dissipated the shadows of despair (with a quotation from Seneca); (*c*) His coming dissipated the darkness of death (with an illustration from Robert Louis Stevenson). This is preaching of the highest order, but is there not a temptation to hard-worked preachers here not to do for themselves in their sermon preparation the Bible study that they should?

Admiration for the lucidity, the vast learning and the real charm

with which Dr Barclay expounds Scripture makes it hard for lesser men to find fault, but, yet, in a serious theological journal this must be done.

(1) One of Dr Barclay's phrases is, 'It does not really matter.' He uses it in his discussion as to whether our Lord actually raised Lazarus from the dead, and a similar phrase as to whether the young man at Nain was dead or in a cataleptic trance. Similarly in connexion with the Virgin Birth, he says, 'In this matter we may make our own decision.' Apart from the particular examples, it surely matters very much indeed whether the whole 'apostolic tradition', handed down by the Four Evangelists is or is not a reliable tradition. If it be unreliable in these particular instances, it is likely to be unreliable elsewhere as well. In one case Dr Barclay puts it more generally: 'There is room in the Empire of the Kingdom for a wide variety of beliefs.' Of course we must realise the limitations of our own knowledge, and respect the views of Bible scholars who hold different views from ourselves. Yet we must always remember that *of two contradictory statements only one is true*, and it is our business to discover the true one. As our Creeds all show, it has mattered a great deal to most Christians of all ages that Christ was born of a Virgin, and a Christ whose miracles are simply 'miracles of diagnosis' is not the Christ of the apostolic tradition. A commentator may hold other views than the accepted ones, but he has no right to say that what we hold does not matter. The truth always matters.

(2) In this respect, as elsewhere, Dr Barclay appears to be hankering after an outmoded 'liberalism'. It is true that in the case of most of the miracles he provides, and characteristically takes a lesson from, the traditional statement alongside a more rationalistic explanation. Apart from it mattering a great deal, I find it incredible that the apostles should have seen the power of God in the miracles of Jesus if these were merely unusually keen diagnoses of the presence of life in the victims of trances or the not at all unusual stimulation of people to share their food for the day with less fortunate neighbours (something that often happens on railway journeys) or the like. While faith certainly had a part in many miracles, it is untrue and a little unfair to modern sufferers who have sought healing from Christ but have not received it to say that, if we had only a faith like the Roman centurion, 'for us too the miracle would happen'. Miracle is not as simple as that, as St. Paul knew with his thorn in the flesh. The wonderful range of moral qualities that Dr Barclay finds in a little child surely belongs to a pre-Freudian psychology, and most modern commentators, as contrasted with those of the heyday of liberalism, would interpret this

passage theologically rather than psychologically. When Dr Barclay translates Luke 9.27, 'You will see signs that the Kingdom of God is on its way', one wonders if the twentieth-century students of eschatology have done their work in vain. And, after what we have heard of Belsen and Buchenwald, it is surely an extreme evolutionary optimism which can maintain that things like the drowning of weakly and deformed children cannot happen today.

(3) This hankering after liberalism now and then seems to hinder Dr Barclay from presenting the Gospel in all its tremendous mystery. This is of course a danger that must accompany the gift of clear, simple explanation; one is tempted to explain something that is beyond explanation. Even some of the ways in which Dr Barclay refers to our Lord are more understandable than theologically satisfactory. He translates '*soterion*' by the very ugly and, I believe, misleading phrase, 'instrument of salvation'. Christ is our salvation, and no mere tool. Again while the title of 'God's Chosen One' has certainly Scriptural roots, may it not suggest an Adoptionist view of our Lord's Divinity? It is, however, in his treatment of the Sacraments that Dr Barclay appears to offend most. Of course God may come to men through all sorts of material means, but to suggest that every meal can be a Lord's Supper is as wrong as to suggest that every bath can be a Baptism. The Sacraments are not mere signs, not even, as Dr Barclay suggests, instruments through which God speaks to men; they are mysteries in which Christ comes with all His benefits to His people; in the Sacraments, we were there when they crucified our Lord. In his exposition of John 6.50-59, Dr Barclay may be right in holding that St. John is using the language of the Mystery Religions, although much of it is a more universal religious language, and some of it has Old Testament ideas behind it. It would be most unfortunate if from Dr Barclay's very sympathetic picture of the Mystery rites a reader, learning of them for the first time, should infer that there is nothing more in the Christian Communion than was in them. Of this there seems to be real danger.

(4) Dr Barclay's expositions are full of moral wisdom, and yet we must question some of his ethical statements. It is surely not true of Christian *agape* that 'we can only love one person at a time'. Again it is a half-truth to say that 'it is a law of life that service leads to greatness', particularly when the career of John D. Rockefeller is used as an example; one thinks of many humble souls whose service was great, but whose greatness was not of this world. To think of the disciplining of our bodies (as Dr Barclay does in interpreting 1 Cor. 9.24-27) as primarily concerned with physical fitness is a strange limitation of Christian practice in the matter; it was for

very different motives that the saints practised austerities. Occasionally Dr Barclay's zeal as a preacher leads him to exaggerated statements. To say that the man who tries to inflict injury on others has not 'the remotest tinge of the love of Christ within his heart' is surely an over-simplification. Again to say that 'we cannot really help a man until we have been in . . . the same abyss of shame as he has been' is not literally true, and has the most dangerous suggestion that a man needs to sin himself in order to help other sinners! Of course, what Dr Barclay means is that we can use our experiences of shame and failure in the helping of others. Dr Barclay's eulogy on second marriages is certainly not derived from the teaching of 1 Corinthians.

These considerations do not prevent our realising that Dr Barclay has probably done more than any other New Testament scholar of our age to make the New Testament intelligible to ordinary people. Many of his readers will be glad to have these commentaries in book form, although some may share the reviewer's dislike of the strawberry-pink colour of binding and wrapper. The lay-out of the pages and the printing are excellent; I have noticed three misprints, 'Bercoa' for 'Beroea' on p. 23 and 'critized' for 'criticized' on p. 259 of the Corinthians volume, and 'moskos' for 'kosmos' on p. 22 of the second volume on St. John. It is a sad fact that the price of a book of this kind has to be more than doubled if it includes the cost of a rather cheap-looking cloth binding. WILLIAM LILLIE

A History of the Ecumenical Movement 1517-1948. Edited by RUTH ROUSE and STEPHEN CHARLES NEILL. Published on behalf of the Ecumenical Institute, Château de Bossey, by the S.P.C.K., London, 1954. Pp. xxiv+822. 32s. 6d.

THE complaint used to be made of the kind of history taught in our schools that too much emphasis was laid on the military and political conflicts which are an abiding feature of human existence. It was claimed that not enough care was being given to the teaching of the co-operative and creative achievements of society, especially in the economic sphere. We are assured that this is being put right nowadays. Perhaps the charge of concentrating on divisions and controversies was laid less frequently against the teachers of Church History because it was commonly assumed that most Christians for most of their time have been involved in this process of fragmentation!

Here is a magnificent Church History written from the opposite point of view, viz. that in every age and country Christians have been endeavouring to recover the lost unity of the Church. No less than fifteen distinguished scholars, representing seven Christian

confessions and eight nations, have given us of their best in twenty essays. Yet this is *one* book—not a precariously constructed symposium. That this is so is due to the skill of the editors, the team-spirit of the collaborators and, above all, the validity of the underlying thesis just mentioned.

There is no end to the fascinating variety of this monumental work. It should be read by those—and they seem to be a disturbingly large number in Scotland—whose knowledge of the subject is a shadowy and complex impression in which the distant Church of South India, the rather embarrassing discussions with the Anglicans and the return of the Old Seceders to the Church of Scotland all rub shoulders with the local Union and Readjustments Committee! It should be read by those who think that all we need to do is to be of one spirit while retaining our denominations! It should be carefully studied by any who think that matters of doctrine, ethics, polity and liturgy are the sole, or even in many cases the main, sources of our divisions. Here is a book that will make you pray more, send in that overdue subscription to the Scottish Churches Ecumenical Association and take a more personal interest in the aspirations of overseas students.

How different some eminent figures appear from their conventional portraits when the spotlight of this fresh historical approach picks them out and holds them. For example Hugo Grotius, Leibnitz, Frederick I of Prussia, Cromwell, Peter the Great, Gustavus Adolphus, Count Zinzendorf and Cyril Loukaris all grappled with the challenge of the disunity of Christendom. Leaders like Luther, Zwingli, Beza and Bucer had a much deeper interest in this subject than they usually get credit for. Calvin towers amongst them all in his persistent, well-informed yet severely frustrated concern. What a contrast with the monolithic sectarianism of Rome!

If pressed for criticisms I would mention three. (i) More space might have been given to the achievements in Scotland during the last sixty or seventy years. Yet can the compiler be blamed when we recall that not much has been written since the books by the late John Buchan and Dr J. R. Fleming in connexion with the 1929 Re-Union? (ii) More attention might have been given to what was going on amongst the young Churches of South America and Africa during the 1930s and 1940s. (iii) Surely Dury and Comenius are worthy of a greater place?

The book has a full table of contents, captions to the pages, cross-references in the text, a glossary, explanatory notes, appendices on the word 'Ecumenical' and on Intercommunion, and a good index.

Great is our debt to the Disciples of Christ in America whose generosity made this work possible. KENNETH MACKENZIE

Christianity and Race. By Philip Mason. Lutterworth Press. 10s. 6d.

The author now holds the post of Director of Studies on Race Relations at the Royal Institute of International Affairs—obviously a key position for the subject of this restrained but realistic book. It deserves to stand beside Dr J. H. Oldham's *Christianity and the Race Problem* (which he regards as still essentially up-to-date), Professor B. B. Keet's *Whither South Africa?* (whose views he regards as providing the best ray of hope), and Mr L. van der Post's *The Dark Eye in Africa* (which is exceptionally valuable and fascinating).

Mr Mason has several caveats about his own qualifications for the task he undertakes, e.g. that he is not associated with any group or tendency within the Anglican Church, and that he is very conscious of the relevant books he has not read. But he has given us a book which is a good introduction to the subject for those who have not yet read much on it and are prepared to do some hard thinking. In a way there is a great deal more about 'Christianity' than about 'race'—that is his chosen approach and that also is the special merit of the book. It is the ethical questions involved in the problems of race that he is specially concerned about, and he believes that in this matter Christianity is in the dock. Sometimes the argument seems to be a little remote from the subject—but that is only an appearance. A great deal of space is given to the building up of what Christianity is and how it may be defended. It is on the basis of faith in God, the Eternal Mind and in the Person of His Son, that true Christian ethics arise—all of which is very sound and important and timely.

The two great challenges to the Christian ethic, as Mr Mason sees them, come from without in agnostic naturalism and from within in the view of the Bible and the Christian religion held by the Dutch Reformed Church. In the first chapter, in a somewhat circuitous fashion, the shortcomings of evolutionary, humanistic ethics, as a means of tackling the race problem are convincingly set forth. Then the Afrikaner attitude is clearly stated in its historical development, and the supposed biblical justification for segregation disposed of. Although a measure of sympathy with the Afrikaner position is conceded, Mr Mason rejects it on basic principles. The New Testament teaching embodies principles which must be applied to social and political affairs—such is the argument of a fine chapter entitled 'A Return to the New Testament'—and he advocates the method of 'reading it in great draughts'. 'There is a torrent of evidence' against segregation.

In two closing chapters all this is applied in concrete terms to problems in Africa and in Britain. He makes the important dis-

tinction of working '*for* the African versus *with* the African', and he knows that 'there is a black racialism as well as a white'. He reminds us that Britain has a coloured population of 100,000. The doctrines of the Capricorn Africa Society are commended. There are ten frank, wise pages on inter-marriage. GEORGE S. GUNN

Life and Liturgy. By LOUIS BOUYER. Sheed and Ward, 1956. Pp. 284. 18s. net.

THIS is one of the most valuable of recent books on the Roman Liturgy. It opens a series to be known as the Notre Dame Liturgical Studies, and consists of lectures delivered in the University of Notre Dame, published in the U.S.A. under the title *Liturgical Piety* in 1954. It is not an easy book to read, but this is partly due to the typography, the type being small for the size of the page, and the inking is often uneven. Otherwise the book is well produced, the paper and the binding being pleasant to handle.

The title, which reverses that of the smaller book by Theodore Wesseling published in 1938, is meant to suggest that liturgy as the prayer-life of the Church is also the sustainer of the authentic Christian life, for liturgy and piety have close associations. The author sets out to define the essential nature of the liturgy and therefore in the first two chapters deals with such false conceptions of liturgy as were prevalent in the Baroque and Romantic periods. His criticisms of these are interesting. The Baroque mentality was the product of three main factors—the literary and aesthetic world of Renaissance neo-paganism, the violent hunger for life, life both of the senses and of the mind, and a soulless kind of conservative loyalty to the Church. This, however, was the providential means whereby the Church kept her liturgical treasures safe in a period when few understood their true worth. The lessons drawn from this period are, first, the necessity for real understanding of the nature of the liturgy, and second, the need to put ourselves into the spiritual world of the liturgy and to attune ourselves to its own modes of thought, feeling and outward expression. In the Romantic period, while the author shows great appreciation of the work of Dom Guéranger, he is not slow to make serious criticisms, viz. the emphasis on archaism and archaeologism, the idea that the focus of the Christian liturgy is not the sacrificial action but rather the physical Presence of our Lord in the Holy Eucharist, and the incredible weakness of its scholarship.

After a chapter on the relation of Jewish to Christian worship, the author turns to the problems of liturgical movements, and deals first with the seventeenth century. He suggests that these movements really began with the Caroline Divines for whom he has a high

regard, feeling that their achievements have never been properly appreciated. Then the argument comes to more recent movements on the continent. In particular the Mystery theory of Dom Casel is fully discussed, the problem being brought under scrutiny in the light of Scripture and especially of Paul's use of the term, and also in the light of the mystery religions. Succeeding chapters relate the idea of Mystery to all the rites of the Church, to the Liturgical Year and the Divine Office.

The penultimate chapter tackles the problem of the relation between liturgy and the life of piety, and here he says that the first and fundamental condition for any liturgical revival which is truly a revival of piety must be a personal knowledge of the whole Bible and meditation on it, with a full acceptance of the Bible as the Word of God and as the framework and ever-living source of all authentic Christianity. Throughout the book, the author attributes great importance to the Liturgy of the Word.

The last chapter deals with the problem of the relation 'between the world in which we live when we are in church and the world in which we live outside it'. He suggests that the world into which the liturgy introduces us is not a world in its own right but rather the meeting-point of the world of the Resurrection with this very world of ours in which we must live and suffer and die. The liturgical life has thus a missionary task. The Mystery is 'to take hold of this world, to struggle with it even to death, and only to master it finally in the resurrection'. To follow the whole argument the book itself must be read, and the task will prove to be rewarding.

There is an appendix which is an historical bibliography of books for futher study. The index to be of real use should have been much fuller. But Father Bouyer's book can be strongly recommended. It requires careful thought and study, but there is a great deal in it for Protestant as well as Roman Catholic, for preacher as well as theologian and liturgist.

JOHN A. LAMB

My Way of Preaching. Edited by R. J. SMITHSON. Pickering and Inglis. 12s. 6d.

The Secret of Preaching Power. By SIMON BLOCKER. Pickering and Inglis. 8s. 6d.

Exposition and Encounter. By JAMES S. STEWART. The Berean Press. 2s.

THE first of these three books on preaching—how many there now are!—consists of a short essay by fourteen well-known preachers, revealing their method of sermon preparation, followed by a specimen sermon. This is bound to be interesting, even if not very useful, and it is necessarily an ephemeral kind of book. Fortunately, it is the

kind of book which, if required, could be produced every year, as there is an abundance of preachers up and down the country who could repeat this process indefinitely.

Necessarily there is a considerable degree of inequality in the book. Some of the sermons are slight, and all the preachers concerned have many better sermons than the one they have selected. The most valuable pages are probably the first fifteen. It is recognised not only that has each preacher his own method, but also that he may well have several methods, and the methods of preparation change as the years advance. There is no clear gain in being so tied to a method that, as soon as the text is announced, the more discerning hearers will be able to say, 'I know how he will handle that text.' True, 'a sermon must have a shape'—but which?

One of the contributors confessed that he felt it to be somewhat pretentious to respond to the editor's invitation, and yet another is conscious of considerable hesitation in such 'self-portraiture and self-confession'. How much more pretentious does the title of the second book sound. The author is a Professor of Practical Theology in Western Theological Seminary, Holland, Michigan, and prior to that he was a pastor for twenty-eight years. The bold claim is made that 'no book in the field of preaching known to the author covers the same ground as this one'. Starting in a rather dull way, with little sparkle, the book greatly improves as it proceeds. The underlying theme is that the secret of preaching power lies in 'thematic preaching', defined as getting the right theme, which ought to be 'expressed in a single sentence at the close of a brief introduction', and 'the right theme should be only eight words long, but not more than twelve or fifteen'. It is held that this kind of preaching hits the nail on the head, and avoids irrelevance.

Professor Blocker has done a notable service by giving so much space to detailed exposition of what his method means, in several extended examples—the Ascension; Christ's Many Forms; Romans 8 (in *one* sermon!); Confessing Christ before men; Daniel 4; Hebrews 2.3; John 3.16; John 4. These pages are strewed with wise reflections on the preacher himself in his personal relationship to God—'when a preacher is brilliant and has a "swell" Church, he will constantly be tempted to place more emphasis on rhetoric than on redemption'. The claim that is made on p. 20 for James Denney's article 'Preaching Christ' in Hastings' *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* is no exaggeration, for there is nothing better in print.

In the autumn of last year, Professor Stewart delivered the Joseph Smith Memorial Lecture at Birmingham. As was to be expected from a man who has so exalted the preacher's office for more than thirty years, these animated and inspiring pages

are crammed full with ripe wisdom and vivid expression. It is 'in the context of worship' that preaching here is dealt with. He quotes with approval the arresting words of William Temple—'this world can be saved from political chaos and collapse by one thing only—worship'. Those who are skilled to understand and expound the Bible are aware that that is precisely what the Bible is proclaiming from Genesis to Revelation. And so, 'expository preaching is our capital assignment and our all-absorbing task'. This alone, says the Professor, will rejuvenate the Church, remake secular history, and bring into all life 'a strange, incalculable waft of the supernatural'. Like Spurgeon, whom he quotes in the opening paragraph, he sees no need to defend the Bible, but to unchain it and it defends itself. 'The aim of exposition is encounter'—preaching of the Word has one purpose, that men and women should meet God in Christ. No preacher who assimilates the spirit and the outlook of this dynamic pamphlet will ever be at a loss for a subject for all the Sundays of a lifetime.

GEORGE S. GUNN

A Christian Palestinian Syriac Horologion. Edited by MATTHEW BLACK. Cambridge University Press, 1954 (Texts and Studies—New Series, vol. 1) Pp. x+458. 70s.

IT is a matter for great satisfaction that the Cambridge Press has found it possible to resume the very valuable series 'Texts and Studies', and through this medium has been made possible the editing of this interesting manuscript whose existence has been known since 1906. It is no fault of the editor that the price of his volume would at that time have purchased the first thirteen numbers of the old series. In spite of its obvious advantages perhaps the high cost of binding makes it rather a luxury for the many biblical students on both sides of the border whose means are somewhat limited.

Professor P. Kahle purchased the manuscript here studied in Cairo on behalf of the Berlin State Library where it is now known as MS. Or. Oct. 1019. In his Preface, Professor Black acknowledges Dr Kahle's preliminary work and also that of Dr A. Baumstark, but it is clear that the editor himself has put in a vast amount of work on the preparation of the 300-odd pages of Syriac text. In addition the volume contains, in separate sections, a partial translation, a series of critical notes and a useful vocabulary of 'new words, new meanings or new parts of words already known and additional examples of rare words or usage'.

The Introduction shows that the date of this paper manuscript is 1187 and that it is a copy from an earlier parchment Horologion (Book of Hours) and then goes on to show that the book was

associated with the Malkite Branch of Syrian Christianity. The text of one of the hymns shows that the Malkites were 'at least at one time in their history, Monothelites'. An indication is given of dependence on the Greek Orthodox services but a detailed discussion of the differences is given which will be of interest to students of Eastern Liturgy.

When finds of new textual evidence in other versions are frequent, it is good to know that Professor Black has made available new material for thirty-five Psalms, for various Odes and Canticles and, in the New Testament, the text of *Magnificat* and *Benedictus*. There is also a specially valuable collection of *Troparia* which are either absent from the Greek collection or differ in considerable detail. It is claimed (p. 14) that 'The Palestinian Syriac Version of the Scriptures was made from a Lucianic type of Greek text. . . .' The association of Lucian with the *New* Testament is perhaps still open to qualification. Stress is laid on the need for examination in both Testaments of the non-Byzantine and non-Greek variants on the basis of collation with a Byzantine-type Greek text. It is shown that there are both direct and indirect influences of the Peshitta and, in discussing Targumic relationships, indication is given of the existence of 'pre-Rabbulan Syriac variants'.

A few small points have been noted. On p. x and elsewhere for *BKT* it seems more natural to read *BTK* as on pp. 6-7. At p. 19, n. 2 a page reference appears to have dropped out. The use of etc. in critical notes (p. 49) seems too indefinite to add much of value. P. 412, n. 1 is perhaps excessively contracted. The page references in Index 5 are not accurate and it seems doubtful if this index of 'Saints' should include Elijah and Elisha who are described as 'Prophets' in the body of the text.

In this well-produced and worthy edition Professor Black has not only provided a fitting volume to reopen the series but has put all serious students of the literature of the Palestinian Syriac dialect very much in his debt. It is to be hoped that the number of those who can derive benefit from this full study will continue to increase.

Ian A. Moir

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